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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the processes of social change that characterise the 
/re/formation of the nation. It argues that such processes can only be identified 
through the examination of the interplay between social structure, culture and 
agency in a specific period of time. Through the exploration of the basic 
assumptions of Social Realist Theory, a methodological framework is 
constructed for the analysis of the morphogenesis o f the nation. The basic 
assumptions of the developed framework are tested on the case of Croatia. A 
historical analysis explores the processes of structural change and the formation 
and competition of corporate agents from the beginning of the nineteenth until 
the end of the twentieth century. The processes of cultural change that occurred 
in the same period of time are investigated through a content analysis of the 
writings of the dominant Croatian nationalist ideologists, which identifies the 
ways in which the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular were 
defined. The interaction between social structure and culture in the process of 
nation /re/formation is explored through a content analysis of secondary school 
history textbooks. This analysis looks at the ways dominant ideas of nations and 
nationalism were incorporated into the education system from the 1880s until the 
1990s and, through the medium of textbooks, were designed to influence the 
attitudes of primary agents. In order to investigate the interplay between structure 
and culture, on the one side, and primary agents, on the other, a survey was 
undertaken in early 2000 on a sample of the population of Zagreb. It examined 
the ways these agents perceive the nation in general, the Croatian nation in 
particular, national symbols and national enemies. These analyses show that the 
issues of defining the nation and explaining the process of its formation are 
necessarily inter-linked. The study concludes that the nation emerges with the 
emergence of social processes - the formation of political community, the 
politicisation (nationalisation) of culture, the mobilisation of a population around 
specific nationalist ideologies, and the population’s acceptance of certain aspects 
of these ideologies.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1990s were years of dramatic change for Croatian society. At a personal 
level, it was a tragedy for all involved. The experiences of war, moreover, a 
Balkan war, leave memories for life. Shelling, bomb-shelters, burning houses, 
dead bodies, they were all daily images, for the lucky ones on TV screens, and 
for those less lucky in front of their eyes. But at the same time, my compatriots 
and I had a chance to witness and, indeed, actively participate in ‘making 
history’. It was the period of the /re/formation of the nation. The Croatian nation 
fulfilled its ‘nine-hundred-years long dream’ and formed an independent and 
sovereign state, the Constitution defined it as a nation-state, new national 
institutions were established, the national flag was redesigned, a national 
language was redefined, the new unity of the nation was proclaimed, national 
values were guarded, the Croats were ready to die for their nation.
Today, there is not a single scholar of nations and nationalism, not a single 
citizen of Croatia, and not a single Croat politician, who would not recognise the 
existence of the Croatian nation. Yet, at the same time, there is probably very 
little consensus between these scholars, citizens and politicians about when and 
how the Croatian nation was really formed.
To the key question ‘when was the Croatian nation created?’ different approaches 
and theories would offer a variety of answers. Some Croatian historians searched 
deep into the ancient past in order to detect traces of the Croatian name, 
assuming that the name is a sufficient condition for proving the existence of the 
nation. Others emphasised the creation of the Croatian Kingdom, and, hence, 
some form of statehood, in the tenth century as the beginning of the Croatian 
nation. After all, the rare documents and monuments, the surviving symbols, 
myths and legends, the Glagolitic script and the Bible written in the vernacular, 
could be interpreted as telling the story of the Croat nation. Still for others only 
the emergence of the first Croatian nationalist ideology and political movement 
in the first half of the nineteenth century signifies the transformation of the
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Croats into a nation. Finally, some held that the Croatian nation could not have 
really existed prior to the formation of the nation-state. All in all, the range of 
disagreement spans 2000 years. The difference in answers is a consequence of 
the application of different concepts of the nation. Yet, regardless of these 
differences, it is almost too obvious to mention that a specific named social 
group went through considerable changes, so much so that what could be 
assumed as the tenth century Croatian nation could not possibly mean the same 
as the twentieth-century Croatian nation.
The Problem
The differences in the above answers are, of course, not just ‘historical’, but 
qualitative, and this brings us to the main questions of this research: What is the 
nation? How is the nation formed? What are the fundamental processes that form 
the social phenomenon called the nation?
The dominant theories of nations and nationalism offer numerous illuminating 
insights on the process of the formation of the nation. The complex nature of the 
subject of analysis initiated employment of different approaches to the study of 
nations and nationalism. As a result we learn from these theories about 
sociological, historical, anthropological, political and socio-psychological aspects 
of nations and nationalism. These theories apply various techniques and methods 
of analysis. They formed their conclusions on the basis of in-depth analyses of 
single case-studies and comparative analyses of various examples world-wide, in 
a certain period of time or long span of history. Different approaches and 
methods of analysis however resulted in different, sometimes directly opposite 
answers.
Different views that the existing theories of nations and nationalism offer on the 
processes and ‘nature’ of the formation of the nation is a logical consequence of 
ways in which the theories define the phenomenon. The predominant method for 
defining the nation is through enumeration of various constituent elements. A
13
review of these definitions1 will show that the most common constituent 
elements of the nation mentioned in these theories are: state, shared culture, 
common language, history, religion, myths, traditions, and values, sense of 
solidarity, common destiny, economic system, territory, and many others.
Through an analysis of some existing ‘theoretical definitions’ of nations and 
nationalism, this thesis will demonstrate that: the nation cannot be defined by a 
single constituent element; there is no final set of constituent elements that could 
define the nation; there is no single constituent element that is generally more 
important for the formation of the nation than others, since this varies from case 
to case; and, finally, a set of constituent elements cannot clearly distinguish the 
nation from other forms of social community.
Second, through an analysis of the case of ‘ideological definitions’ of the nation, 
this study will argue that there is no final set of constitutive elements of the 
nation that signifies the existence of a specific nation, in this case the Croatian 
nation. The relevance of a single constitutive element for the /re/formation of a 
nation can change with changes of social conditions. It will be shown that the 
same nation could be defined in different and, indeed, in diametrically opposite 
ways.
Third, by ‘measuring’ perceptions of the nation through an analysis of attitudes 
of a sample of the Croatian population, it will be shown that even the members of 
the same nation, in a specific historical period, could perceive different 
constitutional elements as crucial for the formation of their nation.
If enumeration of constituent elements cannot offer a clear basis for defining the 
nation, an answer should be found in the ‘nature’ of the nation. The nation is a 
social phenomenon, where ‘social’ means not only a set of characteristics of a 
group of people, but also the organisation of their political and cultural life, and 
the establishment of interrelations between the members of that group. This 
premise assumes that a definition of the nation should point to the major
1 See Chapter Two.
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characteristics of social organisation of the group in question. It should explain 
its structural, cultural and agential characteristics and their interrelations. Social 
processes that form these characteristics, at the same time, reveal the answer to 
the question ‘How is the nation formed?’.
The problem of the formation of the nation is the issue that distinguishes the 
dominant approaches to the study of nations and nationalism. These are usually 
termed ‘perennialist’, ‘primordialist’, ‘ethno-symbolist’, ‘modernist’, 
‘instrumentalist’, or ‘constructionist’. They all offer explanations of the process 
of nation-formation. However, each emphasises different domains of the society 
as crucial factors in this process. Hence, perennialist, primordialist and ethno- 
symbolist theories would predominantly emphasise the relevance of certain ideas 
and ideologies, traditions and customs, myths and symbols, that is the domain of 
‘culture’, as crucial for the formation of the nation. Modernist theories tend to 
place their explanations in certain properties of different political, social and 
economic institutions, that is, in the domain of ‘social structure’. Finally, 
constructionist and instrumentalist theories tend to stress the role of certain 
individuals and social groups as the main ‘creators’ of the nation, hence, placing 
their explanations for the emergence of the nation in the domain of ‘agency’. As 
a result, most of the theories of nations and nationalism, which fall within one or 
the other ‘school of thought’, by concentrating on a single domain of society and 
reducing one segment of the society to another, fail to offer an explanation that 
would analyse the whole complexity of the interplay between the three domains 
of structure, culture and agency in the process of the formation of the nation.
Hence, for example, an application of a modernist theory would offer important 
insights into the relevance of various institutions to the formation of the nation. 
At the same time, they would not offer any explanation for the questions of how 
institutions were changed, who changed them, or whether cultural elements 
played any role in the process of nation-formation. This theory explains ‘agency’ 
and ‘culture’ as mere epiphenomena of the social structure and, hence, fails to 
explain the interaction between these three segments of society.
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An application of a constructionist theory would provide a reverse picture of the 
process with similar types of fallacies. While it emphasises the role of the 
agency, that is, mainly of so-called elites, it fails to explain the relevance of 
cultural and structural conditioning of their actions, or the relevance of the so- 
called masses in this process of nation-formation. Therefore, social structure and 
culture are conflated with agency and explained as epiphenomena of the 
agencies’ actions.
Finally, while an ethno-symbolist theory could reveal the importance of the 
cultural elements for the formation of the nation, it fails to elaborate the 
interrelation between culture and the structure of society, as well as processes of 
cultural change and the role of agency in these processes.
We can conclude that most of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism 
deprive either structure or culture or agency of their relative autonomy, fail to 
explain the relevance of each segment of reality, and, hence, fail to demonstrate 
the importance of cultural, structural and agential interrelations for the process of 
nation-formation.
The problem is not only of theoretical nature. While the dominant theories of 
nations and nationalism provide an understanding of the main concepts and 
social processes involved in the process of nation-formation, they offer very 
limited help for the understanding of specific case studies. The general 
approaches of these theories, on the one hand, very rarely offer methodological 
frameworks for analysis of various case studies, and, on the other hand, are 
difficult to operationalise so as to be applicable to empirical analysis.
Purpose of the Thesis
One of the main hypotheses of this thesis is that the process of the formation of 
the nation can only be explained by examining the interrelations between social 
structure, culture and agency as different spheres of social reality. Hence, it will 
be assumed that the nation emerges only as a consequence of specific processes
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of social change that occur within structural, cultural and agential domains of 
society in a specific period of time. The aim of this research is to detect these 
relevant social processes and to analyse their interrelations and functions.
Hence, I will argue that the issue of defining the nation and explaining the 
process of its formation are necessarily inter-linked. A definition of the nation 
can only be given by defining a set of social processes that will lead to its 
formation and re-formation. It will be demonstrated that the nation emerges with 
the emergence of social processes of formation of political community, processes 
of politicisation (nationalisation) of culture, processes of mobilisation of a 
population around specific nationalist ideologies, and the population’s 
acceptance of certain aspects of these ideologies. Only when these social 
processes emerge at the same historical period can we say that the process of the 
formation of the nation has begun.
A model that offers an explanation of the process of nation-formation has to 
provide a methodological framework for the analysis of the process through 
specific case studies. Such a framework should, on the one hand, point to the 
main relations between and within segments of structure, culture and agency in 
the process of nation-formation, and, on the other hand, provide a set of 
methodological tools for the analysis of each relation.
The framework will be constructed according to the main premises of Realist 
Social Theory, which will be fully elaborated in Chapter One. I should stress that 
the methodological framework for the analysis of the process of nation-formation 
based on this theory could offer important insights into the main stages of the 
processes of social change within the domains of social structure, culture and 
agency. Applied to a specific case, this research tends to explain the social 
dynamics and the emergence of a novel social form, such as the nation. An 
application of this framework will, I contend, result in an analytical history of the 
emergence of a nation.
Finally, this research will apply the developed framework to the case of the 
formation of the Croatian nation. This part of the research will not only test the
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main hypotheses of the framework, but also provide a ‘space’ for developing 
different methods for the analysis of the role of social structure, culture and 
agency in the process of nation formation.
In order to conduct such an analysis, we need to set out certain premises of the 
investigation and to define the key terms of our enquiry.
Nation vs. Nationalism
From the start, it is important to emphasise that in this research the terms nations 
and nationalism are assumed to represent two distinct social phenomena. While 
the nation refers to a specific social group, a durable human collectivity, the term 
nationalism will be reserved for marking a consistent set of ideas or a doctrine 
that defines this social group, that is, its characteristics and aims. For the purpose 
of this research, therefore, nationalism as a doctrine will be clearly separated 
from another phenomenon, that is, ‘a movement with national aspirations and 
goals’ (Smith, 1999: 101). Such a phenomenon will be termed ‘national 
movement’, which clearly emphasises the phenomenon’s distinctive 
characteristics.
As soon as the terms are separated a specific question imposes itself: Can there 
be nations before and without nationalism? In other words: What are the 
relationships between the three phenomena of nation, nationalism and nationalist 
movement? At this point, I would only mention that the answer to the above 
questions depends solely on the way the nation is defined. I shall return to these 
questions in Chapter Two.
Nation vs. Ethnie
Another term that has to be clearly distinguished from the nation is ethnie. This 
research will adopt Anthony D. Smith’s definition (1986: 32) which sees ethnies 
as ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, 
having as association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity’. It should 
be clearly emphasised that issues related to the ethnie as a social phenomenon do 
not form part of this research. The reason is mainly a question of the space that
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such a discussion would require. For this reason some basic understandings about 
the relevance of ethnie for the formation of the nation should be stressed at this 
point.
As stated above, the process of the formation of the nation will be analysed in the 
context of the interplay of social structure, culture, and agency. As I will show, 
the process of social change within and between each segment of society occurs 
in different stages when the segments of society are conditioning and interacting 
with each other, and consequently going through some type of transformation. 
One of the premises of this research is that ethnie could play an important role in 
the process of the nation-formation. This research will maintain that ethnic ties 
and symbolism could condition the generation of a sense of belonging among 
population, as one of the factors in the rise of nations. However, it should be 
emphasised that ethnic ties could serve both as an enhancement of the formation 
of the sense of collectivity, as well as a barrier to that enhancement. I will 
attempt to demonstrate that the process of the formation of the nation is not only 
about the adoption of ethnic traditions and loyalties, but also about breaking with 
those traditions and loyalties. Hence, in order to avoid further complication, 
instead of discussing the relevance of ethnie as such, this research will 
concentrate on the importance of preceding cultural, structural and agential forms 
for the process of the formation of the nation.
Nation vs. Culture
One of the implications of the application of the basic assumptions of the Social 
Realist Theory is the rather specific understanding of ‘culture’. The theory 
implies that relations between the components of culture can be clearly 
distinguished from the relationships between different cultural agents. That 
means that a system of ideas, definitions and explanations, doctrines and 
ideologies exist regardless of the fact whether, at a specific moment, any 
particular agency, individual or a social group, accepts and promotes such ideas. 
These ideas can complement or contradict each other, or are not in any direct 
relation. Relationships between various ideas, doctrines and ideologies form a 
specific Cultural System.
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For example, some local traditions are regularly practised in a certain community 
and some underwent considerable changes. Yet, some are not practised at all. The 
fact that some traditions are not practised does not erase them from the cultural 
system of that community. They exist not only as a part of the community’s past, 
but also as a part of the community’s present in books, narratives or memories. 
As long as they are part of the community’s present they could be part of the 
community’s future. They could be revived and practised again. In order to 
understand why some of these traditions are not practised any more, it will not be 
sufficient just to explain the characteristics and conditions of the agency, that is 
the community. It will be necessary to analyse the relations between these non­
practised traditions both with those that are practised and with other ideas, 
concepts and ideologies accepted by the community in question.
Hence, in order to analyse a process of nation-formation it is necessary first to 
detect the relevant ideas, doctrines and ideologies of the nation-as-a-concept that 
exist in a specific cultural system and then to analyse relationships between them. 
Therefore, my research will concentrate on analysing of various nationalist 
ideologies that were formed in Croatian society and then on existing logical 
consistencies between these ideologies. The importance of such a reduced 
understanding of ‘culture’ results from the premise that the cultural system 
conditions an agency’s actions at any given period of time and that it is agency 
alone that transforms that cultural system.
Further on, I shall argue that a specific language, religion, symbols, myths, 
traditions, or memories (alone or any combination of them) could be seen as 
necessary, but never sufficient conditions for the formation of the nation. The 
nation could be formed in a social group that does not possess an authentic 
language, or a specific myth of origin, and whose members do not share the same 
religion. Regardless of the question ‘which stated cultural elements a nation 
possesses’, the process of nation-formation always involves the definition of a 
specifically defined culture as ‘national’. Even an unauthentic language could be 
called ‘national’, even a multi-religious population could have a ‘national’ 
church. Hence, through the analysis of different nationalist ideologies and
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attitudes of the members of the Croatian nation, I will show that there is no final 
set of constituent elements that define the nation either throughout a longer 
historical period or at one specific historical moment.
Therefore, we can conclude that the level of culture, just like the levels of social 
structure and agency, is crucial for understanding the process of the formation of 
the nation, and it cannot be conflated with other segments of society.
Why Croatia?
There are several reasons for choosing the case of Croatia as a case study and as a 
test-case for a developed methodological framework. One of them, and the least 
important, is probably of a personal nature. The experience of the process of 
nation-/re/formation in the 1990s awoke my desire to understand the social 
processes behind it. On the other hand, Croatia with its long history, specific 
geographical position, turbulent politics, and rich culture, offers a fertile ground 
for analysing the interplay of different segments of a society in the process of 
nation-formation. The history of Croatia involves histories of the medieval 
‘golden age’ of the Croatian Kingdom, of the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom, of 
the Venetian Republic, of the Habsburg Empire, of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
of the fascist Independent State of Croatia, of Socialist Yugoslavia and, finally, 
of the Republic of Croatia. Each state formation introduced various political, 
economic and social structures into Croatian society and opened a space for 
various cultural influences. All of these were creating and recreating specific sets 
of circumstances within which the Croatian nation was to be formed and re­
formed.
For these reasons it seemed that the case of Croatia might offer a good basis for 
an analysis of the interplay of social structure, culture and agency in the process 
of the nation-formation.
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Structure of the Research
In line with the above aims, this research is divided into two main parts. The first 
part is devoted to the formulation of the methodological framework for the 
analysis of the process of the formation of the nation, and, the second to the 
empirical application of the developed framework to the case of Croatia.
The first part consists of three chapters. Chapter One, through a review and 
criticism of the dominant sociological theories, firstly defines the phenomenon of 
social change, and, then, examines the main analytical requirements for analysing 
the processes of social change. It points to the necessity for such an analysis to 
examine the interplay of structure, culture and agency in the process of 
emergence of new social forms. Further on, it explores the basic assumptions of 
the Realist Social Theory and the concept of Morphogenetic cycles, mainly 
through writings of Margaret Archer. It concludes that such a concept offers an 
elaborate and comprehensive methodological framework that can be applied to 
the specific case of the emergence of the nation.
Chapter Two defines the main term of the dependant variable - the nation - and 
deals with problems of the analysis of its emergence. Through a brief 
examination of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism, such as those of 
Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony D. Smith and Pierre van den Berghe, 
this examination points to the main problems of ‘upwards’, ‘downwards’ and 
‘central’ conflation in theorising the process of nation-formation. Finally, in the 
last section of this chapter, a methodological framework for the Morphogenesis 
o f the nation is elaborated.
Chapter Three of Part I operationalises the main hypothesis of the 
methodological framework, describes the main relationships of the empirical 
research, defines periods and levels of analysis, and, finally, outlines the 
methodological tools used for analysing the main relationships and processes.
Part II of the research applies the results and tools of the methodological 
framework to the case of Croatia.
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A brief historical analysis of the developments of different political, social and 
economic institutions and the formation of various competing agencies from the 
seventh until the early nineteenth century is given at the beginning of Chapter 
Four. This analysis shows that prior to the 1830s there were no significant 
attempts to define ‘national culture’, to form the concept of the Croatian nation or 
to form ‘national’ institution and agencies. Hence, this chapter, through a content 
analysis of the writings of the nineteenth century nationalist ideologists, 
examines the emergence of different doctrines and ideologies of the nation and 
nationalism from the 1830s until 1900. The three dominant ideologies are 
considered: the Illyrian nationalist ideology, the Yugoslav nationalist ideology, 
and the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right.
Chapter Five follows a similar plan. It analyses the twentieth century Croatian 
nationalist ideologies, that is, the nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasants 
Party, the Ustasha’s nationalist ideology, and the Communists’ nationalist 
ideology. The content analysis looks at the ways in which each nationalist 
ideology answers the following questions: What is the nation? What is the 
Croatian nation? Who are the enemies of the Croatian nation?
Chapter Six concentrates on the events of the 1990s in Croatia. It offers a brief 
historical background, and analyses the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudjman. 
This part of the research is based on a content analysis of Tudjman’s published 
writings and interviews given to the media in the period of 1992-94.
Chapter Seven seeks to examine the interplay of the social structure and culture 
in a specific social segment. It explores the ways dominant ideas of nations and 
nationalism were incorporated into the education system and, in the form of 
textbooks, designed to influence the attitudes of agency. Hence, this chapter 
offers a review of the results of the content analysis of the history textbooks in 
the period from the 1880s until 1996. The comparison of the textbooks’ content 
is organised around several issues: to what extent do the textbooks reflect the 
dominant ideology? what myths and symbols are portrayed as national? which 
historical personalities are described as national heroes? how does the textbook
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describe the nation, national values and interests? and, finally, who are portrayed 
as historical enemies of the Croatian nation?
Chapter Eight presents the results of a survey undertaken in early 2000 in order 
to investigate the interplay between structure and culture, on the one side, and 
agents, on the other. This chapter examines the ways these agents perceive the 
nation in general, the Croatian nation in particular, national symbols and national 
enemies.
In the Conclusion, the findings of the empirical case of Croatia are considered 
with reference to the previously constructed methodological framework where 
the main hypotheses of the research are re-examined.
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PART ONE
Chapter One
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1. Introduction
One of the few, and most evident points of agreement among the theories of 
nations and nationalism is that the nation is a social phenomenon. One could 
expect, then, that social theory should be able to offer a starting point for the 
study of the nation. It would be too optimistic to say that the debates in social 
theory are more articulate than those debates in theories of nations and 
nationalism. However, while the current social theories use at least similar 
terminology, respect some basic epistemological assumptions, or share 
methodological approaches, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of nations 
and nationalism frequently opens a wide space for disagreements and 
misunderstandings among theoreticians. Without any aspiration to deal with or, 
even less, to resolve the current debates in theories of nations and nationalism, I 
would attempt to restrict my analysis to a single approach - a sociological 
approach. Without offering any definition of the nation at this point it should be 
stated that the nation will be analysed as a particular social form with specific 
emergent properties. These properties have emerged as a result of a particular 
interplay of social structures and cultural systems among a given social group; as 
such the nation became a ‘real’ social phenomena, that is, irreducible to its 
‘parts’- members of the nation - and inexplicable as an epiphenomenon.
Any attempt to explain the emergence and characteristics of a phenomenon 
demands answers to several questions like when, how  and who? In dealing with 
social phenomena the three simple questions serve as directions for an analysis, 
rather than as formulae for offering a ‘correct’ explanation. Answers to the 
question when does a social phenomenon emerge? could rarely be defined by a
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date or precise time. Rather the question should be read as ‘what were the 
conditions for the emergence of a social phenomenon’. By asking how has a 
social phenomenon emerged? one is asking which political, social and economic 
mechanisms and processes were activated, what functions they performed, and 
whose interests were promoted. In explaining the emergence of a social 
phenomenon, the answer to the question who ?rarely has a first and second name. 
The major actors in the formation of this social form are social groups - defined 
as interest groups, social classes, elite and masses, leaders and followers, political 
parties etc.
These questions are at the centre of all sociological theories, and the differences 
and similarities in answers offered to these questions categorise these 
sociological theories into different ‘schools of thought’. In the first chapter I will 
outline the basic debates in social theory regarding the process of the formation 
and emergence of social phenomena and social change. Working from the 
premise that any fruitful analysis of social change has to regard the interplay 
between structure, culture and social actors in time, the second part of this 
chapter will outline basic assumptions and methods of Realist Social Theory, 
especially the explanatory methodology which Margaret Archer calls the 
Morphogenetic approach.
1.2. Social Change
A thorough analysis of existing theories of social change could easily become an 
overview of the history of social thought. This particular analysis, however, has a 
much narrower focus. Dominant debates in theories of social change can provide 
a direction for formulating a methodological framework for analysis of the 
process of nation-/re/formation. Such a methodological framework should be 
able to define a scope, direction and aim of analysis, so as to provide definitions 
of the main terms used.
In that sense, the term ‘social change’ needs to be clarified. The first point of 
agreement between the theorists of social change is that every change occurs in a
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period of time. The change is always observed in relation to previous stages: ‘we 
are dealing with difference between what can be observed before that point in 
time, and what we see after that point in time’ (Strasser and Randall, in: 
Sztompka, 1993: 4). The concept of change ‘involves three ideas: (1) difference, 
(2) at different temporal moments, (3) between states of the same system’ {ibid.). 
These three ideas could be considered as necessary conditions for defining 
change, yet, such a definition fails to distinguish between regular, cyclical 
changes, like seasons of the year, and situations when, as a result of some crucial 
events, a system acquires new characteristics and functions. Anthony D. Smith 
(1976: 13) emphasises the notion of novelty of change, and defines social change 
as ‘a succession of events which produce over time a modification or 
replacement of particular patterns or units by other novel ones’. Smith’s 
definition still contains a notion of progress and development. Even though the 
introduction of the criteria of novelty more specifically defines the phenomenon 
of social change, in some cases this definition could be considered as too narrow 
since it excludes the cases when a social system changes in an ‘opposite 
direction’, that is, reintroduces ‘old’ characteristics and functions.
Over any period of time, every society is changing. Some theoreticians consider 
change as being ‘natural’, while others emphasise stability of the system as a 
natural state of a society. In either case, they all agree that changes can vary by 
their scope, extent, and direction. Sztompka (1993: 5) states that a society can 
experience changes in composition, structure, functions, boundaries, relations of 
subsystems and environment. Some changes are labelled as partial and some as 
total changes. While Percy Cohen (1968: 176) shows that every change in a 
society is a partial change and that one can only distinguish between minor and 
fundamental changes, others emphasise that change can occur on micro, mezzo 
and macro level of society (Sztompka, 1993: 7).
Without any wish to enter further into discussion about the definition of social 
change2 one could draw several conclusions:
2 For more about definition of social change, see Sztompka (1993), Cohen (1968), Smith (1973, 
1976), Etzioni-Halevy & Etzioni (1973) and others.
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i. It looks as if social change is a process which could be detected only ex 
post facto - a social change is usually triggered by a set of events, but 
only after these events occur can one analyse if the previous state of a 
system differs significantly to the new characteristics of the system. If the 
system in question did not go through a significant transformation, one 
cannot say that social change occurred.
ii. Even though a social change occurs, and this change is a relative factor of 
time, the same social change can differ in its characteristics - it is a 
prerogative of an analyst of the social change to select the time-span in 
which one could observe changes in the system. For example, one who 
analyses the events in the Habsburg Empire in the period of 1848-1849 
could reach different conclusions about the nature of social change than 
one who analyses the social change in the period 1848-1918 in the same 
society.
iii. It could be said that the subject of analysis itself defines the main 
characteristics of social change. Without specifically defining the subject 
for analysis, one is unable to conclude whether the social change that 
occurred is minor or fundamental. If the main subject of the analysis is 
the economic system in Socialist Yugoslavia, introduction of the so- 
called self-management system in early 1950s represents a fundamental 
change, while it could be categorised as a minor change in an analysis of 
the world economy in the same period. The same can be said for 
categorising a particular social change as micro, mezzo or macro. In the 
first case, introduction of the self-management could be labelled as macro 
change, and in the second as micro change.
When do social changes occur? Answers to this question are numerous enough to 
be systematically categorised into distinctive theories. If social change is defined 
as a pattern of events which brings a discontinuation of social processes, and as a 
consequence creates new patterns and units, another question arises: what 
triggered these patterns of events? Generally, this question deals with the 
problem of mechanisms and factors of social change. Many theories emphasise 
the salience of a single mechanism to bring about social change. These 
mechanisms are described as either endogenous or exogenous processes or
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factors.3 The former are dominant in social theory. These theories emphasise 
characteristics of a given social system, especially structural ones, in which, 
apparently, lie ‘potentiality’ for change. On the other hand, for the exogenous 
model a ‘source of change is to be sought outside the phenomenon whose 
transformation is being analysed’ (Smith, 1973: 158). Cohen (1968: 178) further 
develops categorisation of the theories which explain social change in terms of a 
single factor. The most representative ones are: the technological theory, the 
economic theory, the conflict theory, the malintegration theory, the adaptation 
theory, the ideational theory, and the cultural integration theory. At this point, 
only the outline of main ideas and criticism for each of these theories will be 
given.
Theories labelled as technological state that ‘(a)ny technological change which is  
great enough will produce some other social change as a consequence’ (.ibid.\ 
179, italics in original). Cohen argues that a rapid technological change can occur 
without affecting other factors in society, just as social change of other social 
factors can occur without a rapid technological change. The question of why 
technological change occurs remains unexplained by these theories.
The economic theories of change were mainly influenced by Marx and Marxism 
by stating that ‘changes in economic “infra-structure” of society are the prime 
movers of social change’ {ibid.: 180). These theories were mainly criticised for 
neglecting the influence of political and ideational “super-structure”. The 
relationship between the economic “infra-structure” and “super-structure” of a 
society in these theories is mainly in one direction, since the former always 
directs the later.
Other Marxist theories emphasise conflict between different social groups and 
their interests as the prime cause of social change. However, Cohen holds that 
social conflict is equally a cause and a consequence of a social change (1968: 
186). Another critique comes from Lockwood (1964: 249) who holds that
3 For more about endogenous and exogenous models, see Smith (1976: 124-129).
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conflict theory cannot explain ‘why some conflict results in change while other 
conflict does not’.
Similarly, malintegration theory is mainly concerned with the role of social 
actors in causing social change, but it emphasises the ‘incompatibilities between 
different parts of social system’, interpreting social change mainly as a 
consequence of the ‘conflicting pressures or demands of different sectors of a 
society and culture’ (Cohen, 1968: 186-187). Cohen’s main critique of this 
theory is that it does not offer any explanation on ‘why should any parts ever 
become incompatible with one another in the first place?’ {ibid.: 189). The 
adaptation theory offers an answer to this question, by stating that the parts of 
society ‘need’ compatibility, and that social changes are serving exactly that 
purpose. Such theories are mainly criticised for their determinism in the 
explanation of social change, ignoring cases when social conflict could also 
enhance malintegration of the parts of the system.
The ideational theory of change charts the source of social change to a diffusion 
of doctrines, that is, to a system of ideas about ‘social institutions, structures and 
system, as well as about the physical and “supranatural” world’ (Cohen, 1968: 
195). As already outlined, there are many, varying ideational theories of change. 
Some hold that the existence of a doctrine is a necessary condition for social 
change, while the others argue that it is just a sufficient one. In any case, the 
main criticism comes from the fact that not all doctrines cause a social change, 
and not all social changes are influenced by the formation of a doctrine in a 
society.
Cultural integration theory has been developed mainly as an attempt to explain 
change in simple societies, and is based on the idea that ‘when the members of 
two cultures interact there is a tendency for cultural change to occur or for an 
acceleration of cultural change to occur’ (Cohen, 1968: 203). Cohen’s main 
critique of these theories stems from the fact that, while maintaining contact with 
other societies, some historical and simple societies resisted radical changes. 
Cohen also argues that ‘it is also possible that some forms of contact encourage a 
resistance to change’ {ibid.).
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Even this rather simplistic outline of demonstrates the existence of serious 
problems with the theories of social change. We can conclude that any attempt to 
explain social change in terms of a single factor is insufficient. These theories, 
nevertheless, point at the fact that factors of social change could be found in
• the domain of ideas - either as innovative technological ideas, political 
ideologies, or economic and religious doctrines;
• in the domain of integration or malintegration of the different political, social 
or economic institutions of a society; or
• in the domain of intended or unintended consequences of actions of 
individuals or different social groups in a society.
Hence, one could conclude that any attempt to explain the phenomenon of social 
change must deal with the interplay between social structure, social culture and 
social action. An examination of the interplay between structure, culture and 
actions could not only systematise factors of social change, but also provide a 
framework for analysis of the mechanisms of social change.
One theory which analyses the relationships between social structure, culture and 
action as a basis for social change is Realist Social Theory. In the next part of the 
chapter basic ideas of Realist Social Theory and especially the analytical 
framework of Morphogenesis will be outlined.
1.3. Realist Social Theory
Realist Social Theory, most clearly expressed in the work of Margaret Archer, 
has been developed around current debates in social theory regarding the 
relationship between structure, culture and agency. The last two decades of 
theorising in sociology have been marked by various attempts at the integration 
of, on the one hand, micro and macro theories - like George Ritzer’s integrated 
sociological paradigm, Jeffrey Alexander’s multidimensional sociology or 
Randall Collins’ radical microsociology - and, on the other, theories based on 
action and those emphasising the social structure - such as Anthony Giddens’
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structuration theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field. The 
common starting point of these theories is an understanding that social theories 
which present the society in terms of dichotomies - like ‘individual vs. society’ 
and ‘action vs. order’ - fail to explain an interplay between structure, culture and 
agency and hence the dynamics of an open system such as human society.
Margaret Archer developed Realist Social Theory on similar assumptions. Archer 
claims that the fallacies of the myth o f cultural integration and three types of 
conflation - ‘downwards’, ‘upwards’ and ‘central’ - marked the theorising of the 
relationship between structure and agency in social theory.
The myth o f cultural integration is based on a perception of ‘culture as the 
perfectly integrated system in which every element was interdependent with 
every other’ (Archer, 1988: 2). This perception of culture as an ‘integrated 
whole’ was represented in German historicism, in the works of anthropologists 
such as Bronislav Malinowski and Ruth Benedict, in Parsonian Functionalism, 
and in humanistic Marxism. Archer argues that the myth pictures a well 
integrated, non-conflictual, harmonious culture accepted by all people in a given 
society. Hence, myth confounds two intrinsically distinct levels of analysis of 
culture. The first level of analysis is a property of ideas, logical consistency, that 
is, ‘the degree of internal compatibility between the components of culture’ {ibid. 
4), the second level is a causal consensus as the property of people, that is, ‘the 
degree of social uniformity produced by the imposition of the culture ... by one 
set of the people on another’ {ibid.). Archer argues that it is important to 
distinguish logical consistency and causal cohesion ‘in order to gain analytical 
grip on the cultural components and upon socio-cultural dynamics’ {ibid: 6). 
Archer’s distinction between ‘logical consistency’ and ‘cultural cohesion’ is 
parallel to Lockwood’s distinction between ‘system integration’ and ‘social 
integration’.4 Hence, logical consistency is termed cultural system integration and 
cultural cohesion is termed socio-cultural integration. Therefore, it could be said,
4 According to Lockwood ‘whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention upon the 
orderly or conflictful relationships between the actors, the problem of system integration focuses 
on the orderly or conflictful relationships between the parts, of the social system’ (Lockwood, 
1964: 245).
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the myth of cultural integration actually confuses cultural system integration with 
socio-cultural integration.
The myth o f cultural integration is expressed as ‘one-way theorising’, which 
conflates structure with agency. Archer calls theorising which reduces structure 
and culture to agency, that is, which denies their independence as different strata 
of social reality and explains them just as epiphenomena of the activities of 
agents, upwards conflation. Archer labels theorising which reduces agency to 
structure and culture, that is, which explains agency as entirely determined and, 
hence, as their epiphenomenon, downwards conflation. These two versions of 
conflation, according to Archer, preclude any interplay between structure and 
agency. One level of social reality is always rendered inert: ‘instead of interplay 
there was the one-way domination of either the logical (downwards account) or 
the causal (upwards account)’ {ibid.: 97). However, epiphenomenalism, 
according to Archer, ‘is not the only way in which the more general process of 
conflation operates’ {ibid.). The third type of conflation Archer calls central 
conflation, and this theorising is characterised by elision of structure and agency. 
The best example of this type of conflation Archer finds in Giddens’ structuration 
theory which introduces the concept of duality and agency and structure as 
ontologically inseparable.5 Central conflation deprives both structure and agency 
of their relative autonomy, ‘not through reducing one to the other, but by 
compacting the two together inseparably’ (Archer, 1995: 101). As a result of this 
elision, any analysis of the interplay between structure and agency is impossible.
Through the criticism of conflation theorising, Archer develops another approach
to the study of the relationship between structure and agency - analytical dualism.
Analytical dualism is based on two premises:
Firstly, it depends upon an ontological view of the social world as 
stratified, such that the emergent properties of structure and agents are 
irreducible to one another, meaning that in principle they are analytically 
separable. Secondly, it asserts that given structures and agents are also 
temporally distinguishable (in other words, it is justifiable and feasible to 
talk of pre-existance and posteriority when dealing with specific instances 
of the two), and this can be used methodologically in order to examine the 
interplay between them and thus explain changes in both - over time. In a
5 For more about Archer’s criticism of the structuration theory, see Archer (1995: 93-134).
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nutshell, ‘analytical dualism’ is a methodology based upon the historicity 
o f emergence. (Archer, 1995: 66; italics in original)
Hence, analytical dualism assumes the social world as made up of structure, 
culture and agents that belong to different strata of social reality. Any reduction 
of one to the other or elision of them would preclude the exploration of the 
interplay between them.
However, ‘without the proper incorporation of time the problem of structure and 
agency can never be satisfactorily resolved’ (Archer, 1995: 65). According to 
Archer structure and agency are ‘neither co-extensive nor co-variant through 
time’ (1995: 66). Both structure and agency possess autonomous emergent 
properties, that is, their differentiating features are relative endurance, natural 
necessity and the possession of causal powers {ibid.: 167). They are capable of 
‘independent variation and therefore of being out of phase with one another in 
time’ {ibid.). What distinguishes realist social theory is its basic assumption 
which holds that for a successful analysis of social processes ‘analytical 
separability and temporal distinction were needed in conjunction’ (Archer, 1995: 
67). Archer argues that it is necessary to separate structure and agency in order to 
(a) ‘identify the emergent structure(s), (b) differentiate their causal powers and 
the intervening influences of people due to their quite different caused powers as 
human beings, and, (c) explain the outcome at all, which in an open system 
always entails an interplay between the two’ (1995: 70). As Roy Bhaskar (1998, 
218-219) summarises: ‘Social structures (...) do not exist independently of the 
activities they govern’, but they also ‘do not exist independently of the agents’ 
conceptions of what they are doing in their activity’ and hence, these structures 
‘may be only relatively enduring’. Hence, he defines society as ‘an articulated 
assembly of tendencies and powers (...) which exist only as long as they (or at 
least some of them) are being exercised; are exercised in the last instance via the 
intentional activity of human beings; and are not necessarily space-time 
invariant’ (Bhaskar, 1998J219).
The analytical separation of structure and agency provides a methodological tool 
for analysis of the interplay between them. Structure, culture and agency shape 
and re-shape one another over time, and only by analysing that process can we
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‘account for variable social outcomes at different times’ (Archer, 1995: 64). 
Therefore, in opposition to the claims of so-called downwards and upwards 
conflationists, structures ‘are not only irreducible to people, they pre-exist them, 
and people are not puppets of structures because they have their own emergent 
properties which mean they either reproduce or transform social structure, rather 
than creating it’ {ibid.: 71).
According to Archer, agency always operates in some given structure. So, 
structure ‘necessarily pre-dates the action(s) which transforms it’; and this 
‘structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions’ {ibid.: 76). Structures, 
as emergent properties, are ‘irreducible to the doings of contemporary actors’, yet 
they emerge from the ‘historical actions which generated them, thus creating the 
context for current agency’ {ibid.: 139). Archer calls this process a 
morphogenetic circle. Processes in which a system, state or structure is 
elaborated or changed as a consequence of social interaction Archer defines as 
morphogenesis. Conversely, processes in which ‘complex system-environmental 
exchanges’ tend to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, organisation or 
state are defined as moiphostasis {ibid.: 166). Schematically, a
morphogenetic/static circle of structure has three phases:
Structural conditioning
T1
Social interaction
Structural elaboration (morphogenesis)
Structural reproduction (morphostasis) .
T4
Figure 1: The basic morphogenetic/static cycle of structure (Archer, 1995: 157)
The morphogenetic/static cycle offers an explanatory framework which 
acknowledges and incorporates (a) ‘pre-existent structures as generative 
mechanisms’ - structural conditioning, (b) ‘their interplay with other objects 
possessing causal powers and liabilities proper to them in what is a stratified
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social world’, which happens at the level of social interaction, and (c) ‘non- 
predictable but nonetheless explicable outcomes from interactions between the 
above’, which can result as structural elaboration (morphogenesis) or as 
structural reproduction (morphostasis) {ibid.: 159). The morphogenetic/static 
analysis of the structure is therefore based on four propositions:
(i) there are internal and necessary relations within and between social 
structures (SS);
(ii) causal influences are exerted by social structure(s) (SS) on
social interaction (SI);
(iii) there are causal relationships between the groups and individuals at 
the level of social interaction (SI);
(iv) social interaction (SI) elaborates upon the composition of social 
structure(s) (SS) by modifying current internal and necessary 
structural relationships and introducing new ones where 
morphogenesis is concerned. Alternatively, social interaction (SI) 
reproduces existing internal and necessary structured relations when 
morphostasis applies. (Archer, 1995: 168-69).
According to Archer, the method of analytical dualism based on separation and 
temporal analysis of the interplay between structure and agency can be directly 
applied to an analysis of the interplay between culture and agency. In this case, 
the basic propositions can be re-formulated by stating that culture can be 
separated from agency, since culture possesses its own emergent properties, that 
is, it has its own irreducible and relatively enduring character and autonomous 
influence. Culture, therefore, necessarily pre-dates the action(s) that transform it, 
and cultural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions.
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Cultural conditioning
T1
Socio-Cultural interaction 
T2 T3
Cultural elaboration
T4
Figure 2: The morphogenesis of culture (Archer, 1995: 193)
The relative autonomy of structure and culture means that ‘they are not 
necessarily in synchrony with one another’ {ibid.: 218). Archer argues that ‘any 
form of socio-cultural conditioning only exerts its effects on people and is only 
efficacious through people’ {ibid.: 184). Both cultural system and structural 
integration are creating a situational logic which motivates different forms of 
agents’ actions. This situational logic is a consequence of the relationships 
between the elements of structure and culture.
At the structural level, which exists at any given T1, relationships between the 
elements (institutions) can be either necessarily or contingently related to one 
another. Alternatively these relationships may be ones of complementarity or 
incompatibility (Archer, 1995: 216). These relationships create four types of 
‘institutional configurations’ which Archer calls the ‘second order emergent 
properties’ {ibid.), and they create four possible situational logics.
i. When the institutions are in the relation of necessary complementarity 
they are ‘mutually reinforcing, [they] mutually invoke one another and 
work in terms of each other’ {ibid.: 219). This relationship of high system 
integration creates a situational logic of protection where the highest 
benefits for the agents are found in sustaining and supporting the 
established system, since alternative resources are unavailable. In this 
case morphostasis is the most probable outcome.
ii. The institutions can be in a relationship of necessary incompatibility. 
‘[W]hen two or more institutions are necessarily and internally related to 
one another yet the effects of their operations are to threaten the
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endurance of the relationship itself, this has been referred to as a state of 
“contradiction”’{ibid.: 222). This relationship opens a space for changes, 
yet an unstable configuration creates the situational logic of compromise, 
since the outcome of any change is still uncertain.
iii. In the situation when contingent institutions are incompatible with each 
other, either because of internal or external influences (such as war), the 
agency finds itself in a situation when the greatest gains could be 
achieved by ‘inflicting maximum injuries on the other side’. Hence, the 
institutional relationship of contingent incompatibility creates a 
situational logic of elimination.
iv. The contingent institutions can be compatible with the interests of 
particular groups. It creates a situation of status quo, that is, a situational 
logic of pure opportunism where the agencies tend to preserve their 
already achieved gains and protect themselves from any losses. Still, this 
situational logic can be morphogenetic with the emergence of new 
interests of the agency and new material means for institutional re- 
patterning.
Just as at the level of structure the elements (institutions) can be in the 
relationship of contradiction and complementarity, so the elements of culture can 
be in similar relationships. The four ‘second order emergent properties of 
structure’ listed above, correspond with four ‘second order emergent properties 
of culture’ and they create another four situational logics. At this point, culture is 
‘conceptualised as supplying directional guidance for agency’ {ibid.: 229). 
Archer tries to analyse the possible relationships between the agencies which 
represent different theories, ideologies or beliefs. She argues that the 
‘maintenance of ideas which stand in manifest logical contradiction or 
complementarity to others, places their holders in different ideational situations’ 
(Archer, 1995: 229):
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Second order Emergent 
Properties of Culture
Situational Logic
CONSTRAINING CONTRADICTIONS ► CORRECTION
CONCOMITANT COMPLEMENTARITIES >  PROTECTION
COMPETITIVE CONTRADICTIONS >  ELIMINATION
CONTINGENT COMPLEMENTARITIES OPPORTUNISM
Figure 3: Cultural conditioning of strategic action
These second order emergent properties of structure and culture form a context 
which conditions the actions of the people within it - that is the first stage of 
every morphogenetic cycle which Archer calls ‘Social and Cultural 
Conditioning’. However, only by analysing the second phase of the 
morphogenetic cycle - the level of socio-cultural and group interaction - is it 
possible to examine ‘how the relationships between people are capable of 
changing or maintaining the relationships between ideas’ (Archer, 1995: 184) 
and institutions. These ‘people’ are not merely passive holders of ideas or 
puppets of their institutions, but active agents who transform and maintain it. 
Yet, through the process of changing their environment, the agency changes 
itself. A specific position of agency6 in a society as a medium of all changes is 
produced by ‘double morphogenesis’ - ‘people collectively generate the 
elaboration of structure and culture, but they themselves undergo elaboration as 
people at the same time’ {ibid.: 253). The morphogenesis of people happens in 
the three phases, just as structural and cultural morphogenesis:
6 Archer defines agency as a product of ‘double morphogenesis’, as ‘Collectivities sharing the 
same life chances’ (Archer, 1988: 255). She distinguishes Agency from Actors and Persons where 
‘Agency stands as the middle element linking Person to Actors’ {ibid.). For more about the 
definitions and distinctions between Agency, Persons and Actors, see Archer (1995: 255-257) and 
(2000).
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Socio-Cultural conditioning of groups
T1
Group interaction
J 2  rp3
Group elaboration
rp4
Figure 4: The elaboration of Agency (Archer, 1995: 248)
Socio-cultural conditioning of the groups does not direct behaviour of the 
agency. Rather, it is responsible for the distribution of resources amongst 
different agencies, and creates a context in which agencies are rewarded for 
protecting and promoting their vested material and ideational interests. Agency 
positioned in this way has ‘powers proper to itself (...) Its typical powers are 
capacities for articulating shared interests, organising for collective action, 
generating social movements and exercising corporate influence in decision 
making’ {ibid.: 259). An agency which organises and articulates its interests 
Archer calls Corporate Agents. On the other hand, Archer calls those which lack 
both organisation and articulation of their interests, and are unable to exercise 
their power in structural and cultural modelling, Primary Agents (Archer, 2000: 
265). Even though passive in direct social action, a Primary Agent ‘reconstitutes 
the environment which Corporate Agency seeks to control’ {ibid.: 260).
However, as mentioned before, the context of the second order emergent 
properties of culture and structure condition the re-grouping of agency. In 
morphostatic situations the groups are mainly well defined, where structural and 
cultural Corporate Agents are in control of resources and hence prevent Primary 
Agents in organising and articulating their ideas. These situations resemble those 
which Archer labelled the ‘Myth of Cultural Integration’. Yet any alterations in 
an agents’ situation redefines the categories of both Corporate and Primary 
Agents. In a morphogenetic scenario ‘progressive expansion of the number of 
Corporate Agents and divergence of the interests represented by them’ results in 
‘substantial conflict between them’ {ibid.: 263). This conflict alters the 
environment of Primary Agents by broadening the debate, which becomes an
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issue of ‘popular agenda’. In conflicts between the Corporate Agents, their 
success becomes dependent on their success in the mobilisation of support 
amongst Primary Agents. The power of the Primary Agents in this context is 
what Archer calls ‘Co-action’ where ‘groups in roughly the same position (act) in 
approximately the same way’ {ibid.: 267) and produce an aggregate effect, which 
simultaneously constrains and enables Corporate Agents. In this way Primary 
Agents present an ‘environmental pressure of numbers’. Elaboration of Social 
Agency is thus the ‘resultant of aggregate effects produced by Primary Agents in 
conjunction with emergent properties generated by Corporate Agents and thus 
does not approximate to what anyone wants’ (Archer, 1988: 265).
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Figure 5: When morphostasis versus when morphogenesis (Archer, 1995: 295)
The question of whether a cultural, structural or group morphogenesis or 
morphostasis will occur depends directly on developments in Socio-cultural 
interaction, which is conditioned by the prior social context. Archer 
schematically represents relationships in this context (see Figure 5), following 
Lockwood’s distinction between social and system integration, and claiming that 
‘mal-integration of the two at the same moment tended to issue in 
morphogenesis’ {ibid.: 295).
However, the answer to ‘when does morphogenesis happen’ can only be found in 
‘relations (interaction) between groups’ {ibid.: 297) since social elaboration does 
not depend only on cultural proliferation or re-stratification of structure, but also 
on social reception of these changes {ibid.: 304).
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The distribution of resources and pre-grouping of agents determine their potential 
bargaining power. Finding themselves in the situations conceptualised by 
systemic complementarities and/or contradictions, these vested interest groups 
are confronted with situational benefits or penalties. Their further actions, guided 
by existing situational logic, depend directly on the ability of corporate agents to 
‘organise mobilisation of the resources potentially available’ {ibid.: 297). 
Depending on the success of this mobilisation, corporate agents will acquire a 
specific negotiating strength which positions them in a specific relationship to the 
other corporate agents involved.
However well positioned and defined groups are at this stage, it is difficult to 
‘predict’ the outcome of this conflictual situation, since it occurs in an open 
system, that is human society. Anyway, as mentioned earlier, social changes can 
be identified only ex post facto. But the purpose of this theoretical exercise was 
not to equip a social scientist with a tool for prediction of social events in 
general. Archer’s Morphogenetic approach offers an explanatory methodology 
which results in an analytical history of emergence.
The purpose of this study is to offer an analytical history of the emergence of a 
nation. I believe that the Morphogenetic approach could offer a methodological 
basis for such an analysis. Hence, in the next section I will attempt to, firstly, 
define the nation as a specific social form, and, secondly, offer a theoretical 
framework for analysis of the history of emergence of any specific nation. In 
doing so, it is necessary to emphasise that the analysis of the process of the 
formation of the nation is: (1) an analysis of a distinctive social phenomenon - 
the nation; (2) an analysis of the formation of a new social phenomenon; and (3) 
an analysis of a social process. I will refer to these three issues from the 
perspective of Realist Social Theory. Lastly, such a framework will be employed 
for the analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation.
42
Chapter Two
THE NATION AS A SOCIAL FORM
As outlined in previous chapter, I believe that realist social theory could provide 
a methodological tool for analysis of the process of nation-/re/formation. 
However, it is necessary first to define a phenomenon before getting involved in 
any analysis of the process of its emergence. When a phenomenon such as the 
nation is in question, that task is not easy. Even though there is a growing interest 
in the study of the nation, very little consensus among scholars exists where the 
issue of its definition is concerned. The numerous existing definitions of the 
nation throughout the literature are the best indicators of the problem.
2.1. Defining the Nation
The first problem arises even with the question: what kind of social phenomenon 
is the ‘nation’? Benedict Anderson, Adrian Hastings, Paul R. Brass and many 
others describe the nation as a community. Walker Connor (1994: 74) sees it as a 
‘group of people’ while Miroslav Hroch (1996: 79) adds that it is also a ‘large’ 
one. Peter Alter (1991: 17) simply calls it a ‘social group’, Karl Deutsch (in 
Alter, 1991: 10) ‘a people’, while Anthony Smith (1991: 14) calls it ‘a human 
population’. Michael Billig (1995: 24) sees the nation as a more complex 
phenomenon which can designate both a specific type of state and the people, 
while Ernest Gellner (1996: 117) holds that the nation is a type of culture.
In an attempt to summarise existing definitions of the nation, Eric Hobsbawm 
found two different types to be the most frequent: objective and subjective 
definitions (Hobsbawm, 1991: 5-7). The first type tries to establish objective 
criteria for 'being the nation', either by emphasising particular criteria or by 
giving some combination of them. The other tries to escape from a priori 
constraints and define the nation through members' consciousness of belonging,
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at the level of the individual or a collectivity. According to Hobsbawm, both 
attempts fail to explain 'the nation'. Similarly, in opening his discussion about 
nations and nationalism, Gellner defined two ‘provisional definitions, the cultural 
and voluntaristic’ (1983: 7). The first emphasizes a shared culture as the main 
criterion for the identification of whether two persons belong to the same nation. 
In that sense, culture is defined as ‘a system of ideas and signs and associations 
and ways of behaving and communicating’ (1983: 7). The other, voluntaristic 
definition states that ‘two men are of the same nation if, and only if, they 
recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations 
maketh man,; nations are the artifacts of man’s convictions and loyalties and 
solidarities’ (1983: 7). These examples show us that scholars dealing with the 
national phenomenon tend to divide along familiar dichotomies in social 
sciences: objective vs. subjective, cultural vs. voluntaristic, individual vs. 
institutions. However, even when some scholars share the same assumptions 
about the ‘nature’ of the nation as a social phenomenon, they do not necessarily 
agree about its constituent elements, origins or functions.
For example, numerous scholars define the nation is cultural terms. Thus, Smith 
emphasises the importance of a common culture (1992: 450), and marks the 
nation as a cultural group (1973: 18). Various authors have emphasised the 
importance of ‘cultural products’ such as a common language (Kautsky in Nimni, 
1991: 46) religion (Alter, 1991: 17-18), history (Stalin in Nimni, 1991: 47), 
myths (Smith, 1992: 438), symbols (Haas, 1993: 508), values (Hroch, 1996: 80), 
etc.
On the other hand, a group of theoreticians see the nation as based on a particular 
social structure: as a political association (Breuilly, 1985: 65), as an imagined 
political community (Anderson, 1983: 6), as a ‘social entity only insofar as it 
relates to a certain kind of modem territorial state’ (Hobsbawm, 1990: 9). 
Deutsch states that if a cultural community ‘also possesses its own state 
apparatus and wields autonomous political power, then it can be regarded as a 
nation’ (Alter, 1991: 10). According to Pierre van den Berghe, an ethny which is 
defined biologically and culturally, becomes the nation in the moment it ‘claims 
the right to statehood’ (1987: 61). Gellner (1983), on the other hand, emphasises
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the role of the modem state, more precisely, the specific role of industrialisation 
and the universal education system.
Some of the above-mentioned authors have emphasised the role of the subjective 
feelings of the members of the nation, over and above the ‘objective’ 
characteristics of the nation. These authors find the base of the nation in the 
characteristics or properties of different agencies. Hugh Seton-Watson includes 
what Gellner calls a voluntaristic notion of the nation: ‘the nation exists when a 
significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a 
nation, or behave as if they formed one’ (1977: 5). Hence, Seton-Watson 
underlines the importance of a sense of solidarity (1977: 1). Jurgen Habermas 
(1992: 2) defines the nation as the ‘prepolitical unity of a community with a 
shared historical destiny’. Achad Ha’am defines the nation as a subjective feeling 
(Smith, 1983: 11) and Ernest Renan as a ‘daily plebiscite’ based on a collective 
will (Kedourie, 1985: 81). Otto Bauer argues that the nation can be explored only 
on the basis of the notion of ‘national character’ where national character is 
understood as ‘a historically modifiable characteristic which culturally links the 
members of a national community over a given historical period’ (Nimni, 1991: 
148).
Some constituent elements of the nation are sometimes seen as an objective bond 
that is often based on affective relations among members of the same nation. 
Hence, Otto Bauer sees the nation as a community of destiny (1996: 40), 
maintained by common blood (1996: 52), and supports Lord Acton’s (1995: 29) 
emphasis on collective will of the members of the same nation. For some authors 
the nation has to develop special ‘national’ sentiments among co-nationals 
(Breuilly, 1995: 147), or a sense of uniqueness and self-awareness (Connor, 
1994: 43).
Authors also often emphasise particular functions of the nation which could be 
seen as emergent powers. Thus, the nation has to provide equality (Hroch, 1996: 
79), common rights and duties for all its members (Smith, 1991b: 40). It also 
provides a sense of institutional and symbolic legitimacy (Connor, 1994: 82). 
The nation is a base of sovereignty and social integration of its members
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(Habermas, 1996: 284). Even Gellner defines the nation as a ‘culture which was 
to provide the crucial moral identity for those who accepted it’ (1996: 117).
Any definition of the nation which emphasises a single cultural or structural 
constituent element as the basis of the nation fails to explain it as a specific 
stratified social form. It merely reduces this social form to one of its ‘parts’. For 
example, if the nation cannot be seen as a social entity unless related to a modem 
territorial state, as Hobsbawm claims, then the nation and this type of state 
become a synonym for the same phenomenon, in which case the term nation is 
either redundant or an ephipenomenon. Similarly, if the nation is marked as a 
group with a common language, then there is no need for the introduction of the 
term ‘nation’ where a ‘linguistic group’ is all that matters.
Some definitions of the nation acknowledge the stratified ‘nature’ of the nation
and emphasizing the importance of some aspects of social structure, culture and
agency. Hence, the nation, according to Smith, fuses three dimensions: territory,
culture and citizenship (1973: 18). ‘A nation can ... be defined as a named human
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories,
a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties
for all members’ (Smith: 1991, 14). The nation can be also seen
as a large social group integrated not by one but a combination of 
several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, cultural, 
religious, geographical, historical) and their subjective reflections in 
collective consciousness. (...) But among [these ties], three stand out as 
irreplaceable: (1) a ‘memory’ of some common past, treated as a 
‘destiny’ of the group - or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density 
of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social 
communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the 
equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society. 
(Hroch: 1996, 79)
It can be observed that most of the definitions mentioned above explain the 
nation as a type of social form. That is, the nation is described as a specific 
emergent property, which cannot be explained as an epiphenomenon and, as 
such, possesses a set of causal powers. Just as with other social forms, the nation 
presents a stratified set of relatively enduring relations between and amongst its 
structure, culture and agencies. Hence, the nation as a social form cannot be
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people-less, since only the agency can maintain and transform it. Moreover, only 
through people’s activities does the nation exist, regardless of possible 
differences in perception of that nation. The same people are the mediators of all 
relationships between and among the national structure and culture. However, 
these ‘people’, the members of the nation, do not act in an empty space. It is a 
structure and culture, that is, their causal powers, that sets conditional influences 
on people’s projects; conditioning but not determining their actions. Hence, to 
paraphrase Archer (1995: 197), the structure of the nation provides a material 
basis for their action and the cultural system supplies a fixed set of symbols 
which these people use in interpreting their situation. Without explaining the 
relationships that exist between its ‘parts’, the nation as a social phenomenon 
cannot be fully explained. In order to define the nation, it is necessary to 
emphasise the uniqueness of this type of social phenomenon.
In this research the nation will be defined as a social agency politically organised 
as a community which claims its rights on the basis o f a culture defmed as its 
own.
It is a political organisation that, on the one hand, re-stratifies a structural system 
(by forming political parties, a leadership, and ultimately state institutions); and 
on the other, offers a set of values, beliefs, ideas etc. in the form of a ‘nationalist 
ideology’. Such a nationalist ideology offers a basis for mobilisation of the 
population around proclaimed national symbols, national values, national myths 
and memories, aims and agendas.
On the basis of this politicised culture the social agency perceives itself as a 
community. In this definition the term ‘community’ implies, firstly, that its 
members perceive each other as members of the same social group and, hence, 
distinguish themselves from ‘the other’. Secondly, being ‘a community’ assumes 
that this group perceives itself and is perceived by others as a group which 
possesses a set of unique characteristics. Finally, it implies that its members 
perceive each other as equals and promotes solidarity amongst its members. This 
definition does not claim that the members of the same nation are equal or that 
the characteristics of this community are unique for that group. A perception of 
its members is what constitutes them as a community.
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However, the social structure of the nation and nationalist ideologies are not 
formed ex nihilo. The structure of the nation is always formed in reference to 
previous existing structures; nationalist ideologies are always formed in reference 
to existing culture.7 Moreover, the formulation of a nationalist ideology is always 
contextualised by a form of social structure, and the structure of the nation is 
always reconstructed in reference to the proclaimed nationalist ideals.
The nation as a social form emerges as a consequence of a process of social 
change. An analytical history of the emergence of the nation could offer a more 
elaborate definition of the phenomenon and better understanding of its internal 
dynamics.
2.2. Conflation in Existing Theories of Nation-Formation
The most common classification of theories of the nations and nationalism has 
been centred around one question: what this theory infers about the origins of the 
nation. The discussion between so-called primordialists and modernists has been 
based on whether the nation is ‘invented, imagined or reconstructed’ (Smith, 
1991: 353). This polarity is the most popular one, but authors dealing with the 
classification and explanation of similar theories use other polarising 
classifications: Smith (1983: 12) uses primordialism vs. instrumentalism, and 
perennialism vs. modernism; Comaroff and Stem (1994: 36) use primordialism 
vs. constructionism etc.8 However they are named, one group of theories 
represent the attitude that ‘nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of 
history and integral elements of the human experience’ and the other group sees 
the nation ‘as a purely modem phenomenon’ (Smith, 1983: 8-12). Some 
theoreticians avoid this terminology and present this distinction simply by 
questioning whether a theory represents the idea of creation of the nation before 
or after the emergence of nationalism.
7 Diversity of structures and cultures which have preceded the formation of nations is what 
ultimately characterises these nations as ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’, ‘state-seeking’ 
or ‘state-sustaining’, ‘cultural’ or ‘political’, etc
8 For a full explanation of these concepts, see (Smith, 1998).
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Theories dealing with the issue of the ‘origins of the nation’ assume a particular 
approach to the question of the process of social change, a result of which is the 
formation of a distinctive type of social form - the nation - and hence, directly 
involves issues regarding the necessary conditions for change, and the factors, 
mechanisms and scope of that change. Several of the most dominant theories of 
nation-formation could be seen as examples of what Margaret Archer labels as 
‘conflation in social theorising’.
Today, one of the most prominent theories of the nation as a modem 
phenomenon is that developed by Ernest Gellner. According to Gellner, the 
nation and nationalism are phenomena which originate from the process of 
transition from an agrarian society into a growth-oriented industrial society. 
Agrarian society was characterised by the existence of two horizontally 
differentiated (socially, politically and culturally) social strata. The first massive 
one was illiterate, food-production orientated, and static. The other was a literate, 
educated group which had all the economic and political power. These two 
groups, or as Gellner calls them, ‘subworlds’ (1983: 23) were sharply divided 
along cultural lines, separated by different ways of life, traditions, even language. 
Such a society, Gellner argues, cannot create or maintain either the nation or 
nationalism - ‘an ideology’ which is supposed to overarch all strata in a society.
On the other hand, a modem industrialised society is based on the idea of 
perpetual growth. It demands a highly mobile, literate, specialised working-force. 
The transition from the previous centralised, closed, and fused society into a de­
centralised, open, and specialised one (Gellner, 1983: 14) also transforms 
existing ‘low culture’ into a ‘high culture’. High culture is ‘a culture 
characterised by standardisation, a literacy- and education-based system of 
communication’ (Gellner, 1983: 54). Gellner also labels this period of transition 
as the age of nationalism. ‘Nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, 
dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the 
consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on deeply internalised, 
education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state’ (1983: 48).
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Gellner’s theory of nations and nationalism is a good example of ‘downwards 
conflationism’ in theorising the emergence of a social phenomenon. This theory 
implies that it is the social structure and the cultural system that not only provide 
the context of human action, but also direct and limit it. The relationship between 
structure and culture on one hand, and agency on the other, involves the one-way 
flow of influence from the former to the later. Structure and culture exercise their 
causal powers over agency and, hence, determine agency’s actions. Gellner’s 
theory of nation-formation is people-less. On the one hand, the changes in the 
structure and cultural system are seen as a product of contradictions within and 
between previous social structures and cultural systems; agency is only seen as 
their epiphenomenon. On the other hand, socio-cultural cohesion is explained as 
a result of system integration and cultural cohesion.
In describing the ‘nature’ of the so-called agrarian society Gellner emphasises 
how the emergence of new technologies brings structure and culture of the 
society into direct conflict. New technology requires changed economic and 
political systems which in return require a change in a cultural system. The 
sources of change are found exactly in these contradictions. Social change 
happens, and the nation emerges, as a result of the causal powers of social 
structures and cultural systems. The result of this social change is a fully 
integrated social system supported by cultural cohesion, now called ‘national 
culture’, achieved though a uniform educational system. The whole process is 
triggered from above. Members of the newly created nation are depicted as 
‘lemmings’ whose actions and beliefs are shaped by a greater force. The mighty 
educational system teaches them to forget their old Tow and high’ cultures, and 
introduces a new ‘national’ culture of uniform language.
The nation described in these terms has to be explained as a new social 
phenomenon. It is a product of industrial and technological revolutions, which 
constitute a dramatic change of social systems. Hence, Gellner could ignore the 
question whether the nation ‘has a navel’ or not, since it is explained as a social 
form with a new integrated social structure and cultural system which, according 
to Gellner, have little in common with the ‘low’ and ‘high’ culture of agrarian 
societies. The nation emerges at a particular point in Gellner’s unilinear
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evolutionist path of development after which a new era, the era of nationalism, 
starts, incomparable with previous stages of human development.
Gellner’s theory of nations and nationalism points to some of the most important 
processes of structural and cultural change which, one could easily agree, set the 
context for the formation of the nation. Yet, the picture of the process of nation- 
formation is rather cloudy. The role of agency entirely disappears during this 
process. It leaves us wondering whether the industrial and technological 
revolutions and the introduction of a uniform state-sponsored educational system, 
besides being necessary, are also sufficient conditions for the formation of the 
nation.
One of the theories which is labelled as primordialist, and stands in direct 
opposition to Gellner’s, is that of Pierre van den Berghe. Following basic 
sociobiological assumptions, van den Berghe understands ethnicity as an 
extension of the idiom of kinship. Ethnic sentiments can be understood only as 
an extended and reduced form of kin selection. Like many other types of human 
communities, an ethnic community, or as van den Berghe calls it ethny, is shaped 
endogamously and territorially.
In an attempt to explain the ‘nature’ of an ethny,; van den Berghe reaches for the 
roots of human sociality. The basic units of human sociality are family, clan, 
tribe, i.e. small groups of interrelated individuals, who share common unilinear 
descent (patrilineal or matrilineal). This type of community has an ‘evolutionary 
stable strategy’. Mutual inter-relatedness is a guarantee for mutual maximisation 
of inclusive fitness. A shared proportion of intrinsically selfish genes will always 
prefer kin over non-kin; nepotism will be the dominant kind of behaviour. 
Therefore, this mechanism can secure the immortality of the common gene, 
which is at the same time the basis of evolution.
When an exogamous basic group is transformed into an endogamous group (a 
breeding population of limited size whose members are related to each other), 
one can talk about an ethnic group. This ‘ethnicity can be manipulated' but not 
manufactured (van den Berghe, 1987: 27). Only with the developing of the
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political consciousness of an ethny, can an ethny develop into the nation: 
according to van den Berghe ‘the nation is a politically conscious ethny, that is, 
an ethny that claims the right to statehood by virtue of being an ethny. Such 
ideology is called nationalism’ (van den Berghe, 1987: 61).
This biologically based explanation of the process of nation-formation could be 
seen as an example of what Archer calls ‘upwards conflation’ in social 
theorising. Van den Berghe’s starting point is the nature of human beings. Unlike 
Gellner, he rightly emphasises that humans as social beings are those which 
create and then transform and maintain a specific set of relations known as social 
structure and cultural system like kinship, the family, tribe, ethny and, hence, the 
nation. All of these social forms are seen by van den Berghe as ‘evolutionary 
stable strategies’ which secure human survival. Hence, the main rationale behind 
the creation and maintenance of these social forms is not found either in human 
free will or in the ‘nature’ of social structure and culture, but in the internal 
driving force of genes.
However, it would be unjust to say that van den Berghe describes the whole 
richness of human society as deriving exclusively from genes. He recognises that 
human actions could be motivated by their interests, principles and even 
curiosities. But van den Berghe does not recognise the causal powers of those 
human ‘creations’. Social structure and culture are not only transformed or 
maintained by agency, but they also provide a context and, at the same time, 
enable and condition human behaviour. For example, even van den Berghe 
cannot ignore the power of the taboo in directing the behaviour of a member of a 
tribe. This taboo could have been created by members of a tribe in the past, but 
the taboo is maintained by the following generations who live according to the 
rules the taboo has set. These cultural and structural emergent properties always 
precede a particular agency, even though the same agency can transform them. 
This point can be even more clearly illustrated through another example of 
‘upward conflation’ in explaining the process of nation-formation.
With the aim of explaining the processes of nation-formation, a group of 
theoreticians emphasise the role of social engineering ‘which (is) often deliberate
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and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1989: 13). This approach also considers the creation of the nation as 
a modem process, but its methods are found in the so-called ‘invention of 
traditions’. Eric Hobsbawm sees this set of practices as a method for the 
implementation of certain values and norms of behaviour simply by repetition 
(Hobsbawm, 1989: 4). This process occurs in moments of great social change, of 
rapid transformation in societies, when older traditions cease to fulfil the task 
they were designed for: ‘ 'New' traditions simply resulted from the inability to 
use or adapt old ones’ {ibid.: 5). Such a rapid social change was most visible in 
the age of industrialisation and innovation - in a modem society. To create the 
cohesion and stability necessary in such a society, three main modes of inclusion 
and control can be implemented: (1) by establishing or legitimising institutions;
(2) by the invention of new status systems and modes of socialisation, which will 
also provide modes for desirable beliefs, value systems, and behaviour; and (3) 
through the formation of a community such as the nation, which can provoke a 
sense of identification either within that community or with the institutions 
representing, expressing or symbolising it {ibid.: 9). Put in this way, the nation 
becomes a perfect means for the creation and stabilisation of modem societies, 
and it is constructed with that aim.
Hobsbawn’s concept of ‘invention’ assumes the role of agency and yet it plays a 
crucial part in the process of nation-formation. At the same time agency is 
strongly influenced by radical changes in social structure and culture, which 
occur as consequences of contingent contradictions between their ‘parts’. 
However, it could not be said that Hobsbawm fully recognises the causal powers 
of structure and culture on human action. Following Hobsbawm’s arguments, it 
seems that the structural and cultural elaboration is entirely a result of agency’s 
free will, which can invent a whole new set of ‘traditions’. He does not recognise 
that even these ‘new traditions’ are set in the context of previous ‘traditions’ and 
other cultural emergent properties; that these ‘new traditions’ need legitimisation 
for their introduction and are legitimised mainly by reference to the cultural 
system which preceded the changes.
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Both van den Berghe’s and Hobsbawm’s theories of nation-formation explain the 
emergence of the nation as a result of agents’ interests and agendas. At the same 
time both theories, though different in approach and context, fail to explain the 
influence of those necessary unintended consequences of human actions that 
appear in the form of stratified and complex social structures; they fail to explain 
the richness of the cultural system, and above all, the interrelations between these 
structures and culture. Even in the most turbulent periods it rarely happens that 
the whole social structure collapses, and that the entire existing cultural system 
proves unable to ‘fulfil the task for which they were designed’. New social forms 
mainly emerge as a reflection of the old ones.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the examples of some of the most 
dominant theories of nation-formation given above:
• any theory of nation-formation which conflates one ‘part’ of social reality 
with another fails to explain the dynamics of the process of nation-formation;
• such a theory cannot explain the stratified ‘nature’ of social structure, cultural 
system and agency and their causal powers;
• hence, such a theory fails to explain relations and interactions between 
structure, culture and agency on which the process of nation-formation is 
based;
• this theory cannot offer a sufficient explanation of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for morphogenesis to occur, the product of which would be a 
nation.
One theory which recognises the importance of structuralised analysis of 
interrelations between social structure, cultural system and agency is the ethno- 
symbolic approach developed chiefly by Anthony D. Smith. Briefly, Smith 
argues that the nation and nationalism are modem phenomena, but that there are 
‘ethnic roots’ which ‘determine, to a considerable degree, the nature and limits of 
modem nationalisms and nations’ (1986: 18). This constitutes an ethnie, which is 
the basis for a future nation, and is shaped by a quartet of myths, memories, 
values, and symbols, shared and transmitted by a group of people over 
generations. This community, characterised by its isolation, passivity and cultural 
accommodation, was forced to change into a more activist, mobilised and
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politically more dynamic community - the nation. This process has occurred over 
time through triple revolutions: the division of labour, a revolution in the control 
of administration, and a revolution in cultural co-ordination (Smith, 1986: 131). 
These three revolutions have developed social surroundings which prefer 
centralised and culturally homogenised states. Achieving this aim, Smith argues, 
was possible only through a massive mobilisation of population and its further 
transformation into active citizens through the conjunction of culture with 
politics. The old ethnic ‘myth-symbol’ complexes and mythomoteurs* were 
revived and combined in order to achieve mobilisation, and create new identities 
among its citizens. These processes demanded a national unity, therefore, based 
on cohesion - fraternity, and on compact, secure, recognised territory - a 
homeland (Smith, 1986: 163). A long history of collective experience is 
necessary for both aims.
In his later work Smith (1998, 1999) emphasises that ‘it is the sense of cultural 
affinities, rather than physical kinship ties, embodied in a m yth of descent, shared 
historical memories and ethnic symbolism, that defines the structure of ethnic 
communities; and the same is true for any nations created on the bases of cultural 
affinity’ (1998: 192, italics in original). In this sentence Smith emphasises a one­
way relation between culture and structure: it is the cultural domain that formats 
a new social structure - the nation. Nevertheless, the term ‘cultural affinity’ 
implies socio-cultural interaction where an agency accepts and internalises a 
defined set of cultural properties. However, ethnic and/or national culture as a 
system contains a richer set of theories, doctrines, ideologies, systems of value 
and variety of myths, since, as Smith (1998: 187) himself defines, ‘culture is both 
an inter-generational repository and heritage, or set of traditions, and an active 
shaping repertoire of meanings and images, embodied in values, myths and 
symbols’. At this point Smith adds that culture defined in this way ‘serve(s) to 
unite a group of people with shared experiences and memories, and differentiate 
them from outsiders’ {ibid.). But at the same time the ‘ethnic past is composed of 
a series of traditions and memories which are the subject of constant
9 Smith defines mythomoteur as a constitutive myth of the ethnic polity, and 'myth-symbol' 
complex as a summarisation of existing ethnic ‘myths, symbols, their historical memories and 
central values’ (Smith, 1983: 15).
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reinterpretation’ (1999: 178). Following this argument, Smith’s definition of 
culture needs to be redefined: what unites, or could unite an ethnic group and/or 
nation in a particular moment; or period of their history, are specific myths of 
descent, particular historical memories and some symbols that represent an ethnie 
or a nation at that time. At one and the same time, culture is a collection of the 
cultural achievements of the previous generations and knowledge of current 
generations.
The myth-symbol complex is, one could agree, a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for the formation of an ethnie and nation. However, throughout its 
history the members of a specific nation are redefining and reinterpreting this 
complex. Therefore, depending on given circumstances, a single nation could 
claim unity based on different interpretations of the same myths and symbols, or 
use different symbols and myths to claim the same unity. The current myth- 
symbol complex is what defines the dominant nationalist ideology.
These dominant nationalist ideologies are always formed in respect to given 
circumstances. It is Smith (1999: 179) who emphasises that existing ‘concepts, 
institutions and symbols impose limits on the way subsequent generations grasp 
the experiences of their communal forebears. (...) As a result (...) it also sets 
clear limits to subsequent interpretations of itself, irrespective of the ideology of 
the interpreter’. At this point Smith recognises the causal powers of culture on 
agency that creates nationalist ideologies: ‘The nationalist finds that there are 
clear limits to the way in which his or her chosen nation can be reconstructed. 
These are the limits of particular ethno-histories’ {ibid.). However, the active role 
of agency in constructing nationalist ideologies is not only conditioned by 
cultural system, but also by the existing social structure. The role of nationalists 
does not end with an ‘archaeological type of work’. It is always provoked by 
current political, economic and social circumstances. It is the past, myths, 
symbols etc. that provide legitimisation for present demands - an independent 
state, autonomy, sovereignty, minority rights, a redefined economic system etc. 
This is the reason why ‘myth-symbol complexes’ have to be, as Smith says, 
‘renewed periodically’. They have to provide legitimisation for new demands 
that have emerged as a reaction to a new set of structural and cultural
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circumstances. Nationalist ideology is never just a set of reinterpreted ‘myth- 
symbol complexes’. It is also a political, social and economic agenda with clearly 
stated aims, claiming to protect the interests of a specific social group. In their 
attempt to create a nationalist ideology, these nationalists are at the same time 
constrained and enabled by both existing social structure and culture.
Just as in previous cases, this brief summary falls short of describing the whole 
richness and thoroughness of the theory. However, it demonstrates that the 
process of nation-formation can be described in terms of ‘active dynamism, the 
transformative power, which is characteristic of what we call “nation-building”’ 
(Smith, 1999: 175). Dynamism in Smith’s theory of nation-formation is reflected 
in interrelations between structure (triple revolutions), culture (myth-symbol 
complex), and agency (an elite which organises the ‘masses’). In addition, unlike 
some ‘modernist’ theories, the ethno-symbolic approach emphasises the 
importance of the ‘origins’ of the nation which provides a picture of the 
structural and cultural conditioning associated with the emergence of the nation. 
For these reasons Smith’s ethno-symbolic theory of nation-formation is a strong 
starting point for developing a social realist framework.
In the next section I will attempt to sketch a framework for analysis of the 
process of nation-formation based on the principles defined by Realist Social 
Theory.
2.3. Morphogenesis of Nation
The nation as a social form emerges through a process of social change. At the 
beginning of this chapter it was emphasised that in most cases it is difficult to 
predict when and if a social change will occur, and such a change can be detected 
and analysed only ex post facto. Nevertheless, even though subject to change, the 
relationships between structure, culture and agency are relatively enduring. It will 
now be argued that the process of nation-formation can only be analysed by a 
closer examination of these relationships.
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This analysis of the process of nation-formation, based on the principles of 
analytical dualism, is necessarily historical in two senses: first, it assumes 
historicity o f emergence (Archer, 1995: 66) where structure, culture and agency 
are not only analytically separable but also temporally distinguishable; and, 
second, the nation as a social phenomenon necessarily emerges in a specific 
historical period.
Following Margaret Archer’s arguments this analysis consists of three stages: 
first, it is necessary to analyse structural and cultural conditioning, that is, 
circumstances that preceded the emergence of the nation; second, an analysis of 
the dynamics of socio-cultural and group interaction is necessary in which 
contradictions between them can be explained; and, third, it is necessary to 
analyse the ways structural, cultural and group elaboration occurs which could 
ultimately result in the creation of the nation. Following Lockwood, Archer 
(1996: 294) emphasises that agential interaction does not necessarily or even 
usually mirror systemic interaction. However, for a nation to emerge, a specific 
morphogenesis of structure, culture and agency has to occur in the relatively 
same period of time, and it could only be explained by individually analysing its 
three phases of emergence.
The aim of this section is not to offer a full account of the history of the 
emergence of the nation as a social phenomenon. Rather, it will be an attempt to 
construct a methodological framework for the analysis of the process of the 
/re/formation of a particular nation.
2.3.1. Structural and Cultural Conditioning
One of the common characteristics of all pre-national societies was the relation of 
necessary complementarity of structural emergent properties where the existing 
institutions were mutually reinforcing. The system has developed institutions 
designed for reinforcing the rule of the monarch, protecting the existing 
distribution of resources, and preventing the emergence of any potential force 
which could contest it. One of the major forces required for the implementation
58
of ‘law and order’ was the army, which served an individual, rather than a certain 
people or specific country. Even in situations where the rule of an existing 
monarch was contested by a pretender to the throne, the consequent system itself 
was not to be changed. Such a political system suited a mainly agricultural 
economy which, together with trade, small industry and occasional conquering, 
could sustain the existing political system. This high system integration produced 
a situational logic of protection, where those involved could only find sustaining 
the existing system personally beneficial.
While structural integration in these societies seems obvious, some authors, like 
Gellner, question the level of its cultural integration. Indeed, in the way Gellner 
describes them, ‘low’ and ‘high’ culture have little in common. They represent 
two different lifestyles, sets of traditions, customs and mores, even languages. It 
was a period of low socio-cultural integration. Yet, at the same time, at the level 
of the cultural system these two ‘cultures’ were in a direct logical relationship of 
‘necessary complementarity’. The ‘high’ culture of the elite would not be 
possible or understandable without reference to so-called ‘low’ culture and vice 
versa. However different in content these cultures were, reference to the ‘low’ 
culture necessarily invokes a ‘high’ one. The relationship between these two 
‘cultures’ was regulated by the dominant doctrines, created in order to provide 
legitimisation for the existing distribution of resources. Hence, the idea of a 
divine source of the monarch’s sovereignty, and ‘rights by birth’ were equally 
accepted by both cultures, as too was the idea of a ‘natural’ division between 
those who rule and those who are ruled. Such a situation can be described as high 
cultural system integration.
This situation of high systemic integration (both cultural and structural) created a 
situational logic for the agency and conditioned the creation of a single corporate 
(ruling) agency in a society. This agency managed to gain control over both 
ideational and material resources. Where structural and cultural emergent 
properties are in a relation of necessary compatibility, the cultural and structural 
corporate agents find an interest in sustaining and protecting the system. Hence, 
the cultural elite, mainly composed of, or controlled by, the clergy, found it 
beneficial to be sponsored by the political elite thus securing their material
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interests. In return, the political elite adopted the doctrines promoted by the
cultural elite which provided its legitimisation. In contrast to these corporate
agents, the vast majority of the unorganised population of primary agents were
unable to articulate their interests. As Archer describes it (1996: 263):
(W)here there is unopposed cultural traditionalism and unchallenged 
structural domination, Corporate Agency tends to congeal into one, rather 
than developing fissiparous tendencies, and as a single group is even 
more empowered to mould and manipulate Primary Agents by controlling 
their opportunities for and attitudes towards greater social participation.
Even though the Primary Agents are described as passive and unable to directly 
participate in reconstructing the structural system in which they live, they still 
constitute the environment in which the corporate agents act and thus constrain 
them. What Archer calls ‘cultural traditionalism’ does not appear only at the 
level of the cultural system of the society. At the local level, independent from 
the corporate agents, primary agents are conditioned by their local ‘low’ cultures 
as well. While most of the corporate agents in a society share a similar ‘high’ 
culture, the primary agents are divided by their own traditions, maintaining their 
own local vernaculars, customs and mores, myths and symbols. Where these 
primary agents also sustained a specific name for their group, and were attached 
to a specific territory, they were also recognised as a unique ethnic group.10 
Hence, unlike the corporate agents, the primary agents of a pre-national society 
were culturally conditioned in two ways - by the dominant doctrine which 
legitimises the position of the corporate agents, and by their local traditions. The 
two doctrines and cultural systems were not necessarily in contradiction or 
competition. Yet, even those who denied the legitimacy of the existing rule, 
either due to the lack of a competing doctrine or a lack of material resources, 
could not successfully contest its legitimacy.
In spite of the existing high level of systemic integration, factors such as strong 
divisions between corporate and primary agents, and division amongst the 
primary agents themselves, also prevented the creation of high socio-cultural 
integration. Nevertheless, as long as the resources were concentrated in the hands
10 As explained in the Introduction, in order to keep the arguments simple and as clear as possible, 
at this point I will not further develop the relationship between the ethnic group and the nation.
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of a single corporate agent, and as long as the cultural system was unable to 
produce alternatives, society was going through a series of morphostatic cycles.
According to Archer, these long periods of morphostasis are mainly responsible 
for the creation of a myth of cultural integration. However, every society 
undergoes some changes.
The situational logic of protection, Archer explains, which is a result of necessary 
complementarities between structural and cultural ‘parts’, tends to strengthen 
pre-existing relations by both a systematisation of existing relations, and an 
adoption of systemic innovations. At the level of the cultural system, the 
systematisation of ideas results in a substantial increase in ‘cultural density’ 
(Archer, 1996: 176). Thus it develops a specific vocabulary, distinctions, 
symbols and concepts, a tightly articulated set of ideas, which in return create 
‘natural boundaries’ between cultures. Hence, while facing difficulties related to 
the adoption of further innovations, the systematised concept protects its stability 
by ‘brooking no rivals from outside and repressing rivalry inside’ {ibid.: 111). 
Such a protective closure strengthens boundary-maintenance of a particular 
culture. It is important to emphasise that the same process of cultural closure 
occurs at the level of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, yet not necessarily at the same 
time.
This is a rather simplistic picture of the structural and cultural conditioning of 
pre-national societies, mainly emphasising what was common in the majority of 
pre-national societies. Of course, there are some significant differences between 
these societies as well. Without any wish to enter into a detailed discussion, it 
will be enough to emphasise the strategic differences between systemic 
conditioning of monarchies, empires and city states.11
Besides the structural differences in the management of societies due to their 
size, the most significant difference in the conditioning of agency was in the 
cultural domain. Even though the cultural system of these societies was
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characterised by relations of necessary complementarities, not all of these 
systems had an equal success in systematising its main ideas, values and 
doctrines, or in protecting and reproducing them among its population. Excluding 
the ancient civilizations, probably, in these terms, the most successful societies 
were those of Western European monarchies. Here, the cultural elite, in co­
operation with a structural one, managed to create and reproduce a unifying 
doctrine of legitimisation of their status which even at this stage prevented the 
formation of competitive corporate agents. On the other hand, the vast majority 
of population shared a similar local, ‘low’ culture. By protecting the ‘intrusion’ 
of any rival concepts from outside, which could contest the ‘high’ culture, the 
corporate agents were, at the same time, protecting any major disturbance of the 
local culture as well. As long as corporate agents were successful, the stability of 
the society was secured.
European empires faced bigger difficulties. Firstly, the main principle of the 
legitimisation of the dominant corporate agents, which was based on ‘birth’ and 
‘divine’ rights, did not necessarily incorporate former elites of the conquered or 
‘inherited’ societies, which had claimed their rights by the same principles. 
Moreover, these potential counter-elites were still perceived as corporate agents 
by their local population. In spite of existing differences, the lack of resources, 
both material and ideational, prevented these former-corporate agents from 
organising and articulating their interests. Secondly, at the local level, corporate 
agents were facing different environments created by culturally distinct primary 
agents. This conditioning, in turn, created the context in which corporate agents 
acted, and these agents inadvertently found themselves introducing instability 
into these local cultures. Hence, for example, the stability of the Habsburg 
Empire, throughout its existence, depended greatly on capabilities of Habsburg 
rulers to gain support or at least some level of cooperation of Hungarian, Czech, 
Croatian and other ‘local’ nobility.
In European city-states, the situation was the opposite. Both ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
cultures found it difficult to ‘protect’ themselves from the influences of the
111 believe that parallels could be drawn to the non-European and colonial societies as well, but at
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surrounding cultures due to their closeness in space and structure. Except in 
terms of a specific territory, these cultures could not successfully produce their 
own ‘natural boundaries’. Constant changes of alliances, borders and rulers of the 
German city-states, for example, and diversity of developed doctrines and 
ideologies that emerged at the time, illustrate the level of instability of their 
structural and cultural systems.
Nevertheless, every society is an open system and the protection from the 
‘intrusion’ of novelties is always partial, even in the case of successfully 
systematised relations of necessary complementarities. By force of internal 
factors (i.e. pauperisation of the population, revolts, fiscal problems) and external 
factors (like wars, change of trade routes) the control of the corporate agents over 
the systemic configuration of the society was weakened. Hence, on the one hand, 
innovations in techniques and technologies implemented in the economy created 
a situation of contingent incompatibilities within the economic system which 
resulted in what some authors call the industrial revolution. The same 
innovations increased the mobility of population and the exchange of ideas. 
Those ideas, doctrines and ideologies that could not be incorporated into the 
existing dominant core doctrine, contested it.
These developments on both structural and cultural levels necessarily 
conditioned the relationship between corporate and primary agents. 
Industrialisation forced a re-distribution of resources. While the dominant elites 
were mainly engaged in agriculture, cultural reproduction and governing the 
society, the primary agents entered into the sphere of industrialisation, both as 
managers and entrepreneurs, and as a newly urbanised workers. A more complex 
economic system, along with the introduction of new technologies in war 
machinery, demanded stronger control by the corporate agents over the structural 
system. Industrialisation and developments of warfare brought with it 
bureaucratisation. These developments set the stage for possible socio-cultural 
interaction.
this point, in order to keep the argument simple as possible, I will not refer to these societies.
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From this short overview of the systemic conditioning in pre-national societies, 
several methodological directions for an analysis of the emergence of a specific 
nation can be drawn. An analysis of nation-formation in a particular society 
must:
• take into account the specificities of developed structural and cultural 
systems;
• explore relations between existing institutions which condition the 
distribution of material resources in a pre-national society;
• explain the relationships between the dominant set of doctrines, and the 
emergence of new doctrines and ideas which contest them; and
• examine the level of socio-cultural integration in that society, that is, the 
existence of separate cultural (ethnic) groups and the distribution of resources 
among them.
An analysis which offers an explanation of this specific structural and cultural 
conditioning, represents a starting point for the analysis of the socio-cultural 
interaction of relevant agencies.
2.3.2. Socio-cultural Interaction
The structural and cultural conditioning described above created certain 
predispositions for the agency’s actions. These conditional effects, ‘to be socially 
efficacious (...) have to be taken up, articulated and acted upon’ (Archer, 1996: 
253). As previously emphasised, systemic conditioning is mediated through 
agency where it supplies the reasons for maintenance or change of the system. 
These reasons have to be recognised and accepted by an agency, and hence 
associated with its vested interests.
Newly created groups of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats that emerged in previous 
stage were increasingly recruited from the ranks of primary agents. Both groups 
took over positions which enabled them to control material resources, by 
increasing their wealth or power in governing the state. Yet, the strict distinction 
between the existing corporate agents and primary agents, as maintained by the 
dominant ideology, prevented these newly formed social groups from entering
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the ranks of dominant corporate agents. Certain ranks in the army, as well as in 
politics, like top positions in bureaucracy for example, were primarily reserved 
for the corporate agents themselves. Certain social circles were closed to the 
‘newcomers’. The education system, mainly controlled by the Church, was not 
open for all social strata. In addition, the existing corporate agents were 
controlling the taxation and customs systems, which were perceived as being 
restrictive to the newly developing industrialisation.
Even though the new agencies, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats clearly recognised
their own vested interests, they still could not directly challenge the legitimacy of
the ruling elite. In order to accomplish this, these new agencies had to co-operate
with a new cultural agency which could be able to create a counter-ideology. As
Archer (1996: 266) explains:
Only if resources can be brought to bear to undermine the basis of 
domination, only if organisation can mobilise sufficient members to this 
end, and only if a counter-ideology challenging legitimacy and 
legitimating assertions is developed does a new Corporate Agent 
confront the entrenched Vested Interest Group.
While the structural system produced new social actors, usually labelled as the 
‘bourgeoisie’, at the cultural level a new group of cultural agents emerged. Their 
emergence was the result of an inability of the cultural corporate agents to adopt 
and systematise new ideas within the dominant doctrines, since these newly 
created concepts and ideologies were in direct confrontation with the dominant 
ones by contesting the same legitimacy of the corporate agents. The most 
dominant contesting ideology was that of nationalism. The ‘core doctrine’ of 
nationalism is summarised by Smith (1999: 102) as follows:
1. the world is divided into nations, each with its own character and destiny;
2. the nation is the sole source of political power, and loyalty to it overrides all 
other loyalties;
3. everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free;
4. to realise themselves, nations must be autonomous;
5. nations must be free and secure if there is to be peace and justice in the world.
As is apparent, the nationalist ‘core doctrine’ was built around the concept of 
popular sovereignty. The idea that the ‘people’ themselves have to be creators of
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their own destiny by forming their own government was presented as a new 
‘natural law’. This concept was in direct opposition to the dominant doctrine, 
which recognised only one sovereign, the monarch. Yet, in order to successfully 
challenge the doctrine of the corporate agents, the term ‘people’ required further 
elaboration, and the demand for popular sovereignty further justification. Both 
were found in the concept of the ‘nation’. The nation defined by a nationalist 
ideology is not an entirely ‘new’ concept created ab ovo. In this concept the 
nation is a delimited group, characterised by certain attributes. But the range of 
limitations and variety of attributes of such a group are necessarily constrained 
by pre-existing cultural and structural properties. On the one hand, those existing 
dominant doctrines and previously implemented structures, through the 
systematisation of their ideas and practices, had already formed a ‘naturally 
bounded’ agency. On the other hand, the broad population of these societies was 
not described as an agency just for the sake of being different from corporate 
agents. They were also adherents of their local cultures and structures. Nationalist 
ideologies defined the nation exactly around these specific properties - their 
culture. To be more precise: nationalist ideologies are not concerned with culture 
as a set of integrated ideas, concepts and doctrines, ways of life, symbols, myths 
and folk songs. Rather, they define a nation in terms of those cultural properties 
which could, first of all, be perceived by the majority of the given population as 
common and unifying, and second, as exclusive and unique. Only then can 
‘culture’ be described as ‘ours’. ‘Our culture’ is not only a marker of a group’s 
boundaries. It is also a source of legitimisation for the group’s existence and its 
rightful demands.
The vast majority of primary agents during the period of increased 
industrialisation were disorganised and their demands went unarticulated, yet 
they still formed the environment for corporate agents’ actions. Newly emerging 
cultural agents could establish the idea of sovereignty among a specific 
population characterised by distinctive cultural characteristics. The idea of 
popular sovereignty was in a relation of necessary complementarity with the idea 
of the nation. This relation created a logical situation of protection and required 
further systematisation.
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In order to challenge the position of dominant corporate agents, new structural 
agencies adopted the new nationalist ideology and hence made an alliance with 
the newly emergent cultural agency. At the same time, these new cultural agents, 
by collaborating with the new structural agents, found protection and 
sponsorship. Finding common interests, the new agencies acquired a structural 
organisation (either as political parties, movements or cultural groups), and an 
articulated legitimising ideology, which at the same time successfully challenged 
the legitimacy of the ruling elite. They gradually established themselves as the 
new corporate agency in direct confrontation with the old elite, each with their 
own bargaining powers.
Empires and city-state societies found themselves in an even more complex 
situation. In the case of empires, the redistribution of resources and the 
emergence of an alternative ideational concept - nationalist ideology - opened a 
space for the formation of several competing corporate agents. Those who 
managed to articulate their interests and organise themselves necessarily 
concentrated on challenging the legitimacy of the ruling elite. In addition, due to 
their competing vested interests, some found themselves in direct confrontation 
with each other. The concept of the nation provided them with a tool for 
mobilising, not only their own culturally distinctive primary agents, but the local 
former-elites as well.
The corporate agents of city-states, who managed to define the structural but not 
cultural boundaries of their societies, found themselves challenged by new 
corporate agents, who in turn, had found a solution in the concept of the nation.
As already emphasised, new cultural and structural agencies were mainly formed 
from the ranks of the primary agents. While corporate agents were still in 
possession of the bulk of material resources, these primary agents could rely 
mainly on their human resources. The appearance of new ideas, doctrines and 
ideologies, at the same time, opened a debate which put the issue of popular and 
national sovereignty on the ‘popular agenda’ (Archer, 1996: 267). The success of 
the new ‘nationalistic’ corporate agents now depended on the popular appeal of 
their proclaimed ideology.
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Hence, in its second phase, an analysis of the formation of a particular nation has 
to examine developments of socio-cultural interaction, conditioned by the 
structural and cultural systems in a pre-national society. A few methodological 
directions can be drawn from this. For such an analysis it is necessary to:
• determine all relevant agencies, whose vested interests were in direct 
opposition to each other, due to the differential distribution of material and 
ideational resources;
• determine the main structural and cultural corporate agents, explain the 
process of their emergence, and the relations between them;
• at the same time, explain the main characteristics of the primary agents,
especially in reference to their distinctive local cultures;
• give special attention to the explanation of which cultural corporate agents 
developed a nationalist ideology, and how they went about doing this. This 
must include an analysis of the proposed definition of the nation in general 
and ‘their own’ nation in particular, the way it defined national culture, and 
proclaimed political agenda; and
• examine the methods corporate agents employ for mobilising primary agents.
Therefore, an analysis of the socio-cultural interactions of the main agencies in 
pre-national societies could underline the main processes which may eventually 
result in the formation of a particular nation.
2.3.3. Social Elaboration
The main objective of this section, to paraphrase Archer (1996: 294), is to set out 
the conditions under which the morphogenesis of the nation could occur, taking 
into account the developments in the socio-cultural interaction conditioned in a 
prior social context. As Archer emphasises, bearing in mind that the nation 
emerges in a society defined as an open system, these conditions are only 
tendential. Moreover, the morphogenetic approach is not constructed with the 
aim of explaining the emergence of social phenomena, but rather to provide an 
explanatory methodological framework for an analysis of the emergence of a 
particular social phenomenon in a specific society at a defined time.
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As already stressed, even though agency is conditioned by prior social structures 
and cultural systems, it also changes or maintains these systems. Therefore, 
whether a socio-cultural system will be reproduced or transformed depends 
exclusively on the developments in the socio-cultural interaction of the corporate 
agents. Hence, as Archer explains ‘to specify the conditions under which changes 
are transacted is to indicate what, in addition to their initial bargaining position, 
gives a group negotiating strength ’ (1995: 297; italics in original)
These initial bargaining positions of the groups are mainly determined by 
available resources and pre-groupings of agents. As was shown earlier, newly 
developed corporate agents, which adopted a nationalist ideology and agenda and 
achieved some level of organisation and definition of their mutual interests, had 
limited access to material resources which necessarily limited promotion of their 
demands. However, with the development of industrialisation, division of labour, 
development of bureaucracy and systematisation of the new nationalistic 
doctrines, the availability and concentration of resources changed as well. These 
changes provided a new context for further interaction between conflicting 
corporate agents. The potential negotiating strength of the corporate agents in 
question depends on the availability of both material and ideational resources, but 
their real power depends mainly upon the social reception of their proclaimed 
ideology and political agenda by primary agents. These nationalistic corporate 
agents will occupy a better bargaining position only when they manage to 
successfully mobilise available material resources and gain the support of 
primary agents.
Primary agents were structurally and culturally constrained in a twofold manner: 
by their own local structure and culture, and by structure and culture that were 
shaped and maintained by corporate agents. What defined them as primary agents 
was a lack of proper organisation and failure to articulate their own vested 
interests. This disorganisation was a direct consequence of the conditional 
influences of that dual set of structural and cultural emergent properties. 
Differences of gender, age, education, socio-economic status, vernaculars, 
symbols, affinities, etc., in pre-national societies prevented them from forming an
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organised collectivity beyond their narrow locality with clearly defined vested 
interests. At the same time, direct confrontation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
corporate agents forces them to seek support from primary agents. At this stage 
primary agents are still just ‘recipients of struggles over decision-making 
between Corporate agents’ (Archer, 1995: 186). Even though unorganised and 
internally divided, these primary agents still present a substantial human resource 
which corporate agents will try to mobilise for their own purposes. However, 
through that process of mobilisation these primary agents ‘(a)s self-reflective 
agents, (...) underwent regrouping in the process: in future time they were no 
longer a mere resource but have started to become a force - in a struggle which 
had now become their own’ {ibid.). The primary agents increasingly became 
ogranised into ‘movements’.
To be more specific, new nationalist corporate agents formed their ideology 
around the principle of popular national sovereignty and consequently the 
principle of national self-determination, which directly challenged the 
legitimising principle of the ‘old’ corporate agents. In order to legitimise these 
claims, it was firstly necessary to define what is the nation and who are its 
members. Legitimisation is found in ‘national culture’. Even though defined in 
terms of local cultures, these local cultures are not adopted as a whole into the 
new ‘national’ culture. Rather, local cultures provided already an existing set of 
cultural ‘products’, myths, memories, vernaculars, and symbols, with which 
primary agents could identify. By carefully selecting specific cultural traits as 
markers of their nation, the corporate agents were politically organising 
fissiparous primary agents into a new community.
However, it would be misleading to conclude that an appeal to common cultural 
traits alone is what mobilises primary agents. The appeal to the common 
‘national’ culture defines the group which is to be mobilised, and offers a 
legitimisation for proclaimed demands. These proclaimed demands, and the 
stated political agenda of the nationalist corporate agents are what will be 
decisive for the mobilisation of primary agents.
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The beginning of this chapter also emphasised that the nation emerges as a result 
of a process of social change. According to the main principles of Realist Social 
Theory a new social change occurs through the series of distinctive 
morphogenetic cycles. Any change which occurs in a structural or cultural 
system at the same time forms systematic conditioning for the following 
morphogenetic cycles. The morphogenesis of the nation has to be examined in 
the same manner.
Every redistribution of material and ideational resources available to the 
corporate agents is a product of some morphogenetic cycle. The existing 
distribution of resources conditions the actions of corporate agents involved. The 
level of availability of resources to nationalist corporate agents at their inception, 
the level of systematisation of their proclaimed ideology, and their direct relation 
to other corporate agents, conditions the formulation of their demands. Therefore, 
for example, not all nationalist corporate agents have as their primary demand the 
formation of an independent nation-state. Conditioned by the structural and 
cultural context, corporate agents have to deal with the issues they perceive as the 
most constraining or beneficial for the development of their bargaining power. 
Hence, nationalist corporate agents would include in their political programme 
and make their primary aims issues regarding the usage of their ‘national’ 
language in the education system, minority rights, equality of opportunity, 
parliamentary representation, and other similar issues.
Even if corporate agents manage to define national culture and their nation in a 
form attractive to primary agents, their success in mobilising these primary 
agents will depend on the ways that nationalist corporate agents have responded 
to pressing political, economic and social problems. With a changed set of 
structural and cultural circumstances, the corporate agents would have to redefine 
their ideology in order to sustain the broad support of primary agents. This does 
not just include a redefinition of priorities or introduction of new political 
demands. Influenced by internal and external factors and changes of the 
structural and cultural segments of society, the nationalist corporate agents will 
also have to redefine their national culture, their concept of the nation in general
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and ‘their own’nation in particular. Like any other social form, the nation is an 
open system predisposed to changes.
The question still remains: when does the nation emerge? Following the 
definition of the nation given earlier, it could be said that a specific nation 
emerges when:
• the nationalist corporate agents manage to institutionalise their activity 
through some kind of political, economic or cultural organisation;
• the nationalist ideology of corporate agents manages to clearly define the 
‘national culture’;
• the nationalist corporate agents successfully mobilise the primary agents 
around their proclaimed ideology and political agenda;
• the primary agents re-group into a promotive interest group whose co-action 
supports the corporate agents’ demands;
• the primary agents perceive each other as a members of the same community; 
and
• such a triple morphogenesis, that of agency, structure and culture, occurs at a 
roughly similar time.
Hence, it could be concluded that the level of success of the processes of 
institutionalisation of nationalist groups, nationalisation of social institutions, 
ideologisation of the nation, nationalisation of culture, and mobilisation and 
nationalisation of primary agents determines the emergence of the social 
phenomenon called the nation.
This framework is developed with the aim of providing a methodology for the 
analysis of the history of the emergence of a nation in a particular society. In the 
following chapters this methodological framework will be applied to the case of 
the emergence of the Croatian nation.
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Chapter Three
OPERATIONALISATION AND METHODOLOGY
The previous chapter examined Social Realist Theory, and developed a 
methodological framework for the analysis of the emergence of the nation. This 
chapter will operationalise the basic principles of the developed framework, so 
that is can be applied to a specific case: the emergence of the Croatian nation. 
This chapter aims to establish the principles of an historical analysis of the 
emergence of the Croatian nation through examining interrelations between 
structure, culture and agency within Croatian society over a specific period.
3.1. Period of the Analysis
The basic thesis of Social Realist Theory states that all social forms emerge as a 
consequence of social process. Therefore, in order to examine the consequence - 
the emergence of the Croatian nation - it is necessary to first limit the analysis to 
a specific historical period.
As examined in the previous chapter, this research defines the nation as a social 
agency politically organised as a community which claims its rights on the basis 
o f a culture defined as its own. This definition itself limits the period of the 
analysis. The first organisation which attempted to introduce the broader 
population into Croatian politics appeared in the 1830s. The same organisation 
made the first attempt to formulate a more-or-less coherent Croatian nationalist 
ideology. Hence, the 1830s should be a starting point for a historical analysis of 
the emergence of the Croatian nation. However, since social developments in 
Croatia in the 1830s are conditioned by an earlier social system, as the previously 
developed theoretical framework makes clear, a brief historical analysis should 
explain the structural, cultural and agential interrelations which ‘produced’ the 
first attempts of defining the Croatian nation.
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Just as in many other Eastern European cases, for more than 150 years after the 
formulation of the first nationalist ideology, the Croatian nation could not and did 
not, develop the ultimate nationalist aim of creating a state in which ‘ethnic 
boundaries ... (will not) separate the power-holders from the rest’ (Gellner, 1983: 
1). Disregarding the tragic attempt of 1941-1945, the Croatian nation managed to 
establish its first sovereign nation-state in 1991. The established state, defined by 
its Constitution as national, provided a new social structure in which a new 
nationalist ideology and a new set of cultural properties marked as a new national 
culture. The 1990s will constitute the last stage of the analysis.
From the 1830s until the 1990s, Croatian society went through numerous 
changes. An historical analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation does not 
imply that all of these changes should be accounted for. Rather, this analysis will 
be concentrated around a specific set of social processes. As argued before, since 
social change can be identified only ex post facto, the stages of analysis, that is, 
the morphogenetical cycles of the emergence of the Croatian nation, can be 
recognised from the outset. Taking into account the level of structural, cultural 
and agential change, from the 1830s until the 1990s Croatian society went 
through six stages:
• from 1830s until 1868 - the period of Enlightened Absolutism
• from 1868 until 1918 - the period of Dual Monarchy
• from 1918 until 1941 - the period of the First Yugoslavia
• from 1941 until 1945 - the period of the Independent State of Croatia
• from 1941 until 1990 - the period of the Second Yugoslavia
• from 1990 onwards - the period of the Croatian nation-state
Each of these stages and the transition from one stage into another will be 
analysed on several levels.
3.2. Levels of the Analysis
Even though the terms social structure, culture and agency signify specific levels 
of analysis, they are too general and undefined to be used as such in empirical 
research. Hence it is necessary to offer an operational definition of each of them 
(see Figure 5).
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For the purpose of this research morphogenetical cycles of social structure will 
be defined as dependent on three segments: the political and economic structures 
of the society and its educational system. Political structure will be examined 
through an analysis of the structure of the political institutions and political party 
system; economic structure through an analysis of the existing economic 
institutions and the dominant economic policy; and the educational system 
through an analysis of the educational institutions and some segments of the 
curriculum.
Bearing in mind that the term culture is one of the most widely used and defined 
concepts in social sciences, for the purpose of this research, as emphasised in the 
Introduction, ‘culture’ will be defined mainly as a set of ideas related to national 
and ethnic issues. Therefore, cultural morphogenetical cycles will be examined 
through existing nationalist ideologies. A consistent set of the ideas that offers a 
definition of the nation in general, a definition of the Croatian nation and a 
definition of the significant others, represents a Croatian nationalist ideology.
Finally, the agency will be analysed on two levels: the level of corporate agents 
and the level of primary agents. Hence, corporate agents will be analysed on the 
cultural level as nationalist ideologists and on a structural level as ruling or 
oppositional political agencies. This research will hold that the role of primary 
agents in the emergence of the Croatian nation can be examined only through the 
examination of their attitudes and only hypothesised through the examination of 
their actions.
For each historical period of analysis this research will give an account of its 
social structure, culture and relevant agencies operationally defined in the terms 
explained above.
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3.3. Interrelations of the Levels of the Analysis
Morphogenesis of the nation defined in the previous chapter assumes three types 
of interrelations between social segments (see Figure 6):
A. interrelations between social structure, culture and agency within a specific 
morphogenetical cycle that appears in three forms:
1. The first form (O) signifies the interrelation between the structural and 
cultural conditions, that is, the ways political, economic and educational 
systems present an institutionalisation of the dominant 
doctrines/nationalist ideologies and local/national cultures, and, in return, 
how dominant doctrines/nationalist ideologies promote social structure.
2. The second form (©) is a consequence of structural and cultural 
conditioning of the formation of agency and agential action. In the 
specific case of an empirical analysis of the emergence of the Croatian 
nation, these ‘internal’ relations will be presented through an analysis of 
the methods the political institutions, economic and educational systems 
on the one side, and dominant doctrines/existing nationalist ideologies 
and local/national cultures, on the other, determine the formation and 
action of the corporate agents and mould the attitudes towards the nation 
of primary agents.
3. The next type of interrelationship (©), structural and cultural elaboration, 
examines corporate agents’ attempts to transform social structure and 
culture according to their goals as stated in their nationalist ideology.
B. Interaction between different internal segments of structure, culture and 
agency (O). As stated earlier, one of the significant relationship in the 
process of the emergence of the nation is an interrelation between corporate 
and primary agents. Hence, at the level of socio-cultural interaction relations 
between the corporate and primary agents have to be examined. Therefore, 
one of the aims of the research is to investigate the methods corporate agents 
utilise in the mobilising of primary agents around corporate agents’ 
nationalist ideology and, consequently, primary agents’ responses to these 
attempts.
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C. Interaction between consequent morphogenetical cycles (©). According to 
the theoretical framework, each elaboration of the structural and cultural level 
at the same time composes social conditioning for the following 
morphogenetic cycle. However, in order to observe a social process, it is 
necessary to analyse the extent of structural, cultural and agential 
transformation which occurs between each period of analysis.
[n this case an analysis of the process of the emergence of the Croatian nation 
:hese five types of interrelations dictate a specific structure for the empirical 
research.
3.4. Structure of the Empirical Research
[n order to test the hypotheses stated in the theoretical framework, the set of five 
nterrelations, described above, have to be examined throughout the six given 
periods of analysis. It is important to emphasise that the structure of empirical 
research is, in principle, conditioned not only by the stated hypotheses, but also 
]>y the availability of data; not only with a set of proclaimed research goals, but 
by the chosen period of analysis. Hence, bearing in mind the limitations of an 
malysis of social process, the process of the emergence of the Croatian nation is 
itructured in the following way:
I. Such an analysis firstly has to offer a brief historical analysis of the 
development of structural and cultural conditioning in the period from the 
migration of the Croats to the Balkan peninsula until the 1830s. The main 
political structure and economic system of Croatian society will be given, as 
well as a brief account of the existing dominant doctrines and existing local 
cultures. A brief history of the emergence of those corporate agents who were 
dominating events prior to the 1830s will also be inclyded.
I. Consequently, for each period of the analysis a historical account of the main 
political structure and economic system will be given, followed by an 
examination of the ways established political and economic systems 
conditioned the formation of corporate agents.
79
3. For each period an analysis of the dominant nationalist ideology will be 
conveyed. Following the operational definition of these ideologies given 
above, these analyses will offer an overview on the main definitions of the 
nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular which will include 
analyses of the ways national culture, political goals and significant others 
have been defined.
4. In a separate chapter this research will offer a comparative analysis of the 
Croatian educational systems. This research which deals with their 
interrelation with the structure and culture at a given time, aims to explore the 
ways social structure incorporates dominant nationalist ideologies. Hence, 
the educational curriculum will be compared from the second half of the 
nineteenth century until the 1990s.
5. Finally, this research has to examine the relationship between corporate and 
primary agents. While the methods employed by the corporate agents in order 
to mobilise the primary agents will be analysed within each historical period, 
the final task of the research is to examine how the primary agents respond to 
structural and cultural conditioning and the nature of their response to the 
actions of the corporate agents. As already stated, the role of the primary 
agents in the process of the emergence of the nation can be examined only 
through investigation of their attitudes and only hypothesised through the 
examination of their actions. In this case the limitation of data available for 
analysis will manifest itself most intensively.
3.5. Methodology
The proposed structure of the empirical research sets strict conditions on the 
available methods of analysis.
The character of structural and cultural conditioning and the processes of the 
formation of relevant corporate agents for each period of analysis is investigated 
through a review of relevant secondary literature on Croatian history. This review 
offers a picture of Croatian political system, developed political institutions and 
party systems, and the Croatian economic system, with reference to its economic
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institutions and economic policy. At the same time the review identifies relevant 
political, economic and cultural corporate agencies, and the relations between 
them.
The same review of literature reveals seven dominant Croatian nationalist 
ideologies within the set periods of analysis. These are:
• the Illyrian nationalist ideology,
• the Yugoslav nationalist ideology,
• the nationalist ideology of the Party of Rights,
• the nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasants Party,
• the Ustasha’s nationalist ideology,
• the Communists’ nationalist ideology, and
• the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudjman.
The main ideas and principles of each nationalist ideology are described through 
a content analysis of the writings of their creators. The content analysis looks at 
the ways each nationalist ideology answers the following questions: what is the 
nation? what is the Croatian nation? who are the enemies of the Croatian nation?
In addition, Tudjman’s nationalist ideology is also analysed through a content 
analysis of Tudjman’s public speeches printed in the Croatian daily newspaper 
Vjesnik during the period of June 1992 to October 1994. As well as addressing 
the stated three questions, this analysis identifies the messages the Croatian 
President of that time was sending to the Croatian primary agents.
In order to analyse the ways the Croatian educational system  incorporates 
dominant nationalist ideologies, a comparative content analysis of high-school 
history textbooks is conveyed. This part of the empirical research is limited by 
the available data. The history curricula from the late nineteenth century until the 
first half of the twentieth century are reconstructed through the review of the 
relevant literature. For the period 1941-1995 a content analysis is carried out on 
the primary resources: history textbooks published in 1943 during the Ustasha 
regime; textbooks published in the period 1953-1957 during the Communist 
regime; and those published in 1995-96 during Tudjman’s regime. The 
comparison of the textbooks is concentrated around several questions: to what
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extent do the textbooks reflect the dominant ideology? what myths and legends 
are portrayed as national? which historical personalities are described as national 
heroes? how does the textbook describe the nation, national values and national 
interests? and, finally, who are portrayed as historical enemies of the Croatian 
nation?
Finally, in order to investigate whether Croatian primary agents actually 
incorporated and supported the dominant nationalist ideology, a survey has been 
undertaken. As already emphasised, a historical comparative analysis of the 
attitudes of primary agents is impossible due to the lack of data. These attitudes 
can only be partially, and probably inadequately, reconstructed through an 
analysis of national censuses and the results of party election.
The construction of my own survey followed the general structure of the 
empirical research. The questionnaire has four main parts: primary agents’ 
perception of the nation in general, the Croatian nation in particular, attitudes 
towards other nations, and some demographic data about the sample. The 
perception of the nation in general is ‘measured’ by two separate instruments: 
constitutive elements of the nation, and origins of the nation. The perception of 
the Croatian nation was reconstructed from the data given by an instrument 
which ‘measured’ the acceptance of the dominant Croatian nationalist ideologies 
and that which ‘measured’ a level of acceptance of different Croatian historical 
personalities as ‘national heroes’. Finally, the primary agents’ attitudes towards 
other nations was ‘measured’ through a modified Bogardus’ ethnic distance 
instrument. The survey was conducted on a sample (N=307) of the Zagreb 
population in late 1999 - early 2000. It was constructed on the basis on the 1991 
census, which, unfortunately, even though the most recent, cannot be taken as 
representative of the Zagreb post-war population.12
12 For more about the sample and the construction of the questionnaire, see Chapter Eight.
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PART TWO: THE CASE OF CROATIA
The framework developed in Part One of this thesis was constructed to provide a 
theoretical and methodological basis for an analysis of a specific case study. This 
framework points at significant relationships between and among the three 
segments of society - structure, culture and agency - in the process of nation- 
formation. It also offers methodological tools for the analysis of these 
relationships.
The hypothesis and methodological framework developed in Part One will be 
tested through the case of the nation-formation process in Croatia. The main 
reason for choosing the case of Croatia as a testing-ground for this analysis lies in 
the fact that the application of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism 
fails to fully explain the process of the formation of the Croatian nation. Hence, 
for example, an application of a modernist theory would not grasp the relevance 
of the pre-modem development of Croatian society to the process of formation of 
the Croatian nation. It would fail to offer an explanation for the emergence of 
supra-nationalist ideologies that played a crucial role throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. It would also fail to explain all the relevant stages of the 
/re/formation of the Croatian nation. In addition, no modernist theory could offer 
a relevant answer to the question why the Croatian nation managed to form a 
nation-state only after two hundred years of the process of modernisation. In 
contrast, a primordialist theory would have some difficulty in offering an 
explanation for the significant structural and cultural differences that existed 
among that population that is today called Croatian, or for the lack of national 
consciousness even among the so-called elite up until the twentieth century. 
Finally, even though an ethno-symbolist theory could offer important insights 
into the relevance of long-enduring cultural forms for the formation of the 
Croatian nation, it would fail to stress importance of the structural conditioning 
of agencies and culture in creating the Croatian nation.
83
In brief, Part Two of this thesis aims to demonstrate how in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries the Croatian nation was formed and re-formed in reference to 
different concepts of the nation, which developed at the level of structure, culture 
and different agencies. It will be shown that the emergence of a nation does not 
assume the existence of a single concept of the nation that would be shared by 
different corporate and primary agencies, supported by the social structure and 
promoted by the dominant culture. I will demonstrate that, in the case of Croatia, 
the nation emerged as a result of the process of:
• mobilisation of primary agents around different concepts of the nation,
• institutionalisation of certain nationalist groups,
• nationalisation of social institutions, and
• nationalisation of culture.
Hence, the historical, political and cultural complexity of Croatian society 
demands a broader approach for the analysis of the process of the formation of 
the Croatian nation. The developed framework of the Morphogenesis o f the 
Nation provides a specific structure for the analysis of a specific case. The 
following chapters will focus on different levels of analysis.
First of all, it will be necessary to explore the formation of different ideas of the 
nation at the cultural level. Therefore all relevant nationalist ideologies 
developed since the nineteenth century will be analysed in Chapter Four. This 
analysis, which aims to investigate the ways Croatian nationalist ideologies have 
defined the nation, its meaning and functions, will be accompanied by brief 
historical accounts of major structural and cultural developments, corporate 
agencies that have emerged and certain socio-demographic characteristics of 
primary agents that preceded the development of each ideology.
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Chapter Four
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CROATIAN NATIONALIST 
IDEOLOGIES
The Croats like to follow  a famous name, 
without really understanding 
the content o f the message 
(Ante Starcevic; in Gross, 1971: 207)
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will analyze the ‘core doctrine’, origins and aims of the three 
most dominant nationalist ideologies in nineteenth century Croatia. The first was 
created in the 1830s and 1840s by the leader of the Illyrian Movement, Ljudevit 
Gaj (1809-72). A continuation of this nationalist ideology, in some sense, takes 
the form of Yugoslavism mainly shaped by Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) 
and Franjo Racki (1828-94). The end of the nineteenth century was marked by 
the clash of two nationalist ideologies - that of Yugoslavism and the ideology of 
the Party o f (State) Right which was formulated by its leader Ante Starcevic 
(1823-96).
It could be said that these three nationalist ideologies represent what Miroslav 
Hroch calls Phase A and Phase B of the national awakening of the Croats. Phase 
A, according to Hroch, is characterized by efforts for the ‘development or 
improvement of national culture based on a local language which had to be used 
in education, administration and economic life’ (Hroch, 1995: 66). It is the phase 
in which activists, or national awakeners, devote themselves to the search for a 
national history, traditions and language which characterize their ethnic group 
(Hroch, 1995: 66). According to Hroch, this phase of the nationalist movement 
lacks clearly stated political goals and the support of the broader masses. It is 
oriented towards an educated elite, and it is mainly inspired by the ideas of 
Romanticism. In this phase, the political awakening is preceded by a cultural 
awakening. Defined in this way, it can be said that the Illyrian Movement 
represents Phase A of the Croatian national awakening.
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In Hroch’s schema, Yugoslavism and the activities of the Party of Right could 
represent Phase B. The main aim of the activists of these nationalist movements 
and ideologies is to ‘win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to the 
project of creating a future nation, by patriotic agitation to “awaken” national 
consciousness among them’ (Hroch, 1996: 81). It is also the phase when the first 
political demands based on the ‘natural rights’ of the nation were formulated. 
However, Hroch points out, these ‘activities’ at first are not necessarily 
successful. The real mass movement occurs in Phase C. Hroch classifies the 
national movement in Croatia as a type13 where the transition to a mass 
movement, or Phase C, was ‘delayed until after a constitutional revolution’ 
(Hroch, 1996: 83). In Croatia Phase C occurred only in the twentieth century.
Even though Hroch’s schema is applicable to many cases of emergence of the 
nation in Eastern Europe, its evolutionist, uni-linear character would fail to grasp 
the dynamics of the process of nation-formation in Croatia. The case of Croatia 
and its national movements were more complicated. As will be shown in the 
Chapter Four and Five, the Croatian nationalist movements created specific and 
sometimes confrontational ideologies and defined and re-defined their ‘national 
culture’. To use Hroch’s terminology, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
century Croatian nationalist movements repeated their Phase B and C several 
times. Croats found themselves squeezed between the demands of the Habsburg 
Empire and rising Magyar, Serb, German and Italian nationalisms. Moreover, as 
a non-dominant ethnic group, with territory divided among several big powers, 
with numerous ethnic minorities, economically under-developed, without any 
real national nobility, Croats developed very specific nationalist ideologies. 
Hence, the process of national awakening in Croatia, it might be said, has been 
shaped by its peculiar geographical position, by crucial historical political events
13 Hroch’s typology of the national movements in Europe is based on the relationship between the 
transition to Phase B and then to Phase C and the transition to a constitutional society based on 
equality before the law. According to this typology in the first type of the national movements, 
Phase B occurred under the old regime of absolutism, but it acquired a mass character in a time of 
revolutionary changes in the political system. In the second type, the national movements acquired 
a mass character already under the old regime, therefore before the establishment of a civil society 
or constitutional order. And in the final type, national agitation first began under constitutional 
conditions in a more developed capitalist setting, such as that of Western Europe (Hroch, 1996: 
82-83).
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and by its economic weakness. These three factors - geographical, political and 
economic - influenced the creation of national ideologies which were mainly 
oriented towards ‘the others’. The most significant ‘others’ in the nineteenth 
century Croatia were Magyars, Serbs and the Austrian Germans.
These are the reasons why it is impossible to analyze a nationalist ideology in 
Croatia without strong reference to the historical events that helped to shape it 
and to the socio-economic situation which gave it its character.
Yet, the main aim of this chapter is to analyze the core doctrine of the nineteenth 
century Croatian nationalist ideologies and to offer an explanation of the origins 
and functions of these ideologies, as well as of the consequences created for 
nationalist ideologies in the twentieth century. Hence, each ideology will be 
analyzed around four questions: (1) how an ideology defines the nation; (2) how 
it defines the other nations; (3) which myths, memories, symbols and values an 
ideology advocates; and (4) how an ideology explains the political situation of 
the nation in its time. The analysis will be based on the original writings of the 
main ideologists where possible.
4.2. Historical Background I (Seventh - Eighteenth century)
Medieval history in most cases is based more on myths and legends than on 
actual historical facts. The Croatian case is no exception.
Once upon a time, Croatia was a great and independent kingdom. Croats 
migrated from the Karpathian area organized, according to myth, into 12 tribes. 
They settled on the territory of today’s Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
around the seventh century. Soon after they accepted Christianity of their own 
free will.14 In those early days the Croats survived and fought against the 
Byzantine and Frankish Empires, against invasions of Avars, Bulgarians, and
14 In 680, Pope Agathon issued a document which stated that the leaders of the twelve Croatian 
tribes agreed to ‘respect the Christian religion and Christian practices in their territory’ (Gazi, 
1973: 17).
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Magyars. The Croats were ruled by wise and less wise chieftains, zupans, dukes, 
bans and finally kings. Medieval Croatia reached its peak under the rule of king 
Tomislav Trpimirovic (910-28), who united the lands of Dalmatia and Pannonia 
and with the permission of the Pope, become the first Croatian king.15
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The kingdom of Croatia was short-lived. According to the thirteenth-century 
Chronicle o f the Priest o f Dioclea, frequently quoted by Croatian historians, the 
last descendant of the House of Trpimir, king Dmitar Zvonimir (1075-89) died at 
the hands of his own nobles at the assembly near Knin.16 King Zvonimir died 
without heir and thus the question of succession to the throne was open. The 
interpretation of the end of the Croatian independent kingdom in 1102 varies, 
depending on the author. Yet, this issue influenced the whole of Croatian 
political life in the nineteenth century and, therefore, the formation of Croatian 
nationalist ideologies. The facts were that after Zvonimir’s death there were two
15 The question of Tomislav’s coronation, even though very prominent in the myths and legends, 
is still a point of dispute among Croatian historians. According to the myth, King Tomislav was 
crowned on the Field of Duvno (Tomislavgrad) or in Knin, or perhaps elsewhere, in 
approximately 924 or 925 (Gazi, 1973: 27; Tanner, 1997: 9; Jukic, 1965:6)
pretenders to the Croatian throne, each supported by different factions. The Court 
faction17 supported Zvonimir’s widow, Jelena, and offered the crown to her 
nephew Ladislav, King of Hungary (Gazi, 1973: 33). The popular faction backed, 
and in 1093 elected, Petar Svacic as king. In 1097, Ladislav’s successor Koloman 
Arpad crossed the Drava river (which marks the border between Croatia and 
Hungary) and defeated Petar’s army on Gvozd Mountain. Petar lost his life in the 
battle and the way to the Croatian throne was opened. In 1102 the historic 
agreement called Pacta Conventa was signed by which Koloman was recognized 
as the Croatian king.
Some Croatian historians have interpreted these events to show that Croats have 
elected Hungarian kings as their own by their free will, thus establishing only 
personal unity between two separate kingdoms. According to the Pacta Conventa 
the new kings were to be separately crowned as the kings of Dalmatia and 
Croatia. Croatian internal administration was to be left to the ban (viceroy) and 
the Sabor{diet), but kings were to appoint the ban (Goldstein, 1999: 21-22). Yet, 
Tanner points out that the Hungarian rulers had drawn a distinction between the 
lands of northern Croatia, which had accepted king Ladislav’s rule in the 1090s 
(or simply those lands which had been conquered) and the lands of the South of 
Gvozd Mountain, which had accepted Koloman’s rule on the basis of the Pacta 
Conventa (Tanner, 1997: 16). These northern territories, which Hungarians called 
Slavonia, were placed under the jurisdiction of a separate ban and Sabor. Hence, 
the lands of the former Croatian kingdom were known from then on as the 
Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia, or the Triune Kingdom.
Three hundred years later, Croatia was to be described by historians as Reliquiae 
Reliquiarum - the period when Croatia experienced the invasion of Tartars, 
Crusaders, and Turks and the attempts of the Venetian Republic to conquer
16 Myth has it that ‘he cursed the unfaithful Croats and their descendants before God and all the 
saints for his violent death, declaring that the Croats should never again have a ruler of their own 
tongue but should always be under foreign rule’ (Tanner, 1997:1).
17 The political factions were created around conflict over religious matters, namely between the 
Latin Church and the Croatian Church, which advocated usage of the vernacular in religious 
practices. The first Court (or Latin) faction was created when the Latin Church affiliated itself 
with the court, while the Croatian church was affiliated with the popular or Glagolitic faction 
(GaZi, 1973: 35-38).
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Dalmatia. In 1409, King Ladislav sold a major part of Dalmatia to Venice for
100,000 ducats, and by 1420 all of Dalmatia, except the Republic of Ragusa 
(Dubrovnik) was in Venice’s hands and remained so until the Napoleonic era. In 
the 1420s, the Turks invaded Croatia for the first time and conquered most of its 
territory. In several battles Croats also lost its nobility. In 1493 at the battle on 
Krbavsko Polje the leaders of several hundreds of Croatia’s noble families were 
killed, and as Goldstein quotes a chronicler, ‘the flower of the Croatian nobility 
was wiped out’ (1999: 31).
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The invasion of the Turks triggered several significant events which would 
greatly influence the future of Croatia. The first result was a change of ruler. On 
21 August 1526 at Mohacs, Louis II (Ljudevit) King of Hungary, Croatia and 
Slavonia, was defeated by Suleyman the Magnificent. In the battle which lasted 
only one day, the King perished as well, apparently by drowning in a stream of 
the Drava river. Once again the throne was empty.
In 1527, one year after the Hungarians and Czechs elected Archduke Ferdinand 
of Austria as their king, the Croats did the same. For nearly 400 years the 
Habsburgs would remain on the throne. However, Croats and Hungarians elected 
Ferdinand as king in the hope of gaining more military aid against the Ottomans.
The election of Ferdinand provided another event on which the nineteenth 
century national awakeners would build their ideology and formulate their 
political demands. Once again, Croatian historians and politicians would 
emphasize the act as the free will of the Croatian people. Hence Gazi (1973: 95) 
writes how the Sabor at Krizevci declared Croatia as independent from Hungary 
and insisted that ‘(a ) f te r  the death of Zvonimir, our last king of fond memory, we 
joined the holy crown of Hungary by our free will, just as we do now, the rule of 
your majesty (6 October, 1527)’.
The second effect of the Ottoman invasion was the creation of the so-called 
Military Frontier or Vojna Krajina.18 With the constant threat of Turkish 
expansion to the west, the Habsburgs faced the problem of defending their 
frontiers. For that purpose a chain of fortresses and fortified villages was built 
mainly staffed by mercenary troops and settled by peasant soldiers. The 
significance of the Croatian Military Frontier for the defense of the entire 
Habsburg Empire was perceived by Austrians as too important to be left under 
the Sabor’s and ban’s jurisdiction. This was governed on a purely military basis 
directly from Vienna, and it remained under the Habsburgs’ direct rule until 1881 
when it was reincorporated into Croatia - after the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
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The third event which would play an important role in future events in Croatia 
was the direct result of the migration of the population. The lands occupied by 
the Turks were left devastated and depopulated by the Turkish war. The same 
happened in the newly established Military Frontier. At the invitation of the 
Habsburgs these areas were settled with Orthodox populations which fled from 
Turkish oppression. They were immediately incorporated into the strict military 
system of Krajina and were granted special privileges such as guaranteed 
freedom of religious practices and exemption from the feudal system. They were 
soldiers who were expected to spend their whole life in military service. The 
origins and ethnic identity of these settlers has become a point of dispute among 
Serbian and Croatian historians. There is some agreement that the settlers were 
Vlachs most of whom belonged to the Serbian Orthodox Church (Goldstein, 
1999: 40). Yet, as Tanner (1997: 39) points out, Serbian historians have insisted
18 The territory of Military Frontier was around 8,000 square kilometers, just slightly smaller then 
area of rest of Croatia (c. 10,600 km2) (Goldstein, 1999: 41).
that these Vlachs were of Serbian ethnic origin, while Croatian scholars were 
more inclined to emphasize that these Orthodox Vlachs began to identify 
themselves as Serbs only in the nineteenth century under the pressure of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. In any event, in the sixteenth century, the ethnic 
origins of the settlers meant little.
The conflict between the Habsburgs and the Croatian Sabor concerning the status 
of the Military Frontier culminated in the sixteenth century. The Croatian Sabor; 
which was composed as an assembly of estates, was disturbed mainly by the free 
status of the peasants who lived in the Military Frontier. Ethnic and religious 
matters would only appear significant a few centuries later.
After liberation from the Turks in the 1690s, only a small part of Slavonia was 
returned to the Ban’s jurisdiction, while the rest either became part of Hungary or 
was transformed into a Military Frontier. In that way, very little territory came 
within the domain of the agreed Croatian autonomy - the Sabor and its ban.
Throughout the following centuries, although with some interruptions, the Triune 
Kingdom succeeded in retaining some remnants of its independence: internal 
affairs and administration were mainly headed by the Croatian Sabor and by the 
ban of Croatia. The Sabor and ban were responsible for justice and education and 
the rest was under the direct rule of Hungary. The territorial position of the 
Triune Kingdom as part of the Habsburg Empire, surrounded by the great powers 
constantly in conflict - the Ottoman Empire to the East and the Republic of 
Venice to the South-West - shaped its political position.
With the attempts of Maria Theresa and Joseph II to centralize the Empire with 
the establishment of the Council of the Kingdom for Croatia in 1767, the 
Croatian Sabor and the ban became even more limited in their sphere of 
jurisdiction. The main purpose of this Council was to strengthen the personal 
union between the ruler and the Kingdom. When the Council was abolished in 
1779, the jurisdictions of the. Council were not transferred back to the Croatian 
Sabor and ban, but directly to the Hungarian Court Chancellery. Hence, Croatia 
was simultaneously governed by Vienna and Budapest, and few political,
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economic and social matters remained in the hands of the Croats themselves and 
were defined by the so-called Municipal Rights of Croatia which had existed for 
centuries and defined the Croatian position within Hungarian Kingdom. The 
most important rights were jurisdiction in internal affairs, reduced taxes, special 
representation at the meetings of the Hungarian Parliament, the maintenance of 
an independent military force, and independence from Hungary in decisions 
concerning religion and language (Despalatovic, 1975: 12). The struggle for the 
defense of these Municipal Rights was the key element which marked political 
events in Croatia after the end of the eighteenth century.
Nevertheless, it could be said that the actions of the Croatian Sabor from the end 
of the eighteenth century onwards were more directed towards the preservation of 
the rights of the Croatian nobility than the Municipal Rights. The attempts of 
Joseph II to make his Empire a centralized egalitarian state provoked reaction 
throughout the Empire. Joseph II considered his state to be a German state and 
ruled it accordingly. Even Hungary was brought under the direct rule of German 
bureaucrats (Taylor, 1990: 20). The privileges to which Hungary was entitled 
were not recognized by the Emperor, moreover he refused to be crowned as the 
King of Hungary. At the same time, the Roman Church lost its privileged 
position and found itself under direct state control. The agrarian reforms 
introduced were another, perhaps more painful, blow for the nobility. Moreover, 
the abolition of serfdom, the reformation of taxation, the centralization of the 
administration, and educational reforms ‘struck at the very roots of Croatian 
autonomy’ (Despalatovic, 1975: 13). In an attempt to preserve itself from any 
further undermining of its position, the Croatian nobility found an ally in its 
Hungarian counterpart. As a result, in 1790 and 1791 the Croatian Sabor 
surrendered a good part of its traditional autonomy to Hungary, placing it under 
the direct control of the Regent’s Council in Budapest. Thereafter, the status of 
the ban and Sabor became increasingly symbolic. Only strictly internal affairs 
such as education and justice remained in their hands. ‘The power of the Ban was 
radically curtailed, and Croatia-Slavonia came to be regarded no longer as regna 
socia, but merely as partes adnexae of the Crown of St. Stephan’ (Seton-Watson, 
1969: 24).
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The Croatian nobility found itself under the great pressure of a rising Magyar 
nationalism. The linguistic question became the major point of conflict. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the Magyars attempted to introduce Magyar 
as the official language of all administration and parliamentary discussions, while 
the Croats tried to preserve Latin. The hostile reaction to this push for 
Magyarisation could have been inspired by mere conservatism and the reluctance 
to learn a foreign language, but in 1805 Bishop Vrhovec of Zagreb ‘openly urged 
the Croats to retaliate by introducing lingua Illyrica into the public life of the 
country’ (Seton-Watson, 1969: 25), thus giving an ideological platform for the 
national awakeners. Still, in 1827 the Sabor passed a law by which Magyar was 
to be taught in Croat schools, and in 1830 introduced Magyar as obligatory for all 
officials. It could be said that ‘Magyar nationalism pushed the Croat nobles into 
the arms of the Habsburgs’ (Taylor, 1990: 31). Such was the situation in which 
the Illyrian movement under the leadership of Ljudevit Gaj began to arise.
However, to understand fully social and political life in Croatia preceding the 
emergence of the Illyrian Movement, it is necessary to consider the demographic 
structure of early nineteenth century Croatia.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the size of the Triune Kingdom (334.8 
square miles) was smaller than that of the Military Frontier (373.7 square miles). 
However, the Triune Kingdom had a larger population: in 1785 it was estimated 
at 649,075 inhabitants, and 656,519 in 1805; the Croatian and Slavonian Military 
Frontier had 523,326 and 629,729 inhabitants respectively (Despalatovic, 1975: 
8).
In this period the vast majority of the population was peasants and the economy 
of the Triune Kingdom was almost entirely agrarian. The Church and nobility 
owned all the land which was worked by serfs. According to laws established in 
1756 for Civil Slavonia and in 1789 for Civil Croatia by Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II, the serfs were personally free, but their obligations to landowners 
consisted of their labor, produce, and many payments. Additionally, the serfs had 
to pay a tithe to the Church (Despalatovic, 1975: 9).
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The nobility was divided according to their economic and political positions. The 
magnates owned large estates and, with the prelates, they participated directly in 
the meetings of the Croatian Sabor. The lesser nobility was indirectly represented 
in the Sabor. The magnates were of mixed ethnic origins: the majority were 
Hungarian and German, and a very small proportion were descendants of the old 
Croatian nobility.
The gentry was numerous and of different origins. It was composed of small 
landowners, those who owned only a title, and the peasant nobility which was 
granted this status mainly during the Turkish wars of the early fifteenth century. 
Despalatovic states that in 1785 there were 8,946 male nobles in Civil Croatia 
and 314 in Civil Slavonia (1975:10). The industry of that time was small and 
undeveloped, based mainly on the processing of raw materials such as timber, 
foodstuffs, tobacco, and leather. There were some mines, shipyards and small 
ceramic and glass factories. Except in the manufacture of silk, the textile industry 
was poorly developed (Despalatovic, 1975: 10).
Major towns in Croatia were growing along the main roads which connected the 
Hungarian lands and the coast. The small middle class was stationed in these 
towns which were administrative, military, religious, economic and cultural 
centres. In 1787 the biggest town was Varazdin, with 4,814 inhabitants. The 
populations of the towns grew rapidly, and in 1829 the largest town was Osijek 
with 9,242 inhabitants, most of whom were Hungarian. The second and third 
largest towns were Zagreb, with 8,175 inhabitants, and Varazdin with 7,787 
inhabitants. Both these towns had large German populations. Karlovac, which 
had a population of about 4,000 at that time, was considered a ‘Croatian town’ 
(Despalatovic, 1975: 11).
The educated population in the Triune Kingdom was small. According to 
Despalatovic, in 1805 the Triune Kingdom had only 55 primary schools, and in 
1825 six secondary schools, ‘four theological seminaries and the two-year Zagreb 
Academy, a partial University which offered courses in law and philosophy’ 
(1975: 19).
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The late and slow development of the education system in the Triune Kingdom 
did not prevent the development of Croatian literacy and literature. The first 
inscriptions in the Glagolitic script and the Croatian language appeared in the late 
eleventh century. Though, as Goldstein (1999: 19) points out, Glagolitic was a 
‘formal script reserved chiefly for religious writing and unsuitable for widespread 
use, these monuments are nevertheless the beginning of vernacular literacy and 
literature among the Croats’. The twelfth and early thirteenth centuries witnessed 
the appearance of the first hagiographies and chronicles like the Ljetopis popa 
Dukljanina (Chronicles of the priest of Docleia) and the Historia Salonitana by 
Archdeacon Thomas of Split. The latter was the history of the town of Split, and 
according to Goldstein (1999: 25) was ‘the best work of Croatian medieval 
historiography’.
In the fourteenth century the vernacular Glagolitic script spread northward and, 
hence, marked the beginning of cultural integration between Dalmatia and 
Croatia and Slavonia. Goldstein emphasizes that ‘the first literature written in the 
pure vernacular speech dates from that time: prose describing the legend of St. 
Catherine and the Zivotopisi svetih otaca (Lives of the Holy Fathers) and 
recasting pseudo-historical Western ‘gesta’ like Price o Troji (The Tales of Troy) 
and Aleksandar Makedonski (Alexander of Macedon)’ (1999: 27). A century 
later, in 1483, M isalpo zakonu rimskoga dvora (Missal by the law of the Roman 
court) was printed and constituted the first book in the Croatian language and the 
Glagolitic script (Goldstein, 1999: 32).
In the sixteenth century some literary forms came to maturity, confirming that the 
literary language was completely developed. In the 1530s the first Croatian novel 
appeared, Planine (Mountains) by Petar Zoranic of Zadar. Renaissance literature 
was especially marked by the comedies of Marin Drzic of Dubrovnik. At the end 
of the sixteenth century in Venice, Faust Vrancic of Sibenik printed his Rjecnik 
pet najuglednijih evropskih jezika  (Dictionary of the five most prominent 
European languages). It was a dictionary of Latin, Italian, German, Hungarian 
and ‘Dalmatian’ languages. Even though Goldstein (1999: 38) points out that by 
‘Dalmatian’ Vrancic actually meant Croatian, it could be said that the concept of 
a ‘Croatian’ language, let alone ‘nation’, was still not developed. A year later the
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Jesuit Bartol Kasic published the first grammar of the Croatian language in 
Rome. The first integral histories of the Croats were published a century later by 
Juraj Rattkay in Vienna, and in 1667 by Ivan Lucic (Lucius) in Amsterdam 
(Goldstein, 1999: 43).
Hence, it can be seen that the Croatian society followed the major cultural trends 
of Western European societies. Croatian literary traditions (as well as 
architecture, painting and science) firstly developed in the cities of Dalmatia as a 
result of their connections with the major European economic and cultural 
centres. With the decline of Venice, the importance of the Adriatic Sea as a trade 
route started to decline for the Dalmatian cities, except Dubrovnik (Republic of 
Ragusa). The cultural centre of Croatia shifted northwards. In the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries it was Zagreb that established itself as the political and 
cultural centre of the Triune Kingdom. At the beginning of the nineteenth century 
Croatian society had developed literary and cultural traditions. However, even 
though these traditions today are subsumed under a single name - Croatian 
culture - they varied significantly from one region to another. Dalmatia, Slavonia, 
Croatia (in the narrow sense) and Military Krajina developed specific customs, 
myths, symbols, folk songs and dances, and promoted particular dialects.
From this brief historical account several conclusions could be drawn:
• Since the twelfth century, despite the constant loss of territory and 
jurisdiction, the Triune Kingdom preserved some form of political autonomy 
and some symbols of statehood like the Sabor and the position of the ban. 
Regardless of the fact that both institutions lacked real power to rule the 
Kingdom independently, they would remain a powerful symbol of the idea of 
continuity of Croatian statehood for the future generations.
• For about 700 years, from the beginning of the twelfth until the end of the 
eighteenth century, the structure of Croatian society changed little. Even with 
the abolition of serfdom the population remained strictly divided between the 
small group of corporate agents, consisting of local nobility and priesthood, 
and a large mass of predominantly peasant population.
• For the same period of time the only challenge to the Croatian corporate 
agency came from external factors like the Habsburg and Hungarian nobility.
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Internally, the corporate agents faced, on a few occasions, peasant revolts19 
which, poorly organised and coordinated, were easily crushed and the 
participants severely punished. Primary agents at that time were not 
perceived by the Croatian nobility as significant political factors. Throughout 
this period the Croatian corporate agents did not appeal to the primary agents 
for support in their competition with the Hungarian and Habsburg nobility. 
Rather, the main tactic employed was the formation of an alliance with one 
corporate agency against the other.
• Continuous use of Glagolitic script and vernacular language in religious 
liturgies and scripts and secular writings since the eleventh century should 
not be misunderstood as proof of the existence of a kind of Croatian 
‘national’i consciousness. The uncertainty of the name of the language 
(Croatian or Dalmatian) and the predominance of Latin indicate that even 
though the vernacular was fully developed into a literary language, until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century it was still not considered as ‘national’.
4.3. National Ideology of the Illyrian Movement
A nationality without nationalism is 
like a body without bones.
(.Danica, the journal of the Illyrian Movement)
The Illyrian movement represents the beginning of the Croatian national 
awakening. The movement reached its peak in the 1830s and 40s, when it was 
led by Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72). Three major features characterized the movement: 
‘it was a cultural renaissance in which the Croatian vernacular was made into a 
modem literary language. It was a political movement which strove to uphold the 
traditional privileges of Croatia within the Hungarian Kingdom, and it was an 
attempt to establish cultural unity among all South Slavs’ (Despalatovic, 1975: 
2). The Illyrian movement grew in an atmosphere of national awakening in other 
nations within the Habsburg Empire, and to a great extent was shaped by contacts
19 The most famous serfs’ revolt occurred in 1573 under the leadership of Matija Gubec who was 
subsequently arrested and crowned with molten iron on the main square in Zagreb. Matija Gubec
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with them. The idea of Pan-Slavism, the Romantic idea of the nation based on 
national culture and liberal ideas of the freedom of nations, were reflected in the 
Illyrian national ideology. It can therefore be seen that the Illyrian movement was 
a ‘natural’ product of its political and social environment.
4.3.1. The Name: Illyrian, Croatian and South-SlavNations
The nature of Illyrian national ideology is best expressed in the actual name, 
‘Illyrian’. The ambiguity of this term would give a special character to national 
movements in the future. In the Croatian history of national ideologies this term 
was not used for the first time in the nineteenth century. The earlier ‘national 
awakeners’ such as Juraj Krizanic (1617-1683) and Pavao Ritter Vitezovic 
(1652-1713) directly introduced the term ‘Illyrian’ into the language of later 
national ideologies. In their writings it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the 
precise meaning of the term. Krizanic used the term Illyrians as a synonym for 
Slavs (Golub, 1986: 458), while sometimes the ‘Illyrian nation’ had the same 
meaning as the ‘Croatian nation’ {ibid. 466). Pavao Ritter Vitezovic spoke about 
‘Illyrian or Slavic nationhood’ and the ‘Illyrian or Slavic tongue’ (Banac, 1986: 
495), but at the same time Vitezovic considered that ‘Slav’ and ‘Croat’ were also 
synonyms {ibid.: 502). The terms ‘Slav’, ‘Croat’ and ‘Illyrian’ began to be used 
interchangeably (Despalatovic, 1975: 3). ‘Illyrian’ was not only used in 
ideologies, but, especially after Napoleon’s occupation and creation of the 
Illyrian province, it became a term which symbolized a specific territory as well. 
By 1825, ‘Illyria’ had been the name for many political and administrative 
entities: it was used in ancient times, in Roman-Byzantine periods, during the 
Napoleonic occupation and by the Habsburgs (Despalatovic, 1975: 4).
In the same way, the leaders of the movement, and especially Ljudevit Gaj, 
considered ‘Illyrianism’ as a type of cultural and linguistic identification 
(Despalatovic, 1975: 142). However, it is necessary to explain more precisely the
became a powerful symbol of peasant resistance to serfdom especially during the Communist 
regime.
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interplay between terms such as ‘Illyrian’, ‘South-Slav’ and ‘Croatian’ nation 
{narod) in the Illyrian national ideology.
In the writings of some historians from the period of socialist Yugoslavia it was 
common to explain the Illyrian movement as a pfoio-Yugoslavian’ movement, i.e. 
as a movement which propagated the idea of unique national consciousness for 
all South Slavs.20 Such an interpretation is, to a large extent, misleading. It could 
be said that Ljudevit Gaj and his followers developed a hierarchy of 
national/ethnic communities, a genealogical tree of nations and ethnic groups. 
First of all, it is important to emphasize the multiple meanings of the term narod. 
The leaders of the Illyrian Movement have used this term: 1) narod as citizens, 2) 
narod as plebes or commoners, 3) narod as an ethnic group, and 4) narod as a 
nation. Moreover, the term narod in the Illyrian nationalist ideology could have 
three levels of generality depending on its function and political meaning: 1) as 
Slav nation!narod, 2) as Illyrian-South-Slav nation//7m></ (later as Yugoslavian 
nation), and 3) as Croatian nationJnarod (Korunic, 1989: 23-24). Hence, Gaj 
wrote: ‘The broadest sense of the term narod includes us (Croats as Slavs) on one 
level together with all Indo-European nations, like Hellenic, Romanic and 
Germanic nations. The broad sense of the term narod includes us (Croats as 
Illyrians) on the same level with all Slavs - with Russians, Poles, Czechs. The 
narrower sense of the term narod includes us (Croats as Croatian narod) at the 
same level with our Illyro-Slav brothers - with Serbs, Slovenes and Bulgarians. 
The narrowest sense of the term narod includes us ourselves - the Croats, just as 
all of our brothers stand for themselves: Serbs, Slovenes or Bulgarians’ (in 
Korunic, 1989: 24).
‘Pan-Slavism’ was present in Croatian national ideologies from the beginning. 
This idea had its basis in the myth of origin of the Slavs. Krizanic was convinced 
that the only autochthonous Slavs were Russians and that all other Slavs 
originated from them (Golub, 1986: 479). Vitezovic, on the other hand, took over 
the idea of Vinko Pribojevic (fifteenth-sixteenth century) claiming that all the 
Slavs were actually Illyrians, i.e. Croats. This was based on the legend of three
20 See J. Sidak (1973,113-124).
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brothers - Czech, Lech, and Rus - expelled from Illyria during a period of civil 
strife, and who later on established new Slav tribes (Banac, 1986: 499). It was 
believed that these three brothers, the founders of three Slavic nations - the 
Czechs, Poles and Russians - originated from Gaj’s native town Krapina. 
Therefore, Krapina, according to this legend, was the legendary home of all Slavs 
(Despalatovic, 1975: 28). In his youth, Ljudevit Gaj himself was strongly 
influenced by this legend. His research among the people of Krapina and its 
archives was embodied in his Die Schlosser bei Krapina published in 1826. It 
could be said that his later Pan-Slavism was formulated through this legend as 
well.
Yet, the Illyrian ideologists clearly rejected the idea of creation of the unique 
‘Slav-nation’. Pan-Slavism in the Illyrian nationalist ideology was, above all, an 
expression of cultural unity. Illyrians, with the aim of preserving and reviving the 
Croatian culture and national consciousness, relied on Pan-Slavic unity as a 
support against aggressive attempts of Germanisation and Magyarisation of the 
Croat population.
On the other hand, the national ideology of the Illyrian Movement and their term 
‘Illyrian nation’ wanted to signify and underline the importance of the creation of 
the new  common Illyrian-South-Slav culture. In the beginning, the term ‘Illyrian’ 
did not have any political meaning. It was not an attempt to create political unity 
among the South-Slavs. Moreover, the Illyrian ideologists rejected any idea of 
ethnic unity of the South-Slavs. They clearly underlined different national 
identities, different histories, myths, symbols and values of the Croatian, Serb or 
Slovenian nations.
4.3.2. The Concept o f the Croatian Nation
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the territories of the Habsburg 
monarchy, Herderian Romanticism found fruitful ground. Under this influence 
Ljudevit Gaj formulated his concept of the nation. Gaj considered the nation as a 
living being, ‘a natural unit with its own personality. Humanity was divided into
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nations, and it was the duty of each nation to develop to its full potential’ (in 
Despalatovic, 1975: 85). The nation in his writings was understood as a 
community which bases its identity on history. The nation occupies its specific 
territory - a homeland - and its population is bound by the same language, 
customs and history (Korunic, 1989: 31). However, the only way for a nation to 
preserve itself was through the development and nurturing of its national culture. 
Thus, Gaj believed that the cultivation of the mother tongue was essential for the 
survival of a nation: ‘It is in language, above all things, that the life of the nation 
is reflected. Spirit and language are organically and inseparably united. Language 
is actually spirit making itself evident’ (Despalatovic, 1975: 85).
The standardization and modernization of the Croatian language and its 
orthography which Gaj initiated in 1829, and which was adopted by the writers 
of the Illyrian Movement by 1835, was influenced by the Pan-Slavic idea and the 
political position of the Croats within the Habsburg monarchy at that time. The 
reformation of the orthography was supposed, on the one hand, to encompass the 
differences in the Croatian language used in the territory of the Triune Kingdom, 
and, on the other, to encompass the languages of all South Slavs. The choice of 
the stokavian dialect as the literate variant of the Croatian language was 
influenced by the introduction of the same variant into the Serbian language 
conducted by Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic some years earlier. The new Croatian 
orthography was a conglomerate of the orthography used in the Czech and Polish 
languages.
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Therefore, the new literary language, based on a new orthography and the 
stokavian dialect, was to establish a common literary tradition and, through this, 
a national identity for all of the people of Civil Croatia and Civil Slavonia, and 
by ‘drawing them together enable them to withstand the pressures of 
Magyarisation’ {ibid.\ 65).
4.3.3 The Others
Therefore, the only effective weapon against growing Magyar nationalism, was 
seen to be heightened Croat/Illyrian nationalism. The motto of the Illyrian 
Movement, which was published in each issue of D aniel stated: ‘A nationality 
without nationalism is like a body without bones’ (Despalatovic, 1975: 81). This 
nationalism was directed mainly against the Hungarians. Gaj described them as
21 The journal of the Illyrian Movement, firstly published in January 1835.
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the ‘enemies of all goodness, mercy, and virtue, enemies of our blood, enemy of 
our benevolent King and Emperor...’ {ibid.: 101). With such a clearly identified 
enemy, the political goals of the Illyrian national movement became clear as 
well. The nation understood in the way Gaj formulated it was an ethnic nation, 
composed of all classes. However, the Illyrian Movement did not pay particular 
attention to the lowest class - the peasantry. It was a concept of the nation 
oriented to the specific, conservative interests of the Croatian nobles. In 1841, 
Ljudevit Gaj defined the political framework of the Illyrian movement: ‘May 
God preserve the Hungarian Constitution, the Croatian Kingdom, and the Illyrian 
Nationality’ (Despalatovic, 1975: 137).
In the same year the Illyrian Movement, previously characterized only as a 
national cultural movement, formed a political party, later known as the National 
Party. In 1841 the pro-Hungarian nobles founded their own party with the aim of 
establishing closer ties with Hungary. In the beginning they were known as the 
Magyarones, and later they adopted the name of Unionists. It could be said that 
this party had been formed as a direct reaction to the Illyrian Movement and its 
anti-Hungarian policy. Soon after, in 1842, after the name of Illyria was banned, 
the Movement changed its name to the National Party (Narodna stranka). The 
purpose of this party was to oppose the influence of the so-called ‘Magyarons’ 
and in that way ensure the survival of the Movement.
The political aims of the Illyrian Movement could not be formulated on the basis 
of Illyrianism alone, since it presented just a linguistic and cultured identification. 
On the other hand, Croatism did not belong in cultural life because at that time it 
meant support of the local kajkavian dialect.22 Therefore, the Movement 
combined the traditional Croatian political goals of defending Municipal Rights 
with a linguistic nationalism. Cultural Illyrianism and political Croatism were the 
main features of the National Party {ibid.: 142).
This linguistic nationalism could not strive for an independent national state. 
Well aware of its position, the Illyrian Movement on many occasions expressed
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its loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy and ‘personal union’ under the Hungarian 
crown, but with a redefined political position for Croatia. Nevertheless, Ljudevit 
Gaj in his later writings considered the idea of a sovereign Illyria as one possible 
future solution for the Croats. In 1842 he wrote: ‘I knew that sooner or later 
harmony would be achieved, so that a united homeland and sovereign Illyria 
would come to life’ (Despalatovic, 1975: 149). At that time, however, both the 
Movement and Croatia lacked real political and economic strength for serving as 
the nucleus for a South Slav independent state.
The Illyrian Movement succeeded to a great degree in achieving its cultural 
goals, that is the standardization and modernization of the national language. It 
published several newspapers and journals, the reconstructed language was 
accepted by the majority of writers, they organized Reading Clubs, which would 
later come to form an independent organization known as Matica Ilirska, and, as 
its major victory, on 23 October 1847 the Sabor voted to make the national 
language the official language of the Triune Kingdom. On the other hand, its 
political aims remained just an aspiration. The revolutionary events of 1848 
proved to the Illyrians that they were used just for settling relations between the 
Habsburg dynasty and the rising Magyar nationalism. According to 
Despalatovic(1975: 183), 1847 represents the actual end of the Illyrian 
Movement, ‘for in the next year with the coming of revolution, the Croats would 
be swept into a new phase of their national history’.
4.3.4. Conclusion
The Illyrian national movement was largely shaped by the political position and 
social composition of the Triune Kingdom: illiteracy, low living standards, the 
dominant peasant economy, growing Hungarian nationalism, and the conflict 
between Hungarian aspirations and official Habsburg policies limited activities 
of the Movement. The social structure and culture of Croatian society, and its 
position within the Habsburg Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century,
22 At that time the term ‘Croatia’ was used to refer only to ‘Civil Croatia’, a part of the Triune
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conditioned the development of the Movement’s political programme, the 
characteristics of the promoted ‘national culture’, and the formation of a specific 
concept of the nation.
For the first time Croatia witnessed a rising of a new internal corporate agency, 
organised around the Illyrian Movement and politically institutionalised through 
a political party, that contested the dominance of ‘old’ ruling corporate agents. 
The first task of this new ‘nationalistic’ agency was formation of a ‘national 
culture’. As can be seen from the analysis of Gaj’s writings, the formation of the 
‘national culture’ was limited in scope and directed by a specific understanding 
of the concept of the nation and political goals. The ‘newly’ developed ‘national 
culture’ was formed in opposition to the local traditions. The introduction of the 
stokavian dialect as the ‘national language’, a newly developed script, the Illyrian 
name and a specific myth of origin formed a ‘national culture’ distinct from the 
local cultures of the Croatian peasantry. The broader peasant population did not 
play any part in the cultural and political life of the Triune Kingdom. The first 
phase of the national awakening of Croats was oriented mainly towards cultural 
issues, and, therefore, towards the Croatian nobility and small middle class, who 
were the only actors in cultural and political life.
Balancing between a strong Magyar nationalism, which directly endangered the 
position of these actors, and the centralized Habsburg administration was the 
main characteristic of the Illyrian political programme. Convinced of Habsburg 
support against the Magyars, the movement easily and openly chose its allies and 
enemies. The national ideology based on the idea of Pan-Slavism had the aim of 
unifying all divided Croats, as well as the South Slavs, against ‘the worst enemy’ 
- the Magyars. The ‘nation-in-process’ which was for centuries divided 
politically and culturally by the domination of different powers needed an 
element of integration, and the Movement served this end. On the other hand, the 
national composition of the Triune Kingdom, with its considerable Serb, Italian, 
German and Magyar population, could not be attracted by pure ethnic 
nationalism. The Illyrian ideology was supposed to be an overarching idea which
Kingdom, in which the kajka vian dialect was spoken.
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could unite all nationalities with the common aim of gaining political 
independence within the Habsburg monarchy. The chosen name of this cultural 
movement was also a clear political statement.
The Illyrian Movement influenced the shape of future national movements of the 
Croats. The romantic idea of a cultural nation, grounded in historicism, identified 
with the dominant national leader, uncertain in its strength for achieving an 
independent national state, were the main characteristics of the Illyrian national 
ideology, and would form the basis of future national ideologies. However, as 
Tanner (1997: 81) writes: ‘The average Croat or Serb peasant certainly never 
came to think of himself as Illyrian, and Illyrianism faded in the era of mass 
politics, when the peasants got their vote’.
Even though at this point the Movement did not attempt to mobilise the broader 
population around its programme, it marked the beginning of the process of the 
formation of the Croatian nation by:
• institutionalising nationalistic politics through the formation of its political 
party and cultural institutions;
• nationalising culture mainly through the formation of a ‘national language’;
• developing the first nationalist ideology through the formation of a specific 
concept of the nation in general and of the Croatian nation in particular.
These achievements mark the end of the first morphogenetic cycle of the 
formation of the Croatian nation.
4.4. Historical Background II (1840-1900)
Political life in the 1840s in Croatia was characterized mainly by a latent conflict 
between Croats and Magyars, which just a few years later culminated in war. The 
conflict arose with the formation of Croatian national ideologies and the 
awakening of a Croatian national consciousness among the corporate agents, and 
it was clearly manifested in the issue of language.
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Within the growing Magyar nationalist ideology, the necessity for the creation of 
a homogenous and unitary Hungarian state was repeatedly underlined. These 
attempts became more emphasized by the intolerant nationalistic movement 
under the leadership of Lajos Kossuth (1802-94). His program strove for the 
establishment of a single centralized Kingdom of Hungary and a single Magyar 
nation ‘stretching from the Karpathian Mountains to the Adriatic Sea’ (Gazi, 
1973:144). Hence, Kossuth showed intolerance towards all other non-Magyar 
nationalities under Hungarian rule.
When the Hungarian authorities attempted to introduce the Magyar language as 
the official language in all lands under their rule, the Sabor resisted and in 
October 1847 proclaimed the Croatian language as official in return. Kossuth’s 
reaction was to introduce a law aimed at the elimination of Croatian autonomy. 
The enforcement of this law was halted by the revolutionary events of 1848. 
Encouraged by these events, the Hungarian Diet requested the immediate 
formation of a Hungarian government independent from Vienna, the 
establishment of the exclusive Kingdom of Hungary and a united Magyar nation.
Croatian leaders reacted promptly and put forward Baron Josip Jelacic (1801-59), 
colonel of the Military Frontier, as a new ban of Croatia. Jelacic was a supporter 
of the Illyrian Movement and loyal to the dynasty at the same time. Soon after 
his election, the new ban ordered all authorities in Croatia not to act on any 
communication emanating from the Hungarian government and to act only on 
instructions issued from Zagreb (Gazi, 1973: 146). This act was later to be 
interpreted by Croatian historians as the end of all common affairs between the 
Hungarian and Croatian kingdoms. After unsuccessful meetings of the Hungarian 
and Croatian heads of government, Bathyany and Jelacic, the outbreak of armed 
conflict between the two countries was only a matter of time. In September 1848 
Jelacic declared war ‘on Ferdinand V, King of Hungary, in the name of 
Ferdinand V, King of Croatia’ {ibid:. 148), and crossed the Drava River initiating 
the invasion of Hungary.
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During the events of 1848,23 the Croatian leadership took the side of the Empire 
and against Hungary. They did not react against the revolutionary demands 
which were in motion over almost the entire stretch of Europe, but rather against 
an increasingly intolerant Magyar nationalism. They were also counting on 
rewards for their loyalty to the dynasty, which actually never came.
Once Hungary was crushed the new Emperor Francis Joseph I (1848-1916) 
introduced a new centralized system which abolished all parliaments and local 
constitutions. The new so-called ‘Bach-system’ relied heavily on the police and 
the German-speaking bureaucrats. Tanner (1997: 91) writes: ‘What Hungary 
received as a punishment, Croatia had received as a reward’.
During the 1850s the Croats enjoyed less control over their territories than ever. 
They lost their Diet, their ability to govern themselves, and very soon the 
German language was introduced as the official language for the administration 
and education system (Gazi, 1973: 152). Yet, the events of 1848 strongly 
determined future political life in Croatia.
Until then the National Party’s main program followed the basic Illyrian ideas 
about the unity of the South Slavs. However, with Josip Juraj Strossmayer at its 
head, and in the changed political circumstances, the National Party reformulated 
its program as well as its terminology. Pan-Slavism was replaced by the new 
concept of Yugoslavism. Warned by the post-1848 events, the National Party 
adopted a policy of non-cooperation with Vienna.
At the same time a new ideology and a new party emerged: the Party of Right. 
This party had been formed and its program formulated mainly through the 
influential writings of Ante Starcevic and Eugen Kvatemik. Unlike the National 
Party and Strossmayer, Starcevic and Kvatemik developed an ideology of a 
‘pure’ Croatian nation. Disappointed by the policy of Vienna towards Croatia, 
they developed a policy of non-cooperation towards both Vienna and Budapest.
23 For more about the 1848 events in the Habsburg Monarchy see Taylor (1990: 63-90) and
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With the fall of Bach’s absolutist system, the activities of these parties become 
more prevalent. The parliamentary life of the Empire was re-established, and a 
session of the Sabor was called in 1861. The elections for the Sabor w t i t  held on 
the basis of the electorate law of 1848, and the National Party won a majority of 
the seats. The first declaration of the Sabor was a demand for the unification of 
all Croatian lands, i.e. of re-uniting Dalmatia, Military Krajina and the city of 
Rijeka with the Triune Kingdom. Furthermore, the Sabor held that the events of 
1848 had ended all ancient relations between the Hungarian and the Croatian 
Kingdoms, and hence, it demanded new negotiations which should determine 
their future relations. Finally, the Sabor refused to send a delegation to the new 
Reichsrath, declaring that Croatia had never had any common affairs with 
Austria. ‘This decision brought about the dissolution of the Sabor’ (Gazi, 1973: 
157). In 1866, a delegation from the Sabor wiih Strossmayer at the head, tried 
and failed again to reach a compromise with Hungary. By the outbreak of the 
Austro-Prussian war, the talks had collapsed, and soon after Croats found that 
‘the Emperor and the Hungarians had already reached an agreement to split the 
empire between them’ (Tanner, 1997: 98). With this agreement, Croatia was 
handed over to direct Hungarian control, and it was merely ‘left to work out 
whatever form of autonomy was pleasing to Budapest’ {ibid.).
The new political environment brought significant changes to Croatian political 
life. Baron Rauch, the leader of the Unionist Party had been appointed as a new 
ban. Soon after the electorate law was changed, favouring the nobility who were 
mainly supporters of the Unionist Party. At the 1867 election, 52 members of the 
Unionist Party were elected and the whole opposition consisted of only 14 
representatives. As the majority in the Sabor, Unionists (Magyarons) formed a 
delegation for negotiating with the Hungarians. The result of these negotiations 
was the so-called Nagodba (Compromise), signed in January 1868. Hereafter it 
became the basic law for the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia.
According to the Nagodba, Croatia was to retain a degree of autonomy in its 
internal administration, police, religion, judicial affairs and education. Croatian
Goldstein (1999: 67-71).
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was to remain as the official language for all public affairs in the territory of 
Croatia. Yet, even though Dalmatia had been recognized as a part of the Triune 
Kingdom, it remained under direct Austrian administration just like Military 
Krajina. Moreover, the city of Rijeka24 was put under the direct administration of 
the Hungarian government. Hence, not only did the Triune Kingdom not achieve 
its ultimate goal of uniting the Croatian territories, but it additionally lost another 
part. Even though Croatia retained some form of autonomy, all crucial decisions 
about its future development were in the power of the Hungarian government. 
Moreover, according to the Nagodba, the ban was to be appointed by the King on 
the recommendation of the Hungarian Prime Minister.
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The leaders of the opposition, the National Party and the Party of Right, saw this 
agreement as treason against the Croatian nation. Both parties lacked any 
significant means for changing this situation. Activities of these parties were 
mainly focused on cultural domain. It is the period when Strossmayer and his
24 The port at the Adriatic Sea.
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colleagues succeeded in establishing several national institutions like the 
Yugoslav Academy of Art and Sciences (1866) and the University of Zagreb 
(1874). Yet, the more active cultural life was accompanied by constant defeats in 
the political arena. Hence, in 1873 Strossmayer withdrew from active politics 
entirely.
Changes in political activity were initiated by events within the Ottoman Empire. 
With the treaty of San Stefano in 1878 the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This again brought into question the issue of the 
‘Croatian historical territories’. Starcevic and his followers were demanding 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to be annexed to the Croatian Kingdom. They also 
demanded the abolition of Military Krajina, which now lost its purpose, and its 
reuniting with the Croatian lands. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the abolition of Military Krajina a few years 
later (1881) brought a new political group to the centre of Croatian political life - 
the Serbs.
After the incorporation of Military Krajina into Croatia, Serbs made up a quarter 
of the population (Taylor, 1990: 203). Moreover, Serbs from Krajina were, at that 
time, already fully nationally conscious. This consciousness had been 
‘preserved’, and some would say ‘constructed’, through the institution of the 
Orthodox church, on the one hand, and with the establishment of an independent 
Serbian national state, on the other. Therefore, while Croat intelligentsia was 
supporting South Slav, and later the Yugoslav national ideas of Gaj and 
Strossmayer, Serbs expressed strong nationalist and expansionist ideas, and thus 
never really accepted Yugoslavism. By the 1840s, the Serbs had already 
formulated their political and cultural nationalist program. A political program 
was most clearly provided by the foreign minister of Serbia, Ilija Garasanin 
(1812-1874) in 1844 with the publication of the so-called Nacertanije (Plan). In 
that plan, Garasanin saw the expansion and creation of a greater Serbia as the 
primary aim of Serbian foreign policy. These territories included Kosovo, which 
had been perceived as a cradle of the Serbian nation, and further south to 
Thessaloniki. Even the Slavs from the Habsburg Empire were to be included in 
greater Serbia. The justification of these plans was found in the cultural domain.
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It was Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic who introduced the criterion of language as a 
yardstick for nationality. According to him, most of the inhabitants who lived in 
Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were Serbs. He wrote: ‘those 
(Serbs) of the Roman Catholic Church find it difficult to call themselves Serbs 
but will probably get used to it little by little, for if they do not want to be Serbs 
they have no other choice’ (in Tanner, 1997: 103). The second criterion, which in 
large part influenced the Serbs from Krajina, was religion. With the help of the 
local clergy the idea that ‘to be Orthodox was to be Serb’ had been propagated 
among the population. Hence, a clear distinction between the Orthodox Serbs and 
the Catholic Croats was formulated.
The political parties in Croatia reacted differently to these ideas. In the 1860s and 
1870s, the National Party still held its position of Yugoslavism which aimed to 
create a new cultural and later political union among the South Slavs. On the 
other hand, the Party of Right reacted with equally nationalistic ideas. They 
adopted an ideology, according to which, the bare existence of Serb nationality 
was denied. The culmination of these ideas was Starcevic’s polemic ‘Ime Srb£5 
(The Name Serb) published in 1868. In 1886 a disillusioned Franjo Racki wrote 
an article titled ‘Zablude srpske politike * (The Mistakes of Serbian Policy) in 
which even he, the most prominent advocate of Yugoslavism, concluded that in 
Serbdom, an overdeveloped national consciousness and national exclusionism 
had been established. As a sign of developed national consciousness, in 1881 the 
Serbs from Krajina established their own political party the Serb Independent 
Party (SSS, Srpska samostalna stranka) which, three years later, started to publish 
Srbobran (The Serb Defender) in Zagreb (Biondich, 2000: 14-16).
The reason for such a dramatic change even among the ideologues of 
Yugoslavism, was to be found in an open alliance and support for the Serbs, both 
in Serbia and in Krajina, by the Austro-Hungarian governments. As Taylor 
(1990: 203) describes: ‘in that time the Magyar rulers of Croatia deliberately 
favoured its Serbs in order to spur on the Croats against them’. Those were the
25 See page 143.
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years of the rule of ban Khuen-Hedervary. He was appointed as a ban in 1883
and he ruled Croatia for 20 years: also the years of the strongest Magyarization in
Croatia. In 1888 the ban introduced new amendments on the 1881 electoral law.
As Biondich (2000: 14) explains:
The franchise was restricted to less then 2 per cent of the total 
population; in urban centres to men over twenty-four who paid 30 or 
more crowns in direct taxes, and in most rural areas to males who paid 
100 crowns (...) Furthermore, all priests, retired army officers, members 
of the free professions, and government officials, including Magyar 
officials residing in Croatia-Slavonia, had the vote. By 1906 there were 
just over 45,000 voters in a total population of nearly 2,6 million.
All these events directly or indirectly shaped the two most dominant nationalist 
ideologies in the second part of the nineteenth century in Croatia: the 
Yugoslavism of the National Party, and the nationalist ideology of the Party of 
Right. For most of the time these mutually exclusive ideologies had been 
competing with each other.
For a better understanding of the situation in which the two dominant nationalist 
ideologies emerged, it is important to sketch the social structure of Croatian 
society.26 In 1900, the Triune Kingdom had 2,400,766 inhabitants, i.e. 688,413 
more than 20 years before. Of these, 1,482,353 were Croats and 607,381 Serbs. 
The biggest minorities were Magyars (90,180), and Germans (134,000). The 
religious composition of Croatia and Slavonia was 1,710,425 Roman Catholics, 
612,604 Orthodox, 43,628 Protestant. In the same year the capital Zagreb had 
61,002 inhabitants, and it was the centre of political and cultural life in Croatia. 
The biggest city in Slavonia was Osijek with a population of around 25,000. All 
other towns were much smaller. Zagreb was the seat of the Archbishop, and the 
other dioceses were Senj and Djakovo, under which the Bosnian archiepiscopal 
had been included until 1882. The small town of Karlovac was the seat of the 
Serb Orthodox Patriarch.
Around 82 per cent of the whole population was engaged in agricultural 
production, but the timber industry was growing. Factories were just a few and 
mainly with outdated technology. As Allcock (2000: 51) concludes the Tack of
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vigorous mercantile centres and the small numbers of the population facilitated 
reliance upon craft production’. Hence, even in 1910 68 per cent of firms in 
Croatia did not hire a single worker and another 30 per cent employed from one 
to five workers (Goldstein, 1999: 106). The railways were under direct 
Hungarian control, and they were constructed to meet Hungarian needs. Hence, 
the main railway connected Budapest and the port, Rijeka, via Zagreb, and there 
was no direct line from Zagreb to Vienna. Goldstein describes Croatian society at 
the end of the nineteenth century as ‘peasant-middle-class society which retains 
some elements of traditional pre-capitalist forms of production and way of life’ 
(1999: 106). In 1869 the Austro-Hungarian government established by law 
universal free elementary education.27 In the same year 80.6 per cent of the 
population of Croatia-Slavonia was illiterate, and 20 years later, in 1890, 66.9 per 
cent (Biondich, 2000: 16).
At the end of the nineteenth century in Dalmatia 80 per cent of the population 
were Croats and 16 per cent Serb. Only 15,279 were Italians, and in spite of this, 
the Italians were controlling the Dalmatian Sabor,: It was also a time when 
poverty forced tens of thousands to emigrate, mainly to America. The biggest 
cities in Dalmatia were Zadar with 16,000, Split with 24,000 and Dubrovnik with
10,000 inhabitants.
To summarise, Croatian society in the second half of the nineteenth century saw 
its first signs of industrialisation and modernisation. These processes were 
reflected at all levels of Croatian society:
• The formation of the first competing political parties in Croatia - National 
and Unionist parties - in the 1840s created institutionalised forms of political 
activities. It created a space for political competition between the dominant 
agencies: two ‘external’ - the central agency of the Empire in Vienna and the 
increasingly nationalistic Magyar leadership in Budapest - and two ‘internal’ 
agencies - leaders of the Unionists party that supported a strong connection 
between Croatia and Hungary, and the leaders of the National Party that 
demanded a broader autonomy for Croatia within the Empire.
26 All data is taken from Seton-Watson (1969: 3-6).
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• The competition between the two ‘external’ corporate agencies resulted in a 
new structural arrangement for the Empire - the creation of the Dual 
Monarchy, which induced a new structural composition for Croatia.
• Redefinition of the position of Croatia within the Empire, and especially a 
new relationship between Croatia and Hungary, created a space for further 
differentiation of the ‘internal’ agencies, and, consequently, the creation of a 
new corporate agency around the Party of Right.
• Introduction of an absolutist system forced the ‘internal’ agencies to 
concentrate their activities at the level of culture. These activities resulted in 
the establishment of new cultural institutions - like the Yugoslav Academy of 
Art and Science and Zagreb University - and the proliferation of schools and 
art institutions.
• In addition, the redefined political and cultural structure of Croatian society 
conditioned the emergence of the two competing nationalist ideologies 
characterised by their specific concepts of the nation in general and the 
Croatian nation in particular.
In the next part of this chapter, the nationalist ideology of the National Party - so- 
called Yugoslavism - will be analyzed, followed by its direct political and 
ideological opponent - the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right.
4.5. Yugoslavism
This program is a program for the future 
(..) our nation is not ready for it ye t 
(Franjo Racki, 1870: 409)
A few decades after Croatian intellectuals introduced Illyrianism onto the 
political scene, a new term was invented - Yugoslavism. The difference was not 
only terminological. While Illyrianism had been presented as Pan-Slavism, 
Yugoslavism narrowed its scope. For now on, the Croatian intellectuals had as 
their aim the creation of a political and cultural union of certain South Slav
27 For more about the education system in Croatia in the nineteenth century, see Chapter Seven.
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nations only. However, this desired union was not imagined as an amalgamation 
of nations. Yugoslavism, just like Illyrianism, created an interesting ‘hierarchy’ 
of ethnic/national identities for the South Slavs. The primary concern of this 
nationalist ideology was with the political and social position of the Croatian 
nation. Here, the Croatian nation was regarded as a Slav nation or, more 
precisely, as a South Slav nation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and as a 
politically divided nation.
The aspiration for a more ‘natural’ environment in which all the Slav nations 
could live and prosper was the moving force of the Movement. The shameful 
current position of the once glorious Croatian nation was explained, and those 
responsible for it - the enemies of the South Slavs in general and the Croats in 
particular - were repeatedly condemned.
Yugoslavism was a product of the renewed National Party, created in 1861, and 
of its leaders Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) and Franjo Racki (1828-1894). 
They became the charismatic leaders of the nation in both the political and 
cultural sphere. Josip Juraj Strossmayer was a bishop in Dakovo for more than 
fifty years, a leader of the National Party from 1861 to 1873, an active 
contributor to scholastic discussions, and, above all, a great donor and 
philanthropist, directly responsible for the establishment of the Yugoslav 
Academy of Art and Science and Zagreb University. Franjo Racki, for his part, 
was a prominent Croatian scholar: indeed he was the greatest Croatian historian 
of his time and the first President of the Yugoslav Academy of Art and Science. 
By means of an analysis of their original writings, I will seek to analyze the ‘core 
doctrine’ of Yugoslavism.
The first part of this discussion will deal with the way in which the Yugoslav 
national ideology defined the nation in general; the second part will focuse on the 
definitions and presentation of the Croatian nation; and the last section will look 
at the accounts of the ‘enemies’ of Croatia.
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4.5.1. The Concept o f the Nation
For the next hundred years after its emergence, the new phenomenon of 
Yugoslavism played an important role in the territories of the South Slavs. The 
interpretations of the term, however, varied throughout that time. In many 
twentieth century writings of social scientists, Yugoslavism was interpreted as an 
attempt to create a new Yugoslav nation, i.e. as an attempt to amalgamate the 
South Slav nations (see, for example, Schopflin, 1993). But whatever the later 
interpretations of the term, its original meaning was quite different. In order to 
understand this original meaning, it is necessary first to analyse the concept of 
the nation introduced by the leaders of the Yugoslav Movement.
In their writings Racki and Strossmayer followed many of the ideas of the 
Illyrian Movement: for example, they defined the ‘nation’ in a similar fashion. 
Yet, as a consequence of the political circumstances of the second half of the 
nineteenth century in Europe, the emphasis shifted from cultural elements, such 
as language, to history. History, or a shared past, became a crucial condition for 
defining a group as a nation. Racki wrote: ‘The real nation can be only that 
nation which has one history, either political or spiritual, which is tied by the 
common past, in which all individuals feel that they are of the same flesh and 
blood...’ (Racki, 1860: 277). According to this definition history plays a crucial 
role at the level of the individual, by creating a sense of solidarity, and equally at 
the political level, as a source of ‘national’ and therefore ‘natural’ rights: ‘a 
nation justifies and defends its longings by virtue of its natural rights and 
historical rights, (...) and the eternal laws which lie in the heart of every nation, 
and finally ancient documents’ (Racki, 1861: 291). These eternal laws are 
derived from the belief that ‘each nation is self-sufficient’ (Strossmayer, 1886:
266). This self-sufficiency has been interpreted as the right of the nation to 
arrange its own political and cultural life. Hence, any interference from other 
nations in the political and cultural life of the nation is considered an attack on 
national rights.
It is clear that when Racki and Strossmayer defined their concept of the nation, 
the starting-point was their concern with the position of Croatia in the Austro-
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Hungarian Empire. The dominance of one nation over another was perceived as a 
mortal threat to the identity and spirit of the oppressed nation: ‘it has always 
been, and it will always be, that when a weaker nation is in a relationship with a 
stronger nation, whatever precautions are taken the weaker nation will lose its 
self-consciousness and its rights, until the point when, as has happened to us, that 
consciousness becomes a shadow’ (Strossmayer, 1861: 104). This is the reason 
why ‘a nation cannot rule another nation on the basis of historical rights when the 
latter does not want to live in a community with the former’ (Racki, 1870: 406).
Just a couple of years later, after the creation of the Dual Monarchy, the leaders 
of the Yugoslav Movement and the National Party changed their position. They 
realized that ‘great changes in the life of the nation, which are happening these 
days in Europe, are not happening on the basis of the historical right, but rather in 
spite of written laws’ (Racki, 1870: 422). They admitted that they had ‘thought 
that a nation could be rescued and a people's essence developed without an 
independent homeland but (that was an) illusion’ (ib id 405).
From now on, Racki and Strossmayer redefined the nation by putting greater 
emphasis on the ‘spirit’ of the nation and particularly on the need to develop a 
national consciousness among the Croats. It is also obvious that Racki and 
Strossmayer were concerned about the future of a Croatian nation. In that period 
the Croatian identity was under great threat of Magyarisation and Germanisation. 
They believed that a divided nation becomes an easy target for ‘foreigners’ 
(Racki, 1860: 281). The development of national consciousness offered the only 
solution. Hence, once again language and the spirit of the nation became crucial 
for national survival. Racki held that literature ‘is a focal point around which 
nations have crystallized’ {ibid.: 282). Language was also defined as a marker of 
nationality. Strossmayer wrote: ‘I don’t believe that our people would ever agree 
to let those who can speak only the Magyar language decide about matters of 
blood and sweat’ (Strossmayer, 1861b: 125). In this way the notion of the blood 
connections that unite the members of the Croatian nation was introduced into 
the definition of the nation.
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Racki and Strossmayer faced a difficult task in bringing the nation to self-
consciousness. Hence they demanded loyalty to one’s own nation and opposition
to the rule of foreigner. National politics was also defined as that around which
the whole nation must ultimately be united: ‘He who betrays it is a traitor to the
nation’ (Racki, 1861b: 352). Strossmayer set another condition for the existence
of the nation: ‘Whether a nation can and should live will be judged in accordance
with that nation’s display of heart and energy in resisting infidel and unjust
attacks on its holiest goods’ (Strossmayer, 1866: 162). A few years later
Strossmayer (1884: 240) was even more clear:
A nation whose light leading to its Bethlehem has died out; a nation 
which is immersed in mud, so that it is not able to rise to the meaning that 
God intended for it; a nation which does not know how to fight for its 
ideals...; a nation which is always in fear and which always surrenders; a 
nation which thinks only about its weaknesses and its helplessness; a 
nation which holds that it can live only under foreign power, help and 
patronage: that kind of nation is rotten; it declines and collapses; that 
nation has no purpose in life, no future.
The message that Strossmayer and Racki wanted to send to the Croatian nation 
was clear. The major task of the nation was to liberate itself from foreign 
influences, and to create a national union of all its members and territories. For 
this purpose the nation had to be able to define its major opponents and allies.
This concept of the nation served as a basis for an explanation of Croatia’s 
particular position in the Empire, and a formulation of the specific political 
program which was supposed to liberate the Croatian nation and hence to secure 
its prosperity. However, the position of the Croatian nation had to be understood 
in relation to its neighbouring nations; the issue of Yugoslavism and a clear 
definition of the enemy became crucial.
4.5.2. The Croatian Nation and Yugoslavism
As the follower and descendant of Illyrianism, Yugoslavism developed a peculiar 
concept of the nation. This concept was created with the aim of embracing South 
Slav nations and preserving the specificities of each of them. It could be said that 
the result of such an aspiration was the creation of a division between an ethnic
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and national identity: ethnically Croats were defined as Yugoslavs - they had the 
same blood, myths of common ancestors, language and culture as other South 
Slavs, but nationally they were Croats - they had a different political history, 
state, laws etc. to other South Slavs.
In an article entitled Jugoslavinstvo (Yugoslavism), which was published in 
Pozor in 1860, Racki sought to explain the meaning of Yugoslavism. Throughout 
his article, Racki used term the ‘Slav tribe’ to emphasize the distinction from an 
another phenomenon - the nation. The Slav tribe was understood as a big family 
of Slav nations, and it belonged in the same category as the Roman and German 
tribes. He explained that ‘Slavdom has never in history been one nation’ {ibid.: 
277). In the same manner Racki defined the ‘Yugoslav tribe’ (1870: 380). 
Originally this ‘tribe’ had comprised all South Slav nations, but gradually, it had 
narrowed. It was now supposed to embrace the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian 
nations.
As has been already pointed out, the Yugoslavs were defined in ethnic terms. The 
most important constituent element was common language. Racki (1860: 278) 
wrote: ‘We Yugoslavs are divided by the same language, by this real soul of the 
nation’. Therefore ‘if Yugoslavism wants to become one nation in a spiritual 
sense, it should attempt unity through literary language’ {ibid.:21%). Once again, 
Racki emphasized ‘the spiritual essence’ of the Yugoslav nation. This nation 
should ‘merge Croats and Serbs through language and books’ {ibid.: 280) and 
‘both scripts (Latin and Cyrillic) are yours and mine’ {ibid.: 281).28 Hence, the 
Yugoslav Movement had as an aim the creation of a single cultural or, as Racki 
called it, ‘spiritual’ nation. Yet, he repeatedly emphasized that this ‘spiritual 
nation’ encompasses different ‘historical nations’: ‘Croats and Serbs, one nation 
by blood and language, have established two different states; later on Bosnia 
joined them. Therefore we have different pasts, which should be sacred and 
preserved for all of us, and for the future we have a salutary ideology’ {ibid.: 
292). History, once again, became the crucial constituent element of the nation.
28 Racki was aware of the separate Slovenian language, but he held that ‘Serbo-Croat is 
predestined to become the literal language... the Slovenian dialect has to merge into it’ (1860: 
279).
122
Yugoslavism, according to the nationalist ideology of Strossmayer and Racki, 
was solely a political program. It was constructed purely from the Croatian 
standpoint and it was intended to serve Croatian interests in the first place. 
Strossmayer (1861b: 124) wrote: ‘we are in the first instance Croats’. Racki 
(1870: 385) was even more clear: ‘The Croatian nation needs an ally in order to 
achieve and secure freedom’. It is thus necessary to see how the Yugoslav 
nationalist ideology defined the Croatian nation: how it explained its political and 
social position and defined its future.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the issue of the unification of all 
Croats was still crucial for those who wished to ‘awaken’ the nation. The primary 
aim of the Yugoslav Movement was to unite all Croatian lands under the 
Croatian government. In 1861 Strossmayer (1861a: 131) was mourning the tragic 
destiny of Croatia: ‘in the sixteenth century the sessions of the Sabor were 
opened with: “Nos reliquaie Regnorum Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae... ” (...) 
Today, I should open the session not only with that dismal “Nos Reliquiae”but, 
concerning our sufferings, I would say “Nos rudera reliquiarum regnorum...”: we 
the remnants of the old remnants of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and 
Slavonia’. He proposed as the ultimate aim of the nation: ‘The unity of our 
homeland!’ (Strossmayer, 1866b: 131). Both leaders of the National Party were 
referring to the ancient historical rights according to which Slavonia, Dalmatia 
(including the Adriatic islands) and Serbian Vojvodina belonged to Croatia: ‘We 
can show the whole of Europe that the Croatian nation has all possible rights to 
that territory: it has the historical right, the national right, the right based on 
ancient documents, and the right based on the blood of our brothers’ (Racki, 
1861b: 326).
Yet at this time the two leaders were not accusing foreign powers for the 
miserable position of Croatia. They were blaming the Croats themselves. In 
Listovi jednoga antiunioniste (The thoughts of one anti-unionist), published in 
1870 Racki (1870: 377) wrote: ‘All violations of the Croatian state right 
originated in either the Sabor or the Hungarian side...’. The election of the 
Hungarian king as king of Croatia he labeled ‘the first major mistake of the
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Croatian nation, the consequences of which we are suffering today’ {ibid.: 371). 
His intention was clear: by referring to the mistakes of ‘our ancestors’, 
Strossmayer and Racki wanted to promote a national pride and aspirations for an 
independent and sovereign government. They emphasized the necessity for a 
change in attitudes among the Croats themselves, who should have had 
confidence in their intrinsic values and courage.
However, this criticism was not aimed at the broad mass of the population. 
Rather it was directed to the Croatian nobility. Having observed the role of the 
nobility in the process of national awakening within other European nations, 
Strossmayer and Racki were embittered by the behavior of the Croatian nobility: 
'our nobility willingly follows the Hungarian nobility (...) the Sabor will gladly 
recognize them as national leaders as soon as they express their love for the 
homeland’ (Racki, 1861b: 349). Even worse, 'they do not know even the 
language which our Frankopans, Zrinskis29 (...) spoke’ {ibid.: 350). The Croatian 
nobility was also accused of sabotaging the national awakening of the Croats: 'In 
the Triune Kingdom thirty years ago, when the national spirit started to awake, it 
found the greatest resistance among bom Croats: descendants of the glorious 
forefathers, but with hearts and minds tied to Pest' {ibid.). The leaders of the 
National Party were convinced that the unity of the homeland could be achieved 
through their own efforts, especially if national consciousness among the elite 
was aroused, supported by other South Slav nations which were supposed to be 
united around the concept of Yugoslavism.
It is interesting that Strossmayer and Racki perceived the Croatian nation as a 
‘good-hearted nation (which) happily forgets offences as well as suffering’ 
(Racki, 1870: 384). On several occasions Strossmayer (1884: 228) described 
Croats as a ‘loyal people’ whose loyalty is ‘proven by the rivers of spilled 
blood’(Strossmayer, 1886: 257). What Strossmayer (1866b: 179) demanded from 
his people was ‘loyalty to their own nation’. These frequent references to loyalty 
were intended to emphasize the sacrifice Croats had made for the entire Empire 
and, at the same time, to highlight the lack of gratitude for these sacrifices that
29The ancient Croatian noble families.
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had by shown by the Empire. At the same time the great mission of the Croats 
was emphasized. It was the mission to protect the Western world from invasions 
of Avars, Franks, Tatars and Turks: ‘Europe was lucky that the Croatian nation 
settled on the place where the keys to Italy and the entire West lay. If these 
territories had remained in the hands of the Avars, the whole Christian 
civilization would have been in mortal danger’ (Racki, 1861b: 327). With this 
picture of a brave and self-sacrificing nation, a new image was created:
[W]e have never, not even for a moment, made an agreement with the 
eternal enemy of Christianity and the Christian civilization; for centuries 
we were fighting against the enemy so bravely that, while Vienna was 
shaking, while Pest was for 150 years under the Turks, this holy land was 
never disgraced by the foot of a single Turk. Under the leadership of 
Frankopans and Zrinovics we fought so bravely that from all Europe we 
deserved the title: antemurale christianitatis. (Strossmayer, 1866a: 182)
The title ‘rampart of Christianity’ connected the idea of the mission of the Croats 
with their glorious past. Such symbolism was supposed to arouse a sense of 
national pride and readiness for further sacrifice. It is not surprising that a 
Catholic bishop should merge religious symbolism with national identity in his 
nationalist ideology. And in any case, this symbolism had been imposed by the 
political environment. The presence of other nations and religions played a 
significant part in the definition of the Croatian nation.
4.5.3. The Others
Strossmayer and Racki observed the position of the Croatian nation in relation to 
the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, as a part of the Hungarian Kingdom, and as 
one element of the ‘Slav tribe’.
The particularity of a nationalist movement such as Yugoslavism necessarily lay 
in its peculiar interrelations between proclaimed national interests and political 
reality. Even though an independent and sovereign state had been proclaimed as 
an ultimate goal of the Movement, the Habsburg monarchy was not perceived as 
an obstacle, or at least as an enemy. Strossmayer frequently stressed that ‘Austria
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would have to be invented if it did not exist’ (1886: 258). The Habsburg Empire 
was seen as a ‘European necessity’ {ibid.: 261), as a ‘microcosm’ and a ‘world 
for itself’ {ibid.: 263). What Strossmayer advocated was the rearrangement of the 
internal policy of the Empire, which would guarantee prosperity for each nation. 
Hence, the centralism and unitarism which had been imposed in the period of 
1848 to 1861 was perceived as a direct threat to the survival of the constituent 
nations.
This policy changed with the establishment of the Dual Monarchy. From then on, 
the leaders of the National Party were advocates of the so-called Trialism. They 
demanded the same position for Croatia as was enjoyed by Hungary. Even then, 
whenever Croats felt betrayed, Strossmayer and Racki were both unwilling to 
blame the Empire, or still less, the Emperor. Hungary or, more precisely, the 
Magyars were labelled the main enemy of the Croatian nation.
Racki called himself anti-unionist - ‘a patriot (...) who holds that the union (with 
Hungary) cannot be sustained because of the Magyar politics. (...) Recent events 
have convinced me that the Magyars are aggressive towards weaker and 
indulgent nations, as has been proved throughout history’ (Racki, 1870: 368).
The events of 1848 introduced a new factor to the politics of the Empire: the 
nation. However, it could be said that by the middle of the century the Magyars 
comprised the only self-conscious nation of the Empire. It set a pattern for the 
others: the issues of culture and language became tightly interwoven with 
political ambitions to create a national state. Hungary, as a union of several 
nations and nations-to-be, changed its character. The Magyar nationalist parties 
had as their purpose the creation of a state for the Magyar nation only. As a 
consequence, the Croatian nationalists started to distinguish between two 
different political factors - Hungary and the Magyars. Racki (1861b: 332) drew a 
clear distinction and proclaimed his major enemy: ‘we Yugoslavs in the Triune 
Kingdom are not opponents of Hungary, but we are eternal enemies of Magyar 
politics in Hungary. (...) Our fathers, in fighting for Hungarian politics, were not 
ashamed of the Hungarian name (...) but nobody can ask from our people to make 
sacrifices for the Magyar politics’.
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For Strossmayer and Racki Hungary became a ‘multinational’ state within which 
the Magyar nation intended to dominate over the other nations. Hence it was 
appropriate to view the Croatian nation as a part of the Hungarian state, but 
certainly not as an element of the Magyar state. The ideologists of Yugoslavism, 
it appears, were aware of the distinction between civic and ethnic identity. They 
were prepared to agree on common citizenship, i.e. to be described as a 
Hungarian nation, but were strongly opposed to being regarded as Magyars.
Fearing the strong position which the Magyars held after the establishment of the 
Dual Monarchy, the leaders of the National Party again questioned the union 
with Hungary. This once more caused them to reinterpret Croatian history. The 
task of the leaders was to prove that Croatia had always had a state that was 
independent of Hungary, and that only a personal union undertaken by the King 
tied the two countries. It was important to show that the Croats had always 
suffered and made sacrifices for the common state, while the Magyars wanted 
only to dominate over other nations. The crucial moment, it seems, was the 
creation of the Dual Monarchy: ‘In 1867 Magyars showed such a lack of 
gratitude to the Croatian nation that we should never forget it. (...) Hungary 
cannot perceive the Triune Kingdom as an equal but only as a subordinate (...) 
now, between our homeland and Hungary eternal friendship cannot exist, and 
therefore it would be better for both sides to separate peacefully and live as a 
good neighbours if they cannot live as equals’ {ibid.: 369).
All the Croats had got for their sacrifices, the leaders explained, was offence and 
humiliation. ‘The Croatian regiments were spilling their blood at the battles of 
Siget, Kaniza, Kiseg, Djer, Budim etc., for the freedom of Hungary’ (Racki, 
1870: 376) and in return ‘gradually, Hungary crippled Croatia, and up to 1790 it 
almost completely destroyed it’ {ibid.: 375). Racki explained how the Croatian 
state, in the union with Hungary, had disappeared and ‘the Croatian people fell 
into a state of unconsciousness so deep that for half of this century we have been 
struggling to bring them back to consciousness’ {ibid.: 402).
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Thus the only solution for Croatia lay in the creation of an independent homeland 
- or at least one that was independent from Hungary - or more precisely the 
Magyars. To make their point clear, the National Party tried to mobilize 
supporters through the newly created myth of Ban Jelacic. In November 1866, 
with the most splendid display, the monument of the ban was erected in Zagreb's 
main square. Jelacic's drawn sword was pointing North - to Hungary.
Until the 1880s the leaders of the National Party relied on the help of their ‘same- 
blood brothers’ in their struggle against Magyar dominance. However, with the 
change in the royal dynasty, Serbia changed its policy as well. When Serbia 
attacked Bulgaria in 1885, Strossmayer and Racki were greatly disappointed. 
That was also the moment when the National Party altered its perception of the 
Serbian role in the creation of the South Slav union. In 1886 Ra£ki published an 
article Zablude srpske politike (The mistakes of Serbian politics). Even at this 
moment Racki was emphasizing the brotherhood of the two nations: ‘[The 
Croats] are not inspired by any hatred, even less because if we take into account 
the similarity of Serbs and Croats, at least in language, each gain of Serbian 
territory would be to Croatian benefit’ (1886: 470). Racki finally realized that 
with such a developed and self-aware national identity on the part of the Serbian 
nation, it would be very difficult to establish a South Slav state. One of the 
reasons for that difficulty was the role of religion in Serbian national 
consciousness:
[The Serbs have an] overdeveloped national consciousness and national 
exclusiveness. (...) The Serbs are nourishing and expressing their national 
and tribal specificity, and they are not willing to sacrifice anything for the 
sake of the community. They are marking their tribal uniqueness with 
markers which have no meaning in international politics; furthermore we 
can say that they are not justified by science. That marker is religion. 
Every person of the Greeko-Eastem church, even if he is settled in 
Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, where the Croatian name is dominant, 
even if he speaks the same language, is Serb. (...) Now, because of that 
the Croatian name has begun to be used more often and the memories 
connected with that name are more vividly expressed, (ibid.: 476)
Racki felt greatly disappointed with regard to the Serbian policy which tied itself 
to Hungary and with the Italians in Dalmatia. As a consequence the Serbs from
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Croatia opposed the demand for territorial unity of Dalmatia with the Triune 
Kingdom. Racki thought that the ‘Serbs of the Croatian state, i.e. of Croatia, 
Slavonia and Dalmatia, are obliged, for their own sake, to support the idea of 
territorial integrity and state independence of their own homeland, and to support 
the Croatian national policy which is not and cannot be anti-Serbian’ {ibid: 483). 
Even though the Serbian nationalistic ideas had been present in the Serbian 
media for a long period, only now did Racki acknowledge the aggression of the 
Serbian policy and their hegemonistic aspirations. ‘Yugoslavian Piedmont’, he 
wrote, actually strives to rule others by ‘nourishing conquering aspirations 
towards its brother’ {ibid.: A ll). For the first time Racki stressed that Serbian 
nationalism did not even recognize the Croats as a separate nation. He found a 
little satisfaction in pointing out that Serbia ‘is betrayed, when it itself had 
wished to betray everybody’ {ibid: 415).
The clearest signs of disappointment and the change in policy of the National 
Party and its ideologists occurred in 1893 when Strossmayer met his greatest 
opponent and rival Ante Starcevic, in order to establish a political reconciliation 
within the ideologically divided nation. Ante Starcevic, the leader of the Party of 
Right, had built his ideology around love for his own nation and anti-Serbianism.
4.5.4. Conclusion
In many respects Yugoslavism is a continuation of the Illyrian Movement. 
However, under the influence of the political events of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the ideologists of Yugoslavism had to redefine their ‘core 
doctrine’. Their doctrine was shaped in accordance with the ultimate aim: the 
creation of a union of South Slav nations. Their nationalist ideology can be 
analyzed only by keeping this aim in mind.
The first specificity of Yugoslavism is their definition of the nation. The 
distinction between the ‘spiritual Yugoslav nation’ and ‘historical Croatian 
nation’ unintentionally (?) imposed a distinction between an (wider) ethnic and 
(narrower) civic nation {sic!). Surprisingly, the Yugoslav nation was described as
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an ethnic nation, and the Croatian nation as a civic one. At the same time, other 
nationalist ideologies, Serbian and Croatian, were using the same categories of 
common origins, language, culture etc., in the creation of their own ‘greater- 
nations’. Yugoslavism had not been created as an amalgamation of nations, 
neither did it have the purpose of creating a nation-for-itself. It had been created 
with the aim of preserving the specificities of all the South Slav nations. The 
preservation and prosperity of the Croatian nation was the ultimate aim of 
Yugoslavism.
However it appears that political events were narrowing the scope of 
Yugoslavism. At the end of the century the creators of the Yugoslav nationalist 
ideology realized that neither Serbs nor Slovenes accepted their ideas. 
Yugoslavism had started as a Croatian ideology and it ended as such. However, 
the idea of Yugoslavism was to be resurrected just a few decades later, and was 
to mark the history of the South Slav nations over the course of the twentieth 
century.
4.6. The Nationalist Ideology of the Party of Right
For us the nationality is sacred' 
and we are afraid o f those who 
love it less than we do 
(Starcevic, 1860: 93)
While the Illyrian Movement presented the first attempt to ‘awaken’ national 
consciousness among Croats, the formation of the nationalist ideology of the 
Party of Right signified the creation of the first nationalist ideology of the 
Croatian nation. For the first time the Croatian nation was given a clear 
definition, programme and aim. The ideology had been formulated by Ante 
Starcevic who has become known as the ‘Father of the Nation’. Starcevic’s 
programme was based on the ‘historical’ and ‘natural’ right of the Croatian 
nation for an independent and sovereign state. The nation was defined around 
that time by the dominant ideas of Romanticism combined with the ideas of the 
French Revolution. For the first time, Croatian nationalist ideology denied any
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significance to Pan-Slavic or South-Slavic ideas. From the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the Croatian nation was clearly distanced from all other 
nations - the Serbs, Magyars and Germans.
Since the creation of a comprehensive nationalist ideology by Ante Starcevic in 
the 1850s until the end of the so-called ‘Starcevic’s Party of Right’ in 1918, the 
Party went through many schisms forming many branches, which were 
frequently directly opposed to each other. Still the core doctrine of their 
ideologies changed only a little. The Father of the Nation’ developed his ‘core 
doctrine’ during the period from the 1850s to 1889, which was mainly influenced 
by the political and social situation of that time, and particularly by the formation 
of the Dual Monarchy. As Gross (1973: 22) pointed out, the roots of the 
nationalist ideology of the Party of Right could be found to originate from three 
sources: first, from the tradition of the Croatian nobility; second, from the fact 
that the Croatian national awakening started under the Dlyrian, and not the 
Croatian name; and third, from the underestimation of the Croatian nation by 
Pan-Slavic and Serbian nationalism.
In the next few pages I will present the core doctrine of Starcevic’s nationalist 
ideology. This analysis will be based on Starcevic’s writings published in the 
period from 1860 to 1892 and collected by Tomislav Ladan (1971). The first part 
will deal with Starcevic’s definition of the nation, the second part with his 
definition of the Croatian nation in particular, and the third part with the 
definition of both internal and external enemies.
4.6.1. Definition o f the Nation
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideas of Romanticism and the 
French Revolution started to play an important role in political and academic life 
in Croatia. Hence, it could be assumed that Starcevic’s nationalist ideology was 
greatly influenced by both of them. These influences were particularly reflected 
in Starcevic’s definition of the nation.
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Starcevic put forward two necessary conditions for the existence of the nation: 
first, the nation had to be homogenous, and second, it had to possess its own 
state. The problem of the homogeneity of the nation for Starcevic, originates 
from the so-called ‘nature’ of the nation. The nation in his concept was 
understood as a living being, as a personality. Every nation is specific and 
original, and every nation has its own biography and peculiar national spirit. The 
nation itself is the ultimate value, and ‘the nation in its life has no other judge 
than God’ (Starcevic, 1881: 353). The spirit and genius of the nation are its most 
vital characteristics. Moreover, Starcevic understands the nation as a community 
tied by the same national consciousness, and by a specific language and culture. 
As with Romantic thought, Starcevic believed that language, history, mores, art 
and literature are the expressions of a national spirit. It is interesting that 
Starcevic did not see blood ties as important for the creation of the nation. He 
wrote: ‘Every Croat probably has some Roman, Greek or Barbarian blood in 
himself. There were no Croats in the seventh century who were of pure Croatian 
blood’ (in Gross, 1971: 132). The spirit of the nation was perceived in 
Starcevic’s ideology as the expression of the mystical centre of all creativity 
(Gross, 1971: 10). The preservation and development of this spirit has to be 
secured if a nation wants to be a nation. The only guarantee for national survival, 
i.e. the preservation of the national spirit and genius, is the state. To be more 
precise, the national state. Starcevic wrote: ‘Truly, without independence and 
sovereignty a nation cannot be a nation but just a group of people’ (Starcevic, 
1869a: 176); and further on: ‘as long as a nation wants to be a nation, it will 
struggle for its independence and sovereignty. That is a condition for its survival’ 
(Starcevic, 1869a: 188). Starcevic held that when a nation loses its sovereignty, 
that nation has nothing more to lose. The national state in Starcevic’s ideology is 
a natural entity, based on the historical rights of each nation. Hence, a 
multinational state is an unnatural creation:
it is impossible, and it is against nature, to unify regions, laws, 
governments by force or by free will; to unify the nations which are so 
different by breed, by history, by nationality, level of enlightenment, 
geographical position, social relations, economic interests or by the 
religious laws. (Starcevic, 1878: 311)
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The right of creation of a sovereign and independent state is not an exclusive 
right of a few, but rather a universal right for all nations. In 1860 Starcevic 
explained: ‘For us, each nationality is sacred. With the term nationality we 
understand an unrestricted right to develop the spiritual and physical strength of 
the nation, and so without harming any other nation’ (in Gross, 1971: 59). Yet, 
the question remains ‘who is the nation?’. The criteria for being recognized as a 
nation Starcevic found in history - the source of legitimization and justification: 
‘Only real historical names of the nations have any real strength’ (Starcevic, 
1871b: 240). History also provides the basis for all national rights. Starcevic 
called these rights ‘primary rights’: ‘the primary right to property is eternal, and 
every nation whose rights have been violated can and has to retrieve these rights 
at any time and against anyone as long as that nation exists’ (in Gross, 1971: 45).
This is the framework within which Starcevic explained the origins, aims and 
future of the Croatian nation.
4.6.2. The Croatian Nation
When Starcevic described the Croatian nation he had one goal - to accelerate the 
process of formation and integration of the Croatian nation. He systematically 
compared the shameful position of the Croatian nation of the time with the 
glorious past and possible free and happy future. His aim was to provoke a desire 
for change in the position of the Croatian nation among the Croatian 
intelligentsia (Gross, 1971: 9).
Awakening and expanding the national consciousness for Starcevic meant 
strengthening national pride. Starcevic described the Croatian nation as ‘the most 
glorious nation among the Slavs’, ‘once a ruling nation’, a ‘chosen people’, but 
also as ‘those who did not pass the childhood of nationhood’ (Starcevic, 1860:
88). Therefore, Starcevic’s personal aim was to bring and guide the Croatian 
nation to its maturity, i.e. to awake national consciousness among the Croats and 
to explain to them their national mission.
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The first step in the realization of his aim was to explain who the Croats were. 
According to his concept of the nation, he held that a Croat is any person who, 
though not necessarily a descendent of the ancient Croats, was pervaded by the 
spirit of the Croatian nation. Hence, he labeled as an ‘unclean breed’ all of those 
who were Croats by origin, but ‘foreigners’ by spirit (Gross, 1971: 205). 
Therefore, Starcevic did not deny the Slav origins of the Croats. However, he 
also refers to Croats as ‘we Austrian Croats’ (Starcevic, 1860: 102), or ‘we 
people from the East’ (Starcevic, 1869a: 182). The mission of the Croats, 
Starcevic held, was to save Christian Europe from ‘infidels’. He was convinced 
that Europe sees the Croats as a Rampart of Christianity - Antemurale 
Christianitatis. He also held that the territorial position of the Croatian Kingdom 
has been the source of all good and evil for his nation.
Starcevic described the Croats as lazy and insentient, but ‘Europe (...) knows that 
every people is like that if it suffers under despotic rule, and therefore cannot 
enjoy the fruits of its own labor, and especially if it is forced by its government to 
live a life of an animal’ (Starcevic, 1861a: 123). Yet, it was not always like that, 
‘Croatian people used to be strong, wealthy, sophisticated, and only because they 
used to be free’ (Starcevic, 1860: 97). In spite of all of this Starcevic continues, 
‘we Croats have to say, without pretension, that we have four times more brains 
than any other nation’ (Starcevic, 1879: 336). From these quotations it is obvious 
that Starcevic wanted to offer his compatriots a bleak picture of their position: 
the homeland was exploited, the Croatian people oppressed and ruined, the 
Croatian historic rights were violated, and national pride was dishonored. 
Therefore, Starcevic felt he had to awaken their wish to change the position of 
the Croatian nation.
Besides the oppression and injustice, Starcevic had to deal with the problem of a 
divided homeland. Hence, in his writings and speeches he paid particular 
attention to the so-called ‘historic Croatian territory’. He described Croatia as a 
‘land blessed by God, gained by the blood of our fathers, defended from all our 
enemies’ attacks’ (Starcevic, 1860: 81). It is exactly this blood, spilled sometime
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in history which, according to Starcevic, marks the ‘historic Croatian lands’.30 He 
was the advocate of a Greater Croatia. Not only did he consider Dalmatia as the 
‘historical limb of our nation’ (Starcevic, 1860: 95), and Slavonia, Istria and 
Bosnia as historic Croatian lands, but he also added the ‘Croatian regions Styria, 
Camiola, Carinthia’ (Starcevic, 1878: 302). Once again, history for Starcevic 
justifies the territorial rights of the nation.
In order to offer real justification, history has to be rewritten. Starcevic, just as 
other Croatian national awakeners, paid particular attention to rewriting Croatian 
history so that it could fit his ideology. Here, few examples will be given.
To justify the claim of the ‘historic Croatian territories’, Starcevic went far back 
in history. Hence, according to him, ‘in the ninth century the Kingdom of Croatia 
(...) was divided into ten states...’ (Starcevic, 1860: 89), and therefore the 
territories of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia etc. historically belong to Croatia. 
According to Starcevic’s interpretations, the territories of the Croatian Kingdom 
are even bigger: ‘when this part of Croatia (which kept the title of Kingdom of 
Croatia) chose the king of Hungary for its own constitutional king, then Croatia, 
which preserved its independence and sovereignty, in some way gained, or better, 
conquered Hungary’ (Starcevic, 1860: 92).
Starcevid paid special attention to the events of 1102 and 1527, when the Croats 
were electing their kings. He tried to prove that the Croats had never declined 
their national rights, but rather that these rights had been violated. He repeatedly 
underlined that according to both treaties, Croats elected the kings, and hence, 
created only a personal union between the kingdoms. It follows that
the Croatian Kingdom has never been and is not a hereditary kingdom 
(...) Just as the Croatian nation cannot inherit a ruler - a ruler cannot 
inherit the Croatian throne. Therefore, both sides continued to respect the 
contract, they inherited mutual rights and duties, and if these rights and
30 It is interesting that Starcevic was using the term ‘Croatian Kingdom’ where, for example 
Strossmayer was using the ‘Triune Kingdom’ or ‘Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia*. It 
could be said that even in terminology Starve vie wanted to underline the unity of the historic 
Croatian lands.
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duties were not respected, then the agreement between the two parties 
ceases to exist. (Starcevic, 1878: 307)
This interpretation is the basis of Starcevic’s claim for the independent and 
sovereign national state. Since the rulers of Croatia repeatedly violated the 
historical rights of the Croats, the personal union ceased to exist.
Starcevic was a product of Romanticism, but he was definitely not a naive 
person. He was fully aware that merely to refer to historic or natural rights would 
not be enough to overrule the Austrian and Hungarian yoke and establish an 
independent state. Starcevic himself was not an advocate of violent means 
either.31 He wrote: ‘from one hundred rebellions maybe only one turns out to 
benefit the people, therefore I would say that rebellions are more deadly for the 
people than for the throne’ (Starcevic, 1861b: 137). Therefore, the only effective 
means, according to Starcevic was to educate the people. He wrote: ‘the worst 
misfortune for a nation is when a foreigner is raising its children. And if you 
allow your children to be raised abroad, you should be aware that from your 
children, you are creating your enemies. A child raised abroad is detached from 
its homeland, from its nation, from its parents’ (Starcevic, 1871b: 227).32 Hence, 
the national education, according to Starcevic, had to start from childhood. 
Furthermore Starcevic stated that ‘when raising your children, it is important to 
enlighten their hearts with love towards their nation, their homeland’ (Starcevic, 
1871b: 232).
Besides education, Starcevic advocated a policy of non-cooperation with the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, because ‘if we cannot work for ourselves (Croats) let 
us not work for foreigners (our enemies) either’ (Starcevic, 1869b: 223). He asks: 
‘Why, who, and how would anybody respect our rights when we ourselves don’t 
care for them?’
31 In 1871 Eugen Kvatemik, an associate and ideologue of the Party of Right attempted to stir a 
rebellion in Military Krajina against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Gross (1971: 167-193) argues 
that Starcevic was not involved in the preparations for this rebellion and that he learned about it 
when it was already too late. In this rebellion Kvatemik lost his life.
32 It is interesting that StarCevic directed this advice towards Serbia.
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Still, Starcevic is very careful not to provoke anger from the authorities. Even 
though his statements about a free and independent Croatian state seem to be 
clear, he corrected himself: ‘I don’t want to say that for the first time Croatia will 
be an independent state, but I say that our homeland can be independent just as it 
used to be’ (Starcevic, 1861a: 124). Moreover, Starcevic frequently emphasized 
that what he demands for the Croatian nation, he would not deny to other nations: 
‘we hold that the happiness and unhappiness of any nation in the East of Europe 
is directly related to the happiness or unhappiness of neighbouring nations’ 
{ibid.: 100). It looks as Starcevic really did advocate the equality of all nations. 
The only problem was that the status of being a nation cannot be granted to all, 
but only ‘historical nations which are settled on their own land’ (Starcevic, 
1871a: 180).
The ancient historical rights, the ‘nature’ of the nation, equality and freedom: all 
of these a Croat has to learn, to be ready for the fulfillment of the national 
mission - the establishment of the independent and sovereign state. Starcevic 
demanded complete dedication of his co-nationals: ‘Let’s swear at the holy 
graves of our martyrs (and that grave is our homeland) that we will revenge our 
fathers, and let that revenge be freedom, equality and brotherhood for all of us’ 
(Starcevic, 1860: 102). The only help Croats could expect is help from God. The 
slogan ‘God and Croats’ became a battle-cry of the Party of Right in their 
struggle against numerous external and internal enemies of the Croatian nation.
4.6.3. Internal Enemies
In his writings Starcevic spent a lot of energy attempting to reveal the internal 
enemies of the Croatian nation. This is not surprising bearing in mind that 
Starcevic’s ultimate aim was the homogenization of the nation. Starcevic’s main 
criteria for distinguishing and ranking the internal enemies was loyalty and 
attachment to the Croatian nation.
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Starcevic made a precise categorization of the internal enemies. Moreover, he 
introduced symbolic labels for each of them. There are two ‘types’ of enemies: 
Magyarons and Magyarols.
The first type - Magyarons - were mainly the members of the Croatian nobility 
but either of Magyar origins or supporters of the union with Hungary. They are 
‘...egoists which look after only their own stomachs’ (Starcevic, 1869a: 165). 
Starcevic showed some understanding toward these enemies of the Croatian 
nation, even though he also showed some bitterness, bearing in mind the role the 
nobility played in the national awakening of other nations: ‘In all Europe the 
nobility takes first place in science and patriotism. How come that only the 
Croatian nobility is indifferent?’ {ibid.: 166). Starcevic made the sins of the 
Magyarons even clearer: ‘But instead of extinguishing that Illyico-Slavo- 
Serbianism, instead of standing for Croatism and proving that throughout history 
(...) Illyro-Serbia has been nothing else but Croatia; instead they proved how 
Illyro-Serbo-Slavism is nothing but an illusion; (...) instead of all of that, 
Magyarons started to mess with Magyars’ {ibid.: 167).
Yet, Starcevic held that Magyarons are a ‘breed’33 which will eventually die out, 
and hence not the ultimate threat to the Croatian nation. He states: ‘Magyaronism 
is an old sickness, but not contagious one’ (.ibid.\ 168). The other type of enemy 
was perceived as much more dangerous - Magyarols.34
For Magyarols, who Starcevic considered a much worse group of enemies of the 
Croatian nation, he also used the term ‘Slavoserbs’.35 In his article Strankle u 
Hrvatskoj (Parties in Croatia), Starcevic described Slavoserbs with very vivid 
terminology: ‘Slavoserbian trash’ {ibid.: 211); ‘such dirty bastards as Slavoserbs 
you cannot find anywhere, you cannot find such egoism, impatience and such
33 Starcevic was not using the term ‘breed’ in a racist manner, not as a biological, but rather as a 
spiritual characteristic. For more details see Gross (1971: 205).
34 Starcevic was using term ‘Magyarons’ for those who accepted Magyar national and cultural 
identity. The term ‘Magyarols’ is combined by the name Magyars and Tyrolians (Tirolci), which 
Starve vie uses to name the followers of the Illyrian and Yugoslav Movements. With this term he 
wanted to characterize the followers of the Yugoslav Movement as ‘double slaves’.
35 Starcevic is not the founder of this term. It was a Slovak Safarik who introduced it for the Serbs 
and Croats who spoke a stokavian dialect.
138
stupidity’ {ibid.: 207); ‘The Slavoserb breed (...) is by it very nature incapable of 
thinking, its spirit rejects any noble and high thought, it stays barbaric’ {ibid.:
267); ‘Slavoserbs know everything without learning anything’ {ibid.: 198); ‘Only 
Slavoserbs, who are disgusting slave creatures, want to equalize the world 
according to their own measure; they want to arrange the whole world; and yet 
they don’t know how to arrange their own language, still waiting for others to 
arrange even their own stomachs’ {ibid.: 202). The real reason for Starcevic’s 
open animosity towards the members of the Yugoslav Movement in general, and 
towards Strossmayer in particular, is because ‘Slavoserbism (...) kills all 
particularities of the nations’ {ibid.: 213). Magyarols or Slavoserbs are those who 
‘...labeled as lunatics everybody who wants to defend the rights of the homeland, 
who want to retrieve a constitution and legal conditions in Croatia. They declared 
as lunatics and thieves those who did not want to embarrass Croatia, who did not 
want to convert a Croat into a Tyrol’s or Magyar’s slave’ {ibid.: 170). Finally, 
‘that party has as its purpose to extinguish Croats’ {ibid.: 173).
Here, it is important to emphasize that even though Starcevic expressed clear 
animosity towards any Pan-Slavic, Illyrian and Yugoslav idea, he did not 
necessarily ‘hate’ the Slav or South-Slav nations.36 He just held that such ideas 
present a clear danger for the national existence of the Croats. He emphasized 
how the history, culture, and even the language of the South Slav nations is so 
different that it would be ‘unnatural’ to push them into one political community. 
According to his ideological model, there is only one way of uniting the nations:
If some nationality would not have the ‘strength for life’, it would 
disperse in a quiet and natural way, and other nationalities would progress 
and amalgamate[37] until, maybe, at one time, on this entire planet there 
would be one nationality only. (...) But when no other nationality cares 
about this, we Croats can also not deal with that business. Today that kind 
of unity cannot be our programme, (ibid.: 183)
Hence, all the Croats could do was to work on good neighbourly relations 
because ‘the nations in Eastern Europe are settled in that numerical and 
geographical relation that none of them can harm the others without being
36 Well, as long as he recognized them as nations.
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harmed itself: these nations, united under one government, under one law, cannot 
be happy and very soon they would be the target for foreigners’ (Starcevic, 1860:
89).
However succinct Starcevic was in defining internal enemies, he was even more 
succinct in describing and defining external enemies.
4.6.4. External Enemies
The concept of external enemies Starcevic developed was again in order to 
clearly separate the Croatian nation from other nations. Nevertheless, he held that 
history could provide numerous examples of how the Croatian nation had been 
oppressed and exploited by other nations. Yet, the most dangerous threat came 
from three neighbouring nations who were directly endangering the very 
existence of the Croatian nation: Austrian Germans, Magyars and Serbs. Each of 
these nations was endangering and violating political, cultural or economic rights 
and specificities of the Croatian nation.
While previously analyzed nationalist ideologies, i.e. Ulyrianism and 
Yugoslavism, were attempting a balancing act between the Hungarian and 
Austrian side, after the events of 1848 Starcevic was certain that neither side 
could bring any good to the Croatian people. Hence, in order to raise some sense 
of pride among Croats, he tried to present other nations as less great than what 
they presented themselves to be. Therefore, just as Srossmayer and Racki, 
Starcevic held that it was of great importance to emphasize how Croats were a 
loyal and self-sacrificing nation, while the other nations thought only of their 
own benefit. Starcevic wrote: ‘the Habsburg monarchy has to thank the 
(Croatian) nation for its survival and its glory’ (Starcevic, 1860: 102). The 
Croatian people ‘already for three hundred years have been making sacrifices for 
Austria, and for all the victims of sacrifice they received only stupidity,
37 In original: sestrile se - to become sisters.
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enslavement, poverty; in spite of all our sacrifices, Austria made a mockery of 
the Croatian nation’ {ibid.: 112).
Still, for purely pragmatic reasons, Starcevic tried to separate the person of the 
king and the Austrian government. He frequently expressed ‘our love to (the 
king) and distrust of Austria’, and how for himself ‘the person of the king is 
sacred, but the government is not’ (Starcevic, 1861a: 119). Now, when he made a 
clear separation between the two, he could describe the Austrian government in 
his specific way, as ‘a bunch of Viennese hypocrites’ (Starcevic, 1861a: 104), or 
in one word as ‘hell’ (Starcevic, 1861b: 130). Starcevic blamed the Austrian 
government for all the evil in Croatia. They were responsible for the loss of the 
Croatian territory - ‘since the Habsburgs were our rulers, no more than one third 
of the kingdom of Croatia was represented in the Sabor’ (Starcevic, 1861a: 110). 
He also blames the Austrian government for the economic backwardness of the 
Croats - ‘from that beautiful land Austria made a desert’ (Starcevic, 1861b: 130). 
Even when Austria tries to help, it works against the Croats - ‘as harder Austria 
tries to reconcile us with other nations, we are more in conflict’ {ibid.: 103).
In order to make his point much clearer to the broader masses Starcevic 
resurrected the myth of Krsto Frankopan and Petar Zrinski.38 Starcevic used this 
myth as the symbol of the destruction of the sovereign Croatian nation from the 
Habsburgs. He wrote: ‘Our Krcki-Frankopans and our Subic-Zrinski were 
declared as rebels and strangled just because Germans wanted the Croatian lands’ 
(Starcevic, 1878: 292). Starcevic described Petar Zrinski as a leader with great 
‘intellectual and physical virtues, but he missed one thing - he was not liked by 
his own people’ (Gross, 1971: 34). In other words, Starcevic wanted to use a 
myth in order to show that the Croatian people had not understood Zrinski’s 
message from the past, and therefore the people had been enslaved by the 
descendants of Zrinski’s killers {ibid.). Such an interpretation of the myth was 
directly opposed to the myth of Ban Jelacic advocated by the ideologists of
38 In 1664 Krsto Frankopan and Petar Zrinski, members of old Croatian noble families, attempted 
to overthrow King Leopold as the Croatian king. This attempt would later be known as the 
Zrinsko-Frankopan conspiracy. Without the broader support of their fellow nobles, the two of 
them were condemned to failure. They went to Vienna to ask for mercy. Yet, they were put in 
prison, tried, and beheaded. For more details, see Gail (1973: 107-109).
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Yugoslavism. While Strossmayer wanted to promote a picture of the glorious 
resistance towards the Hungarians, Starcevic used the myth of Zrinski and 
Frankopan to promote the image of the Austrians as the worst enemies of the 
Croats.
Similarly, Starcevic was relying on other myths, symbols and peculiar 
interpretations of historical events in order to describe the Magyars in the same 
manner. In order to raise national pride among Croats, once again it was 
important to humiliate other nations. First of all, it was important to show that 
Magyars, as a nation, lack real national history, and therefore are less valuable 
than the Croats. He wrote: ‘If in the tenth century Magyars had any name, it was 
Turks” (Starcevid, 1860: 90).
Further on, Starcevic concentrated on the explanation of the events of 1848. He 
justified the actions of Croats not as a support to the Austrian government, but 
rather as a struggle for their national liberation. He was claiming that the 
Magyars attempted to raise their nation on the graves of other Eastern European 
nations: ‘Magyars became known as evildoers and an unjust nation in the eyes of 
all nations in the East of Europe and all historians’ (Starcevic, 1860: 93). 
Moreover ‘Magyars showed that they were not working for the liberation of the 
peoples of Hungary, but for the benefit of the Magyar breed only’ (Starcevic, 
1869a: 161). Hence, with the events of 1848, Starcevic was pointing out, that 
every alliance between Croats and Magyars had ceased to exist.
Starcevic had not finished his list of enemies. Another side had been perceived as 
much more dangerous, especially because it presented itself both as external and 
internal enemy at the same time - the Serbs.
Provoked by the ideas of the Serbian nationalist and expansionist ideologies, 
Starcevic formulated a Croatian counterpart. In 187639 he published an article
39 A year earlier, in 1875 in Bosnia and Herzegovina there began an uprising of the population 
against Ottoman rule. This event initiated aspirations among the Croatian and Serbian elite for 
annexation of the Bosnian territory. Both Croats and Serbs were convinced that the territory and 
population of Bosnia belongs to them. According to Gross (1971: 202) these events initiated a 
conflict between two elites which lasted for the next 30 years.
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‘The Slavoserbian breed’ in which he denied the existence of the Serbian nation. 
Starcevic denied their history, language and the name of Serbs. He held that since 
their migration, the Croats were a ruling and a state-creating nation, while Serbs 
were a people of beggars, and not a nation. He claimed that the name ‘Serb’ 
originates from the term *servn4- slaves. Serbs are, Starcevic concluded, the only 
people who do not know their own name (Gross, 1971: 45). He was claiming that 
before the rule of Duke Milos in the 1860s ‘the people of Serbia had not been 
tied to anything: Croat, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Shiptar, Jew, Gypsy they were all 
mixed, all together ... without a permanent homeland’ (Starcevic, 1871b: 225). 
Using the same principle as Vuk Karadzic,40 Starcevic proclaimed all Serbs as 
Croats.
Moreover, Starcevic reinterpreted the entire history of Serbia. In his particular 
way he was describing Serbian migration, explaining how ‘that breed’ had been 
capable only of theft and robbery. They were always ready for any evil, and 
always blamed somebody else for it. Rather than fighting against the Turks, they 
ran away, and, hence, just because of their cowardliness, the battle on Kosovo 
had been lost. Starcevic respected some Serbian historical characters, but as 
Croats. For example, he would write about the glorious Croatian dynasty of 
Nemanjic (Gross, 1971: 203). However, at the same time, Starcevic advocated 
equality of all religions, and hence, he referred to Serbs from Krajina as a 
Croatian Orthodox population. On the other hand Serbs from Serbia were 
described as unenlightened and uneducated people with barbaric behaviour 
(Starcevic, 1971b: 232).
4.6.5. Conclusion
In the twentieth century, Starcevic was perceived as a true Croatian nationalist 
and as the creator of an extremist nationalist ideology. From the perspective of 
the nineteenth century, this picture could look slightly different.
40 For more details, see p. 114.
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
brought new actors to the political scene - nations. It forced the Empire to 
redefine its policy, and indeed its constitution. It also forced nations to define 
themselves as nations. The Croatian nation gets its clear definition with 
Starcevic.
Starcevic's nationalist ideology entirely follows the political events of his time. 
These events shaped his definition of the nation in general and the Croatian 
nation in particular. The revolutionary events of 1848, the formation of the Dual 
Monarchy, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the issues provoked by 
these events, opened a new space for defining enemies.
Even though the basic ideas of Starcevic's concept of the nation were well known 
and broadly employed by many nationalist ideologies in Europe, Starcevic 
offered an interesting approach. In the tradition of Romanticism, Starcevic 
formulated his definition of the nation in terms of culture and history, but the role 
of the language was not emphasized. Yet, at the same time, he found that blood 
relatedness was incompatible with that definition. Moreover, common ancestors 
in his concept became unimportant for the formation of the nation. Hence, though 
Starcevic defines the nation in ethnic terms, as a community which shares the 
same myths, symbols, historic memories, culture, and, above all, common 
national spirit, he constructed an inclusive definition of the nation. Being bom as 
a Croat was not a sufficient condition to be a ‘real’ Croat. This is the reason why 
he could perceive the Serbian ruler King Dusan as a Croat, not only because 
Starcevic perceived all South Slav nations as Croats, but also because Dusan was 
pervaded by what Starcevic called the ‘Croatian spirit’. The meaning of this term 
- the Croatian spirit - is the main topic of Starcevic’s nationalist ideology.
In Starcevic’s ideology the nation is the ultimate value in itself. It is the centre of 
all social and political life. The nation is the meaning of the life of every 
individual and the struggle for national survival and prosperity should be one’s 
main task. This collectivism was not constructed in order to create uniformity of 
co-nationals. Starcevic's definition of the nation is a ‘secular’ definition, and this 
characteristic is another inclusive element of Starcevic's nationalist ideology.
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Religious affiliation, according to Starcevic, is not a marker of national 
affiliation. Hence, Starcevic can talk about the Orthodox and Muslim Croats.
The main reason for the formulation of an inclusive ethnically-defined nation 
was the heterogeneity of the Croatian nation. Divided by laws, language and 
history, Croats, Starcevic held, needed an element of integration. Therefore, 
Starcevic underlined all elements common to all Croats as important for the 
creation of a homogenous nation, and disregarded all elements of division. The 
glorious ancient history of the Croatian nation offered a basis for that unity.
To summarise, the nationalist ideologies created in the second half of the 
nineteenth century facilitated the formation of the Croatian nation:
• These ideologies introduced a Romantic idea of historicism41 as the main 
source of national legitimacy. History in these ideologies was presented 
mainly as the means for understanding the ‘spirit’ and political and cultural 
rights of the Croatian nation. Such a ‘national history’ was perceived by the 
ideologists as the justification and direction of their present political and 
cultural demands.
• The proponents of these ideologies facilitated the process of 
institutionalisation of ‘national culture’. Hence the JAZU (Yugoslav 
Academy of Science and Art), University of Zagreb and National Theatre 
became the major safeguards of that culture. Firmly established in ‘national 
history’, ‘national culture’ gained its structural establishment which secured 
its future existence.
• Both Yugoslavism and the ideology of the Party of Right acknowledged the 
importance of the nationalisation of the Croatian population in competition 
with the external corporate agents. Even though they failed to address their 
primary agents directly, they set the programme, symbols and rhetoric for the 
process of mobilisation of the broader Croatian population.
41 For more about the origins of historicist thought, see Breuilly (1993: 55-59).
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These developments in the culture, structure and agency of the Croatian society 
at the end of the nineteenth century marked the end of the second morphogenetic 
cycle of the Croatian national re-formation.
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Chapter Five
TWENTIETH-CENTURY CROATIAN NATIONALIST 
IDEOLOGIES
‘Only a cretin’s m ind or criminal soul 
can propagate a Middle Age kind o f 
destructive tribal hatred ‘ 
(Radic, 1902d: 264).
5.1. Introduction
At the beginning of the twentieth century for the first time the Croatian masses 
participated in national movements and experienced a shared sense of ‘national 
identity as a specific value’ (Hroch, 1995: 67). This stage of the ‘national 
awakening* Hroch calls ‘Phase C’.
However, Croatia’s evolving political circumstances generated nationalist 
ideologies that did not correspond to Hroch’s framework. Through the analysis of 
the three most dominant ideologies - those of the Croatian Peasant Party, the 
Ustasha Movement and the Communist Party - it will be shown how Croatian 
nationalist movements have repeatedly reconsidered and reconstructed national 
culture, in particular the role of language and history, and their political goals. 
Hence, it will be demonstrated how the Croatian nation went through various 
morphological cycles throughout the course of the twentieth century.
The nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasant Party {Hrvatska seljacka stranka 
- HSS; formally established in March 1904) was the first to successfully gain the 
popular support of the Croatian masses. The activities of HSS shaped the whole 
Croatian political and social agenda between the two world wars. The content 
and direction of its nationalist ideology was formulated by the first leader and the 
founder of the HSS - Stjepan Radic (1871-1928).
During the inter-war period two other nationalist ideologies were created, both 
with deep roots in nineteenth century nationalist ideologies: the Ustasha
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Movement, a radical and extremist movement which was formally established in 
January 1929 and led by Ante Pavelic (1889 -1957); and the Yugoslav 
Communist Party (founded in 1919) which re-introduced onto the political 
agenda a South-Slav nationalist ideology drawn up by the Party’s main ideologist 
Edvard Kardelj (1910 - 1979).
These three dominant ideologies will be examined through an analysis of the 
writings of their main creators. As in the previous chapter, a brief overview will 
be given of the major historical events that created the circumstances in which 
these ideas emerged.
5.2. Historical Background HI (1900-1928)
In the early years of the twentieth century ‘Croatian lands’ were fragmented, and 
territorially isolated from one another, ruled from Vienna, Budapest and Zagreb. 
The political life at that time in Civil Croatia was still shaped by the rule of ban 
Khuen-Hedervary. As a reaction to the ban’s policies, the Croatian opposition 
parties42 focused their attentions on resisting the enforced Magyarisation as well 
as the aspirations of Serbian nationalism.
Against this backdrop, a demonstration against the ‘Magyarizing regime of 
Khuen-Hedervary’ (Banac, 1984: 95) took place in 1895 on the streets of Zagreb 
during an official visit by Franz Joseph. This relatively minor episode was to 
have a significant impact on future political events in Croatia. The students who 
led the symbolic burning of the flag were subsequently expelled from Zagreb 
University, and had to continue their studies at the University of Prague. Stjepan 
Radic, the founder of the Croatian Peasant Party, was one of the expelled 
students. In Prague, they were greatly influenced by the ideas of Thomas G.
42 At this time the Croatian political parties were divided between those who supported the 
existing regime, such as the National Party {Narodna stranka) and to a large extent the Serbian 
National Independent Party (Srpska narodna samostalna stranka)', and those who were in 
opposition, such as the Independent National Party (Neodvisna narodna stranka) and the Party of 
Right (Stranka Prava). Another descendent of Starcevic’s party, the Pure Party of Right (Cista 
stranka prava) led by Josip Frank, believed that the Croats could liberate themselves from the 
Magyars only with the support of the Habsburgs.
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Masaryk. With their return to Croatia two years later, the group became known as 
the Progressive Youth (.Napredna omladina - NO). The NO emerged as an 
important independent opposition movement. It recognized and actively 
advocated the idea of the natural right of the nation and the notion of national 
unity among the Croats and Serbs.
Khuen-Hedervary’s policy of generating divisions between Serbs and Croats in 
order to increase Hungarian control over the region had been operating 
successfully since the 1890s. In 1902 however conflicts between Croatian and 
Serbian nationalism reached a peak. In September 1902, the daily newspaper 
Srbobran (The Defender of the Serbs - published in Zagreb) printed an article 
entitled Rat do istrage (The War Until Extinction), which had previously been 
published in Belgrade’s Srpski knjizevniglasnik (The Serbian Literary Gazette). 
This article was an open call for all-out war until the end between Serbs and 
Croats. In violent demonstrations that took place in Zagreb in the days following 
its publication, many Serbian shops and properties were destroyed. These 
demonstrations however marked the temporary end of hostilities between the two 
groups. The arrival of a new set of political circumstances the following year, 
along with a new generation of political activists, helped to foster a significant 
level of reconciliation between the two sides and heralded an era of increased co­
operation.
This new found co-operation can be traced to two major political events. In 1903 
the governments in both Serbia and Croatia collapsed. In Belgrade later that year, 
King Aleksandar Obrenovic was assassinated by nationalist officers, and the 
dynasty of Karadordevic ascended to the Serbian throne. The new dynasty 
maintained a pro-Russian, anti-Habsburg stance. The change of dynasty on the 
Serbian throne had a profound effect on the political positions of the Serbs in 
Croatia.
In Zagreb, in the spring of 1903, a sign written in Hungarian at the main train 
station provoked widespread demonstrations throughout Croatia. General 
dissatisfaction with the direction of political events in Croatia, and, more
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significantly, renewed conflicts between Hungarian nationalists and the 
Habsburgs,43 contributed to ending the thirty-year rule of ban Khuen-Hedervary.
The last decade of the Austro-Hungarian Empire witnessed the most intense 
period of political activity in Croatia. For the first time the various national 
movements originated from Croats living in Dalmatia and Istria. At the turn of 
the century, the Habsburg policy of favouring the Italian minority44 in Dalmatia 
provoked widespread dissatisfaction on the part of the Croat population. Ruled 
directly from Vienna, Dalmatia was not directly affected by clashes between the 
Serbs and Croats, because they found themselves united against the Habsburgs. 
The increase in nationalist aspirations among the Croats in Dalmatia and Istria 
was fuelled by economic hardship which drove tens of thousands to emigrate, 
mainly to America.45 This socio-economic situation influenced the whole 
political structure of Dalmatia. In the 1880s, Croats and Serbs had replaced 
Italians from municipal councils and Italians lost control of the Dalmatian Sabor 
(Tanner, 1997: 110). The most prominent political leaders were Frano Supilo and 
Ante Trumbic, the architects of the so-called ‘New Course’ in Croatian politics. 
The main policies defining this ‘New Course’ were threefold: to take advantage 
of the crisis of the dualism to emphasize and press for Croatian national interests, 
to establish a level of co-operation between Croats and Magyars in order to 
prevent Austro-German expansionism, and to establish a Croatian-Serbian 
political union.46 The ‘New Course’ immediately generated a strong degree of 
political support culminating in October 1905 in the signing of the ‘Fiume 
Resolution’ (Rijedka rezolucija). Signed in Rijeka by forty Croat deputies from 
the Dalmatian Sabor; the resolution called for the unification of Dalmatia with 
the ban’s Croatia. Moreover, this resolution recognized the Serbs as having a 
separate status in Croatia ‘guaranteeing their equality as a nation’ (Tanner, 1997: 
111). Shortly after this declaration, Serbian politicians met in Zadar and 
formulated the ‘Zadar Resolution’ supporting demands for unification. These 
resolutions created the conditions for the establishment of the Croatian-Serbian
43 For more about Hungary-Austria relations at that time, see Taylor, 1990: 210-29.
44 At the time, Italians made up only three percent of the Dalmatian population (see Taylor, 1990: 
212).
45 Hence, for example, Goldstein (1999: 97) writes that ‘in the first years of the twentieth century
the central Dalmatian island of Bra£ alone lost 8,063 (over 32 per cent) of its inhabitants’.
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Coalition (Hrvatsko-Srpska koalicija) in December 1905.47 The Coalition took no 
time in demonstrating its political strength by winning the majority of the seats at 
the elections for the Croatian Sabor in 1906, maintaining their majority until the 
break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918.
During the same elections, another nationalist party, which had only been formed 
two years previously, won a mere 500 votes failing to win a single seat. Fifteen 
years later however that same party, Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka (HPSS - the 
Croat People’s Peasant Party), was to dominate the Croatian political scene. The 
HPSS was arguably the first Croatian political party which had as its aim to 
involve the broad Croatian peasant population directly in the political process. 
The HPSS was set up in March 1904 by two brothers Antun and Stjepan Radic, 
who were not only politicians but also social reformers striving to create a 
peasant republic. On the eve of the First World War, however, a political agenda 
of this type could not be realized.
The First World War precipitated by the Sarajevo assassination created the 
opportunity for negotiating the future of the South Slavs. However, the War also 
revealed the different nationalist aspirations of the nations involved, particularly 
those of the Serbs and Croats. These nations found themselves on opposite sides 
of the War: formally, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatia was on the 
side of the Axis Powers, while Serbia was allied to the Entente.
Croatia found itself in the most difficult position. On the one hand, the Croatian 
political leaders were aware that only the complete collapse of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire could secure an independent Croatia and unification with the 
South-Slavs. On the other hand, they were concerned by the political alliances 
the Entente Powers had established in order to secure the support of Italy. In 
1915 in the secret ‘Treaty of London’ the Entente powers offered Italy the 
territories of Slovenia, Istria and the northern part of Dalmatia in return for
46 For more about the ‘New Course’ programme, see Banac, 1984: 97-98.
47 In the Coalition emerged Hrvatska strankaprava (The Croatian Party of Right,), Hrvatska 
napredna stranka (The Croatian Progressive Party), Srpska narodna samostalna stranka (The 
Serbian National Independent Party), Srpska narodna radikalna stranka (The Serbian National
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declaring war against the Axis Powers (Tanner, 1997: 114). In addition, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, part of southern Dalmatia and a large part of Slavonia were 
promised to Serbia. The Croatian politicians felt like they had been ‘sacrificed at 
the altar of secret diplomacy’ (Tanner, 1997: 114). For the leading politicians of 
the Croatian-Serbian Coalition, the formation of the South-Slav state - 
Yugoslavia - seemed the only viable solution.
An important step in the formation of the South-Slav state occurred in November 
1914 in Italy, when Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbic, Ivan Mestrovic and others 
formed the ‘Yugoslav Committee’ (Jugoslavenski odboi).48 Their aim was to 
establish a level of co-operation with the Serbian government as Croatian 
representatives, and to gain the support of the Entente Powers for the unification 
of the South-Slavs. Soon after, the Serbian government sent two Bosnian Serbs 
as its official deputies. Also present were representatives of the Slovenian 
National Progressive Party (Napredna narodna stranka) and Starcevic’s Party of 
Right (Starceviceva stranka prava) to participate in the committee. With 
representatives from the three dominant South-Slav nations, the Committee took 
a truly Yugoslav form. From the moment the Yugoslav Committee learned of the 
details of the ‘London Treaty’ (1915), their opposition to it and to Italian 
territorial aspirations became the major focus of the Committee’s activities. The 
Yugoslav Committee was formally established on 30 April 1915 in Paris, issuing 
a manifesto which denounced any secret treaties involving Croatian territory. 
They shared a profound belief in the principle of the right to national self- 
determination. The Serbian government however did not entirely share the views 
of the Yugoslav Committee.
The Serbian government was headed at the time by the leader of the Serbian 
Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka) Nikola Pasic. In September 1914 the 
Serbian government had already informed its allies that in the case of victory, 
Serbia would expect to create a strong Serbian state which would embrace all 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Banac, 1984: 116). This unification however did not
Radical Party) and for a while Socialdemokratska stranka (The Social-Democratic Party), just as 
many other independent politicians.
48 For more details about the process of unification, see Banac, 1984: 115-40.
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have as its aim to create a ‘Yugoslav’ state, but rather a ‘Greater Serbia’. The 
main obstacle to the creation of such a state was seen to be an independent 
Croatian state. Pasic therefore counted on the backing of supporters of the 
Yugoslav ideal, hoping that the idea of narodno jedinstvo (national unity) could 
be translated in such a way as to ensure Serbian supremacy over the new state 
(Banac, 1984: 117).
The conflict between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee was 
indirectly resolved with the events in Russia in 1917. Having lost the crucial 
support of Petrograd, Pasic was forced to find a compromise with the Committee, 
in order to pre-empt the geo-political implications of a possible separate peace 
between Austro-Hungary and the Entente Powers. On 20 July 1917 the Serbian 
government and the Yugoslav Committee signed a treaty at Corfu. The two sides 
agreed that a new state would be a democratic, parliamentary monarchy under the 
Karadordevic dynasty. However, the question of the new state’s political 
structure was to be decided by a freely elected constitutional assembly (Tanner, 
1997: 117).
In October 1918, with the collapse of the Thessaloniki front, the Austro- 
Hungarian army was disbanded, marking the end of the First World War. Only a 
few days later, on 5 October 1918 representatives of Slovenian and Croatian 
political parties gathered in Zagreb and set up the National Council of the 
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs {Narodno vijece Slovenaca, Hrvata i  Srba - SHS). 
The Council comprised representatives from Slovenia, Croatia, Istria, Dalmatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina. The main role of the Council was to 
work towards the creation of an independent South-Slav state. On 29 October 
1918 the Croatian Sabor proclaimed that on the basis of the principle of national 
self-determination all connections between Croatia, the Hungarian Kingdom and 
the Habsburg Empire were to be severed. Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia along 
with the city of Rijeka were declared as a single independent state which was to 
unite into a common State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs {Drzava SHS).
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The social and political atmosphere within the newly created state was chaotic 
from the start. As early as November 1918 the Council sent a delegation to 
Belgrade ‘pleading for the entry of the Serbian army into Croatia-Slavonia’ 
(Banac, 1984: 131). The existence of numerous conflicting views regarding the 
process of unification within the Serbian government and within the National 
Council necessitated further negotiations. The president of the Serbian 
government, Nikola Pasic, and the president of the National Council, Antun 
Korosec, met in Geneva on 6 November 1918 and signed a declaration in which 
the Serbian government recognized the equal status of the State of SHS with the 
Serbian Kingdom regarding the unification process. The net result of these 
negotiations was that, on 1 December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (Kraljevina SHS) was declared. After around 800 years of struggle for 
an autonomous and an independent state, as some Croatian nationalist ideologies 
would claim, Croats found themselves integrated into another multinational 
entity.
154
The strongest opposition to unification came from the Party of Right and the 
HPSS, which made its views clear in 1920 by officially changing its name to the 
Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljacka stranka - 
HRSS). Stjepan Radic, the Party leader, was concerned that the new Kingdom 
would resemble in practice the previous period of Hungarian rule. The first 
indication that Radic’s fears had some foundation was in the new government’s 
harsh policy of crushing any incidents of disobedience or protest among the 
Croats.49 In 1920 following a public call for the creation of a republic, Radic was 
sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison. During elections around the time of 
his imprisonment Radic’s party won the biggest share of Croat votes, making the 
HRSS the third biggest party in Yugoslavia (Banac, 1984: 227). It is important to 
point out that for the 1920 elections the new state had introduced a system of 
universal suffrage. Hence, it could be argued that public support for the HRSS 
came directly from the Croatian peasant masses. This support was to continue to 
grow over the following years.
On 28 June 1921 Pasic succeeded in pushing through the constitutional assembly 
the first constitution known as Vidovdanski Ustav (the Constitution of St. Vitus’ 
Day). This act ‘abolished Croatia’s traditional institutions, including the ban and 
the Sabor, and broke up Croatia (and the rest of the new state) into departments 
governed (...) by the prefects appointed by the government’ (Tanner, 1997: 121). 
These events were to have immediate repercussions on the Croatian political 
scene. In the 1923 elections Stjepan Radic and his party doubled their share of 
votes. The main issues which drew in the broad support of the Croatian peasantry 
were his refusal to recognize the unification of Yugoslavia, and his demand for 
the establishment of a Croatian assembly which would establish a peasant 
republic (Banac, 1984: 229).
In order to gain support from the international community, Radic visited Moscow 
in 1924 and affiliated the HRSS to the Peasant International. On his return to 
Croatia in 1925, Radic and the whole HRSS leadership were arrested. Fearing
49 For more details, see Banac, 1984: 141-328.
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that the party could disappear entirely from the political scene, Radic wrote a 
memorandum which was read to the Parliament in Belgrade. In it he recognized 
the legitimacy of the monarchy, abandoned his programme for Croatian 
independence, accepted the Vidovdan constitution and changed the name of the 
party to the Croatian Peasant Party (.Hrvatska seljacka stranka - HSS). The 
reaction from the Croatian masses was clear: in the 1927 elections, the HSS lost 
almost 200,000 votes.50 However, as a result of changes to the electoral system, 
the HSS actually only lost six seats in parliament.
In spite of the change of name, Radic’s party did not lessen its level of opposition 
to the government in Belgrade. In 1927 Radic found an ally in Svetozar 
Pribicevic (a Serb from Croatia), who was a disillusioned former minister of 
internal affairs and leader of the Democratic Party. Together they formed the 
Peasant-Democratic Coalition (.Demokratska seljadka koalicija - DSK). Radic’s 
determined opposition to the ruling government began to draw wide-ranging 
support from politicians and the masses alike and began to pose a major threat to 
the government.
During a session of the Belgrade Parliament on 20 June 1928, a Serbian 
nationalist Punisa Racic shot and killed Pavle Radic and Duro Basaricek, and 
wounded Stjepan Radic, Ivan Pemar and Ivan Granda, all of whom were HSS 
deputies at the Parliament. On 8 August 1928, Stjepan Radic died of his wounds. 
Punisa Racic was never tried.
Political unitarism of the Yugoslav state was reflected in the statistical 
representation of its society. Hence, two Yugoslav censuses held in 1921 and 
1931 mirrored the existing political structure and presented the results according 
to the established Banovine - a rather artificial territorial division (see Map 6). 
Goldstein (1999: 117) offers an alternative estimate, according to which during 
the 1920s Croatia was still predominantly agricultural, where the proportion of 
people dependent on agriculture was just below 70 per cent. Goldstein (ibid.: 99) 
claims that in 1910 northern Croatia had 56 per cent illiteracy, and that ‘the
50 In 1920 in the territory of the Kingdom of SHS, 1,607,255 people voted, whilst in Croatia-
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whole country could only claim about 2 per cent intellectuals (excluding the 
clergy)’. The census of 1921 showed that 51 per cent of the Yugoslav population 
were illiterate. The number of children in elementary schools rose from 650,000 
in 1919 to 1,404,000 in 1937. Even in 1934 ‘the average number of pupils per 
elementary school teacher was 53.6 so that in many schools classes were far too 
large for effective teaching’ (Trouton, 1952: 163).
For Croatia the 1920s were years of rapid economic development. Yugoslavia 
provided a wide internal market for Croatian products. Zagreb became a centre of 
commerce and banking and Croatia, more then other part of Yugoslavia, 
experienced significant foreign investment in its industry. The opening of the 
Split-Zagreb railway line in 1925 boosted tourism on the Dalmatian coast. In 
spite of these circumstances, Goldstein emphasises (1999: 117), ‘workers’ 
purchasing power in the 1920s was below its 1914 level’.
To summarise, during the first three decades of the twentieth century Croatian 
society went through considerable structural and cultural changes and 
transformations of corporate agencies:
• After two hundred years of existence within the Habsburg Empire, Croatia 
found itself within another multicultural and multinational society. The 
political centre of the state moved from Vienna and Budapest to Belgrade.
• The agencies that agreed upon the establishment of the new state endowed it 
with new political and cultural institutions. At the same time, the ‘old’ 
Croatian national institutions, like the Sabor and the position of the ban, were 
abolished.
• Soon after the formation of Yugoslavia, the political and cultural Croatian 
corporate agencies that facilitated unification with the other South Slavs were 
overpowered by those that opposed it. The act of the establishment of 
Yugoslavia brought into the foreground the competition between the 
dominant Croatian political and national agency and the dominant state 
agency in Belgrade.
Slavonia the turn-out was 438,799 (Banac, 1984: 389).
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• The introduction of general suffrage of the population brought a new element 
into politics - Croatian primary agents. In this situation gaining the support of 
the primary agents was the main task for competing corporate agents. In order 
to mobilise these primary agents, the corporate agencts had to develop clear 
programmes, ideologies and a vision of the future.
• Finally, with such a task, corporate agencies needed to redefine of certain 
political and cultural institutions (like the media, educational system and 
political practices) that would facilitate the transmission of corporate 
agencies’ messages to their primary agents.
These were the circumstances in which Stjepan Radic offered his vision of the 
Croatian national past, present and future.
5.3. The Croatian Peasant Party’s Nationalist ideology
'... this ne w nationalism has 
to be both political and social9 
(Radic, 1902: 23)
After 800 years of fighting for an independent state, Croats found themselves 
subsumed within a new multicultural state. The setting up of a South-Slav state 
had been the ideal for many generations of Croatian politicians. However, those 
aspirations were a product of the political environment within the Habsburg 
Empire. The new and evolving circumstances in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes changed the outlook of the new breed of Croatian political leaders.
The national movement which was initiated by the activities of Stjepan Radic 
and his party, marks a new stage in the reformation of the Croatian nation. The 
Croatian masses had finally been introduced into mainstream politics and, with 
the introduction of universal suffrage, they were allowed for the first time to 
express their political attitudes and, as a consequence, their national identity. The 
mainly peasant population were equally attracted to the HSS’s social ideas 
relating to the creation of a peasant republic, as they were to its nationalist 
ideology.
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This section will focus on the HSS’s nationalist ideology. This ideology will be 
analyzed through the writings and public speeches of its founder Stjepan Radic. 
The aim of this analysis will be to identify the way Radic defined the nation in 
general, and more specifically the Croatian nation and its enemies.
5.3.1. Definition o f the Nation
Radic defined the nation using the language of his times. The principle of self- 
determination was at the heart of his nationalist ideology. He held that the 
principle of self-determination was the only ideal which could protect the 
existence of small nations. This principle was based on two main premises: the 
first being that there is no nation without the state and, the second, that ‘there is 
no state without the nation’ (Radic, 1923: 426). Even though the state and the 
nation appear to play an equal role in this concept, ‘nations are the only creators 
and the only state-builders’ {ibid.\ 428). For Radic the ‘homeland’, the ‘nation’ 
and the state were ‘entities in which the population spoke a common language 
and breathed with a single national spirit’ (Radic, 1897: 131). Hence, a distinct, 
national language is the ultimate determinant of the nation.
Central to Radic’s nationalist ideology was the idea of the nation being linked in 
terms of morality. The ‘spirit’ of the nation became the ultimate value, which had 
to be nurtured and developed. As Radic wrote, ‘poetically’, the nation, just as 
human beings, had to mature:
The childish love of the sea, lakes, woods, hills and springs can warm a 
young imagination and, for a moment, it can captivate its heart; but a soul 
can be uplifted... only through the mature love towards a nation, a love 
and understanding of national needs and aspirations. (Radic, 1897: 131- 
132)
An immature nation, according to Radic (1902: 162) is a ‘mad’ nation, i.e. ‘it has 
no national consciousness, no national unity, and that nation cannot be its own 
master’ {ibid.). In that context Radic argued that the nation is ‘its own master’ 
when it has control over its own land and has well defined territorial boundaries,
159
as well as its own government: ‘A nation with its own land and government is 
called a state’ {ibid.). A state alone, however, is not sufficient for a nation’s 
maturation. A nation can mature only if its members are also mature - if they 
have a developed national consciousness and national spirit.
For Radic the achievement of national sovereignty and national freedom assumed 
a tremendous responsibility on the part of each member of the nation. It is 
interesting that he set the same criteria for an individual as for the nation. The 
nation, being a living organism, depended on the condition of every individual 
making up that nation. Hence, the nation can be mature only when its members 
are also matured, the nation can be free only when its members are free 
individuals (Radic, 1902b: 194). Through this equation Radic implicitly 
introduced the issue of the political and social structure of the national state. He 
held that democracy was the only guarantee for the preservation of small nations. 
Moreover, Radic (1902b: 192) wrote: ‘a (state) which is not, in a real sense, 
liberal, cannot be called national. In this context, liberalism and nationalism 
complement each other’.
A democratic liberal national state, according to Radic, was the ideal vehicle 
through which to attract the broad support of the Croatian peasant population. 
The nation in his ideology was defined so as to awake the hope of the oppressed. 
Radic (1923: 429) rather poetically asserted that, ‘the nation is not a flock of 
geese which cackle in the same way, but a chorus of angels who perform 
miracles’.
5.3.2. The Croatian Nation
Radic, just like his predecessors in the nineteenth century, held that one of the 
biggest problems of Croatian politics was the undeveloped national 
consciousness of the masses. Consequently, the ‘national awakening’ of the 
peasant population became one of his primary political objectives. The problem 
did not simply occur as a result of the perceived illiteracy and ignorance of the 
masses, but also because the nineteenth century national ‘awakeners’ had not
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worked sufficiently towards raising the level of national consciousness among 
the masses. This was in part due to the fact that they had not perceived the 
Croatian peasants as a politically significant force. Radic, however, thought 
differently.
At the turn of the century Radic (1902a: 148), as part of his nationalist ideology,
described the Croats as ‘ignorant’ and ‘in peaceful times (...) quarrelsome
people’. Radic believed that ‘no nation perceived patriotism in so primitive a way
as Croats’ (Radic, 1897: 131). This primitivism, he argued, was manifested in
perceptions of the nation among both the masses and its leaders. He wrote:
We Croats think of Croatia just as a piece of land, and those who think 
about a bigger piece of land are considered to be bigger patriots. Even the 
term nation (narod) is not clear to us, because even today we cannot 
sincerely believe that that nation is made up of a peasant from Zagorje 
and goatman from Lika, and it is especially unpleasant to hear that a 
member of that nation could be a Vlach’. {ibid:. 131)
Radic was sincerely concerned that the Croatian masses were aware that the 
nation existed but they perceived it just as ‘our nation’. On the other hand, 
‘where the national name (Croat) was broadly used, no state-right consciousness 
existed’ (Radic, 1902c: 214). Radic saw an indicator of this under-developed 
national consciousness, in the everyday language where the word nationality 
(narodnost) did not exist, where the word tribe meant a ‘race’, and the word 
narod meant the people who remained loyal to their national life (Radic, 1902d: 
251). This attitude among the Croat masses is exactly what Radic strove to 
change. He adopted the role of national educator whose aim was to explain to 
‘his’ peasants the true nature of the nation and how it develops. A developed 
national consciousness was for Radic the only guarantee of national preservation: 
‘A conscious Croat cannot be Serbised or Magyarised (...) because a conscious 
nation cannot have its national identity taken away, it can only prosper or 
disappear without a trace’ (Radic: 1902d: 273). The second stage of his attempt 
to enlighten his compatriots was to establish a clear workable definition of the 
Croatian nation. Radic introduced a distinction between the civic and ethnic 
nation. While the ethnic nation was defined mainly through language and 
national spirit, the civic nation was defined through the state - as a ‘political 
nation’.
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The Political nation means that all citizens of Croatia are one unit, one 
state, regardless of their religion and language. Therefore, those Germans, 
Magyars and Jews bom in Croatia, have to recognize Croatia as their own 
homeland, and they should do nothing to harm it, even if their hearts do 
not allow them to love it. They are no longer foreigners in Croatia, 
because they became Croatian citizens. But we should not force them to 
call themselves Croats in the way that Magyars demand all those that are 
bom in Hungary to be Magyars. (Radic, 1902a: 158, italics in original)
Radic’s introduction of the term ‘political nation’ into his nationalist ideology 
had clear political significance. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
Croatia was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Radic was more than 
aware that Croatia alone, without strong support from other nations, could not 
achieve its ultimate aim - the establishment of an independent state. Radic 
(1902d: 271) described Croatia as a ‘completely isolated’ nation. He believed 
that the first sign of political maturity in each Croat should be an awareness that 
Croats could find again a place among their ‘national brothers’, which they had 
while they were ‘wandering’ in Illyrianism and Yugoslavism. This time, 
however, the Croats would take their place ‘with a raised and unfurled Croatian 
flag’ {ibid.). Radic wanted to re-establish relations with other South-Slav nations, 
whilst preserving the Croatian ethnic identity. He was convinced that the 
Croatian question could not be solved in Pest, Vienna, or Rome, but in Zagreb 
and Split, in Ljubljana and Belgrade, in Sofia, Sarajevo and Cetinje {ibid.).
The mistakes of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism, Radic argued, could be avoided if 
the Croatian nation was clearly defined. For that reason he drew up what he 
perceived to be the Croatian nation’s geographic and ethnic borders. To the 
north, Croatia was separated from the Magyars by the ‘thousand year old state 
border on the rivers Mura, Drava and Danube’ (Radic, 1902c: 221); the city of 
Rijeka, Medjumurje and Istria, Radic considered, were integral components of 
Croatian territory, as were Slavonia, Srijem and Zemun. Radic also evoked 
historical rights when claiming the right of Croatia to one part of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BH) ‘which even today carries the name Turkish Croatia’ (Radic, 
1902a: 164).
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After Radic had defined Croatia’s geographical borders, he made some attempt to 
define the ethnic borders.51 Aside from sharing a common national language, 
Radic did not define with any clarity the parameters of the ‘ethnic nation’, or 
rather, he did not clearly state what constituted being a Croat. That is not to say 
that he did not have a conception of what a Croat should be. For Radic, the image 
of the ‘ideal type Croatian nation’ was heavily influenced by the perceived idyllic 
lifestyle of the Croatian peasantry. This image was consistent with Radic’s view 
that the ‘peasantry not only represented the largest sector of the nation, but also 
the healthiest part’, and moreover, ‘from a spiritual point of view, the most 
valuable part of the nation’ (Radic, 1907a: 283). The peasant was seen as being 
‘stable’, ‘patient like the earth, and as indestructible as the field on which he 
works’ {ibid.).
Even though Radic did not particularly stress the importance of religion for the 
Croatian nation, he saw religion as being the basis of morality. Religion in 
general, and Christian dogma in particular should, he argued, become the basis of 
national education (Radic, 1921b: 377). Radic was aware of the importance and 
the power of symbols and history in the education of the population. He 
frequently referred to the ‘ancient Croatian name’, and to the ‘sad but never 
shameful’ glorious history of the Croats. The most powerful symbol of the 
Croatian state-right, of its struggle for independence, and the symbol which 
represented national honor, pride and strength for Radic was that of the ban. The 
position of the ban became known as the ‘Seat of Ban Jelacic’. Radic (1902a: 
163) wrote: ‘The ban's power and honor is the foundation of the Croatian state, 
i.e. it is the source of the real Croatian state-right, the right that determines that in 
Croatia neither Magyars, Germans, Italians nor any other foreigners will ever be 
in command’.
His final definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular, 
was: ‘a population with its own history, with cultural and political institutions, 
with its own organized economy, and, most of all with a clear and positively 
expressed national self-consciousness and national will - constitutes a separate
51 To employ the term ‘ethnic’ in Radic’s nationalist ideology is an attempt to make a distinction
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nation’ (Radic, 1922b: 408). Hence, in 1921 Radic (1921b: 367) described the 
Croats as a ‘nation with an ancient peasant culture, as a nation with twelve-years 
of Christian European education, with four-hundred-years of national written 
tradition and with a hundred-year-old conscious national life’.
Radic (1918b: 305) also described the Croatian nation in other terms: ‘we Croats 
are the most Slavic nation’.
5.3.3. The Croatian Nation and South-Slav Union
Radic started to formulate his nationalist ideology in the 1890s. During that 
period he lived under the regimes of two different multinational states, both 
perceived to be oppressors of the Croat people. Under the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire the main oppressors were the Habsburgs and Magyar nationalists; in the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1929 known as Yugoslavia) the 
Serbian government played that role. Different oppressors required different 
strategies in the Croatian nation’s struggle for liberation. Hence, during the time 
of the Habsburg Empire Radic strove for South-Slav unity, which he believed 
would empower the Croats in their fight for national liberation. A solution was 
seen in the creation of some form of state unity between all South-Slavs 
including Bulgarians. With the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, however, Radic 
opposed firstly the manner in which it was created, and later the way it was 
governed. The solution for Radic was the creation of an independent peasant state 
of Croatia.
For a better understanding of Radic’s ideology it is necessary to analyze these 
two periods separately, even though there is an obvious link between them. 
Radic’s concept of South-Slav unity was never realized in the newly created 
Yugoslav state.
from a more clearly defined civic nation.
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In 1897 Radic asserted that ‘the Croats and Serbs are one nation’ (1897: 131). He 
referred to the South-Slavs as ‘our nation’ {ibid.: 135). According to Radic 
ethnographically the South-Slavs were a strong unit divided by tribal conflicts in 
the middle ages. The Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bulgarians were perceived as 
the four tribes of a single South-Slav nation {ibid.: 136). Radic (1917: 294) 
wrote: ‘the Slavs are one nation. But different processes of historical 
development, geographical divisions, and most of all, too different and 
antagonistic cultural and political influences have divided us into six or nine 
nations’.
Hence, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Radic - in contrast to the 
‘unhealthy’ utopias about Great Croatia, Serbia, or Bulgaria, or the ‘vain’ dreams 
of establishing a political federation of Orthodox Balkan states - proposed the 
creation of an economic community of the South-Slav nation. He was convinced 
that Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians would cease futile conflicts and 
hostilities, and would devise a common action for economic liberation.
In 1902 violent clashes between the Croats and Serbs took place both in the 
media and on the streets. Since Radic saw the Croats and Serbs ‘as the nucleus of 
South-Slavism’ {ibid.: 137), this conflict was perceived as a consequence of 
German and Magyar political and cultural interference, as the act of a foreign 
spirit. Radic set out, as his first task, to point out the counter-productive nature of 
such a conflict for both nations. He underlined how these two nations, or ‘tribes’, 
could actually help each other in any joint endeavors, but in order to achieve this 
level of co-operation ‘they should not have to, like sheep, be placed in single pen 
{ibid.: 150). Again, Radic used metaphors to explain his position: ‘Each brother 
can have his own house (...) and some brothers, like in Croatia, can live together 
in a common house; but between single houses - between Croatia, Serbia and 
Bulgaria - there cannot be deep holes or high fences, only narrow landmarks’ 
{ibid.).
Radic wanted to show that among the Croats and Serbs, especially those who 
lived in Croatia, there was absolutely no cause for conflict. He explained how in 
Croatia there existed only one nation, a nation with a common language, which
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some (Croats) called the ‘Croatian language’ and others (Serbs) called the 
Serbian language. But the fact that it had two names did not mean to Radic that 
there were two languages. ‘The name should not be a reason for dispute’ (Radic, 
1902a: 167). In the same way religion should not be the cause of argument 
between Croats and Serbs.
When in 1918 the issue of the creation of the South-Slav state became a reality, it 
did not take the form Radic had intended. Concerned by the events preceding the 
creation of Yugoslavia, Radic expressed his fears that the Serbs would not 
respond to the ‘love of the Croats’. Moreover, Radic labeled as ‘childish’ the 
signing the Yugoslav Declaration at Corfu. He saw the Declaration as being 
shameful, because ‘there is nothing more indecent, unjust and more harmful them 
a nation asking for subordination from one’s own brother’ (Radic, 1918f: 320). 
He could understand that the Serbian government was striving to unite all Serbs 
inside a single state, and held as natural that the president of thr Serbian 
government wanted the Serbian king as the head of that state. ‘But it is not 
natural that a Croat like Ante Trumbic is in agreement with that’ (Radic, 1918a: 
301). Radic (1918g: 334) warned his compatriots: ‘Don’t rush like drunk geese 
into the fog!’
An ideal Yugoslav state for Radic would be one in which the true national names 
of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs would have equal rights and equal respect, and in 
which ‘all that was created by that nation, good or bad, would be preserved and 
respected, in particular their history and literature’ (Radic, 1918c: 307). He 
claimed that he was willing to promote a Yugoslav state abroad, but he also 
underlined the importance of preserving Croatian internal state borders. He 
warned those who wanted to erase all natural centennial and millennial internal 
borders and differences - borders which were ‘not created by blood, but by God, 
nature and life’ (ibid.) - that they would have to start with violence, civil war and 
slaughter. Radic clearly stated that the Croats wanted Croatian sovereignty, and 
that sovereignty would be achieved through an agreement. In response to 
government accusations, Radic (1918: 321) declared: ‘they think that we are 
separatists. Of course we are!’
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5.3.4. The Enemy
Two different views of the South-Slav union in two different periods - in the time 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia - 
influenced and shaped Radic’s perception of Serbs. Radic did try to differentiate 
between Serbian leaders and politicians, and the Serbian masses, although not 
always successfully. As already pointed out, in Radic’s early writings, the Croats 
and the Serbs were seen as two tribes from the same nation. Serbs were perceived 
as deriving from the same nation as Croats, speaking a common language, 
singing the same songs, enduring the same problems and having the same 
physical and spiritual needs as the Croats.
However, Radic was concerned at the possibility that the Serbs in Croatia did not 
perceive Croatia as their homeland. He asserted that it was not enough for the 
Croats that the Croatian Serbs were not acting against the interests of Croatia, 
‘we have to do everything so that they start to love Croatia as we do’ (Radic, 
1902a: 158). Radic demanded from Serbs to ‘peacefully and willingly recognize 
Croatia as their homeland just as they recognized Hungary’ (1902c: 202).
In the article which Radic wrote (1902e) in response to the Srbobrai?2 article, he 
confessed that he had never conceived that he would write about the Serbs in that 
way. Radic understood the article as a declaration of war to the death from the 
Kingdom of Serbia. Yet, he did not accept the excuse that the declaration of war 
had originated from a few ‘furious people’: ‘The Srbobran which was published 
in the middle of Zagreb, would not be able to print such articles (as it insults us 
in its every issue) if their subscribers did not agree with them - these subscribers 
are Serbs in Croatia’ (.ibid.: 237). Radic called for Croats to be cautious: ‘We 
have to weaken the (Serbian) element: the stronger it becomes, the more 
dangerous it will be, and the harder it will be to resist’ {ibid.: 236). He compared 
the Serbs to a snake winding its way into the Croatian heart, ‘a snake which has 
prepared its poison and wants to inject it into our veins’ {ibid.). The objective of
52 See p. 149.
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the Serbs, Radic wrote, was no secret: ‘firstly they wanted to weaken the Croats 
and, having done so, they would swallow them whole’ {ibid.).
This was not just a protest against Serbian politicians. The Croats were called 
upon to prevent the Serbian ‘offensive’ against the Croats. Radic therefore called 
for the breaking of all links with the Serbs. He wanted everybody to rise up and 
boycott Serbian merchants, to fire all Serbs who were employed by Croats: ‘do 
not give them a job, do not assist (...) a single Serb!’ {ibid.). The Serbs became 
‘the evil and recalcitrant brothers’. From that point on, Croats were supposed to 
support their own - ‘svo jksvom u ’- each for their own {ibid.).
The reason for the Serbs’ hatred towards the Croats, Radic believed, was due to 
their over-developed self-confidence ‘which was a natural consequence of strong 
historicism’53 {ibid.\ 267). The Serbs, Radic wrote (1917: 298), became 
megalomaniacs and were still living in the medieval empire of Dusan.54 The 
Serbs from Croatia, Hungary and Bosnia were really only ‘Dusanists’ - working 
for the creation of a Great Serbian state.
The other main reason for the strong hatred between the Croatian and Serbian
intelligentsia, Radic believed, was as a result of an experience of constant defeats
and failures on both sides.
In short: it is a general psychological phenomenon that the people exact 
their revenge on things weaker or lower than themselves (...). It is the 
same with nations. After great defeats or other failures, strong and 
centralized nations become savages; and when those still nationally 
unconscious nations experience a defeat - a violent tribal conflict starts. 
(Radic, 1902d: 269)
In the decades that followed, the idea of South-Slav unity lost its significance in 
Croatian political life. After a century of Croatian nationalist ideologies which, in 
one form or another, advocated Yugoslavism, the cleavages between the Croatian 
and the Serbian nation became clearer with the creation of the common state. 
Radic (1923c: 434) wrote: ‘between us and Belgrade there exists not a wall or an
53 With the term historicism Radic mainly wanted to emphasise the Serb’s national redefinition of 
their past.
54 The Tsar Stefan Dusan Nemanjic (1331-55) was a creator of the strongest Serbian Kingdom.
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abyss, but we are from fundamentally different worlds’. Two decades later, the 
Croats and Serbs were to really wage a war ‘until extinction’.
5.3.5. Conclusion
Radic’s nationalist ideology was the first to draw the broad support of the 
Croatian masses, yet it was also the first to work towards achieving such a goal. 
There were several reasons for its success.
Firstly, the new electoral system and the introduction of a system of universal 
suffrage had the effect of bringing the broad population directly into Croatian 
politics. The votes of the primary agents became the crucial factor for the success 
of any political party. However, at the same time, other parties, like the Party of 
Right, were not enjoying electoral success. It could therefore be concluded that 
the nationalist ideology of Stjepan Radic itself was the crucial element in 
attracting support. The social component of his ideology was closely 
interconnected with the nationalist part. Radic was also the first to include 
economic considerations into a nationalist ideology. The whole economy of 
Croatia at that time was based on agriculture. Hence, the peasantry was perceived 
as being the main element of society and consequently the most valuable part of 
the nation.
One should also take into account the specific circumstances of the peasantry 
after the First World War to understand the rapid success of the HSS. Four years 
of war had a serious and direct effect on the peasantry, as they were forced to 
play an active part on the battlefields and ended up suffering economic hardship. 
The creation of a new state only served to further provoke them. The attempt to 
introduce a draft-animal registration55 proved to be the catalyst for a revolt in 
1920 that lasted several days, and was violently crushed. Radic’s clear anti­
unification policy was a major factor which drew the support of the dissatisfied 
peasantry.
55 For more details, see Banac (1984: 248-260).
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Radic also acted as a national educator. His aim was to teach the peasantry the 
meaning and importance of the nation. Radic had therefore firstly to define that 
particular nation. Radic defined the nation rather vaguely, in terms of national 
spirit and language. Language however could not serve as a strict distinguishing 
feature between the Croat and the Serb nations. Radic also refused to take into 
consideration religion as a national marker. Yet, the national spirit was defined 
through religious and moral life. When the Serbian nation was defined both by its 
religion and language, Radic viewed the name of the nation as being the clearest 
national indicator. The ‘ancient name’ - Croats - as Radic frequently referred to 
it, was the only marker which could clearly distinguish Croats from Serbs.
This vagueness in defining the nation was even more clearly reflected in his term 
‘political nation, which embraced all citizens of Croatia regardless of their 
‘ethnic’ identity. However, Radic did not attempt to create an artificial ethnic 
nation. He respected and wanted to preserve all ethnic nations in Croatia. This 
brings into focus another national marker - the state. In Radic’s nationalist 
ideology the nation state became the ultimate objective and the only guarantee 
for the preservation of the nation. The principle of self-determination offered him 
the ideological framework to achieve this.
Nevertheless, Radic’s ideology introduced new elements into Croatian nationalist 
thought:
• While the previous nationalist ideologies in the nineteenth century strive to 
‘modernise’ and ‘Westernise’ the Croatian nation, Radic was searching for an 
authentic nation. The source of authenticity was not found in distant history, 
but in culture and the way of life of the Croatian peasantry. Hence, the 
simplicity of peasant life, their morality and interests were proclaimed as the 
authentic national spirit.
• Radic’s distinction between the ethnic and civic nation was not a novelty. 
However, the nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century used the 
distinction in various ways in order to identify the place of the Croatian 
nation within the broader South Slav community. Radic, on the other hand, 
employed the distinction in order to enhance the unity of the Croatian
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population. Ultimately, he developed a clear distinction between citizenship 
and nationality, both of which were based on the members’ loyalty to the 
state.
• The state, therefore, became the central pillar of Radic’s nationalist ideology. 
For the first time in Croatian history, without any reservation, the 
establishment of an independent Croatian state became the central national 
programme.
• Finally, Radic was the first nationalist ideologue that managed to successfully 
mobilise primary agents around his ideology. The reason for his success lay 
in his clear programme and vision of the future, simple rhetoric, and the 
employment of all necessary means so that his ideas could reach the broad 
Croatian population.
Radic and his nationalist ideology, facilitated the process of nation-formation. 
After his tragic death in the Belgrade parliament massacre in 1928, legends 
appeared. Since then, Radic has frequently been referred to as the ‘father of the 
nation’. However, the Independent State of Croatia, created two decades later, in 
no way reflected the fulfilment of Radic’s ideals.
5.4. Historical Background IV (1928-1941)
The massacre in the Belgrade Parliament in 1928 and the death of Stjepan Radic 
in particular, had the effect of polarizing the two main parties in the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This assassination of HSS MPs highlighted the level 
of deep intolerance, lack of understanding and enmity between the Government 
and the Croatian political leadership, and consequently served to fuel the 
activities of radical elements on both sides.
The death of the first real leader of the Croats provoked tremendous bitterness 
amongst the whole Croatian population, who viewed the massacre as an overt 
attack on the Croatian nation. This bitterness was mainly expressed through 
numerous demonstrations and clashes with the police. Members of parliament 
from the Peasant-Democratic Coalition severed any form of participation with
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the government and refused to participate in the work of the parliament. Soon 
after, many other political and cultural organizations announced that they too 
were ceasing to co-operate with Belgrade. The most impressive demonstration 
occurred at Radic’s funeral where more that 100,000 people gathered from all 
parts of Croatia to pay their respect to their leader and to express their political 
stance.
The reaction from King Aleksandar to this volatile and deteriorating situation 
was to proclaim a royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929. With this decree all 
political parties were abolished, as was the constitution, and Parliament was 
dissolved. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was officially renamed 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The country was divided into nine provincial units 
(named banovine) each named after geographical features. On the same day the 
King introduced two laws: one setting out the King’s authority (Zakon o 
kraljevoj vlasti), and one relating to the security of the state {Zakon o zastiti 
drzavS). These laws served to centralize power further into the King’s hands. The 
courts made rulings ‘in the name of the King’, the King introduced laws by 
decree, and strong levels of censorship were introduced.
Against this backdrop, the emergence onto the Croatian political scene of a more 
radical and extremist nationalist movement - the Ustasha56 Movement - came as 
no surprise. To a certain extent it can be argued that the formation of an illegal 
underground paramilitary organization such as the Ustasha Movement came as a 
direct result of the assassinations in Parliament and the introduction of the royal 
dictatorship. The leader and the founder of the Ustashas was Ante Pavelic, the 
president of the Main Council (Glavni odboi) of the Croatian Party of Right 
{Hrvatska stranka prava - HSP). The leaders of the HSP had as their primary 
political objective the formation of an independent and sovereign Croatian state. 
Pavelic was convinced that this task could only be accomplished through armed 
struggle. A day after the introduction of the royal dictatorship, on 7 January 
1929, the Ustasha Croatian Liberation Movement was established in Zagreb. The 
movement proclaimed that: ‘the Ustasha movement has as its main goal, the
172
liberation of Croatia from alien rule and the establishment of a completely free 
and independent state which will rule over all its national and historic territory’ 
(in Tanner, 1997: 125). The Ustasha declared that they would consider all means 
to achieve this - including armed struggle.
Several days after the formal establishment of the Ustasha Movement, Ante 
Pavelic, in fear of being arrested and prosecuted, emigrated to Austria. Over the 
next few years, many supporters and members of the Ustasha Movement 
followed him. With the help of the Italian fascist regime, the Ustashas established 
several paramilitary training camps throughout Italy. Their actions were limited 
to terrorist activities in Yugoslavia. In 1932 the underground cells of the Ustasha 
Movement in Croatia organized an unsuccessful uprising in the region of Lika. 
Two years later, they assisted the VMRO57 in assassinating King Aleksandar 
during an official visit in Marseilles. It was only during the Second World War, 
however, that the Ustasha Movement rose to become the major actor in Croatian 
politics.
At the end of the 1920s, all forms of political life in Yugoslavia were being 
suppressed by the royal dictatorship. With the establishment of the system of 
banovina Croatia was divided into four different provinces. In addition, the King 
introduced a national unitarism where the main Yugoslav nations - i.e. Croats, 
Serbs, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians - were considered as 
constituting a single Yugoslav nation. National particularities were not 
recognized and national symbols - such as flags, coats of arms and national 
anthems - were prohibited.
Under pressure from foreign powers, King Aleksandar, in a decree issued on 3 
September 1931, introduced a new so-called ‘Octroyd Constitution’. Enshrined 
in this new Constitution was the division of Parliament into two executive
56 In the Croatian language, the Ustasha means insurgents, those who take part in an uprising - 
ustanak.
57 The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) was organised in 1893 in 
Ottoman Macedinia. For more about it, see Lampe (2000: 90-92).
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bodies, the National Parliament and Senate.58 Elections were not anonymous and 
only males over the age of 21 were enfranchised. The 1931 Constitution codified 
the establishment of a centralized system, along with the principle of an integral 
Yugoslavism and royal absolutism. The persecution of Croatian nationalists and 
government opponents continued, many were killed by the police. In spite of this, 
political life in Croatia was quickly renewed.
After the death of Stjepan Radic, his close associate Vlatko Macek took over the 
leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party. One of his first declarations - the 
Zagrebacke punktacije proclamation,59 in which he condemned the royal 
dictatorship and Serbian hegemonic rule - resulted in his immediate 
imprisonment (he remained incarcerated for two years). This, however, did not 
result in a reduction in popular support among Croatians for the HSS’s policies.
After the assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseilles his brother Pavle took 
the position of Regent since the actual heir to the throne, Petar, was still a minor. 
Duke Pavle appointed Bogoljub Jevtic as a prime minister, and in May 1935 
elections for the National Parliament were held. The Regent wanted to lessen the 
severity of the dictatorship he inherited, and in one of his first acts he issued a 
decree to release political prisoners. After a six-year absence, political parties re­
appeared on the Yugoslav political scene. In the 1935 elections a united 
opposition list presented itself as an alternative to the government’s list. 
Although the voting was still not anonymous, the government used all the means 
at their disposal to win the elections. The ‘government’s list’ won 60.6 per cent 
of the vote, while the United Opposition gained 37.4 per cent.
Only a couple of weeks after the elections, determined to continue the process of 
change in the political system, the Regent Pavle appointed Milan Stojadinovic to 
form a new government, signalling a change in the government’s strategy. After 
only a few months in power, Stojadinovic publicly recognized the existence of a 
‘Croatian question’. This was also the first statement since 1929 in which the
58 The National Parliament had 305 members which were to be elected in Banovinas. Each 
Banovina had a set number of representatives. One senator needed 300,000 votes to be elected, 
and for every elected candidate the King had a right to place his own candidate.
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government referred to a specific nation, in this case the Croatian nation, other 
than to the unitarist and constitutional concept of the Yugoslav nation.
At the same time, according to Seton-Watson’s estimations (1937: 105), Macek 
had ‘at least 90 per cent of the electorate in Croatia and Dalmatia solidly behind 
him’. The Croatian masses perceived Macek as a faithful follower of Radic’s 
teaching and they accepted him not as party leader, but as a national leader. The 
HSS was therefore undergoing a process of rejuvenation.
The new government was perceived by the HSS leadership as an anti-Croat bloc. 
Nevertheless, a slight shift in the government’s attitude towards the Croats was 
noticeable. Over the next few years, Stojadinovic attempted to set up several 
meetings with Macek in the hope of achieving some level of agreement with the 
Croatian side. In October 1937, after several unsuccessful attempts, 
representatives of three Serbian political parties and the Peasant Democratic 
Coalition (SDK) - which made up the bulk of the opposition in Croatia - met in a 
village called Farkasic and reached an agreement, according to which a new 
government would be appointed. One of its first tasks was the passing of a 
temporary law abolishing the 1931 constitution. On the same day as the 
establishment of this new government, new elections were announced. The new 
constitution, according to the agreement, was to be proclaimed only with the 
agreement of the majority of Croats, Slovenes and Serbs. This agreement was an 
attempt to resurrect a parliamentary system in Yugoslavia, but its success was 
entirely dependent on the Regent Pavle. As one might expect, the Regent did not 
favour the abolition of the very constitution which legalized and legitimized his 
power.
By 1938 the government was experiencing high levels of opposition and dissent, 
not only from Croats but also from the Serbs. Stojadinovic was criticized for his 
undemocratic methods and for his dictatorial behavior. In addition, the Serbian 
opposition parties were against Stojadinovic’s foreign policy which was 
orientated towards fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. This widespread criticism
59 For more about the content of ‘ZagrebaCke punktacije’, see Matkovic (1995: 135-137).
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forced the Regent Pavle to announce early elections which were held on 11 
December 1938. Even though the government won 54 per cent and the 
opposition 44 per cent of the votes, according to the existing constitution, the 
government won 306 seats while the opposition gained only 67. The HSS won 
their highest share of the votes ever. The elections demonstrated a radical decline 
in support for the government throughout the Kingdom. In January 1939 
Stojadinovic offered his resignation.60 The Regent Pavle offered the position of 
prime minister to Dragisa Cvetkovic. The first major test for the new government 
was the achievement of an agreement with Macek.
On 14 August 1939 the leaders of the government and the Croatian opposition 
reached an agreement later known as the ‘Cvetkovic-Macek agreement’. Since 
the Regent Pavle was opposed to changing the constitution until King Petar had 
reached maturity, the agreed restructuring of the Kingdom’s political system was 
made within the framework of the existing constitution. For the Croats, the most 
important change was the establishment of the Banovina Croatia with Zagreb as 
its capital. The Banovina’s territory comprised Croatia, Dalmatia and 
Herzegovina. The Banovina had jurisdiction over major internal policies, while 
foreign, military and transport policy, as well as control over common finances, 
remained in the hands of the central government in Belgrade. The legislature of 
the Croatian Banovina was under the jurisdiction of the newly recreated Croatian 
Sabor and the King. The King was also responsible for the appointment of the 
ban, who held the main executive position in the Banovina. The judiciary of the 
Banovina was entirely independent.
The establishment of the Banovina Croatia put the HSS and its leaders in a 
powerful position inside the Banovina’s borders. Through the medium of cultural 
and political organizations (such as Seljacka sloga - The Peasant Accord, and 
Hrvatski radnicki savez - The Croatian Workers Union) as well as newspapers 
(like Seljacki dom - The Peasant Home, and Hrvatski dnevnik - The Croatian 
Daily) the HSS succeeded in influencing the opinion of a large proportion of the 
Croatian population. The HSS also established paramilitary organizations: in the
60 For more about the events which preceded this resignation, see Matkovic (1995: 150).
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villages they were known as Hrvatska seljacka zastita (The Croatia Peasant 
Protection) and in the cities - Hrvatska gradanska zastita (The Croatian Civil 
Protection). These paramilitary organizations were established in 1935 with the 
aim of controlling security during party rallies. Initially they were armed only 
with canes, but with the establishment of the Banovina they were allowed to 
carry weapons.
Not surprisingly there were many opponents to the establishment of the Banovina 
Croatia both within the Serbian and Croatian opposition. Among the Croats, the 
strongest opponents were the Ustasha Movement and the Communist Party.61 
The leaders of the Ustasha Movement were strongly opposed to any cooperation 
with the Belgrade Government, advocating the establishment of an independent 
state of Croatia. The Communist Party perceived the Cvetkovic-Macek 
agreement as an agreement between the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisie against 
the interests of oppressed masses. These two groups were to play key roles 
during the war.
In 1941, after Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact, Hitler turned his attention to 
Yugoslavia, putting great pressure on the Yugoslav government and the Regent 
Pavle to join forces with the Nazis. On 25 March 1941 the government of 
Cvetkovic-Macek signed the Tripartite Pact. This act provoked strong levels of 
resistance within the Yugoslav army, which carried out a successful coup d ’etat 
on 27 March 1941.62 The instigators of the coup installed seventeen-year-old 
Petar as the new King of Yugoslavia. As a result the leaders of the HSS found 
themselves in a political quandary. The leaders of the coup opposed the 
Cvetkovic-Macek agreement, and the HSS was therefore worried it might lose 
the autonomy which it had achieved within the Banovina Croatia. On the other 
hand, to oppose the leaders of the coup would by implication associate them with 
Hitler. Macek therefore, chose to go to Belgrade to join the new cabinet in the 
hope that the government would strike an agreement with Hitler to avoid war.
61 The establishment and activities of the Yugoslav Communist Party will be discussed in more 
detail the next chapter.
62 For more about the coup d’etat, see Tanner, 1997:138.
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On 6 April 1941 Germany declared war on Yugoslavia and by 17 April 
representatives of the government had already signed an unconditional surrender. 
The King and the cabinet fled to Britain.
As early as 10 April 1941, with the entry of the first German tanks into Zagreb, 
Slavko Kvatemik - Pavelic’s most influential supporter in Croatia - proclaimed 
the establishment of the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (Nezavisna drzava 
Hrvatska - NDH). Pavelic, along with 250 Ustashas, returned to Croatia from 
Italy a few days later, and unilaterally declared himself to be the new poglavnik 
(leader).
The Ustasha leaders were to pay a heavy price for establishing the NDH. 
According to the terms of the ‘Rome agreement’ signed on 18 May 1941 with 
Italy, the majority of Dalmatia along with the city Rijeka was annexed by Italy. 
Croatia was divided by Italy and Germany into two ‘spheres of influence’. In 
addition the regions of Medumurje and Baranja were handed to Hungary. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, however, did become part of the NDH.
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The first days of Ustasha rule made it clear that the NDH was to be a ‘carbon 
copy of Nazi Germany’ (Tanner, 1997: 144). Even though Pavelic summoned the 
Croatian Sabor; in practice it had no authority. The Poglavnik ruled through 
decrees. Opposition political party activity was forbidden.63 The first article of 
the decree issued on 17 April stated: ‘One who violates or has violated the honor 
and interests of the Croatian nation in any way, or who has endangered the 
survival of the NDH or state government, even if such an act was only attempted, 
is guilty of high treason’ (NDH, 1941a: 149). The second article clearly stated 
that the only punishment for high treason was the death penalty. Two days later 
Pavelic proclaimed another decree according to which all transactions between 
Jews, or Jews and Croats undertaken during the period between February-April 
1941, were declared as void contracts (NDH, 1941b: 151). The Poglavnik 
abandoned the use of Cyrillic (NDH, 1941c: 151) and within the ministry of 
theology and education he established the Croatian state office for language 
(NDH, 1941d: 155). New anti-Semitic laws were proclaimed soon after: the 
decree of “racial classification” (NDH, 1941f), the decree of ‘protection of the 
Aryan blood and honor of the Croatian nation’ (NDH, 1941g), the decree 
requiring Jews to wear a yellow star (NDH, 1941k) and the decree confiscating 
Jewish property (NDH, 19411).
The Ustasha regime ruled through terror and, mirroring Nazi Germany, it 
systematically carried out a policy of genocide against Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and 
all other opponents of the NDH regime. As part of this policy the Ustashas 
established concentration camps among which Jasenovac was the most 
notorious.64 In the first months of the new regime, the Ustashas had already 
committed many massacres among the Serbian population.65 The Ustashas also 
exhibited equal brutality towards those Croats who opposed to the regime.
63 In April 1941 Macek, the most prominent leader of the Croats, pleaded for obedience and co­
operation with the new government. Yet he refused to actively participate in the government. 
Later, Pavelic imprisoned him in the Jasenovac concentration camp and then at MaCek’s home; all 
political activity was forbidden to him.
64 The question about the number of victims in Jasenovac is still an issue among the historians.
The number varies from 40,000 to 700,000 victims.
65 According to Tanner (1997: 152), during the summer months of 1941 at least 20,000 Serbs were 
killed.
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Historians66 argue that the Ustasha Movement lacked a broad popular base. Even 
though many Croats supported the establishment of the NDH as the achievement 
of a ‘thousand year old dream’ of an independent Croatian state, after just a few 
months of Ustasha rule many were disillusioned. The loss of most of Dalmatia, 
Croatia’s dependence on the two fascist powers, and the brutality of the regime, 
created strong feelings of opposition. The Ustasha Movement and Ante Pavelic 
himself did not attract many supporters on the basis of their nationalist or racist 
ideology.
At the end of the 1930s and after twenty years of direct conflict between the 
state-ruling and state-opposing corporate agents it looked as if the demands of the 
Croatian national leadership found an accommodation within the Yugoslav 
framework. Macek and HSS found themselves enjoying substantial autonomy in 
ruling the Croatian Banovina. The break-up of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 
1941 was not a consequence of internal strife, but of external military forces. 
Without these the Ustashas would have had a very slim chance for becoming a 
significant political force.
After just thirty years Croatian society experienced another wave of social 
change:
• The new ruling corporate agency, backed up by German and Italian guns, 
eliminated all competition. Its main task was the formation of a solid base by 
recruiting new members of the movement and strengthening its organisation. 
In order to preserve its position, it also undertook extensive reformation of 
Croatian society.
• For the first time in eight hundred years, the Ustashas claimed, the Croats 
gained their own state. Even though this state was heavily dependent on the 
support of its real creators, Italy and Germany, it required the formation of 
certain state institutions. Hence a new national army was established, a 
national currency introduced, and the educational system was reorganised.
• At the same time all cultural institutions were ‘nationalised’. ‘Foreign 
elements’ were expelled from schools, newpapers, and theatres. The school
66 For example Tanner (1997: 154).
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curriculum was designed to educate the youth in the ‘Ustasha spirit’.67 All 
newspapers and publications were controlled and censored. Croatian national 
culture was redefined. The Croatian language was ‘purified’ of foreign, 
especially Serbian, influences; Croatian history was rewritten.
All of these changes were justified by the developed nationalist ideology.
5.5. The Nationalist Ideology of the Ustasha Movement
‘The crucifix, the dagger and the revolver 
are the holy trinity for the Ustashas' 
(NDH, 1942c: 265).
At the time the Ustashas established their totalitarian state, they were a small 
paramilitary group of relativelly well-organized nationalist extremists. The 
independent Croatian state they set up was one in which the great majority of the 
population still supported the HSS and its leader Macek. Since the formation of 
the Ustasha Movement in 1929, the Yugoslav authorities had made great efforts 
to suppress any Ustasha activities. Many of their supporters were prosecuted and 
some were executed.68 Under such strong levels of repression, Ustasha supporters 
could only print their pamphlets and leaflets underground, with a limited 
circulation. The main Ustasha activities took place outside Yugoslav borders. As 
a result, the majority of the Croatian population was ignorant of their aims and 
ideology. Even the Ustasha’s seizure of power in April 1941 did not happen by 
the will of the Croatian population, but through the support of Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany. The Ustashas therefore realized that they needed to put great 
efforts into ‘re-educating’ the Croatian masses.
The nationalist ideology of the Ustasha Movement was based on the concept of 
both internal and external enemies; Nazi ideology served as a blueprint. The
67 See Chapter 7.
68 The assassination of the Croatian historian Milan Sufflay was to play an important role in the 
creation of the myth of Ustasha martyrdom (Banac, 1995).
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definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular was 
formulated in the Nazi vocabulary. For the first time in the history of the 
development of Croatian nationalist ideologies, the notion of ‘race’ was 
introduced. The concept of the nation was defined in terms of blood and origins.
In the following chapter the Ustasha’s nationalist ideology will be analyzed 
through the writings of Ante Pavelic and other Ustasha officials, as well as 
through an analysis of their proclamations, decrees and laws.
5.5.1. The Concept o f the Nation
Some authors69 argue that the Ustasha Movement never developed a clearly 
defined nationalist ideology and was ‘unable to create a coherent doctrine of its 
own and to synthesize different influences into a whole’ (Djilas, 1991: 114). 
Djilas {ibid.) described the Ustasha Movement as a form of ‘pseudo-romantic, 
populist terrorist nationalism’. Without wishing to enter the current debate 
concerning whether the Ustashas were true fascists or not, it would be interesting 
at this point to analyze the Ustasha’s concept of the nation. It should be noted 
though that the concept of the nation in general is mainly developed in parallel 
with the definition of the Croatian nation.
In the ‘Principles of the Croatian Ustasha Movement’, published in 1933, Pavelic 
attempted to define and explain the nature of the Croatian nation in 17 points. 
The Principles (NDH, 1933: 57) defined the Croatian nation as a ‘self-conscious 
national (ethnic) unit; a nation-in-itself, (...) identical to no other nation, (...) not 
part of a tribe or of any other nation’. Among Croats, their awareness of a 
common national sense of belonging was the result of several different factors. 
The Principles argued that individually these factors, ‘cannot characterize a 
nation, but all together (...) they comprise the essence of every nation’ {ibid.).
The first factor determining Croatian national self-awareness is its very origin 
and name. In the Principles, Pavelic argues that the Croatian nation has never had
69 Djilas (1991) for example.
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any title other than ‘Croat’. Its origins do not derive from other nations, nor it has 
ever been a part of another nation. The Croatian nation came to its present 
homeland from its native country as an organized national group named ‘the 
Croats’. Pavelic thus introduced a new myth concerning the origins of the 
Croatian nation: claimed that the Croatian name was of Iranian origin.70 For the 
first time, a Croatian nationalist ideology viewed the Croatian nation as being 
separate and distinct from the rest of the South Slav community, and especially 
from the Serbs. Hence for Pavelic, to deny such a ‘pure uncorrupted and holy’ 
name would mean to deny one’s own individuality, to become, as he called it, a 
‘spiritual fraction’ {ibid.: 61).
The other causes influencing Croatian national self-awareness, the Poglavnik 
argued, were: ‘a collective feeling of historical destiny, a shared innate 
understanding of Croatian statehood, and common folk cultural creations and 
traditions’ {ibid.: 57). The Principles argued that a nation’s traditions, 
achievements and creations, have a common source which demonstrates the 
‘natural uniqueness of everything produced by the spirit and strength of that 
nation’ {ibid.). Hence, the variety of national cultural creativity was not 
interpreted as a sign of national disunity, but rather as a sign of the creative 
strength of the Croatian spirit.
The Ustasha’s leaders placed great emphasis on the notions of ‘the homeland’ 
and ‘territory’ in the creation of the Croatian nation. Their ideology stated that 
the bond a nation has with its territory is unbreakable: ‘The land gave its soul to 
the nation, it built the national character, determined its national habits and its 
way of life’ {ibid.: 61). With this anthropo-geographical notion of the nation’s 
bond to its homeland, Pavelic was highlighting the divine nature of the nation, 
viewing ‘the homeland’ as the nation’s most precious value.
Following the teachings of Ante Starcevic, Pavelic, at least in theory, denied any 
importance of religion in national identification. The reasons were rather of a
70 The theory according to which the Croats are of Iranian descent is derived from the fact that the 
word Hrvat or Horvat is not of Slav origin. ‘Some scholars opted for the Iranian theory, pointing
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practical nature. According to Pavelic historical circumstances had compelled the 
Croats to accept other religions and as a result of this, he talks about Croats of 
Catholic, Muslim, Evangelist and Orthodox faith, since ‘it is in the interests of 
the state not to have any (...) religious conflicts’ (Pavelic, 1942b: 240). This 
practical religious tolerance was broadly employed regarding Bosnian Muslims. 
Pavelic claimed that the ‘Muslim blood in our Muslims is Croatian blood’ {ibid.: 
241). In accordance with this argument in 1942 Pavelic established the so-called 
‘Croatian Orthodox Church’ (NDH, 1942b: 262). He explained that Croats have 
nothing against the Orthodox Church in general and demonstrated his ‘tolerance’ 
stating that ‘one prays to God according to one’s own conscience and according 
to the way one has been taught during one’s youth and at school’ (Pavelic, 
1942b: 241). Since the Orthodox churches were in effect national churches, 
Pavelic concluded that in Croatia there could only be a Croatian Orthodox 
Church {ibid.: 242).
One of the main features of the Ustasha’s concept of the nation in general and the 
Croatian nation in particular, was that the national character was derived from the 
characteristics of the land on which a nation lives. Pavelic described the national 
character of the Croats (1929: 32) as having been imbued by Western culture 
with ‘all the characteristics of a civilized and honest nation’. The Croatian nation 
is a part of Westem-European civilization because it possesses a national sense of 
affiliation to that civilization, and because of its Western-oriented Church {ibid.). 
This nation, Pavelic argued, is striving for a peaceful and cultural life which suits 
its non-violent defensive nature {ibid.: 28).
The most efficient means for ensuring national preservation, according to 
Pavelic, was within a national state. Hence, the right to be part of an independent 
nation state is the ‘ultimate and holiest right’ (NDH, 1933: 71). This right 
legitimized the use of all means necessary to secure the freedom and 
independence of the Croatian nation {ibid.). With the aim of establishing an 
independent Croatian state, the Ustasha Movement wrote a codex which was 
intended to serve as a guide to every Croat. In 1933 Pavelic wrote: ‘We are
to Greek accounts of the Horvatos, or Horoatos, a community of Iranians who lived at the mouth
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building a state of law and order, of submission and discipline! We are all equal 
in front of the state and the Poglavnik.’ (NDH, 1933: 82). Such a state is 
imagined as a big national family: ‘We all know that in every house there is one 
who commands and others who listen, so it is natural that the same principle 
should be valid for a state’ {ibid.: 83).
The Ustasha’s leadership introduced new symbols to Croatian ‘revolutionary
fighters’: the crucifix, the dagger and the revolver. In 1942 the journal ‘Ustasha’
(NDH, 1942c: 265) explained:
We Croats are not such a religious nation, however we are also not 
religious hypocrites, but we are neither infidels nor atheists. It is normal 
that a nation which has stood for centuries on the ramparts of Western 
culture has more fighters that saints. While other nations were fighting 
for their own personal benefits, the Croats had to fight for Croatia.
The article explained that the crucifix gives an Ustasha the courage to fulfill his 
duty to the Poglavnik. The dagger was needed as ‘to break a chain one needs 
something sharp’ {ibid.). The author warned that an Ustasha does not carry a 
dagger as jewellery, but to help him in close combat. ‘The crucifix, the dagger 
and the revolver are the holy trinity for the Ustashas’ {ibid.). The strategy for the 
struggle for independence was set. Pavelic was convinced that there was not one 
Ustasha who would be reluctant to take a machine gun, a bomb or a sharp knife, 
because ‘every person in whom the Croatian blood is boiling is striving to enter 
the battlefield to carry out his oath, and to carry out the oaths of his forefathers’ 
{ibid.: 56).
To a great extent, one could argue that the creation of the Ustasha radical 
nationalist ideology was influenced by the political circumstances existing in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Hence, it is important to analyze the way the Ustasha 
leaders perceived Yugoslavia and the position of the Croatian nation within its 
borders.
of the Don around 200 BC’ (Tanner, 1997: 3).
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5.5.2. The Croats in Yugoslavia
For the Ustashas the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a ‘prison of nations’. The 
Ustasha Movement regarded the first decade of the existence of Yugoslavia as 
proof that Croats and Serbs could not live in the same state. The Yugoslav 
concept was considered as a criminal ideal ‘which held that the Croatian nation 
had to deny its ancient name and to baptize itself with a new ‘Yugoslav’ name 
(Pavelic, 1928: 15). The adoption of the new name, however meant for Pavelic 
an attempt to ‘erase the Croatian past and all those achievements which are 
linked to the honorable Croatian name’ {ibid.). For Pavelic the first decade of 
Yugoslavia was a bloody and terrible experience and those years were to be 
‘written in Croatian history in black letters, black letters of devastation, hunger, 
backwardness and the presence of every evil’ {ibid.: 17).
The establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was perceived by the Ustashas 
as a criminal attempt to rid the Croatian nation of its national identity. The whole 
Yugoslav political system, Pavelic argued, was created to achieve those ends. 
The monarch was described as a ‘butcher-clown’ (Bzik, n/a: 19), the Serbian 
state apparatus as corrupt and unqualified (Pavelic, 1929: 30), the government as 
the ‘violent Serbian beast which spilled the priceless blood of Croatian martyrs 
and which took the lives of its most valuable fighters’ (Bzik, n/a: 20).
However, Pavelic held that the Serbian attempt to rid the Croats of their identity 
was an ancient plan, already initiated in previous centuries. The Poglavnik 
(Pavelic, 1929: 29) described how the Karadordevic dynasty had ‘parked 
themselves on a bloody throne’. From that time, their propaganda spread the idea 
of Serbdom and Serbian nationality among the Orthodox population settled in 
Croatian territory ‘who until then had considered themselves as Croatian’ {ibid.). 
Furthermore, it was argued that the aim of the propaganda was also to win over 
the Croats to the Serbian concept. Serbian propaganda ‘invented different 
terminologies such as the so-called Serbo-Croatdom and Yugoslavism’ {ibid.) 
with the aim of proving how the Croats and Serbs were a single nation and that 
they belonged to a single state.
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An attempt to create a Yugoslav nation was considered unnatural by the 
Poglavnik. It was ‘history, culture and race that formed the Croats’ self- 
conscious national individuality, this cannot be either hushed up or destroyed’ 
(Pavelic, 1936: 96). Hence, any alteration to the nation was considered as 
impossible since ‘that would mean the complete destruction of the moral and 
economic values of the Croatian nation’ {ibid.: 97). For more than a thousand 
years, Pavelic concluded, the Croats had been standing on one side and the Serbs 
on the other as neighbours, separated by a clearly marked border. That border is 
also a ‘border between the East and the West’ {ibid.). In the following years 
Pavelic put great efforts into marking out the border in clear and unambiguous 
forms.
When a radical nationalist ideology formulates its concept of the nation in 
general and its own nation in particular in terms such as those employed by the 
Ustasha Movement, the question of the enemies ‘naturally’ appears. Moreover, 
an ideology of this type requires enemies in order to forge national unity, to 
justify its own actions and, consequently, to justify eventual failures. The 
Ustasha Movement defined its enemies in systematic and very clear terms.
5.5.3. The Enemies
In the Ustasha’s ideology the enemies of the nation ware almost a natural 
consequence of the formation of the nation. Even in their Principles the felt it 
necessary to explain that ‘as soon as a nation realized the value and power of its 
national consciousness, the importance and the beauty of its own language or the 
importance of its own name, this created a desire on the part of the enemy to 
diminish, to weaken, to deny or to destroy those same values ’ (NDH, 1933: 60).
In an article entitled ‘The Croatian Question’ published in German in 1936 
Pavelic listed the ‘enemies of the Croatian Liberation Movement’ (Pavelic, 1936: 
103). The first enemy was the Serbian state government, the second were the 
Jews, the third was international Freemasonry, and the fourth was communism.
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The Serbs
By the end of the 1920s Pavelic proclaimed the Serbian Government to be the 
greatest enemy of the Croatian nation. Yet, as soon as Yugoslavia collapsed and 
the NDH was established it became clear that the Ustashas considered not only 
the Serbian government, but the whole Serbian nation as its enemy. The Ustashas 
did not categorize the Serbs as an inferior race, nor did they consider them as a 
separate racial group. The ‘sins’ of the Serbs were founded in history. It could be 
argued that in some ways the genocide against the Serbs was a form of revenge 
driven by pure hatred.
The Ustashas created a black-and-white picture in which the Serbs were 
portrayed as having all possible negative characteristics while, of course, the 
Croats were viewed in opposite terms. The major distinction drawn between the 
two was the difference in their origins in the East and West. For Pavelic it was 
important to emphasize that the Croatian nation belonged to Western civilization, 
in order to distinguish itself from the Serb’s Eastern origins. The term 
‘Byzantism’ became a pejorative term to describe the Serbs: ‘Serbian Byzantism’ 
(Pavelic, 1929: 33) was used to single out a ‘perfidious, mediocre nation lacking 
integrity’ {ibid.: 40). The Serbs were described as ‘a nation without pride who, 
when they wished, presented themselves as being submissive, to enable them 
later to stick a knife in the back of an adversary. When they feel secure, then they 
are ruthless and without feelings’.
The Serbs were also described as being a chauvinistic nation which suffered from 
‘Serbian megalomania’ {ibid.: 39). They were an uncivilized nation without a 
spiritual or material culture {ibid., 40). For Pavelic the conclusion was clear: ‘The 
Serbs are a nation of Eastern culture and they are educated as pure Byzantine 
members of the Orthodox church and thus, they are eternal enemies of Western 
civilization and Catholicism’ {ibid.: 39).
As soon as the Ustashas established their state they undertook large-scale 
massacres of Serbs. The number of Serbian victims within the territory of the 
NDH is still a matter of conjecture. The number ranges from a million to around
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twenty thousand. Djilas used the approximate figure quoted by the Serbian 
scholar Bogoljub Kocovic, who calculated that ‘Serb’ losses in Croatia numbered
125,000, or 17.5 per cent of the entire Serb population there, while in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina the number was 209,000, or 16.7 per cent’ (Djilas, 1991: 126). 
Irrespective of the actual number of war victims, the fact remains that executions 
of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Communists by the Ustasha were systematic and 
organized, carried out with the expressed aim of ‘purifying the Croatian nation of 
foreign influences’, or to put it in other terms: genocide.
The Jews
Even though anti-Semitic attitudes were present in earlier Croatian nationalist 
ideologies, the Ustasha Movement introduced for the first time anti-Semitic 
attitudes based on racist assumptions. Racism, in the Ustasha’s ideology, was 
justified by the ‘interests of the nation’. In the Principles Pavelic states that a 
nation which desired to preserve its national individuality could not grant the 
same rights to those who were of ‘foreign race as it could to people with the same 
ancestry and the same racial structure’ (NDH, 1941h: 165). Moreover, those 
‘racial foreign elements’ could not be involved in governing the nation and 
enhancing its national culture, because ‘that would lead to a deviation from the 
way of life of the nation and would thus direct the nation into nationally foreign 
ways in conflict with the tradition of the nation and against the national spirit’ 
{ibid.).
The Ustashas denied that they were racists. They justified this position arguing 
that biology does not classify according to any values but it just determines the 
facts. Therefore, the true racists were the Jews themselves who ‘singled 
themselves out as the chosen people in their religious texts, which were also the 
basis of their life as a nation’ {ibid.). According to the Interpretation o f the Racial 
Laws, a special Croatian race did not exist. The Croats, ‘just like other European 
nations were a mixture of the Nordic, Dynaroid, Alpic, Baltic and Mediterranean 
races with a very small input from other races’ {ibid.: 166). The Jews on the other 
hand, the Interpretation continued, are a mixture of Oriental and Middle-Eastern
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races with some input from the Mongol and Negroid races. However, as Pavlic 
argued ‘the Jews do have around 20 per cent European origin’ {ibid.: 167). This 
20 per cent ‘Aryan’ blood in the Jewish race, according to the Ustasha ‘experts 
on racial questions’, opened a loophole for recognizing some Jews as Aryans. 
The criteria of an ‘Aryan Jew’ were founded on behaviour: ‘If a Jew has suffered 
and sacrificed himself for years, and if that Jew has lived in poverty and risked 
his own life for a divine cause (...) then he passes the test which proves that he 
possesses the moral fiber which characterizes the Aryan community; it proves 
that he is a person in whom the Aryan inherited traits are dominant’ {ibid.: 168). 
It would be naive to believe that the introduction of the ‘Aryan Jew’ category 
into the Ustasha’s ideology was a sign of their ‘flexibility’ towards the Jews. 
Rather, it was used to explain and justify the fact that some of the prominent 
Croatian nationalists were Jews, such as Josip Frank the leader of the Croatian 
Pure Party of Right.
According to some authors,71 the Ustasha Movement never developed a coherent 
racist theory. In practice however, there was little ambiguity in their actions.72 
The Ustasha’s ‘solution’ was a radical one: ‘Every Aryan national state has to get 
rid off non-Aryan elements, especially Jews who are constantly striving for the 
key positions and are attempting to influence the population with their political 
and moral principles in order to exploit the host nation’ {ibid.: 168). Only nine 
days sifter the establishment of the NDH the Poglavnik published a decree stating 
that all transactions between the Jews and Croats were deemed invalid. Fifteen 
days later the decrees of ‘racial affiliation’ and of ‘protection of the Aryan blood’ 
were published. Those decrees determined who was to be classified as Jewish, as 
well as prohibiting mixed marriages and any relationship between a Jew and a 
member of the Aryan race. Soon after, the NDH authorities introduced the 
Yellow Star as the symbol for all Jews ‘so that everybody could immediately 
recognize a Jew’ (NDH, 1941k: 173), and they also forced Jews to resettle away 
from certain areas in Zagreb. The other decree demanded that all Jewish property 
had to be declared to the authorities (NDH, 19411, 195). On 5 June 1941 Pavelic
71 See Djilas (1991: 119).
72 Around 80 per cent of the Jewish population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were killed 
during the Second World War (Tanner, 1997: 149).
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issued an order according to which the racial origin of every state employee had 
to be determined (NDH, 1941m: 202).73
In 1936 Pavelic (1936: 105) declared that in Croatia all finance, journalism and
trade were in ‘Jewish hands’. The Jews, just like the communists, were identified
as being pro-Yugoslav. The Jews were described as ‘tough and destructive,
malicious and extraordinarily skilled, the enemies of all nations except their own’
(NDH, 1933: 76). The Poglavnik explained that the Jews:
like dangerous parasites are attached to the bodies of all the nations, they 
are sucking the juices out of host nations and in so doing they are 
destroying those nations economically, politically, culturally and morally. 
They have never acted as an organized power, yet they have been the 
most organized power in the world. Even though nothing was sacred to 
them, they considered as sacred everything which led them to their 
ultimate aim: the exploitation and enslavement of the entire world.’ 
{ibid.)
Hence, it was no surprise that for the Poglavnik the basic principle of the 
development of the Croatian nation was the requirement ‘to eradicate those lethal 
parasites quickly and efficiently from the Croatian national body’ {ibid.: 77).
Communists. Freemasons. Intelligentsia...
The Ustasha’s radical nationalist ideology was extremely anti-intellectual. 
Moreover, they regarded the peasantry as the foundation and source of ‘national 
life and, as such, the peasants are the basis of state power in the Croatian land’ 
(NDH, 1933: 77). They believed that in ninety cases out of a hundred, one who 
does not originate from a peasant family is not of Croatian descent or blood, but 
an immigrant. These immigrants or descendants of immigrants were perceived as 
the source of all the ideas which were destroying ‘the Croatian national body’.
In his speech to the Croatian Sabor in 1942 Pavelic (1942a: 248) stated that the 
whole communist contingent in Croatia was comprised of intellectuals. The 
intelligentsia was responsible for the creation of Yugoslavia and the communists
73 According to this order the racial membership was to be marked in fractions. It gives an 
example: fraternal grandfather Aryan, fraternal grandmother Jew, mother Jew = 3/4 Jew, 1/4
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were guilty of promoting the idea of Yugoslavia. Thus, the Ustashas viewed 
fascism not as the antithesis to democracy, but as a ‘direct descendent of the 
democratic idea and as an antithesis to communism’ (Pavelic, 1938: 110).
In Yugoslavia, as the Second World War progressed, the Partisans - led and 
organized in the main by the Yugoslav Communist Party - grew ever stronger. 
They constituted in effect the only real threat to the Ustashas. The Partisans were 
described in Ustasha propaganda as an ‘element of destruction, an element of the 
worst terror, an element of the worst barbarity, which could only appear in a 
society during times of war’ (Kovacevic, 1943: 320). The Partisans were 
portrayed as being full of hatred for everything Croatian, and as being a direct 
threat to the Croatian nation and state. The Ustasha leaders could not reconcile 
the fact that many Croats had joined and, in many cases, established Partisans’ 
groups throughout Croatia. The only explanation for the emergence of the 
Partisans on Croatian territory was that they were led by ‘Jews and other non- 
Croats’ (ibid: 321). In 1944 Pavelic (1944: 327) asserted that a struggle for the 
salvation of the Croatian nation and Croatian land could not be waged with a 
‘tambourine or prayer book in one’s hand’. He held that all political means had 
been exhausted and that ‘those who want to continue the fight for the Croatian 
lands and the Croatian nation through political means, are not fighters but enemy 
agents’ (ibid.).
Another enemy identified as being responsible for the creation of Yugoslavia 
were the Freemasons. The Poglavnik held that the whole of Yugoslavia lay in 
their hands: ‘Every individual who has held any position of political importance 
since the creation of Yugoslavia has been a Freemason. The main patron of 
Yugoslavian Freemasonry is the Karadordevic dynasty’ (Pavelic, 1936: 103).
The Ustasha Movement identified a wide range of enemies. Yet the only true 
external enemy was the Serbian Government. In spite of this, with the 
establishment of the NDH the Ustashas embarked on a full-scale attack against 
any opponent to their ideology. Pavelic emphasized that the Ustasha Movement
Aryan (NDH, 1941m: 203).
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‘is fighting for the complete liberation of Croatia and for the creation of an 
internal order and system which would be based on healthy nationalist principles’ 
{ibid.: 104). For the Ustashas, therefore, a direct corollary to their primary 
objective of achieving the complete liberation of the Croatian nation, involved 
the destruction of any other nationalities and ideologies within NDH borders. 
Indeed, during the four years of its existence, the Ustashas made great efforts to 
achieve this objective; its success can be measured by its hundreds of thousand of 
victims.
5.5.4. Conclusion
The Ustasha Movement attempted to justify its bloody actions through its 
concept of the nation. The nation, defined as a community of blood and common 
spirit, required a state for its protection. The ‘pollution’ of the Croatian blood, 
along with the influence of foreign cultures were identified as the main threat to 
the survival of a nation. The establishment of an Independent State of Croatia, it 
was believed, would prevent the continued dilution of Croatian blood, and would 
purify the spirit of the Croatian nation. The Ustasha Movement created what can 
be termed the ‘cult of the state’. The state was the fulfillment of ‘an eight- 
hundred-year long dream of the Croatian nation’. It, therefore, became the 
ultimate value which all Croats were to defend and protect from all of its 
enemies.
The Ustashas used ‘biology’ to justify their atrocities. For the first time in the 
development of Croatian nationalist ideologies, the Ustashas introduced the term 
‘race’ into the ideological vocabulary. Previously, the term ‘race’ had been used 
to identify national groups such as the ‘Slav race’ where the main criterion was 
cultural similarity. The Ustashas used the term ‘race’ to categorize a social group 
which shared inherited characteristics, which in turn determined the behaviour of 
the group. Within this perspective, an individual becomes a member of a ‘racial 
group’ by birth, a membership which was considered to be everlasting. For the 
first time an individual became an enemy of the Croatian nation purely by being 
bom as a member of another ‘race’ or nation.
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The Ustashas attempted to rally the masses against a long list of internal enemies. 
In the tradition of the Croatian Peasant Party, the Ustasha Movement defined the 
Croatian nation as a peasant nation. They also created an ideal picture of the 
Croatian ‘way of life’ based on the patriarchal family, on Christian values and on 
the essential bond of the peasantry to the land. Anyone who did not match this 
ideal was proclaimed as an enemy of the nation. The state employed all means 
necessary to purify the Croatian nation of all non-Croatian influences. 
Communism, Freemasonry, liberalism and even democracy were perceived as 
products of foreign and, hence, hostile cultures.
In addition, the newly-created myth of the Croat’s Iranian origins was the first 
attempt to clearly distinguish the Croats from the other South-Slav nations, and 
particularly the Serbs. Defined as a distinct group in terms of their origins, blood, 
history, spirit and culture, the Croats, according to Ustasha nationalist ideology, 
needed to once again defend themselves and Western civilization against the 
Eastern ‘Byzantine’ civilization. When an ideology perceives a dagger, a 
revolver and a crucifix as being its ‘holy trinity’, genocide becomes its ‘natural’ 
consequence.
The main characteristic of the Ustashas’ nationalist ideology is actually a 
radicalisation of concepts that already existed in earlier Croatian nationalist 
ideologies:
• The Ustashas radicalised the Herderian concept of authenticity that was 
already developed within the nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasant 
Party. However, Radic’s search for the Croatian spirit within the Croatian 
peasantry the Ustashas radicalised by a strong anti-intellectualism.
• The claim about the originality of the Croatian name was presented as 
evidence of the uniqueness of the Croatian nation. Even Gaj, one century 
earlier, developed a myth of the origin of the Croatian nation that made the 
Croats unique. Yet the Ustashas’ myth of origin served as a means to exclude 
of other nations.
• Already Radic had defined the creation of the nation-state as the ultimate goal 
and value of the Croatian nation. However, in their national ideology the
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Ustashas created the ‘cult of the state’ for which every true Croat should be 
ready to die.
• The only Ustasha ‘contribution’ was the introduction of clear-cut racism. 
Even these ideas were borrowed from their German and Italian patrons. The 
only problem for this racist ideology was how to prove the Aryan origins of 
the Croats. This brings us again to the Ustashas’ insistence on authenticity 
and uniqueness.
A nationalist ideology defined in these terms inevitably provoked strong 
opposition. The most organized and effective opposition was the one developed 
and led by the Yugoslav Communist Party.
5.6. Historical Background V (1941-1980)
In 1941, at the beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, the only 
organized entity prepared for war was the Yugoslav Communist Party 
(Kornunisticka partija Jugoslavije - KPJ). Moreover, the KPJ was the only 
political organization which had branches and supporters all over Yugoslavia. At 
that time, the KPJ had already accumulated thirty years’ experience of 
underground activity, where its members had been hunted and persecuted, and 
considered as the most dangerous enemies of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
In the post-war period, KPJ officials claimed that one of the main reasons for the 
successful uprising and socialist revolution led by the KPJ during the period 
1941-45, was the KPJ’s policy regarding the national question in Yugoslavia. 
Historians74 have highlighted several different phases ‘in the evolution of their 
Yugoslav nationalities policy’ (Ramet, 1984: 48). In order to examine these 
phases it is necessary to look briefly at the KPJ’s policies over the two previous 
decades.
74 For example Ramet (1984a) and Djilas (1991).
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The first phase of the KPJ’s policy on the national question, according to Ramet 
(1984), was one of ‘centralism and unitarism’ which lasted between 1919 and 
1923. Only a few months after the creation of the Kingdom of SHS, in April 
1919, the revolutionary factions of the pre-war socialist-democratic parties held a 
congress in Belgrade and established the United Socialist Worker’s Party of 
Yugoslavia - Communists (Ujedinjena socijalisticka partija Jugoslavije - 
komunista). While at that time the Yugoslav government was reluctant to 
proclaim Yugoslavism as its official policy,75 the Yugoslav communists were 
‘unitarists from the very foundation of Yugoslavia’ (Djilas, 1991: 61). They 
believed that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three tribes from one South 
Slav nation. Nationalism was regarded by the communists to be a capitalist 
construct created to unify national markets. It was argued that with the 
establishment of a socialist-communist society, nations, just like states, would 
wither away (Ramet, 1984a: 49). In December 1920, the government introduced 
anti-Communist legislation in the so-called Obznana (Pronouncement) and in 
August 1921 in Zakon o zastiti drzave (Law for the Defense of the State), which 
outlawed the KPJ. Soon after, the KPJ entered the second phase of its policy on 
the national question.
The ‘second phase’, which lasted from 1923 to 1928, was characterized by 
internal conflicts between the left and right wings of the party (Ramet, 1984a: 
48). These tensions arose partly as a result of the introduction of a federal system 
in the Soviet Union, and partly as a consequence of the conflicts and tensions 
within Yugoslavia.
The development of the Serb-Croat conflict in Yugoslavia in the mid-1920s 
forced the KPJ to re-examine its policies. The massive support of the Croatian 
masses for the HSS was a clear signal that the KPJ had to adopt a more 
determined and more proactive attitude towards the national question {ibid.: 71). 
It was only at the third Party congress, held in Belgrade in January 1924, that the 
KPJ truly recognized the importance of the national question in Yugoslavia and
75 In this context, Yugoslavism was defined as an ideology which held that all nations in 
Yugoslavia formed a single Yugoslav nation, and, hence, were defined as tribes of the Yugoslav 
nation. The Yugoslav government adopted Yugoslavism as an official policy only in 1929.
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the true significance of the conflict between Croats and Serbs. The congress 
concluded that the ‘process of assimilating the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into a 
single nation had been impeded from the start, because the Serbian “bourgeoisie” 
was “exploiting” and “oppressing” the other South Slav nations’ {ibid.: 72). At 
this congress, the KPJ abandoned their unitarist position and recognized the right 
of every nation to secede and establish its own state.
The ‘third phase’ (1928-34) of the communist policy on the national question 
was heavily influenced by external factors. This phase was characterized by their 
submission to the ‘Commintem dictum that Yugoslavia should be broken into 
separate, homogeneous nation-states’ (Ramet, 1984a: 48). Under pressure from 
Stalin, who believed that Yugoslavia was a bourgeois creation, hence 
fundamentally against the interests of the proletariat, the KPJ adopted the 
approach of their left wing, and started to support secessionist demands. Since 
the national question in Yugoslavia could only be solved by transforming the 
political system, the Yugoslav communists called for the fall of the so-called 
‘Versailles Yugoslavia’. As previously mentioned, the 1931 Constitution was 
formulated with the aim of strengthening the centralist system in Yugoslavia, so 
as to ‘generate a united Yugoslav national consciousness’ (Djilas, 1991: 80). At 
the fourth Party congress held in Ljubljana in 1934 it was decided to create the 
Communist Party of Croatia and the Communist Party of Slovenia as separate 
branches of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This decision was a clear sign 
of support to the Croatian and Slovenian secessionist movements.
In the mid-1930s the Party underwent a thorough reorganization. It also entered 
its ‘fourth phase’ (1935-43) of policy regarding the national question, in which 
KPJ policy, on the one hand, recognized the right to national self-determination, 
whilst on the other, remained committed to preserving Yugoslavia as a 
multinational community. After the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, 
the Comintern called for the fight against fascism to be the major objective of 
communist parties worldwide. To achieve this the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia had to undergo a process of transformation. Conflicts between 
factions ceased and the organizational structure of the party was strengthened. 
Instead of engaging in endless theoretical debates, the party became much more
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pragmatical towards existing crucial issues. In 1937 the KPJ changed its leader: 
the Comintern appointed Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) to the position of General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
The main task for the new Party leadership was to increase membership and to 
organize the Party structure in a more efficient way. Its underground activities 
and the constant purging of Party members resulted in an organizational structure 
based on conspiracy and secrecy, and one which demanded the commitment and 
the determination of its members. Djilas described the KPJ at the beginning of 
1940s as ‘united, disciplined, well organized, experienced, and Yugoslavist’ 
{ibid.: 93).
Already in 1936 at the KPJ’s plenum, which was held in Prague and then in 
Vienna, the Yugoslav Communists concluded that a common South Slav state 
was possible as long as Serbian hegemonism was abolished and the equality and 
brotherhood of its nations established. This resolution was a clear break with the 
Comintern’s policy which favoured the break-up of ‘Versailles Yugoslavia’. 
From then on, the KPJ supported the principle of self-determination whilst at the 
same time opposing any calls for the separation of the Yugoslav nations. Their 
solution was founded in the notion of a federal system based on equality of 
nations. However, only a year later, the Communist Party of Croatia76 
{Komunisticka partija Hrvatske - KPH) was formally established. Its creation 
was a symbolic gesture; the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was still united in 
organization, leadership and policy.
In October 1940 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held its fifth conference in 
Zagreb.77 The conference confirmed the importance of the preservation of 
Yugoslavia, especially given the wartime context in Europe which was
76 In that period the KPJ had 6,455 members of whom 3,164 were in Croatia (Djilas, 1991: 98).
77 More than one hundred delegates from all over Yugoslavia attended the conference. ‘The 
delegates were 53 workers, 14 peasants, 29 intellectuals, and 5 administrative personnel.... Their 
average age was thirty-three, their average length of party membership nine years, and their 
average time in prison two years. Around two-thirds had been tortured by the police at least once. 
Many of them were veterans, and some had held officer rank in the Spanish Civil War’ (Djilas, 
1991: 93).
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threatening to spread onto the territory of Yugoslavia. Preparations for the 
expected war were the Party’s overriding concern.
In June 1941, just a few months after the occupation and break-up of Yugoslavia, 
the Central Committee of the KPJ urged the population to resist the occupying 
forces and, in so doing, initiated the so-called ‘national-liberation struggle’. 
Under the leadership of the Yugoslav Communists guerrilla military groups were 
organized and mobilized throughout Yugoslavia. In four years of war, the so- 
called Partisans grew into a formidable military organization which succeeded in 
liberating the whole country in spite of insufficient assistance from the Allies. 
After the fall of Fascist Italy to the Allies, the Partisans acquired military 
hardware from the fallen regime, which added to their military strength and 
influence in the middle of occupied Europe. This contributed towards their 
successfully holding and liberating much of the Yugoslav territory.
Along with co-ordinating military resistance, the KPJ initiated a social 
revolution. It established a new political entity, the so-called ‘Anti-Fascist 
Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia’ (Antifasisticko Vijece 
Narodnog Oslobodenja Jugoslavije - AVNOJ) which proclaimed itself as the 
only legitimate representative of the peoples of Yugoslavia (Djilas, 1991: 158). 
On 29 and 30 November 1943 AVNOJ held its second meeting in the Bosnian 
city Jajce.78 This assembly announced the birth of the new Yugoslav federal state 
(Tanner, 1997: 163). It also recognized the ‘existence of the Partisan-run local 
governments in Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Sandzak, 
known as National Liberation Councils’ {ibid.). During the assembly, the leaders 
of the KPJ wanted to reassure the people of Yugoslavia that the future state 
would be a federal state of equal nations.
78 The first meeting of the AVNOJ was held in Bihac on 26 and 27 November 1942. Its main 
objective in that period was to represent the Partisans as the leading anti-German resistance group 
in Yugoslavia. In the same period the Chetniks (the Serbs’ nationalist organization) claimed the 
same status.
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In June 1943 the Partisans in Croatia79 established a Croatian replica of AVNOJ - 
the so-called ZAVNOH {Zemaljsko anti-fasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodenja 
Hrvatske).80 The ZAVNOH controlled large areas of territory and it ran its own 
schools, ministries and newspapers (Tanner, 1997: 163). The establishment of the 
ZAVNOH was perceived by the Croats as a guarantee for the establishment of 
federalism in a post-war Yugoslavia. The ZAVNOH nullified the 1920 Treaty of 
Rapallo according to which Istria, Zadar and some Adriatic islands were ceded to 
Italy, and it ‘pronounced illegitimate all international treaties, agreements, acts, 
deeds, debts, and alliances made by the government of the NDH’ (Djilas, 1991: 
159).81 A few months before the end of the war, in April 1945, the ZAVNOH 
proclaimed itself as the only legitimate Sabor of Croatia and formed a 
government of the ‘Socialist Republic of Croatia’.
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79 Goldstein (1999: 149) offers an estimation according to which in late 1943 the Partisans only in 
Croatia had 100,000 soldiers and in 1944 150,000. At the same time the elite voluntary Ustasha 
units had about 76,000 soldiers on the whole territory of the so-called NDH, which included 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
80 Similar councils were created in other territories that would become republics after the war.
81 For more about the ZAVNOH and the clashes between the leader of the Croatian Partisans 
Andrija Hebrang and Tito see Tanner (1997: 163-167).
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The second meeting of the AVNOJ represented the beginning of the fifth phase 
of the Yugoslav communists’ policy regarding the national question. According 
to Ramet (1984: 48) during this phase, which lasted from 1943 until 1964, the 
communists adopted a policy of federalism, ‘characterized by the disjunction of 
republics and nationalities and the concept of “Yugoslavism”’. The full scope 
and shape of this policy was demonstrated in the first post-war years.
Elections held at the end of 1945 resulted in a great victory for the Yugoslav 
communists.82 On 29 November 1945 the newly-elected Constituent Assembly 
proclaimed the establishment of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
{Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavia - FNRJ). As early as January 1946 
the Assembly introduced the new Constitution of the FNRJ. The first article of 
the Basic Principles of the Constitution stated that: ‘The nations of Yugoslavia, 
in accordance with the right of every nation to self-determination and the right to 
secession, have, on the basis of their free will (...) united in a federal republic’ 
(FNRJ, 1946). According to the Constitution, the Federal Assembly (the supreme 
legislative body) was comprised of the Federal Council and the Council of 
Nations (Djilas, 1991. 160). The FNRJ was made up of six republics (Croatia, 
Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, which 
included two autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina). The Constitution 
proclaimed the republics as having equal rights and duties. Officially the equality 
of the republics originated from their sovereignty. Each republic was declared as 
being ‘a sovereign homeland of sovereign nations’ {ibid.: 161). However, in 
practice, the sovereignty of the republics was severely limited. Each republic had 
its own assembly, yet federal laws took pre-eminence over all republican laws. 
The FNRJ was in practice a centralized and unitarist state.
During the war, the Yugoslav communists had launched the slogan ‘Brotherhood 
and unity’ and in the early post-war years, this slogan came to symbolize the 
policy of ‘pan-Yugoslav solidarity, cooperation among the nations of 
Yugoslavia, Yugoslav integration, and, ultimately, the creation of a Yugoslav
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national consciousness’ (Djilas, 1991: 164). The process of building socialism, 
the communists declared, was based on the process of building a “socialist man”. 
The consciousness of the “socialist man” was to be primarily based on patriotism 
and internationalism, both of which were declared as Yugoslav traits. Hence, 
although never officially advocated, the creation of the single Yugoslav nation 
was considered to be the ultimate product of the socialist revolution.
In 1948 the Informbureau83 issued a resolution in which the leaders of the 
Yugoslav communists were accused of exhibiting anti-socialist behaviour and 
nationalist attitudes. The KPJ rejected these accusations and resisted Stalin’s 
effort to bring Yugoslavia under his wing. The Eastern Bloc countries imposed a 
total economic embargo against Yugoslavia and launched a huge propaganda 
campaign, both within and outside the Yugoslav borders, aimed at creating 
disunity and discord among the Yugoslav communists. A number of KPJ 
members supported the resolution and Stalin. The KPJ leadership treated such 
‘renegades’ brutally, many were arrested and sent to a detention camp on an 
Adriatic island called Goli otok. From that point on, Yugoslavia followed its own 
‘road to socialism’.
The first product of Yugoslav socialism was the introduction of the so-called 
‘self-management’ system.84 The Yugoslav economy, already devastated by the 
war, weakened by the nationalization of property and agrarian reform, suffered 
greatly from the economic embargo introduced by the Eastern Bloc. In 1950 the 
leadership acknowledged the weaknesses of the centralist state management of 
the economy and passed a federal law which ‘handed over the state’s enterprises 
to the management of the workers’. Hence, the state leadership introduced a new 
type of ownership: instead of being state property, enterprises were from that 
time considered the property of society. The enterprises were managed by 
‘workers’ councils’, yet each enterprise had to contribute towards the federal 
budget. Capital resources were still allocated from the centre. The Government
82 The so-called Popular Front, which was led by the communists, was the only party standing at 
the elections - it won over 95 per cent of votes.
83 The so-called Communist Information Bureau was established in 1946 as a successor to the 
Comintern and it functioned as an inter-party organization made up of twelve communist parties.
84 For more about the development of ‘workers’ self-management’, see Allcock (2000: 76-78).
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also introduced the policy of supporting less developed regions of the country 
from federal funds.
The introduction of self-management as the basis of the economic system had 
serious repercussions at the political level: ‘once it was conceded that individual 
enterprises had a right to run their own affairs, the republics naturally demanded 
the same rights at state level’ (Tanner, 1997: 185). At the same time, at least 
officially, the Party lessened its control over the state. In November 1952, at the 
Sixth Congress, the Party changed its name to the Communist League of 
Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije - SKJ) and declared a separation 
between the party and the state. This marked the start of a period of political and 
economic liberalization. These changes had the effect of intensifying the 
underlying tensions between the “conservative” and “reformist” factions within 
the Party. Political events in the 1960s were characterized by such factional 
fighting.85
The new economic and political tendencies in Yugoslavia were codified in the 
1963 constitution. The constitution also represented the sixth and last phase of 
Yugoslav communist policy on the national question. Ramet called this phase the 
phase of genuine federalism ‘expressed by the equation of republics and 
nationalities and of inter-republic and inter-ethnic relations’ (Ramet, 1984a: 48). 
The changes in the economy86 had profound effects on the Yugoslav political 
structure. Economic issues became the basis for political claims. According to 
the constitution the republics were accorded a high level of jurisdiction over their 
internal affairs. For the first time the republics expressed their opposition to 
certain federal directions which were perceived to be against their interest. The 
1963 constitution, coupled with the 1969 constitutional amendments, in effect 
transformed the republics into mini-states.
The first expression of open opposition against the official state policy towards 
the national question came not from official circles in Croatia, but from the
85 See Djilas (1991: 177).
86 For more about economic reforms from 1965, see Ramet (1984a: 89-91) and Allcock (2000: 78- 
89).
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Croatian Writers’ Club. In April 1967 the Club announced the Declaration 
Concerning the Name and Position o f the Croatian Language. The catalyst for 
this Declaration was the publication of a new Serbo-Croat Dictionary by the 
Matica Srpska, in which Serbian words and expressions were presented as 
standard while Croatian words and expressions were either omitted or were 
presented as dialect (Tanner, 1997: 190). The Declaration interpreted the 
introduction of this dictionary as an attempt to reduce the Croatian language to 
the status of a dialect. It proposed the introduction of four, instead of three, 
official languages in Yugoslavia: Slovenian, Macedonian, Serbian and Croatian. 
The petition was signed by the twenty most influential cultural institutions in 
Croatia and by around 140 of the most prominent Croatian writers. The Serbian 
writers responded by warning that in the event of an official separation of these 
languages, they would demand the establishment of separate Serbian schools in 
Croatia and that Cyrillic would be the only script used in Serbia {ibid.: 191).
As a reaction to these events, reformists in Croatia highlighted other issues 
regarding the status of the Croatian nation in Yugoslavia. Aside from cultural 
issues, the reformists pointed to the predominance of Serbs within state 
institutions including the army find police,87 and to an unjust economic system in 
which foreign currency earned in Croatia was being transferred to Belgrade. 
These events mark the beginning of what was referred to as the ‘Croatian Spring’ 
or M aspok(coming from M asovnipokret- Mass movement).
One of the major features of the Croatian Spring88 was the variety of dimensions 
it took. It began as an inter-party conflict between forces of conservatism and 
reform, and ended as a full-scale Croatian nationalist movement. The Croatian 
Spring brought together the Croatian Communist Party leadership, activists from 
the Matica Hrvatska and students from Zagreb University. These institutions did 
not necessarily share the same ideological perspective, however. While the 
official Croatian Party leadership was working towards economic liberalization, 
and the students were demanding the liberalization of the Yugoslav political
87 According to Tanner (1997: 191) even though the Serbs in Croatia comprised about 12 per cent 
of the population, they made up about 60 or 70 per cent of the police forces and about 40 per cent 
of the Party membership.
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system, the small nationalist forces were calling for the establishment of an 
independent state of Croatia. During this period, the leaders of the Croatian 
Communist Party - Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar - came to be 
considered by Croats as national leaders.
Mass political rallies, student strikes throughout Croatia, and nationalist articles 
published in the major Croatian newspapers and journals, provoked the Yugoslav 
leadership into taking tough measures against the movement. Even though at the 
beginning of the Croatian Spring, Tito and Kardelj expressed some sympathy 
towards the demands of the Croatian leadership, under pressure from influential 
conservative factions within the Party and from rising Serbian nationalist forces, 
at the end of 1971 it was decided that the Croatian Spring had to be crushed.89 
The perception of Croats as being Ustashas with genocidal aspirations towards 
the Serbs was re-awakened. The leadership of the SKH (League of Communists 
of Croatia - Savez komunista Hrvatske) was replaced, and many other activists 
were arrested and imprisoned for many years, charged with extreme nationalist 
activities.
Even though the Yugoslav leadership brutally suppressed the leaders and 
activities of the Croatian Spring; even though, from that point on, every 
expression of Croatian national consciousness was labeled as a nationalist act; 
and even though as a result of the ‘Ustasha stigma’ Croatia became known as the 
“silent republic”, the events at the beginning of the 1970s had a tremendous 
influence on the Yugoslav political system. With the 1971 constitutional 
amendments and with the introduction of a new constitution in 1974, Yugoslavia 
entered a quasi-confederate stage.
While the 1964 constitution in effect transformed the republics into quasi-states, 
the 1974 constitution transformed them into ‘real’ states inside the federal state 
by increasing and strengthening their sovereignty. The republics gained almost 
complete control over their internal affairs, while foreign policy and the military
88 For more about the Croatian Spring see, Cuvalo (1990) and Tripalo (1989).
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remained very much controlled from Belgrade. The republics gained a significant 
level of control over their finances, although they were still obliged to contribute 
towards the federal budget. The federal government maintained its control over 
foreign currency.
The creators of the new constitution (in particular, Edvard Kardelj) wanted to 
establish a balance of power between the republics, and consequently between 
the Yugoslav nations and nationalities. To achieve this, the 1974 constitution 
introduced several changes. Firstly, the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo, which were part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, gained a level of 
decision-making control over their internal affairs, which brought them close to 
the status of the republics. Representatives from these autonomous provinces 
participated in the Yugoslav Presidency and in the Central Committee of the 
SKJ, enjoying the same rights and duties as the representatives of the republics. 
This constitutional change considerably weakened the position of Serbia, whose 
jurisdiction was reduced to the so-called ‘Serbia Proper’.
Secondly, the new constitution recognized the Slav Muslims of Bosnia and 
Hezegovina as a nation. This change of status officially introduced a third actor 
into the Bosnian political arena which countered Serb and Croat nationalist 
claims over the Bosnian population and territory.
Thirdly, the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia no longer 
defined Croatia in civic but in national terms. Where the previous constitution 
defined Croatia as a ‘community of people living in Croatia’ (SRH, 1969), the 
new one defined it as a ‘community of the Croatian nation, Serbian nation in 
Croatia and other nationalities who live in Croatia’ (SRH, 1974). Such a 
formulation does not only imply the strong connection between the state and the 
nation, but also that the Serbian nation was sovereign in Croatia.
89 However, in the same period the Yugoslav leadership swept away liberals throughout 
Yugoslavia - the liberal regime in Serbia under the leadership of Nikezic and Perovic, 
Crvenkovski in Macedonia and liberals in Slovenia.
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In just five years the Croatian population found itself within three fundamentally 
different state organisations: from Banovina Croatian within the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, the Independent State of Croatia, to the Socialist Republic of Croatia 
within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Moreover, pressed by 
various internal and external factors, the central communist corporate agency 
introduced several waves of social change since its establishment in 1945. These 
social changes differed from previous examples first of all in terms of their 
thoroughness and intensity:
• From the first decades of its rule, the Communist regime mobilised extensive 
forces for the modernisation and industrialisation of the Yugoslav society. 
Such an effort was followed by rapid urbanisation, reform of agriculture, 
depopulation of rural areas and the introduction of a new type of property.
• The socialist system directly challenged the traditional social organisations 
and values by politicising every aspect of social life. Building the ‘new 
socialist man’ included adoption of new socialist values of equality, 
brotherhood and unity that in communist interpretations became value 
orientations of egalitarianism, unionism and populism.
• The same value orientations were reflected on the cultural level. From its first 
days of rule, the new regime put great efforts into education and the 
eradication of illiteracy. In order to secure the education of the population in 
a ‘proper spirit’, a strict control of the spoken and printed word was 
introduced. Even artistic expression was subjected to censorship.
• While every citizen of Yugoslavia belonged to at least one socialist 
organisation (like Pioneers, Socialist Youth, Socialist Union of Working 
People, or the Union of Yugoslav Communists) the ruling party opposed the 
formation of any competing corporate agency, even those within the 
Communist Party. Nevertheless, the 1974 constitution marked the beginning 
of increased decentralisation of power.
This 1974 constitution reflected in full Kardelj’s nationalist ideology, which had 
originally been formulated in his 1938 Razvoj slovenackog nacionalnog pitanja 
(Development of the Slovenian National Question). Kardelj’s writings will be 
analysed in the following section. The analysis will attempt to identify the way 
Kardelj defined the nation and the Yugoslav national question; it will outline
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Kardelj’s views on the future of the nation in general and the Yugoslav nations in 
particular.
5.7. The Nationalist Ideology of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
The nation is not an homogenous unity - 
it is divided by its internal oppositions.
(Kardelj, 1973: LVffl)
Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav Communist Party ideologue, defined his theory of 
nations and nationalism in terms of Marxism, evolutionism, functionalism and 
modernism. Nevertheless, his theory was constructed in opposition to the major 
Marxist theorists of his time, especially Stalin’s definition of nation. Even though 
Kardelj only openly questioned Stalin’s ideas in the Introduction to the second 
edition of his book (1973) he held that Stalin’s ‘theoretical assumptions about the 
national question are untenable’ (Kardelj, 1973: LI). Kardelj offered another 
approach.
According to Kardelj Marxist thought in Yugoslavia had for a long time been 
under the influence of Stalin’s theory of the nation. He conceded that Stalin had 
rightly assumed that the nation was a historical phenomenon, a product of the 
capitalist epoch.90 Stalin had expanded the old Austro-Marxist cultural-linguistic 
definition of the nation, introducing the importance of the economic relations of 
populations in given territory. Kardelj held that such a definition only explains 
what connects a nation, but does not explain the social role of this historic 
phenomenon. It is clear, he argued, that the nation does not emerge accidentally, 
and once it is formed the nation naturally has a social function {ibid.: LI).
In the above-mentioned Introduction (1973: LI), Kardelj argued that Stalin’s 
theory ignored the importance of the ‘organic connection’ between certain socio­
economic structures in society and the emergence of the nation. Stalin also failed
90 Stalin defined the nation as a ‘historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on 
the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological makeup manifested in 
a common culture’ (in Nimni, 1991: 47).
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to understand that the nation is a constituent element of economic and social 
relations, and not simply a manifestation of particular consciousness. This 
consciousness emerges as a consequence of the connection of technological- 
economic development and of established common interests which are really, 
Kardelj argued, only a consequence of the emergence of the nation. The 
‘economic connection’ referred to by Stalin is a direct result of the social division 
of labour in capitalism. This development united the nation within its cultural- 
linguistic borders and, at the same time, enabled these nations to struggle for 
their independent economic and cultural affirmation {ibid.: LII). Stalin’s 
definition of the nation, Kardelj concluded, was an idealistic theoretical 
explanation of the national question {ibid.: LV).
Kardelj’s rejection of Stalin’s definition of the nation put into focus a major 
component of his own theory. As will be shown, Kardelj defined the nation as a 
product of the division of labour, and he considered nationalism as representing 
the nation’s greatest enemy.
Kardelj’s theory of nations and nationalism was the official theory of socialist 
Yugoslavia. It was one which was propagated on a daily basis through the media 
and the education system. This theory was also strongly supported by many other 
ideologists, and in Croatia, especially by Vladimir Bakaric and Stipe Suvar, who 
played an important role in Croatian and Yugoslav politics.
5.7.1. D efinition and the Origin o f the Nation
For Kardelj, even a cursory glance through history demonstrates that the national 
idea, that is, the expression of the emergence of the nation, is a historic 
phenomenon which emerges at certain stages in the development of human 
societies (Kardelj, 1973: 3). He pointed to the connection between the emergence 
of the national idea, and changes in the socio-economic structure of societies at 
the time of the collapse of feudalism and the emergence of capitalism. Kardelj’s 
theory, however, does not fit into a classical modernist scheme. He held that even 
though the nation has emerged with the advent of capitalism, and that the
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nineteenth century marked the beginning of the national idea, manifestations of 
that idea can in some cases be traced back to the Middle Ages.
Kardelj explained that in the ancient world and in the early feudal Middle Ages, 
states frequently overarched a single ethnic group (which he defined as a 
linguistically unique community). Their ruling classes, acting in their own 
interests, developed notions which resemble modem national ideas. Communities 
created in those ways were not socio-economic and culturally connected 
communities which represented what we consider today as being ‘nations’ 
{ibid.). In feudal times, a low level of social division of labor resulted in re­
enforcing local consciousness and allegiances, which were always stronger than 
wider state-level community consciousness {ibid.: 4). Hence Kardelj {ibid.) 
argued that ‘states existed before nations, and every identification of the nation 
with the state is false’.
As a condition for the emergence of the nation, a social consciousness had to 
develop away from existing local and provincial allegiances. Feudalism, 
characterized by its particularism, was in opposition to the centralist aspirations 
which later emerged associated with the national idea {ibid.: 6). The ideological 
manifestations which existed during that period in some ways resembled more 
modem developed national ideas and ideologies. Kardelj described them as 
slogans which appealed to the religious or ethnic community, that is, to common 
cultural or linguistic roots. Nevertheless, the feudal economic and political 
system was not capable of bonding specific ethnic communities into nations, and 
hence ‘on that basis the consciousness of the national community could not be 
created’ {ibid.: 7). Through the developed local consciousness the ethnic 
characteristics of the people were preserved for centuries, regardless of the ethnic 
origins of the feudal rulers. Yet, as soon as elements of capitalism started to 
develop, especially with respect to the development of trade and finance, this 
initiated a process whereby broader economic bonds were established between 
individuals, leading to the collapse of more narrow local economic and political 
orientations. Local perspectives, Kardelj argued, were no longer sufficient. 
Language, common culture, ethnic characteristics etc. became the ‘external 
framework, inside which a new broader popular community developed - the
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nation’ {ibid:. 9) Hence, the process of internal national unification and national 
awakening had begun. Within that process, Kardelj continued, feudalism played 
an especially negative role in the case of the people who lost their statehood. This 
significantly delayed these peoples’ evolution into nations.91
Kardelj held that no blueprint exists for successful national awakening {ibid:. 11). 
Nevertheless, every national movement went through a single socio-economic 
process - the development of the forces of production: ‘the productivity of human 
labor irrepressibly created capitalist relations which demanded bigger popular 
communities, and which could subsequently not accommodate old local 
orientations’ {ibid.: 11). However, in the tradition of Marxist ideology, Kardelj 
held that the national idea could not emerge as a common idea across all social 
classes, but only in a specific class - the bourgeoisie. Their need for an active 
workforce broke feudal relations, weakened people’s bonds to the land, and, 
hence, was reflected in the internal cohesion of the nation.
The basis for national formation was found in ethnic affiliations, i.e. language 
and culture. According to Kardelj, the national language facilitated the process of 
centralization. The national language was also crucial for communication within 
the market. The free development of the economy was to an extent contingent on 
the free development of the national language. The process of nation-formation, 
aside from a common language, could also be based on factors such as 
citizenship, cultural uniqueness, religion, historic destiny, etc. {ibid:. 15).
Even though Kardelj pointed to the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia as being the 
creators of nationalist ideologies and as the national ‘awakeners’, he remained a 
strong opponent of what is currently called ‘constructionism’. He held that 
historical communities and religions could influence, both negatively and 
positively, the development of a particular nation, but they could not formulate 
that national phenomenon {ibid.: 23). Kardelj clearly stated that nations could not 
be artificially created: ‘they exist as soon as the necessary conditions which 
characterize that nation come into existence’ {ibid.). Political ideologies cannot
91 For example the Croats (Kardelj, 1973: 9).
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create a nation (ibid: 39). The only creator of the nation, according to Kardelj, 
was history (ibid.: 38).
The technological, ideological and cultural developments which characterized the
age of capitalism, Kardelj described as a historical force which demanded and
initiated processes of more intensive social integration and which forged a new
‘national’ consciousness (ibid.: 34). Kardelj concluded:
Therefore, the nation is a specific popular community which has 
emerged on the basis of the capitalist division of the labor in a compact 
territory and within the framework of a common language and close 
ethnic and cultural ties, (ibid.: 35)
Regardless of certain exceptional cases, Kardelj argued that in principle, one 
could not talk about a developed nation if all the above-mentioned elements did 
not exist in more or less developed forms (ibid.: 36).
Kardelj also turned his attention to the issue of national preservation. He 
maintained that within the current social climate, the nation state represented the 
most adequate framework for the free development of the nation (ibid.: 37). If a 
certain nation, Kardelj wrote, wants to freely join in a union with another nation 
then that nation has to be truly free. However, a nation is only politically equal if 
it is also economically equal, that is, if it is not in the process of being exploited 
by any foreign force. At this point, Kardelj indirectly referred to national 
relations within Yugoslavia. He held that the right to self-determination was 
universal. However, following Lenin, he also argued that the right to self- 
determination could only really exist as the right of every nation to create its own 
state, that is, in parallel with the right to secession (ibid.: 38). It would be 
misleading to interpret Kardelj’s ideas as supporting the creation of independent 
nation states within Yugoslavia. He believed that for the Yugoslav nations, a 
federal state of equal nations would act as the best protection against external 
threats, and, hence, that ‘secessionist aspirations are against their own interests’ 
(ibid.). He argued: ‘an independent nation-state and a free multinational 
federation are not contradictory’ (ibid.).
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For Kardelj national awakening was the result of a combination of processes: a 
process of internal social growth, a social process leading to internal 
homogenization and therefore the eradication of particularism, and a process of 
economic and cultural unification and common spiritual formation ‘expressed in 
all spheres of national life’ {ibid.: 125). Once these processes are halted or 
disrupted, a national question emerges.
5.7.2. The National Question
For Kardelj {ibid.: 40) the national question meant that the process of achieving 
full national independence has not been completed either in the creation of a 
centralist national state, or in the form of a freely established federation with 
other nations. In most cases where the national question was not solved, the 
obstacle to the formation of a certain nation was a centralized state. Throughout 
history, two patterns could be traced: in Western Europe nations regularly 
developed in opposition to feudalism, while the oppressed nations in Eastern 
Europe had to fight against both ‘feudal-absolutist reactions and against the 
mature hegemonist tendencies of the bourgeoisie of the ruling nation’ {ibid.: 42). 
Kardelj explained that through its opposition to ‘feudal-absolutist reactions’ 
nationalism became an ideology of the new bourgeois nationalist politics. As a 
consequence, nationalist hatred towards other nations dominated over the right 
for independence of all the nations. In that respect Kardelj {ibid.: 51) defined two 
stages of the development of the national question: in the first stage the national 
question was mainly an internal question within a certain state, and, in the second 
stage, it became a general question regarding the crisis of society - the crisis of 
imperialism - which, of course, could not be solved locally.
These assumptions Kardelj applied to the case of Yugoslavia during the inter-war 
period. He emphasized that even though one has to recognize the right to self- 
determination of Croats and Slovenes, every separatist aspiration which tries to 
breakup Yugoslavia will actually lead to new forms of oppression and not to self- 
determination {ibid.: 50). On the other hand, Kardelj strongly opposed Pan-Slav 
and Illyrian ideas which he described as ‘fantasies’ {ibid.: 132) and ‘foggy
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illusions’ {ibid.: 159). Kardelj also described Illyrianism as an ideology calling 
for hegemony over other Slav nations {ibid.: 163). Kardelj expressed equally 
negative attitudes towards the so-called ‘integral Yugoslavism’ which he 
described as an excuse for the hegemony of one nation over another {ibid.: 252). 
‘Integral Yugoslavism’, Kardelj asserted, was a nationalist utopia which strove to 
create some form of Yugoslav nation by artificially merging languages and 
cultures. This type of ‘unitarist-Yugoslavist construction’ was outdated. He 
wrote: ‘The process of merging undifferentiated and related nations was possible 
only in the first stages of the national awakening, when the national communities 
were still not definitely constructed’ {ibid.: 286). Kardelj advocated the creation 
of a federal state of free nations. This community of free nations could be 
achieved only by strengthening the individual characteristics of every nation and 
their cultures {ibid.: 323).
From these assumptions it could be concluded that Kardelj, on the one hand, 
recognized the historical necessity of the national phenomenon and supported 
every movement towards national liberation. On the other hand, nationalism for 
Kardelj was just a ‘non-democratic and socially reactionary bourgeois ideology, 
which uses the feelings of affiliation and love of one’s own nation in the interests 
of the reactionary and imperialistic forces’ {ibid.: 321).
Kardelj frequently referred to Socialist Yugoslavia as a state which, in principle, 
had solved the national question. He held that the guarantee to achieve this was a 
federal system along with constitutional political and social mechanisms which 
secured the equal status and the self-determination of all the nations of 
Yugoslavia. Yet, he admitted, there were still some factors which could provoke 
national problems. One of those factors was the ‘ideological and political 
remnants of classical bourgeois nationalism’ {ibid.: 34). However, for Kardelj, 
the appearance of nationalism in postwar Yugoslavia was just a cover for 
different anti-socialist tendencies, and an advocate of certain egoistic 
particularistic interests. Nationalism hence manifests all that is reactionary, 
ideologically backward or temporarily disoriented in Yugoslav society. 
Nationalism in Yugoslavia, Kardelj continued, is ‘one of those reactionary
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ideological factors which is dragging back, and endangering the socialist 
perspective’ {ibid.: 35).
One should bear in mind that Kardelj was, first and foremost, a Marxist. He 
clearly recognized the importance of the nation in a given social, economic, and 
political context. However, he maintained that, ‘the nation is not an absolute 
which could not forever remain unchanged’ {ibid.: 322).
5.7.3. Future o f the Nation
In the Introduction to the second edition of his book (1973: XLII) Kardelj 
defined the nation as a historic socio-economic and cultural-political 
phenomenon which appears as the social division of labour develops within 
capitalism. He also emphasized that he did not believe that nations were eternally 
given forms. The development of social relations, Kardelj expected, would lead 
to the union of nations. This process was viewed as a consequence of the further 
development of the social division of labour, which would necessarily ‘transcend 
narrow national borders, bring nations together, and involve human beings in the 
mechanism of the world economy’ {ibid.\ XLIII).
Kardelj held that narrow nationalist views would, in due time, necessarily decline 
in favour of wider humanist views; that national-cultural borders would disappear 
in the face of increased cultural exchanges between different parts of the world. 
This process Kardelj called the ‘process of the merging of nations’ (.ibid.'. XLIII).
The process of the merging of nations had, Kardelj argued, already started: ‘even 
today nations are much closer with respect to their cultural structure than were 
provinces within the same nation a hundred years ago’ {ibid.). However, Kardelj 
did not believe that the merging of nations meant the merging of languages, of 
national specificities, of culture etc. He strongly opposed assimilation by violent 
means, especially of small nations. On the contrary, for Kardelj, independence 
and the social and cultural development of the nation were ‘the pre-conditions for 
closer co-operation and the merging of the nations’ {ibid.). What Kardelj stood
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for was, as he termed it, ‘natural cultural assimilation’ {ibid.: XLIV). The 
merging of nations was conceived as an inevitable process actually leading to the 
withering away of nations as a phenomenon. Only the complete reduction in all 
forms of national oppression could produce the conditions in which national 
cultures and general humanistic elements would prevail. Therefore, the necessary 
pre-condition for the liquidation of nationalism and separatism was the free 
development of the national cultures and economic forces of every nation {ibid.: 
40).
The new socialist Yugoslavia, or more precisely its ‘ruling socialist forces’, 
Kardelj argued, rejected all attempts to achieve the merging of nations, languages 
and cultures by aggressive means. However, the same ‘ruling socialist forces’ did 
not oppose the creation of another type of consciousness - a ‘socialist Yugoslav 
consciousness’, as Kardelj called it. He did not interpret this consciousness as an 
alternative to national consciousness. Kardelj argued that the emergence of a 
socialist Yugoslav consciousness primarily meant an ‘organic growth and 
strengthening of the socialist community of working people of all Yugoslav 
nations, the affirmation of their common interests on the basis of socialist 
relations’ {ibid.). Kardelj hoped that it would be the people, and not their 
languages, which would merge to form a ‘higher humanistic community’ {ibid.: 
U S).
5.7.4. Conclusion
Kardelj formulated the core of his theory of nations and nationalism in the late 
1930s. However, his theory could be easily interpreted in the context of current 
debates regarding theories of nations and nationalism.
Above all, Kardelj’s theory is a Marxist one. It is defined in terms of classical 
Marxist general theory in which the economy serves as the basis for the 
explanation of the existence of the superstructure, that is, of all social and 
political phenomena and their development. Hence, the emergence of the nation 
and nationalism is explained as a consequence of, to use Marxist terminology, the
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transition from feudalism to capitalism, or in Gellnerian terminology, from an 
agrarian to an industrial society. In that respect, Kardelj’s theory could be 
categorized as a modernist theory.
On the other hand, Kardelj placed a strong emphasis on the ethnic origins of the 
nation. Culture, language, religion, and common beliefs among a given 
population in a defined territory - these were what Kardelj described as the 
‘properties’ of an ethnic group who, in a process of transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, would ‘grow’ into a nation. He also rejected ideas which are 
encompassed in what is currently described as constructionism. According to 
Kardelj, the nation cannot be invented or artificially constructed - it has to have a 
strong basis, and that basis is an ethnic group. Kardelj also emphasized that ideas 
which resemble the national idea, could be traced back to the Middle Ages. In 
that respect, Kardelj’s theory could be described as being a perennialist theory.
What is clearly Marxist in Kardelj’s theory is his definition of nationalism. 
Kardelj described nationalism as a bourgeois ideology, or more precisely, as an 
ideology which primarily serves the political and economic interests of the 
bourgeoisie. However, in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
Kardelj does view a progressive role for nationalism as long as it advocates 
liberation and the free development of the nation. Nationalism, however, in 
Kardelj’s theory, loses its progressive role within a socialist society. Such 
nationalism is regarded as an enemy to the nation itself.
This dual role of nationalism is a consequence of Kardelj’s evolutionist views. 
Human society, he believed, is developing in a uni-linear way: from feudalism to 
capitalism, and finally to socialism. Or, from another perspective, from ethnic 
group to nation, and finally to cosmopolitanism. Such an evolutionist view had 
several implications.
First of all, every society has to go through every stage of the development 
process in order to reach the final one - socialism. Therefore, the nation was a 
necessary consequence of the development of human society. Every disruption to 
this development, and, hence, every suppression or oppression of a nation,
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necessarily serves as an obstacle towards the creation of socialism. That is the 
reason why Kardelj was a strong advocate of what he called the free development 
of the nation. Such a development could be achieved only within the framework 
of a nation-state or, referring to the case of Yugoslavia, within a federal state of 
equal nations.
Another implication of Kardelj’s evolutionist views was that the nation would in 
due time wither away. What distinguishes Kardelj’s theory from other Marxist 
theories, is his view of the mechanics leading to the disappearance of nations. To 
again use current terminology, according to Kardelj, the nation as a phenomenon 
would disappear as a consequence of the process of globalisation. Kardelj called 
this process ‘the merging of nations’. Nations were to merge of their own free 
will as a consequence of their increased co-operation and shared economic 
interests, in the process, creating a new social consciousness - not a national 
consciousness, but a socialist one.
Future events, however, were to highlight the failure of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party’s policy on nations and nationalism based on Kardelj’s theory. With the 
collapse of central control, nationalism rose again within Yugoslavia and once 
again represented a powerful and dominant political and social force.
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Chapter Six
FRANJO TUDMAN’S NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
...history, in its blind progress, can 
brutally punish even for the old sins.
(Tudman, 1990c: 45)
6.1. Introduction
Franjo Tudman’s nationalist ideology was the dominant ideology in Croatia in 
the 1990s. It first began to take shape in the 1960s with the publication of 
Tudman’s books such as Velike ideje i  m ali narodi (Great Ideas and Small 
Nations, 1968). However, the form and content of the ideology has undergone a 
continuous process of revision over the past three decades, changing according to 
the prevailing political circumstances in Yugoslavia and Croatia, and according 
to the political status of the author. The short official biography92 of Tudman 
states that:
Franjo Tudman (...) is the President of the Republic of Croatia, and 
formerly a historian and political scientist who has written and lectured 
widely. Jailed repeatedly during the 1970s and early ’80s for his dissident 
historical perspectives and political views by the Communist rulers of the 
former Yugoslavia, in 1989 he founded the Croatian Democratic Union 
and became its president. He has helped his nation achieve full 
sovereignty, independence and international recognition since becoming 
President of the Republic of Croatia in 1990 after the first democratic 
elections and was re-elected in 1992.93 (Tudman, 1995)
Not mentioned in this short official biography, but highlighted by a number 
authors94 who dealt with the collapse of Yugoslavia, is the fact that Tudman 
fought for the Partisans during the Second World War, that famously he was one 
of the youngest ever generals in the JNA95, where he was appointed Head 
Political Commissar. His activities as a so-called dissident began in 1967 when 
he was accused of promoting nationalism through his writings as a historian, and
92 This biography was printed on the cover-page of the latest translation of Franjo Tudman’s book 
Bespuca povijesne zbiljnosti, i.e Horrors o f War: Historical Reality and Philosophy, New York: 
M. Evans & Company, Inc.
93 At the 1997 elections Tudman was re-elected as President.
94 See for example Silber & Little (1995).
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as director of the Institute for the Study of Workers’ Movements, in which he 
addressed the controversial issue of the number of Second World War victims 
and, more specifically, with the number of victims in the Jasenovac concentration 
camp. In December 1999 Franjo Tudman died.
Since the first free elections in Croatia in 1990, Franjo Tudman, as President of 
state and President of the Croatian Democratic Union {Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica - HDZ), in practice ruled over every aspect of the political, social and 
economic process. Once again in Croatian history, a nationalist ideology was 
imposed through the mass media and education system, and dominated all 
aspects of daily life.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the content, origins, and influences on 
Tudman’s nationalist ideology. The study is based on an analysis of Tudman’s 
public speeches published in the Croatian daily newspaper Vjesnik during the 
period of June 1992 to October 1994 - a period of intensive national 
mobilisation. All Tudman’s published press conferences (18) and interviews (16) 
have been analysed, along with 16 of his public speeches. The matrix employed 
for the content analysis has been divided into three sections: the first section aims 
to investigate Tudman’s perception of the nation in general and the Croatian 
nation in particular; the second and third sections aim to analyse the way 
Tudman’s nationalist ideology is defined and the way it views internal and 
external enemies of the nation.
Tudman’s nationalist ideology has to be understood within the framework of the 
political and social events which had preceded its formulation, and which to great 
extent influenced its form.
Many works96 designed to explain events leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
have already been published. The historical background detailed in the next 
pages does not intend to provide yet another chronology of the break-up. For the
95 Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav Popular Army).
96 Tanner (1997), Glenny (1992), Allcock (2000), Lampe (2000), Silber & Little (1995), Magas 
(1993), Cmobmja (1994) and many others.
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purpose of this study I will just sketch the major events that marked the period 
1980-1995.
6.2. Historical Background VI (1980-1995)
In the last decade of its existence, Yugoslavia was divided along political, 
economic, social and cultural lines. Ethnically it was the society where six nations 
comprised constitutive elements of the state (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Muslims) with large groups of national 
minorities (such as Albanians, Italians, Hungarians, and many others). There were 
three major religious groups: Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim. The official 
languages were Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian; and both the Latin and 
Cyrillic alphabets were equally used. On the other hand, Yugoslavia nations were 
for a considerable period of time separated by either foreign occupation or culture: 
the Eastern part by the Ottoman and the Western part by that of the Habsburg 
Empire.
These nations were South Slavs, they used similar language (for some, the same) 
and for seventy years they have been living in the same country - Yugoslavia. Both 
of Yugoslavia’s regimes, monarchist and communist tried, to some extent, to erase 
these differences, and especially the memories of fratricidal wars during both 
World Wars. The creation of a new ‘nationality’ - Yugoslavs - was one attempt, 
that became a cross-cutting, political factor, that was increasingly relevant. In spite 
of all attempts at establishing some form of unity, Yugoslavia remained a deeply 
divided society.
As explained in the previous chapter, these diversities were institutionalised, by 
means of the 1974 Constitution and the federal system. Federal segments were 
based on national ‘borders’, as far as they could be, except in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where no nation had an absolute majority. The republics were 
largely autonomous in making decisions at the regional level (as long as they were 
not in contradiction with the main course of the federal communist party policy). 
The federal government and the party leadership insisted on equal economic
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development and distribution by allocation, and, also, on economic and cultural co­
operation between different regions. Except for a few crises in the early 1970s, the 
communist regime under Josip Broz Tito’s leadership and charisma succeeded in 
keeping such a system alive. With Tito’s death in 1980, the whole system had to be 
changed. Inikenw^jM.G. Smith, it could be said that Yugoslavia was an example 
of a social pluralistic society - the society which was politically divided among 
culturally distinct collectivities and their members, characterised by social 
exclusion (M.G. Smith, 1992: 197).
The 1974 Constitution firmly established Yugoslavia as a federal state, ruled by the 
communist party, but mostly by its leader (of the party and the state) Josip Broz 
Tito. His death in May 1980 created the problem of governing the state. The 
Presidency, which in the 1970s was a kind of advisory body to the President, 
remained as the highest collective power in the state. It was comprised of 
representatives of each republic and both provinces, the president of the federal 
communist party, and the commander of the army. On some occasions, the 
presidents of each republic took part in the sessions, depending on the relevance of 
the issue. All decisions in this collective body were made by consensus, and every 
republic and autonomous province had an opportunity to use a veto. The head of 
the presidency was changed annually according to an established order. The 
communist party was governed in the same way as the state. Of course, both 
presidencies were in close contact. Jurisdiction of the federal presidency was 
limited to general political and economic problems of the whole state, its military 
issues and foreign affairs. Other questions, related to the internal problems of each 
republic, fell under republic jurisdiction. The republics had their own presidents, 
parliaments, and their own communist parties. It could be said that after 1980, each 
republic was developing independently, as far as it fulfilled the requirements of the 
federal state (mostly economic and monetary obligations) or as long as it stuck to 
the general communist line. Except in the sphere of military and foreign affairs, the 
republics had all the characteristics of independent states. Yugoslavia was 
established as a consociational society.97
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What was common to all the republics was a still powerful communist ideology, 
relying mostly on a strong bureaucratic apparatus, and the important role of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army as portparole of such ideology. Further, Yugoslavia in the 
1980s was going through a period of economic hardship which was a concern of 
the federal government.98 The republics were established as sovereign states of a 
particular nation.
The balance of power between ethnies was maintained in the early stages of 
consociational Yugoslavia. The largest republic (territorially and by population), 
Serbia, was according to the 1974 constitution, divided into two provinces: 
Vojvodina (with large communities of many national minorities) and Kosovo 
(with, at the time, around 90 per cent Albanian population). This division decreased 
Serbia’s potential power. Every republic was a minority in comparison with others, 
and, therefore, ‘forced’ to co-operate with the others. However, by the end of the 
1980s political relationships within and between the Yugoslav republics changed 
rapidly.
The ‘grand coalition’ - which included both the Yugoslav Presidency and the 
Central Committee of the SKJ99 - was created with the aim of preserving the 
balance of power in multinational Yugoslavia. But it was challenged from two 
sides: from the republican leaderships and from the newly-arisen nationalist 
movements. At the end of the 1980s, it became clear that the federal government of 
Yugoslavia had lost any real state power. Republic leaderships (of party and state) 
took full control over their territories.
Even though the critical problem within Yugoslav society in the 1980s was the 
economic collapse, and the resultant hyper-inflation, the instability of the ‘grand 
coalition’ of Yugoslavia, and its eventual collapse, was to a great extent due to its
97 The theory of consociationalism was presented in Lijphart’s book Democracy in Plural Societies 
(1977).
98 For more about Yugoslavia’s economic crisis in the 1980s, see Lampe (2000) and Allcock 
(2000).
99 SavezKomunista Jugoslavije (League of Yugoslav Communists).
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handling of national issues. As expected, the ‘problem’ of Kosovo100 generated the 
first nationalist clashes. Prior to 1986 the federal presidency had faced the problem 
of an Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo101 a faction of which had grown 
into an all-out secessionist movement. However, the problem of Albanian 
nationalism had not been perceived as a Serbian internal affair, but rather as a 
problem for the federal system. With the publication102 of the Serbian Academy of 
Arts and Sciences’ Memorandum,103 the Kosovo issue stirred previously 
suppressed Serbian nationalist feelings which demanded that a solution to the 
Kosovo problem be treated as an internal Serbian affair. A section of the Serbian 
political elite supported Slobodan Milosevic as he took maximum advantage of the 
political instability over the issue of Kosovo to become the ‘leader of the Serbian 
nation’. While Kosovo, through various myths and legends, plays an immense role 
in the formation of the Serbian national identity104 and has been perceived by Serbs 
as an issue of national survival, the other republics, particularly Slovenia and 
Croatia, perceived Kosovo ‘simply’ as a political and human rights issue. While 
Serbia was experiencing the rise of two antagonistic nationalist forces, those of the 
Serbs and Albanians, the western republics, and especially Slovenia, were going 
through a process of democratisation and liberalisation of their internal political 
and social life.105 At that time, the political elites of Serbia and Slovenia had 
different and contradictory interests and agendas. The subsequent clash between 
them was unavoidable.
As Lijphart (1977: 100) frequently emphasised, political life in a consociational 
society is to a great extent determined by the behaviour of the elites. This was a 
view shared by the Serbian national leadership. In order to accomplish its aims, it
100 According to the 1974 constitution Kosovo gained the status of Autonomous Province (just like 
Vojvodina) with great control over its internal affairs. In 1981 Albanian students started 
demonstrations in Pristina demanding the status of a republic for Kosovo. The demonstrations 
were crushed violently and martial law was imposed by the federal government.
101 For more about the events in Kosovo in the 1960s and 1970s, and particularly on the role of 
Rankovic, see Tanner (1997: 210).
102 The Memorandum was published in Belgrade’s mass-circulated daily Vedemje Novostion 24 
September 1986 as an unfinished draft.
103 For more about the content of the Memorandun, see Silber & Little (1995: 31-36).
104 In the Serbian national formation, Kosovo has been perceived as a cradle of the Serbian nation. 
It is a place where, according to a myth, the Serbs chose death instead of surrender in 1389 on 
Kosovo Polje; it is also the place of the first Serbian Orthodox Patriarchy where the bones of Tzar 
Lazar were buried.
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had to gain the support of other participants within the ‘grand coalition’. To 
achieve this support, the Serbian leadership harnessed the pressure and discontent 
of the masses. This method became known as the ‘happenings of the people’ in 
which the masses were mobilised around the idea that they were part of an ‘anti- 
bureaucratic revolution’. The old ‘bureaucratic’ elites in the republic and the 
federation became the scapegoats for all of society’s problems.106 Enormous public 
rallies supported by intensive media campaigns during the period of September- 
November 1988 swept through Kosovo Polje, Nis, Novi Sad, Podgorica107 and 
Beograd, and resulted in the resignation of the whole leadership of the Republic of 
Montenegro and the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. These 
leadership cadres were replaced by supporters of the Serbian leadership, i.e. of 
Slobodan Milosevic.
These ‘happenings of the people’ provoked significant changes in the established 
consociational system of Yugoslavia, which ultimately affected the efficiency and 
governing capability of the ‘grand coalition’ of the federal government and the 
Central Committee. From then on, the Serbian national leadership, with the support 
of the political leaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro, formed a bloc 
against the other constituents of the ‘grand coalition’: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Macedonia. By threatening to export the ‘happening of the 
people’ to other republics, tension between these elites rapidly increased. The ‘anti- 
bureaucratic revolution’ not only caused a change in the political cadres but it also 
resulted in changing the Serbian constitution, proclaimed on 28 March 1989,108 
which stripped the two provinces within Serbia of their autonomy.
In the same period, the democratisation and liberalisation of the political and social 
life in Slovenia and Croatia reached its peak, witnessed by the establishment of the
105 For more about Slovenian political liberalisation and the importance of the art movement 
known as Neue SlovenischeKunst, see Tanner (1997: 208-210) and Silber & Little (1995: 48-57).
106 This accusation did not necessarilly sound wrong. However, these old elites have been replaced 
by equally bureaucratic ones. The only difference was that the newly established elites were 
obedient to the Serbian leadership.
107 At that time known as Titograd.
108 Under pressure from Milosevic, on 25 November 1988 the federal parliament adopted 
amendments to the constitution which cleared the way for the new Serbian constitution (Silber & 
Little, 1995: 64).
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first non-communist political parties.109 It needs to be emphasised that the 
appearance through legitimate political processes of new political parties, which 
were to ultimately change the nature of political life in the two republics, was 
supported, although not initiated, by the republican Central Committees of the 
Communist Party. Indirectly, these changes in the political system heralded the 
collapse of socialism in Yugoslavia. However, the initiative for change came from 
the communist leadership of Slovenia, while the Croatian communists followed 
suit without a clear concept of the possible repercussions. Throughout the 1980s 
Croatia was labelled the ‘silent republic’ as a consequence of the rigid post-1971 
political suppression of any nationalist or quasi-nationalist sentiment among the 
political, social and economic elite.110 Hence, the Croatian Communist elite 
passively observed the events of the late 1980s and avoided taking an open stand in 
the developing conflict within the Communist Party leadership.
The final break-up of the Yugoslav Communist Party happened at the fourteenth 
extraordinary Party congress held in Belgrade on 23 January 1990. During this 
congress two competing views regarding the future development of the Yugoslav 
League of Communists and, hence of Yugoslavia itself, clashed openly: 
representatives from the Serbian Communists demanded a return to the centralist 
Party structure, while the Slovenian Communists advocated a loose association of 
republican parties.111 After all the amendments proposed by the Slovenians had 
been overruled by majority votes, the Slovenian delegation walked out, followed 
by the Croatian delegation. It marked the end of the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
Moreover, this event constituted the end of the ‘grand coalition’ - the force which 
had kept Yugoslavia together. There was however another force which believed it 
could preserve Yugoslavia - the Yugoslav People’s Army.
109 On 11 January 1989 the Democratic Alliance was established as the first non-communist party 
in Slovenia, and in March 1989 Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) as the first non-communist 
party in Croatia. A few months later, on 17 June 1989 the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was 
established, although it was only legalized in December 1989.
110 In the first half of the 1980s, many Croatian intellectuals who were lebelled as nationalists, for 
example Franjo Tudman, Dobroslav Paraga, Vlado Gotovac and others, were prosecuted and 
given long prison sentences.
111 For more about the 14th extraordinary congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, see 
Tanner (1997: 220) and Silber & Little (1995: 79-81).
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The conflict between the republics’ elites within the federal government and within 
the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists created an 
opportunity for the rise of the nationalist movements emerging from outside the 
ranks of the Communist Party. The disintegration of the federal Party significantly 
weakened their control over the republics. The republics’ Party leaders found 
themselves confronting not only the Communist elites from other republics, but 
also new nationalist elites within their own republics. These new elites vied directly 
for power within their republics’ borders. Once allowed to participate legally in 
public discussions, the nationalist elites rapidly gained the support of the masses. 
One of the most powerful arguments employed by the new nationalist elites in their 
rhetoric against the old Communist guard was the assertion that the Communists 
were an ineffective force, powerless to solve the political, social and economic 
problems of the federal institutions. While some republican leaders still enjoyed a 
level of popular support, particularly in Slovenia, the Croatian Communists’ 
inability to adopt a clear position allowed the nationalist elite to gain political 
capital by espousing their well-defined ‘solution’ to the crisis. However, one of the 
reasons why the Croatian Communist elite lacked the unity necessary for reaching 
any substantial decision in the conflict was the fact that approximately one-third of 
the members of the Croatian League of Communists were Serbs.
In the final analysis, it could be argued that Tudman’s victory in the first multi­
party elections in Croatia in May 1990 was not unexpected. The major 
prerequisites for the Yugoslav consociational system were the balance of power 
between the constitutional parts, coupled with co-operation between the elites 
involved. With the dramatic changes in the political system of Yugoslavia at the 
end of the 1980s, these prerequisites ceased to exist. In addition, the old Croatian 
elite itself functioned as a quasi-consociation created between the Croats and 
Serbs112 in Croatia. Once national issues were brought onto the political agenda, the 
‘consociation’ within the Croatian Communist Party collapsed as well. The same 
happened at the federal level. Clear nationalist demands for self-government and
112 In April 1978 the SKH (Savez Komunista Hrvatske - League of Croatian Communists) had 
282,515 members, which was only 17% of the SKJ membership. According to nationality, 64.2% 
of these members were Croats, 24.2% Serbs and 7.4% Yugoslavs. Every fourth Yugoslav and 
every ninth Serb and every twentieth Croat was a member of the SKH (Tudman, 1990c: 148).
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for the protection of national sovereignty, proved to be forces too powerful for an 
inefficient elite to cope with.
In an atmosphere of increasing conflict, the first Croatian democratic multi-party 
elections were announced for April and May 1990. Goldstein (1999: 210) 
emphasised that in these circumstances ‘it became likely that whoever managed to 
offer voters the most forceful defence of Croatia’s endangered sovereignty and 
settle accounts with the hated Communists would win’. The HDZ won 42 per cent 
of votes and got 57.6 per cent of seats in the Sabor. Soon after the HDZ leader 
Franjo Tudman was elected President of the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia.
At the same time as the Sabor promulgated new amendments to the republic’s 
constitution and confirmed a new official flag and coat of arms, in the Croatian 
village of Srb the Serb National Council was founded (Goldstein, 1999: 218). The 
leaders of the council refused to accept the amendments and called for a 
referendum on sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia. Very soon it 
became obvious that neither side was willing to negotiate their terms. The day on 
which the leaders of the Serbs from Krajina called the referendum - 17 August 
1990 - marks the beginning of the so-called ‘log revolution’ (balvan revolucija). 
That same day is marked as the beginning of the aggression against Croatia {ibid.).
After a year of fruitless attempts by the leaders of six Yugoslav republics to reach a 
consensus regarding the structural form of the future Yugoslavia, on 25 June 1991 
the Croatian Sabor enacted the Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and 
Independence of the Republic of Croatia. A few months later a ‘proper’ war in 
Croatia started. The military operation called Oluja (Storm) in early August 1995 
marked the end of the war. The events that occurred between these dates deserve a 
more thorough analysis than the one I could offer here. At this point, it would be 
sufficient to say that the war in Croatia revived terms like genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and war crimes on European territory. For the purposes of this study it is 
more important to mention the consequences.
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Parallel with the war, the Croats were preoccupied with the process of the 
/re/formation of their nation. The formation of the first independent nation-state113 
required considerable reorganisation of all spheres of society. Due to the 
circumstances in which the nation and the state were /re/formed and due to the 
policies of the ruling party, the war became the major point of reference in this 
process. Hence:
• Even though the opening of democratic processes at the beginning of the 1990s 
facilitated the formation of dozens of political parties, in practice one-party-rule 
was established. Until January 2000 the HDZ won all national, local and 
presidential elections. In the atmosphere of war the HDZ succeeded in 
installing either their party members or their sympathisers in all significant 
governing positions including the army, police, justice, education, media and 
health, as well as in the managerial positions in state-owned industry.
• With a two-thirds majority in the Sabor,; the HDZ controlled the structural and 
legal formation of the state institutions. Even though the Croatian constitution 
defined the political system as so-called ‘semi-presidential’, Franjo Tudman as 
the president of the state throughout the 1990s114 concentrated all executive 
power within his office, even exceeding constitutional authority. Strong 
centralisation of government occurred at all levels of society.
• The new nation-state required new national symbols. After the first proposal for 
a national flag was criticised as too similar to that of the Ustashas’ regime, the 
newly-designed flag was introduced, apparently directly approved by the 
President. The same critique of the name of the new national currency, the so- 
called kuna, failed to achieve any result. The President introduced a new 
‘presidential flag’ as well and surrounded himself by guards dressed in 
‘historical’ Croatian uniforms. The President also required a monument at 
which foreign delegations could pay their respect to the Croatian nation. With 
that aim the so-called ‘Altar of the Homeland’ was erected on a hill above 
Zagreb. The establishment of the new state required not only new national 
symbols, but, at the same time, the eradication of previous symbols. The 
communists’ red star disappeared soon after the first elections; changing names
113 Previous state formation of the Croats could not be labelled as either ‘independent’ or ‘nation- 
state’.
114 Tudman won the presidential elections in 1992 and 1997.
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of streets was the first task of the local government; hundreds of Second World 
War monuments were literally blown up. It was a clear sign of the changing 
political system.
• The new nation-state also required a ‘pure’ national culture. One of the first 
tasks of the new regime was the purification of the Croatian language. New 
words were invented, and a new version of grammar introduced. This was 
accompanied by purification of the Croatian libraries when many books in 
Cyrillic disappeared together with Serbian and other South Slav authors. The 
popular culture became increasingly national. Numerous historians undertook 
the task of redefining national history.
All these processes gained a legitimisation in the nationalist ideology mainly 
created and propounded by President Franjo Tudman. In the following pages I will 
analyse the major characteristics of that nationalist ideology through, just as in 
previous cases, questions of how the nation in general and the Croatian nation in 
particular were defined and who were labelled as enemies of the nation.
6.3. Franjo Tudman’s Nationalist Ideology
6.3.1. Introduction
The rise of Croatian nationalism in the 1990s was defined and directed by the 
Croatian national leader - Franjo Tudman. Tudman played a crucial role in 
shaping national, internal and international policies; he made all the crucial 
decisions for the whole society. Moreover, Tudman was the main ideologist of 
the Croatian nationalist movement, the main constructor of the processes of the 
Croatian national-/re/formation and state-building.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way Tudman defined the Croatian 
nation, explained its past and present, and formulated its national goals and 
interests. Furthermore, when the processes of nation- and state-building occur in 
a period of war, the notion of enemies becomes important. Therefore, the 
analysis of Tudman’s nationalist ideology will be divided into two parts: the first
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will deal with Tudman’s definitions and explanations of one’s ‘own nation’, and 
second, Tudman’s definitions of both internal and external enemies.
In this section I would like to look at the extent to which Tudman’s nationalist 
ideology is indeed an ideology, and to what extent it is oriented towards what 
Breuilly defined as the three different functions which ideology can play within a 
political movement: ‘co-ordination, mobilisation and legitimation’ (Breuilly, 
1993). According to Breuilly, nationalist ideology matters because it provides 
what he calls a ‘conceptual map’ which ‘enables people to relate their particular 
material and moral interests to a broader terrain of action’ {ibid.: 13). Moreover, 
it relates people’s problems to society as a whole {ibid.). According to Breuilly 
nationalist ideologies ‘tend to become specific, outlining clear objectives and 
targeting potential supporters’ {ibid.: 54) only in relation to the requirements of 
specific political action. Therefore, through this content analysis it will be shown 
how a specific war situation in Croatia determined Tudman’s nationalist 
ideology, and how with changes of circumstances, ideology can be changed as 
well.
6.3.2. Tudman*sRhetoric
Throughout the 1990s in Croatia, each daily newspaper published any public 
appearance, speech and comment of the President. Usually, an immense space 
was given to his interviews, press conferences or public speeches.115 They are 
announced on the first page of the newspaper,116 and they are accompanied with 
a proportional number of the President’s photographs.117
The analysis of these articles reveals that Tudman’s typical sentence was long, 
often long enough to form a paragraph, with lots of references to history, many 
metaphors, and burdened with adjectives. In the process of reconstructing the
115 Of 50 analysed articles, 27 were one-page articles, 14 articles were more then one page and 
only 9 articles were less then one page in size.
116 Only 10 articles were not announced.
231
nation and the state, the language was reconstructed as well. Hence, Tudman 
often used words drawn from the ancient Croatian language, as well as those that 
are newly invented. Here is an example of Tudman’s rhetoric:
Those who are raising the question about the building of the Presidential 
Palace, yacht or buying the presidential airplane, are belonging to those 
Yugo-unitarists, in other words, to remnants of the Yugo-communist 
ideology, who cannot accept the fact that Croatia has became a sovereign 
state and that it has its own Head of State who has settled in the Ban’s 
Palace,118 until it was attacked and destroyed, trying to decapitate 
Croatia119 (...) such questions ask politikantP0 and those who cannot 
deeply understand historical changes.121 (8/93)
A few of the common features of Tudman’s rhetoric can be found in the above 
sentence. One of them is the frequent use of the term ‘history’. In 50 analysed 
articles, the term ‘history’ is used in 35 phrases.122 The reason was not only 
because of Tudman’s profession - a historian; history in this case was just a 
marker for certainty and stability. Examples include: ‘the historical coat of arms 
of the historical Croatian kingdom’ (5/94); an emphasis on the importance of an 
event: ‘we should remember history’ (12/92); or as an actor by itself: ‘it will be 
written by history’ (7/94).
In his speeches Tudman frequently emphasised the breaking point between the 
near communistic past and the present ‘new democratic system’. This point was 
not just an important date in the textbooks of history, but it also provided a black
117 25 analysed articles were accompanied with one picture, 15 articles with more then one 
picture, and 8 articles with four or more pictures. Only two articles were not covered with the 
President’s picture.
118 The residence of the President of Croatia in Zagreb.
119 In November 1991, the JNA’s Air-forces bombed the area of the president’s residence.
120 Originally politikant- in the Dictionary of the Croatian language - the man who is dealing with 
the daily, immediate policy without broader ideas and visions, who is involved in small political 
combinations and struggles (Anic, 1994).
121 All quotations from Tudman’s public speeches are translated from Croatian and were published 
in Vjesnik.
122 Here is the list of the phrases used: history (11 times), historical circumstances (2), historical 
paradox (1), historical social development (1), historical meaning (3), historically well known (1), 
historical necessity (1), historically untrue (1), historical dream (2), historical tradition (2), 
historical events (4), historical wheel (2), historical territory (1), historically true (1), historical 
perspective (1), historical results (3), historical task (3), of historical importance (1), historical 
reasons (3), historical reality (1), historical fact (1), historical period (4), historical distance (1), 
historical context (1), historical responsibility (1), historical scene (1), historical experience (1), 
historical development (1), historical step-forward (1), historical connection (1), historical days 
(1), historical decision (2), historical act (2), tragic history (1), historical changes (1).
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and white picture which served as the base for an evaluation of events, people 
and spoken words. Communism and Yugoslavia were seen as symbols of all that 
is evil. Therefore, the purpose of frequent expressions ‘Yugo-communists’ or 
‘Yugo-unitarists’ is to disqualify those so named.123
Another characteristic of Tudman’s rhetoric was his relation with those he was 
directly addressing in his speech. Whether he was addressing the broader masses, 
journalists or fellow politicians, Tudman often took a patronising position. He 
would direct journalists on how to write and what to cover in their articles: ‘write 
about examples of how (...) Serbs already contribute into the Croatian 
government’ (11/93), or ‘You are putting everything into the press, it’s a 
disgrace’ (5/94), or ‘instead of writing the ‘Sabor without opposition’, you 
could better write a ‘new president of the Sabor is elected’, because he was 
elected legally and according to law. You are also responsible for shaping public 
opinion so that our man understands what it means to have his own country’ 
(2/93).
Not obeying this advice could be dangerous because ‘(i)n Croatian journalism 
there are some remnants of that old communism, Yugo-unitarism, and that is a 
result of our historical circumstances’ (2/93). Following this remark, Croatian 
journalists have indeed become more cautious about what they are writing, how 
they are writing, and how they are asking a question:
Q: Mister President, what do you consider as your biggest and, for the
Croatian future, the most important achievement in these two years (...)?
A: For Christ’s sake, do I have to say that? Every normal citizen in
Croatia and in the world knows that. (7/92)
The wrong question could provoke the President’s accusations: ‘In your 
question, as I said, one of the following is reflected: not knowing the essence of 
parliamentary democracy, insufficient political culture, or lack of good 
intentions’ (5/94).
123 The list of such expressions is longer, and will be given in the chapter which deals with internal 
and external enemies.
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Another feature separated Tudman from the majority of his colleagues - talking 
about himself and emphasising his merits. In the quotation given at the 
beginning of this section, Tudman’s opinion about Tudman was clearly stated. 
He prefers to call himself ‘the Head of State’ more than simply the President. 
Therefore, any attempt to endanger the Head of State was an attempt to 
decapitate Croatia.
President Tudman’s achievements in making Croatia a sovereign state were 
numerous. The one responsible for the creation of the independent state and its 
international recognition was clear enough in Tudman’s statements: ‘We 
achieved that not only because of our rational policy (...) but also because of my 
reputation’ (7/92), and ‘because of friendships, and because of my 
broad-mindedness’ (4/94).
One of the major merits Tudman prescribed to himself was the establishment of 
his party HDZ: ‘for me, as the president of the state, it would be much easier not 
to be tied with any party (...) but my party membership is crucial for the party 
that I have established, to which I gave the program, with which I contributed to 
the fact that we have an independent and democratic Croatia’ (7/93).
To participate in the Partisan movement during the Second World War was 
thought of as a disadvantage for Tudman’s political opponents. However, in 
Tudman’s case, this affiliation was translated into an advantage over his 
opponents: ‘If an anti-fascist would not be the head of Croatia, we would not 
have Croatia at all’ (7/92). His episode as a general in the JNA is presented as an 
obstacle in his real interests: ‘believe me or not, I was taking off general’s 
epaulets in order to retire from politics, to concentrate on scientific work. There 
are several of my books which will stay’ (7/93).
The position of Head of State gave Tudman broad obligations but also unlimited 
power over every segment of social life in Croatia. He liked to emphasise that 
power in his speeches: ‘I replaced two ministers’ (7/93), ‘the courts were making
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decisions without my knowledge’124 (7/93).
A picture of Tudman’s rhetoric, and of Tudman himself, should be somewhat 
clearer now. His rhetoric, but not only that, brought him to power during the first 
multiparty elections in May 1990. It probably also helped him to maintain 
power. He himself supported, if he did not initiate, the picture of Franjo Tudman 
as ‘the Father of the Nation’, ‘the Creator of the Independent State of Croatia’, 
‘the Saviour of the Nation’. Even though his sentences sometimes sound too 
bold, untrue, or even funny, for ten years Franjo Tudman and his party have won 
all the elections that have taken place in Croatia. It could be said that Tudman’s 
rhetoric was strictly directed towards the broader masses. And it was successful.
In the next few pages, Tudman’s definition of the nation will first be analysed. In 
his public speeches Tudman was mainly referring to the Croatian nation in 
specific. Therefore, for a better understanding of Tudman’s concept of the nation 
his main writings will be analysed, the majority of which were written in the late 
1960s and 1980s.125
6.3.3. Definition o f the Nation
The concept of the nation in Tudman’s writings was never a clear nor a well- 
defined one. The definition varied according to the context in which he was 
writing. However two main strands of thought can be identified. In the 1960s 
Tudman was a well established communist activist with a military past. Even 
though Tudman’s interests as a historian were to some extent contrary to the 
interests of the communist establishment,126 his theoretical approach was very 
much Marxist, and based on the ideas of historical materialism. However, even 
during that period, Tudman expressed certain nationalist attitudes, or at least 
sentiments, which the communist establishment considered nationalist. During
124 Originally: ‘Sudovi su mi donosili odluke bez mog znanja \
125 For example Tudman (1968/1990) and (1987/1990).
126 In that time, at the end of 1960s, Tudman was dealing with the issue of Second World War 
victims in Croatia and especially in the notorious concentration camp Jasenovac; while the
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the 1980s Tudman was known as a dissident nationalist who had spent periods in 
prison. His writings during that period clearly expressed Croatian nationalist 
ideals and anti-Yugoslavism but, above all, they advocated the creation of an 
independent state of Croatia. It was within the context of this political program 
that Tudman defined the nation.
Tudman’s concept of the nation is historic and organic. The nation exists as an 
historical product and as a distinctive living organism. Consequently, history, as 
an actor, guarantees the existence and preservation of the nation. Even though the 
nation is defined as a living organism, it cannot be compared to the life of an 
individual: ‘The destiny of an individual or an idea is not the destiny of nations: 
they neither give up, nor die as easily; they have to live in the specific conditions 
in which they find themselves’ (1990c: 46). Tudman does not discuss the 
process, nor the timing involved in the emergence of the nation. However, the 
nation does have to have a long and rich history of its own; it has to be a 
‘historical nation’.
In addition to history, the nation, according to Tudman’s conceptualisation, is 
defined through its unique individuality. Tudman wrote: ‘As soon as a social- 
ethnic community reaches a level of historical-political integration (language, 
culture, economy and territory), such that a community appears as a unique 
national individuality, it becomes an actor on the international arena; it strives to 
expand its power for its own gains’ (1990c: 220). From this quotation it can be 
said that Tudman acknowledges the ethnic origins of the nation, even though he 
never defines the ethnic phenomenon.
Since Tudman defined the nation as a unique individuality, he also attributes to 
the nation all the characteristics of a living organism. The nation is not a sum of 
its members, it is an entity above its members. All parts of the nation have to 
function if it is to exist. The nation exists and acts according to its own impulses 
and interests. A nation can be compared only to another nation. As a result of his 
analyses, Tudman concludes that ‘nations as a whole behave more or less
Communist establishment considered every discussion on the number of victims as a nationalist
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uniformly in a psychological sense, according to their historically acquired 
impulses for self-preservation’ (1990a: 437).
The fundamental impulse of the nation is therefore self-preservation. According 
to Tudman, the only guarantee for national self-preservation is the nation-state. 
He calls it a ‘democratic principle, one nation - one state’ (1990c: 9). Tudman 
reminds us that: ‘it has often been forgotten that the creation of nation-states has 
been a necessary historical process’ (1990c: 23). Tudman explains that national 
consciousness - by reaching a specific level of historically and culturally based 
self-awareness - cannot accept being ruled by another nation or by any kind of 
foreign oppression’ (1990b: 312). An oppressed nation is in a ‘continuous fight - 
spiritual and material - for life or death, for national self-preservation. That fight 
could finish, sooner or later, only when the national question is solved, that is, 
with the creation of an independent national state’ (1990c: 221).
Tudman defines nationalism in Marxist terms. Nationalism is an ‘expression of a 
national self-essence, of political individuality and of a natural aspiration to live 
as an equal, sovereign entity within the international community and human­
kind’ (1990c: 230). Nationalism expresses itself in modem history as a major 
obstacle against imperialist-hegemonist oppression and against the imposition of 
any form of dominance. For that reason, nationalism is a symbol of freedom and 
more broadly, of social development, because without nationalism (and this 
according to Tudman, is its most positive function) no country, and hence 
humanity, can progress in a normal way. Consequently, a crime against a single 
nation is a crime against humanity, ‘because any limitation and any binding of 
any nation harms not only the peaceful, but also the harmonious development of 
human-kind’ {ibid.). Hence, Tudman defines nationalism, narrowly, as a question 
of national integration and self-preservation of the non-recognized and oppressed 
nations, and broadly, as a normal, unavoidable phenomenon in the social and 
international development of history (1990c: 219).
Tudman concludes that ‘every attempt to bind the national sovereignty of
activity.
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historical nations is a form of tyranny’ (1990a: 480), and it is the right and duty 
of the nation to fight for its national preservation and against tyranny. This fight 
may also require violence or even genocide, but, as Tudman explains, even ‘the 
Old Testament testifies, in a very dramatic way, how violence, hatred, crime and 
revenge are inseparable constituent elements of a human being as an individual, 
and of the nation as the most developed form of the human community’ (1990a: 
129).
In the next section I will examine how Tudman applied his concept of the nation 
to the case of the Croatian nation. This examination will be based mainly on the 
results of a content analysis of Tudman’s public speeches.
6.3.4. The Croatian Nation by *the Father o f the Nation'
Tudman’s idea of the nation is deeply rooted in history. Shared history, historical 
events, battles and kings, religion and customs serve as a base for the nation. It is 
history that gives the nation shape and determines its future.
By proclaiming the Croatian nation as ‘one of the oldest nations in Europe’ 
(5/94) Tudman’s view of the nation is firmly couched in a historical context. 
Tudman finds a base for such a statement in another historical ‘fact’: ‘here the 
Croatian people had their statehood 1300 years ago, and (...) it was a support for 
other non-Serb people to achieve their national constitution and their statehood’ 
(7/93). The state is a kind of guarantee for the survival of the nation: ‘all nations 
who did not achieve their own statehood, lost their fatherland’ (10/93). That is 
one of the reasons why the state is defined strictly as a national state: ‘Croatian 
state - the national state of the Croatian nation’ (7/93). Even though, Croatia 
from 1102 till 1941 was not an independent state, the Croatian nation ‘preserved 
the elements of both national and state self-essence’ (7/93).
This is the reason why Tudman concentrates his political program around the 
idea of the creation of the national state. In the articles analysed in this content 
analysis, Tudman describes the Croatian independent state as ‘the historical
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tendency of the Croatian nation’ (2 times), as ‘the nine centuries long dream’ (3), 
and as ‘the thousand year long dream of the Croatian nation’ (2). When the state 
is declared as the supreme value per se, the creation of that state is one of the 
greatest achievements of the whole nation, and of the leader particularly.
Moreover, in this concept the nation is highly determined by its geo-political 
position. Talking about the Croatian nation, as the most important factor which 
determines the past and the future of Croats, Tudman emphasises the Croatian 
position between different civilizations. The first division is a ‘division between 
two civilizations: Eastern Orthodox Europe and Western Europe’ (4/94). 
Another division is mentioned in relation to the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BH). Tudman defines Croats, Serbs and Muslims in BH as ‘three 
nations - three civilizations’ (5/94). A criterion for the constitution of these three 
separate civilizations is, at least in origin, religion. The centuries-long common 
life of Serbs, Croats and Muslims in BH undermined the role of the language, 
values and way of life that differentiated them. The only reliable marker for a 
national affiliation is, it could be said, religious affiliation. Boundaries between 
those nations, according to Tudman, are ‘civilizational’, i.e. unbreakable.
As a result of its historical position the Croatian nation developed particular 
national interests. National interests, according to Tudman, are the common 
essence of a nation: ‘Using the example of Croatia and Slovenia we can draw the 
conclusion that there is no long-term love, and that nations [narodij are led only 
by interests. And very often, we can find selfish decisions in relations between 
nations’ (7/93). From this statement it follows that for Tudman a defense of 
national interests is the most significant goal:127 ‘But, when the national interests, 
the interests of the Croatian state, are in question then all considerations towards 
friends have to stop’ (4/94). These interests cannot be changed, as ‘the interests 
of the nation-state are eternal’ (1/93).
127 In the analysed articles Tudman mentions 10 times ‘defending national interests’ as the 
primary aim of the Croatian government. The other aims mentioned are as follows: ‘spiritual and 
national renaissance’ (4), ‘breaking with bureaucratic organizations’ (2), ‘defending constitutional 
order’ (4), ‘liberation of all Croatian territories’ (8), ‘stable Croatia’ (4), ‘democratization’ (2), 
‘creation of the welfare state’ (5).
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Considering the starting premise that national interests are the moving forces of a 
nation throughout its history, historical events are to be explained in a way that 
justifies present events. In this way continuity with the past is secured. A perfect 
example of this usage of history can be observed through Tudman’s explanation 
of the events in Croatia during the Second World War.
During the Second World War the Croatian nation found itself divided between 
two conflicting ideologies: fascism and communism. In April 1941 the pro­
fascist Ustasha movement proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia 
(Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH)128 and became notorious for atrocities and 
mass killings of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Croats themselves. On the other hand, 
anti-fascists gathered around the Communist Party in the battle against fascism 
and, consequently, against the Ustasha movement. The victory against the 
fascists in 1945 was, at the same time, the defeat of the Independent State of 
Croatia.
For Tudman, himself a member of the anti-fascist movement, this episode 
presents a key problem for an explanation of Croatian history. The fulfillment of 
the ‘nine centuries long dream’, i.e. the independent state, had been an 
achievement of the pro-fascistic movement. Nevertheless, the ultimate national 
interest needs to be defended.
The NDH in Tudman’s speeches is described as a ‘mortgage’ for Croats (two 
times) and as a ‘quisling regime’ (2), but also as the ‘Croatian state’ (1). Tudman 
explains: ‘(it is) an historical truth that the NDH committed crimes’ (6/92), but 
‘the centuries long Croatian history cannot be compromised because of a period 
of four years, because of the same period which all European countries went 
through’ (8/93). After all, ‘the Croatian people were (...) partly on the side of the 
NDH, not because it was a pro-fascist, quisling creation, but because they 
wanted their own state’ (4/94).
Now the creation of an independent Croatian state is justified. Still the false
128 See Chapter 5.
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image of Croats being fascists has to be erased. With that aim Tudman sees the 
anti-fascist movement in Croatia as ‘stronger than in other, not only ex-Yugoslav 
countries, but (...) we could even say proportionally the strongest in Europe’ 
(5/94). ‘It is a lie of the Croatian and world public that the partisans and popular 
liberation struggle in Croatia were only Serbian. (...) The leadership of the anti­
fascist movement was in the hands of Croats’ (6/94). Frequent reminders of the 
anti-fascist movement serves also as a balance between an undoubtedly pro­
fascist episode and the demands of the modem world: ‘we are building Croatia 
on anti-fascism because anti-fascism is the base on which today’s international 
system is built’ (4/94). Still, it is not clear whether this statement is an 
explanation or an excuse.
The nation, it is clear, needs to be unified in order to accomplish its aims and 
protect its interests. For this reason Tudman attached great importance to 
reconciling the 50-year long ideological divisions of the Croats. The ideal media 
for this reconciliation Tudman finds in Jasenovac,129 the biggest and the most 
terrible of the Ustasha’s concentration camps. He explains: ‘Jasenovac was the 
consequence of an ideological division of Europe and the world between two 
major opposing ideas - fascism and communism. Those two ideas were fighting 
for the lives and spirit of the people and they caused terrible evils. (...) When we 
already have the monument on that place, let’s find out the historical truth and 
let’s mark the victims separately - Jews,130 Serbs, Croats - let everybody have 
their place, their museum, their chapel as evidence of one historical time. A place 
like that can be a place of reconciliation, of bringing together, an appeal to 
overcome similar evils in the future’ (10/93).
129 In his book Bespucapovijesne zbiljnosti (1990c) Tudman deals extensively with the issue of 
Jasenovac where he accuses mainly Serbian nationalists for exaggerating the myth of Jasenovac in 
order to create a black legend about the historical guilt of the whole Croatian nation (1990c: 21).
130 In the same book (Tudman, 1990c), Tudman tries to show that genocide is neither a modem 
nor a rare phenomena. In that sense, Tudman analyses the genocide against the Jews throughout 
history, and concludes that the Jews ‘provoked a hatred against themselves with the fact that they 
preserved their ethnic-religious individuality on the territories of other nations, even though they 
presented themselves as advocates of cosmopolitan-international ideas’ (1990c: 140). Tudman 
‘proves’ his arguments concluding that ‘only those Jewish communities which willingly and 
without resistance assimilated into a national majority were spared anti-Semitic pogroms’ {ibid.). 
It is clear that Tudman actually blames the Jews for the genocide against them. It is also important
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Again, Tudman attempts to strike a balance between Ustasha crimes and those 
crimes of the Partisans. The episode in Bleiburg in 1945 serves that purpose 
perfectly: ‘On Bleiburg there were one hundred thousand Croatian people killed, 
and not only Ustashas, rather Ustashas were a minority, but there were people 
from different parts of Croatia whose families were aligned to the NDH as the 
Croatian state, and not to fascism, or to nazism’ (5/94). It is clear that both 
ideologies committed crimes, and therefore, neither deserves any credit. The fact 
remains however that the only tragic victim of these events was the Croatian 
people. On this premise Tudman attempts to build a new unity around the 
reconciled nation.
In his speeches Tudman has praised the anti-fascist movement for one more 
reason - the return of lost territory.131 Tudman sees all areas in which Croats have 
been living and still live, as the historic Croatian homeland. He mentions Istria 
(2 times), Herzegovina (2), some parts or the whole of Bosnia (4), and Sveta 
Gera132 (1) as the historic Croatian territories. With the exception of Istria all are 
not parts of the Republic of Croatia.
On the other hand, all of those who have declared themselves as Croats, around 
the world, have the right to assume Croatian citizenship and can actively 
participate in Croatian political life through the right to vote at Croatian 
elections. Therefore, the population of territories that Tudman considers as 
historically Croatian, became a part of the Croatian state. Citizenship and 
national affiliation were equated, at least for Croats. Members of national 
minorities who lived in Croatia had to prove their right to Croatian citizenship. 
According to some opposition leaders in Croatia, the active involvement of 
Croatia in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had as its aim the bringing 
together of all ‘Croatian historical territories’ in one state.
to emphasize that in the English translation of this book (Tudman, 1995), these passages are 
erased.
131 At the end of the First World War Croatia, which was part of the defeated Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, lost Istria and parts of Dalmatia, which were the price that the international community 
paid to Italy for its involvement in the war on the side of the Allies. After the Second World War, 
these territories became a part of the Republic of Croatia.
132 A territory which today & 4wic/e4 bkiu)e*n Ceoatia Sbw\\e\ .
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This statement is not merely an attempt to discredit political opponents in a 
political struggle. As has already been mentioned, one of the most important 
characteristics of Tudman’s rhetoric was emphasizing his own role in the process 
of the creation of the national state. For describing the present position of 
Croatia, Tudman used terms such as a ‘political miracle’ (7 times), ‘a surprise for 
the other nations’ (2), ‘triumphant victory’ (2), or ‘the most democratic country’ 
(2). It is a ‘triumph that Croatian politics has not had in its entire history’ (4/94), 
‘the highest achievement of Croatian politics yet’ (4/94). Such qualifications are 
not surprising. It is interesting that it is a particular policy that is attributed to a 
‘creator’ of the present ‘miracles’, not the Croatian people nor the Croatian 
nation.
The creation of these miracles is emphasised even further when one takes into 
account numerous obstacles Tudman and the HDZ had to face. In the next 
section I will attempt to determine Tudman’s attitudes towards the ‘others’: 
those who belong to the other nations and those who proclaim different political 
orientations.
6.3.5. The ‘Others*
In his books (1990a, 1990b, 1990c) Tudman develops a detailed analysis of the 
role of national enemies. He holds that when a movement or a nation has an 
enemy which has been perceived as a threat to its survival, it will do everything 
possible, and it will employ all means available, to overpower and destroy that 
enemy, if it cannot subject that enemy to its own will (1990c: 161). Tudman 
argues that the violence engendered by war escalates on a regular basis into 
genocide and ethnic cleansing in cases when a conqueror has a long-term claim 
over a territory and has as a goal the ethnic assimilation of an opposing nation 
{ibid). By arguing that genocide and ethnic cleansing are a common 
phenomenon, Tudman attempts to explain how genocidal activities are not the 
property of just a few nations: ‘every attempt to attribute genocidal tendencies to 
some nations or racial-ethnic communities, to some cultural-civilisational spheres 
and to some social-revolutionary movements, religions or ideologies, is to
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misunderstand historical realities’ {ibid.: 166). Tudman goes further by arguing 
that genocide and ethnic cleansing are historical necessities. In order to 
emphasize this necessity Tudman misuses A. Toynbee’s words, and presents his 
own political programme: ‘To be the carrion or the vulture’ {ibid.: 303). 
According to Tudman, the only remedy for national conflicts and unavoidable 
genocide is the concept of the balance of power: ‘Only when competing nations 
convince themselves that they can neither destroy each other nor can they impose 
their domination, will they finally, in some way, be reconciled to a peaceful 
common co-existence’ {ibid.: 304). However, ‘those who refuse to limit the 
mixing of nations, because of their allegedly democratic progressive ideas, they 
forget that in future that mixing can initiate conflicts with far-reaching 
consequences’ {ibid.: 305).
In the next section, I will show how Tudman has applied these general principles 
to specific enemies of the Croatian nation.
The Internal Enemies
Fifty years ago in socialist Yugoslavia, the communist regime created a division
between the working class and honest intelligentsia, on the one hand, and on the
other, all those who could not fit into this typology. A product of those times -
Franjo Tudman - makes a similar distinction. With cunning statements, Tudman
reveals ‘evidence’ about how the intelligentsia is working against the national
interests of the Croatian nation: ‘in the mentality of one particular part of the
intelligentsia it is modem to be in opposition to any authority, and furthermore to
the authority of their state, thereby forgetting the interest of the state’ (7/93).
This could be understood as those intellectuals who are working behind ‘our’
back. It is evident that the President was angered by this perceived treachery and
was unable to control his anger:
some gentlemen do not know the meaning of democracy (...) but that 
kind has always existed, in all nations, countries and circumstances, 
from those biblical times of the Pharisees. They exist even today and 
even in the days when a demand for establishment of a new Balkan 
federation appears. That is not a coincidence. (7/93)
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A few months later he is even more precise: ‘some intellectuals are against the 
HDZ, and the reason for this is envy. And those who are most sarcastic, those 
unsuccessful amateurs, are their leaders’ (10/93). In these statements Tudman 
has directly accused nobody. He merely implies that some intellectuals are 
actually trying to pull Croatia back to where it was a couple of years ago - in a 
‘hell’133 called Yugoslavia. In a period when the country was engaged in war 
with the remnants of Yugoslavia, such an accusation is not harmless, especially 
because a whole category of the population is named. It seems that only the HDZ 
could provide a sanctuary from similar accusations.
In his speeches, Franjo Tudman uses a wide repertoire of names for his 
opponents: amateurs (3 times), ignorants (2), wise-guys (2), great-minded 
intellectuals (1), politikanti (4), irrationalists (2), etc. In this manner internal 
enemies are created, and they are not just opponents of Franjo Tudman and his 
politics, but direct opponents of the Croatian national interest, national state, and 
above all, opponents of the Croatian nation itself.
For the maintenance of absolute power, centralized in the hands of the Leader, 
manipulative techniques against internal enemies helped him to secure more time 
for the exercise of that power. The attention of the broad population was turned 
onto the internal enemies, rather then onto internal political, social and economic 
problems. But, external enemies can be of even more help.
The External Enemies
Defining external enemies in a war is not a difficult job. Nevertheless, how  the 
enemy is defined could also shape the war on the ground. The war in Croatia 
started as an attempt by the communist remnants and those who strongly 
believed in the preservation of Yugoslavia, to keep Croatia inside the 
Yugoslavian borders by pure force. This war ended as a pure ethnic war. One of 
the reasons was the way in which enemies were defined. When a whole nation is
133 Tudman described Yugoslavia as unitaristic (4), hell (2), an artificial creation (2), and a place
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labelled an enemy, then genocide, ethnic cleansing, human resettlement, and all 
kinds of other atrocities can be expected. On the other hand, by observing 
Tudman’s image and definition of enemies, we can get a clearer idea of his own 
nation.
In this chapter, Tudman’s explanation of the origins and aims of two nations will 
be observed: Serbs134 and Muslims.135 As far as possible, differences in the 
perceptions of these two nationalities in Tudman’s speeches will be explored.
Serbs
Since 1990, with the first multi-party elections in Croatia, some Serbs in Croatia 
declared themselves endangered by a rising Croatian nationalism. Helped by 
their co-nationals from Serbia, they soon became well organized and armed. 
Their open rebellion started in the summer of 1991 with the raising of the 
barricades around the territory which they inhabited (Krajina), and continued in 
an open war against the Croatian government and state until August 5, 1995. In 
Tudman’s speeches these Serbs became known as ‘rebel Serbs’ (8 times), 
‘bandits’ (1), ‘Chetniks’ (5), ‘Serbian aggressors’ (9), ‘local Serbs’ (8), 
‘extremists’ (12).
In the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, Croatia was defined as 
the national state of the Croatian nation and Serbian nation in Croatia. Serbs in 
Croatia wanted to have the same status in the newly independent Croatia as their 
Croatian counterparts. Furthermore, they resisted the declaration of the Croatian 
Sabor which proclaimed the creation of an independent state of Croatia, separate
where the Croatian national identity has been suppressed (6).
134 In the Croatian language there is a difference between those members of a Serbian nationality 
who are living in Serbia - Srbijanci, and those who are living in Croatia - Srbi. Considering the 
fact that a similar distinction does not exist in English, the terms ‘Serbs from Serbia’ and ‘Serbs 
from Croatia’ will be used.
135 In the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Muslims were 
recognized as a separate national group for the first time. During the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Muslims tried to determine their national identity more strictly. Since 1992 there 
have been different suggestions for naming their nationality: Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, 
Bosnians, Bosniaks, etc.
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from the Yugoslav federation. Therefore, from 1990 the Serbs from Croatia 
became a national minority in Croatia. Helped by extreme nationalists from 
Serbia, misinformed, and with fresh memories of Croatian Ustashas’ atrocities 
during the Second World War, Croatian Serbs considered themselves highly 
endangered, and demanded territorial autonomy and even the creation of a 
Greater Serbia.
Tudman’s solution for this highly problematic situation was clear. In July 1992 
Tudman declared that ‘we have solved the Serbian question in Croatia’. 
Proclaiming Croatian Serbs as a national minority (16 times in the analysed 
speeches), and as an ethnic community (3 times), Tudman appealed to the 
international community to prevent the Serbian national minority having the 
right to self-determination on the grounds that ‘national minorities do not have 
this right’ (11/93). Rather, ‘they have civil and ethnic rights according to 
international conventions’ (5/94). On the other hand, Tudman concludes that 
‘Croatia is prepared to guarantee to the Serbs all that is written in the 
Constitution and in constitutional laws’ (8/94). In the analysed speeches Tudman 
guaranteed to Croatian Serbs local government (mentioned once), cultural 
autonomy (1), all civil rights (12), all ethnic rights (15), minority rights (3), 
territorial autonomy (3), and special status (1). Nevertheless, Tudman can afford 
to be a little sarcastic: ‘(we could) solve the problem of Serbs in Croatia in the 
same way as Serbia solved the problem of Albanians in Kosovo’ (5/94).
Tudman tried to make a distinction between the people and the leaders of the 
territory of Krajina. On the one hand, Tudman describes the leaders of the 
Croatian Serbs as extreme elements (6), leaders of an irrational policy (4), 
ringleaders (2), irresponsible (2), and other derogatory terms. On the other hand 
he speaks about ‘frauded’ (2) and ‘deceited’ (6) Serbian people who were 
‘drafted by force’ (2) into their paramilitary groups. Yet, in the analysed articles 
published in 1994, Tudman used such an excuse for the Serbian people only 
once.
Later, in the war situation, it had become clearer what Tudman means by ‘the 
solution to the Serbian question’. That solution is presented as, above all,
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humanistic, inspired by the good will of the Leader:
Now when we are already faced with demographic replacements of the 
population in such a size, rarely seen till now - we are doing everything 
we can to bring about a humanistic resettlement rather than a violent 
one. In this way the problems of people who live in those areas, where 
there are no chances for their survival, would be solved. (10/92)
When someone finds this sentence suspicious, Tudman calls for common sense: 
‘Lets be realistic, since the beginning of the world there have been bigger and 
smaller migrations of peoples, genocides and assimilations (...) isn’t it normal to 
predict that people migrate?’ (7/93) The only reason behind this idea of 
humanistic resettlement is stopping further human sufferings: ‘we should allow 
voluntary resettlement with an aim to prevent violent expulsions and violent 
persecutions. Therefore, a political and humanistic willingness to prevail over 
persecution will be shown’ (7/93).
Now, a solution to the problem of Serbs in Croatia could have been quite straight 
forward: without Serbs the problem does not exist. This idea is not referred to by 
Tudman as ‘ethnic cleansing’, but as ‘humanistic’ and ‘voluntary’ resettlement. 
They both have the same end results, but the tools used to bring about the results 
are different. This statement in 1992 and 1993 did not look so terrible, but after 
August 1995, when the Croatian army liberated the area of Krajina, and almost 
all of the Serbian population fled to Serbia, these statements became more 
serious.
Before and after the military action of the Croatian army in 1995, the 
Government sent appeals to the Serbian population in Krajina to remain in their 
homes, and reassured them that nothing would happen to them if they had not 
bloodied their hands. Still, in the issue of 22 July 1996, the independent weekly 
Feral Tribune stated that 942136 older civilians of Serbian nationality who had 
stayed in their homes in Krajina had been killed since September 1995, i.e. since 
all military actions in Krajina were stopped. It would be pure speculation to say 
that Tudman’s statements initiated or played an active role in these crimes, but
136 It is almost impossible to verify these numbers since the government still refuses to investigate 
many reports of atrocities that were allegedly committed after the military operation Oluja.
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still the Croatian government did little to prevent them.
Knowing what Tudman thinks about Serbs, it is even clearer how he imagines 
the Croatian nation. Tudman is making the ‘civilizational’137 distinction between 
the Croatian and Serbian nation. According to him, that distinction has to be 
underlined by state borders. The phrase ‘Croatian state - the state of the Croatian 
nation’, could also mean ‘for the Croatian nation exclusively’.
Muslims
As already mentioned Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved recognition 
of their distinct national identity relatively recently. Through the centuries they 
were developing their specific way of life, culture, traditions and customs, but 
always squeezed between Croats and Serbs who lived in the same area. One of 
the reasons they received recognition in the 1974 Constitution was because 
Croatian and Serbian nationalists claimed that Muslims are in fact of Croatian or 
Serbian origin. By declaring themselves as Muslims and thus as a national group, 
they solved the conflicting problem of their identity. This situation remained 
until the break-up of Yugoslavia. Then came the claims for Bosnian territory and 
identity.
Tudman did not pay too much attention in his public speeches to the Muslims 
until the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in April 1992. Even then, 
preoccupied with the war in Croatia, Tudman just accepted Muslims as allies in 
the fight against the common enemy, i.e. the Serbs. In March 1993 relations 
between Muslims and Croats worsened. The clash of Croatian and Muslim 
political and national interests led to a clash on the battlefield. Tudman started to 
doubt the national identity of former ‘natural allies’. Once again, he used 
traditional nationalist arguments about the Croatian origins of Muslims: ‘The 
majority of Muslims in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are, nevertheless, 
both genetically and by speech, of Croatian origin, but Islam separated them and
137 It is difficult to detect the origins of Tudman’s insistence on ‘civilisational’ distinctions 
between the three nations (Croats, Serbs and Muslims). However, it is interesting that, later,
249
made them special’ (7/93). Even the idea to declare Muslims a separate national 
group was brought into question: ‘I said ‘Muslim people’ even though many 
people in the world asked me a question: “How come that only Muslims in BH 
are declared a special nation?” (...) Even an ambassador of Turkey had written 
that Tito’s solution of the national question was a mistake’ (7/93).
In his book Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi (The National Question in 
Contemporary Europe, 1990c) Tudman points out in clear terms that the Muslim 
population ‘in its great majority is undoubtedly of Croatian origin by virtue of its 
ethnic composition and language’ (1990c: 121). He tried to prove this statement 
by arguing that whenever the Muslims had had the opportunity, they had 
declared themselves as being a constituent element of the Croatian nation {ibid.). 
Hence, in the 1920 elections, Tudman claims, 21 of 24 Muslim representatives in 
the parliament had declared themselves as Croats.138 He even stressed how the 
‘Muslims and Catholics had accepted the NDH as their own state’ (ibid.). 
Tudman concludes: ‘Based on these facts, we can see that Croats constitute the 
majority of the population of BH, and that the geographic-economic connection 
of BH with the other regions of Croatia is such that neither Croatia within its 
current borders nor BH separated from Croatia can fully develop’ {ibid.). Prior to 
the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, Tudman had already 
defined his political programme vis-a-vis BH: ‘if BH enters into a union with 
Croatia, favourable conditions for their mutual harmonious development in the 
political, cultural and economic sphere would be created’ {ibid.).
The war between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1993 
was much worse than the war against the Serbs at that time. Massive executions 
of whole villages, terrible atrocities, notorious concentration camps on both 
sides, and the Croatian media created a picture of Muslims as the worst enemies 
the Croats had ever had. According to Tudman, ‘there were objective reasons for 
the war between Croatian and Muslim forces in BH’ (5/93). The policy of the
Tudman stated that Samuel Huntington’s book ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ is one of the best he 
ever read.
138 However, Tudman did not emphasize that in 1920 Muslims were not recognized as a separate 
national group. Therefore, they could declare themselves only as Croats or Serbs. For more, see 
Banac (1987).
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Muslim leadership and ‘their inclination towards an increasing birthrate’ (5/93) 
directly endangered the survival of a Croatian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
‘the population of Croats in BH has decreased in periods of Serbian and Muslim 
hegemony’ (11/93). In the analysed articles, Tudman stated ten times how Croats 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘defended the whole of BH’, even though their 
survival was ‘endangered’ (6 times). That is the reason the Croatian government 
actively participated in the Bosnian war: to ‘protect Croatian interests’ (12 times 
mentioned), to ‘help Croats in BH’ (7 times), to ‘defend its own borders’ (2), and 
to ‘save the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2) from Serbian occupation.
Tudman lays the blame for the war between Croats and Muslims squarely on the 
Muslim leadership. He described this leadership several times while addressing 
‘his’ nation: ‘The BH Government represents only the Muslim part of the 
population’ (3/93); ‘in the Muslim leadership there are ex-members of KOS139 
sitting, and they are intentionally sneaked into that body’ (5/93); 
‘Izetbegovic’s140 policy is a policy of unrealistic expectations and it is conveyed 
to the disadvantage of Croatians, but also to that of Muslims’ (9/93).
One of the alleged major aims of the Muslim leadership - the creation of an 
Islamic state in Europe - is mentioned nine times in Tudman’s speeches. In 1993, 
talking about the military forces under the Muslim leadership Tudman used 
terms like: Muslim Army (3), fundamentalist’s forces (4), mujahedin forces (6), 
religious army (1), and extremists (4). For example, in July 1993, Tudman 
describes the Muslim military forces: ‘In BH there are five Muslim Armies, of 
which two are under the command of the Army of BH, and three are of a purely 
religious character’. This emphasis on Muslim religious fanaticism created 
among Croats broad distrust towards Muslims in general. Newspapers published 
articles describing crimes Muslims had committed against Croats. But when 
crimes against Muslims were mentioned, Tudman tried to find an explanation: 
‘In Vitez141 crimes against Muslims were committed, and they were committed 
by the people who wore black uniforms and Ustasha symbols from WWD,
139 Counter-intelligence service of Yugoslavia.
140 The leader of the Bosnian Muslims.
141 The small town in BH settled by Muslims.
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therefore there is some evidence that it was an attempt to set-up Croats’ (5/93).
It is interesting to see that Muslims were presented in a much more negative 
manner than Serbs during this period: ‘Muslims are inclined to war, Serbs to 
compromise’ (12/93). In Tudman’s speeches Muslims are presented as wild 
religious fanatics and mujahedins who are committing genocide against Croats - 
that is why he would use all means necessary to ‘defend Croatian interests in 
BH’. Tudman even intimated using the Muslim refugees in Croatia as a kind of 
hostage, hiding behind a ‘justified’ revolt of the Croatian people: ‘Unless the 
Muslim leadership stop the war, this could provoke some changes from our side, 
where we would have to physically protect Muslim refugees’ (7/93).
However, when it was thought that relations between the Croats and Muslims 
had reached a dead end in 1994, pressure from the international community 
made Croats and Muslims revitalise the old alliance. New agreements were 
signed, new interests invented, and a new picture of Muslims transmitted in 
Tudman’s public addresses. Tudman started to assure Muslims that only through 
an alliance with Croats, could Muslims survive: ‘[Muslims] should side with 
Croats, they should bind themselves to western civilization through ties with 
Croats, that is the only chance for their survival’ (5/94); ‘we have to cooperate 
with Muslims, and that is also in the Muslim interest because then Muslims will 
be linked to Western civilization’ (1/94). After all, ‘the Muslim leadership 
understands that Croatia is their only connection with Europe’ (5/94).
Once again, a civilizational division between nations was emphasised. The first 
of Tudman’s assumptions was that Bosnian Muslims belong to some other non- 
Westem civilization. The second assumption is that they desperately want to 
become a part of the ‘Western civilization’. Considering the fact that Croats are 
almost the cradle of ‘Western civilization’, Tudman shows good intentions when 
he offered to Muslims Croatian guidance. A sense of superiority, as revealed in 
this chapter, is expressed not only towards individuals, but also towards whole 
groups, political parties, and nations. The ‘others’ are presented as inferior by 
definition. And, according to Tudman, it seems that this is the only way that one 
can emphasise ones own values as well as the values of one’s own nation.
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6.3.6. Conclusion
The aim of this content analysis was to determine the specific form of nationalist 
ideology propounded by Franjo Tudman. Yet it also provides the basis for a few 
more general considerations. First I would like to summarize the results of the 
content analysis.
For Tudman, the nation is an organic body with its own collective identity. This 
identity is shaped through, and by history. It is expressed through a national 
culture. Yet geo-political circumstances shape national interests that are seen as 
eternal and unchangeable goals of the nation. The most important national 
interest, according to Tudman, is the formation of the national state, because 
only through ones own state can the nation secure its existence and thus prosper. 
According to such a concept of the nation, individuals lose all significance, and 
the collective becomes the most significant actor.
In Tudman’s speeches the Croatian nation is shaped in opposition to other 
nations. Even though Croats are presented as one of the oldest nations in Europe, 
other nations are seen as major obstacles in the fulfillment of the ‘nine centuries 
long dream’ - an independent Croatian state. Throughout history, Tudman sees 
Croats as humiliated, oppressed and exploited, without real friends. That is the 
reason why today’s Croats can be proud of themselves: throughout the time of 
oppression Croats preserved their ‘self-essence’, their right to statehood, their 
culture, and finally, they created their own sovereign state all by themselves. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that when Tudman describes the war for Croatian 
independence, Serbs and Muslims are presented as barbarous, backward, 
‘Eastern civilizations’. Making a civilisational distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, Tudman concludes that these nations should be separated, preferably by 
state borders. Thus the ultimate national interest of the Croatian nation is not 
only the creation of a national state, but rather the creation of the nation-state in a 
literal sense: Croatia - the national state for Croats exclusively.
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From this analysis, it is possible to talk about Tudman’s ideology. Throughout 
the analysed period, Tudman consistently defined the nation, its origins and 
constituent elements, and its main objectives and functions. Moreover, Tudman’s 
perception of his own nation was supported by convenient perception of the 
origins, function and objectives of other nations.
This ideology was constantly presented in the media and not only in Tudman’s 
speeches and public addresses. His ideology had the purpose of mobilizing the 
masses, legitimating his actions and coordinating various political, cultural and 
economic elites. The legitimating function can be seen through frequent 
emphasis on Tudman’s sovereign position as the ‘Head of the State’, ‘Father of 
the Nation’ or as the ‘Creator of the Croatian Sovereign State’. Such a position 
not only allowed but also forced Tudman to take everything into his own hands. 
This then implies that he was the one who gave orders, made decisions and ran 
the country. Tudman tried to mobilize the masses by emphasizing the past and 
present situation of the nation that was surrounded by enemies both internal and 
external. When the situation is described in this way, the genius of the leader is 
not enough - what becomes crucial is the unity of the nation. The enemies of the 
nation serve also as a basis for consensus among political, economic and cultural 
national elites. Those who refused to accept Tudman’s ideas became the enemies 
of the state and nation itself. For Tudman, history is the justification for all these 
definitions and statements. Thus, history becomes an actor by itself and it can be 
interpreted according to a situation. And who can interpret history better then a 
historian himself?
However, taking into account the basic ideas of earlier Croatian nationalist 
ideologies, one could say that Tudman’s concept of the nation in general and the 
Croatian nation in particular is not an entirely original one. It would be 
interesting for further analysis to see to what extent Tudman was influenced by 
the ideas of his predecessor Croatian nationalist ideologists. Tudman himself 
frequently recalls the grandness of Starcevic and Radic in his speeches. 
Nevertheless, the influences of the other nationalist ideologists could be traced as 
well.
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In formulating his concept of the nation in general, Tudman indeed accepted 
many of Starcevic’s ideas. Just as for Starcevic, the nation in Tudman’s ideology 
takes a central position in all social and political life. The nation is the ultimate 
value by itself and it is defined in terms of history and culture. In his final stage, 
however, Tudman, unlike Starcevic, indirectly introduced another national 
marker - religion. While Starcevic deliberately disregarded religion as a 
significant marker of the nation' with the beginning of the war between the 
Croats and the Muslims in 1993, Tudman finally broke with the tradition of 
Croatian nationalist ideologists of describing the Bosnian Muslims as Croats. In 
this way, Tudman practically equated religious and national affiliation. Hence, 
while Starcevic created an inclusive definition of the nation, Tudman created an 
exclusive one.
Another point of difference between Starcevic and Tudman is the issue of the 
nation-state. Starcevic did emphasize the importance of the state for the 
preservation of the nation, but Tudman, like the Ustashas, developed a cult of the 
nation-state. This difference is not a result of different perceptions of the state 
and the nation, but rather a product of the political and social circumstances of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Croatia. While Starcevic would be satisfied 
with a federal status for Croatia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
nationalist ideologists of the late twentieth century find the Croatian nation 
powerful enough to create their own state. Moreover, within the Yugoslav 
federation Croatia developed all the necessary institutions which were easily 
transformed into state institutions. The creation of the cult of the state in both the 
Ustasha ideology and Tudman’s nationalist ideology is to a great extent related to 
their perception of the national enemies - notably the Serbs. Interestingly enough, 
both nationalist ideologies claimed to be the first that fulfilled the 900-years-old 
dream of the Croatian nation - the creation of a Croatian nation-state. Indirectly, 
in this way Tudman expressed some distance from the Ustasha part of Croatian 
history by not recognizing that they achieved the status of a ‘real’ state of the 
Croatian nation.
It could certainly not be said that Tudman was strongly influenced by the Ustasha 
ideology. Yet, while the Ustashas openly advocated a racist ideology, Tudman
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did express anti-Semitic attitudes.142 While the Ustasha Movement conducted 
genocide against all non-Croat nations, Tudman advocated the necessity of 
genocide in human history and conducted an ethnic cleansing.143 To prevent the 
mixing of the nations meant for Tudman to prevent future conflicts. Moreover, 
where the mixing of the nations did occur, it had to be corrected.
Tudman was certainly influenced by Radic’s nationalist ideology. Paradoxically, 
Tudman claimed to be influenced by Radic’s policy of non-violence and 
peacemaking. Rather, it could be said that Tudman was more influenced by 
Radic’s definition of the Croatian nation as a peasant nation. While for Radic this 
definition meant cherishing the peasant’s traditions, values and customs, for 
Tudman it was an ideological justification for his anti-intellectualism.
In the end, it seems that Tudman was to the greatest extent influenced by the 
Yugoslav Communist ideology in general. Even though Tudman entirely rejected 
his communist past, his rhetoric is its fine example.
Hence, from the above analysis it could be observed that in the 1990s the process 
of the /re/formation of the Croatian nation went through another morphogenetic 
cycle. This cycle was characterised by:
• institutionalisation of national politics through the creation of the nation-state 
and defining state political institutions as national;
• nationalisation of the culture through the creation of state-sponsored and 
state-protected institutions, and codification of the ‘national culture’;
• institutionalisation of the state/national symbols in all spheres of social life;
• codification of the national interests and their implementation through state 
policies;
• creation of a nationally homogenous population of the nation-state through 
restrictive and violent state policies;
142 In 1993 Tudman, under pressure from some international forces, publicly rejected some of his 
ideas published in his earlier books and he apologised to the whole Jewish community. A good 
example is the recent English publication of his Bespuca povijesne zbiljnosti (1987) under the title 
Horrors o f War: Historical Reality and Philosophy (1995) where all the pasages which originally 
dealt with the issue of the Holocaust and Israeli politics were either deleted or rewritten.
143 For more, see Tudman (1987/1990b).
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• mass mobilisation of the population in war conditions; and
• homogenisation of the population through state-supported and state-promoted 
nationalist ideology.
This morphogenetic cycle of Croatian society marked the end of the twentieth 
century in these territories. It should be emphasised that it is certainly not the last 
stage of redefinition of the Croatian nation. It is also a preparation for another 
morphogenetic cycle whose processes and outcomes we will have to observe in 
the future.
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6.4. Croatian Nationalist Ideologies - A Comparison
Over the previous chapters seven Croatian nationalist ideologies have been 
analysed:
• the Illyrianism of Ljudevit Gaj,
• the Yugoslavism of Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Racki,
• the ‘state right’ ideology of Ante Starcevic,
• the nationalist ideology formulated by the leader of the Croatian Peasant
Party Stjepan Radic,
• the nationalist ideology of the Ustasha Movement and its leader, Ante 
Pavelic,
• the nationalist ideology formulated by the main ideologist of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party, Edvard Kardelj, and lastly
• the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudman.
These ideologies were analysed in a similar manner and each ideology was 
placed within its historical context.144 The aim of the analyses was to identify 
how these nationalist ideologies defined the general concept of the nation, the 
Croatian nation, and lastly how they perceived and defined the enemies of their 
nation. The following section will take the form of a comparative study which 
will attempt to highlight the similarities between the aforementioned ideologies 
as well as their distinctive features.
Firstly, it is important to point out that the various definitions of the nation were in 
effect the subjective formulations of political activists. None of the ideologists 
followed a ‘scientific’ approach to the phenomenon, and their concepts were 
devised according to a specific political objective. Such nationalist ideologies could 
therefore arguably be viewed as what Brubaker calls ‘remedial political actions’ 
(1996: 79). From that perspective it would be futile to criticise such concepts of the 
nation or to highlight their bias, lack of empirical evidence or epistemological 
inconsistencies. What can be argued however is that all of these concepts of the
144 The impact of the structural conditioning and development of various agencies on the 
emergence of these ideologies will be analysed in the Conclusion.
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nation succeeded in enhancing the political programmes and agendas of their 
creators. For example, given that the leaders of the Illyrian Movement aimed to 
‘awake’ the national consciousness of the ‘passive’ Croatian intelligentsia and the 
masses, within a context of intensive Magyarisation and Germanisation, it is 
understandable that Ljudevit Gaj literally created the concept of the Illyrian nation. 
The fact that in Gaj’s ideology, the nation, the people and ‘race’ were poorly 
defined terms, often used interchangeably, just as were the terms ‘Illyrian’, 
‘Croatian’ and ‘Slav’, does not detract from the effectiveness of his ideology in the 
process of ‘awakening’ the nation. The fact that today, Pavelic’s ideas of ‘race’ and 
of ‘blood purity’ are perceived as risible and farcical concepts, should not detract 
from the fact that in practice this ideology was the driving force leading to the 
perpetration of a genocide. It would therefore be a futile exercise to analyse these 
Croatian nationalist ideologies in a judgmental manner. What is of interest however 
are the messages the nationalist leaders and ideologists were sending to the masses 
and elites, and the extent to which these messages were effective in reaching and 
being accepted by the masses. It is according to these criteria that the ideologies 
will be evaluated.
It could be argued that two distinct and competing concepts of Croatian nationalist 
ideologies have evolved over the past two centuries, those which defined the 
Croatian nation in relation to some form of ‘supra-nation’ (either Pan-Slavic or 
Yugoslav) - what might be called ‘pan-national ideologies’; and those oriented to 
the Croatian nation itself - ‘pure’ national ideologies. Hence, from the middle of the 
nineteenth century until the 1920s the Croatian political scene was dominated by 
the conflict between Yugoslavism and State-Right ideology. This conflict 
intensified during the Second World War with the all-out war between the Ustasha 
Movement and the Communist-led Partisans, and this competition culminated in 
the 1990s which, in the end, had as its consequence the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
One could argue that the conflict between the two concepts started with Gaj and the 
Illyrian Movement, who in the age of the formation of ‘pure’ nationalist ideologies 
created a ‘supra-national’ one. However, it should be remembered that this 
ideology was a product of the political and social circumstances of early 
nineteenth-century Croatia. One of the major reasons for the continuous conflict 
between the two concepts of the nation was the difficulty of the Croatian nationalist
259
ideologists to clearly define in theoretical terms the Croatian nation and, hence, 
divide it from the rest of their ‘South-Slav brothers’.
The study of the various Croatian nationalist ideologies has brought to light the 
different ways in which the concept of the nation, and of the Croatian nation, have 
been defined over the past two centuries, and the ways in which the political, social 
and economic context have influenced their formulation and content. What follows 
will be an analysis of the different ways in which the creators of these nationalist 
ideologies viewed and evaluated the constituent elements of the nation: its 
language, history, territory, religion, myths of origin, etc.
Language. Much emphasis was placed on the role of language by the leaders 
of the Illyrian Movement - one of their primary objectives being the standardisation 
of the Croatian literary language. Language played a pivotal role in their ideology 
as it constituted a significant marker for the Croatian/Illyrian nation in their fight 
against the influence of Magyarisation and Germanisation. According to the 
ideology of the Movement, it was counter-productive to draw a distinction 
between the South-Slav nations. In the struggle against Magyarisation, closer ties 
with their ‘South-Slav brothers’ was seen as the only strategy for survival. With 
this objective in mind, the leaders of the Illyrian Movement standardised the 
Croatian literary language in close collaboration with their Serbian colleagues, 
naming it Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. The choice of the stokavian dialect, 
and not the kajkavian (which was widely used in the Zagreb region) as the 
foundation of the standardised Croatian language was a clear indication of the 
Illyrian political agenda which aimed to bring the South-Slav nations closer 
together. This agenda was to be supported and built on by all subsequent Yugoslav 
nationalist ideologies.
The nationalist ideologies advocating some form of Croatian independence viewed 
the issue of language in a rather different way. The State-Right Party, the Ustasha 
Movement and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) attempted to develop the 
Croatian language away from the Serbian language, by re-introducing terms from 
‘old’ Croatian and by purging the language of foreign terms. This process was 
undertaken in an attempt to emphasise how Croats were and remained a separate
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and independent nation. The role of language in the process of national reformation 
had considerably more emphasis throughout the nineteenth century as part of the 
national awakeners’ strategy to resist Magyarisation and Germanisation. Language 
could not serve as the major national marker for those Croatian nationalist 
ideologists who were attempting to highlight the distinctive nature of the Croatian 
nation, and to distinguish it from the rest of the South-Slavs.
There is another important aspect regarding the issue of language in Croatia which 
needs to be highlighted - the role of language in homogenising the Croatian 
population. However hard the nationalist ideologists tried to impose a single 
literary Croatian language, the regions have preserved their dialects. Stokavian, 
kajkavian and cajkavijan dialects are still reliable markers of one’s regional origins. 
Through their dialects regions such as Slavonia, Dalmatia or Istria have also 
preserved their local cultures and maintained an awareness of their distinct 
histories. With the emergence of regional political parties over the past decade, 
which has resulted in the politicisation of their culture, it remains to be seen if the 
intensive national mobilisation also provokes a transformation of regional into 
ethnic identities.
Religion. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, religion became a significant
national marker for the nations in conflict. Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox 
Christian became synonyms for a Bosnian Muslim, a Croat and a Serb respectively. 
As with language, religion has been dealt with and employed in different ways and 
to different ends by the pan-national ideologies and the ‘pure’ Croatian nationalist 
ideologies. Even though the Yugoslav Movement advocated a South-Slav union, 
the leaders of the Movement also considered it important to unify the South-Slav 
nations around a single religion. Though Strossmayer openly called for a 
‘reconciliation’ between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, he was in effect 
advocating the conversion of the Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. In contrast, the 
‘pure’ Croatian nationalist ideologies did not consider religion as a significant 
marker of Croatian nationhood. These ideologies, hence, viewed all Bosnian 
Muslims as members of the Croatian nation. An emphasis on religion as a 
significant national marker for the Croatian nation would be counter-productive. 
That was the position held by Starcevic and his Party of the Right, and one which
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was subsequently adopted by Pavelic’s Ustasha Movement. At the beginning of the 
1990s, Tudman and the HDZ advocated the same view. The Bosnian Muslims 
were seen as the ‘natural allies’ of Croats, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
‘natural part’ of Croatia. Only when the Muslims organized themselves politically 
and military and hence clearly expressed their own national identity and a wish for 
national independence, did the HDZ identify them as enemies of the Croatian 
nation. Once again, the nation was defined in accordance with the political agenda 
of the ideologists.
M yths o f origin. In an attempt to define the Croatian nation, the Croatian 
nationalist ideologies could not rely on myths of origin either. Once again the most 
effective myth of origin was formulated by the Illyrian Movement. This myth 
however emphasised the common origins of all Slav nations. It served its purpose 
of uniting the Slavs against the non-Slav oppressors - the Germans and Magyars. 
The first attempt to create a myth of origin which served to differentiate the Croat 
nation from the other South-Slav nations was devised by the Ustasha Movement 
and, later on, adopted by the HDZ. The myth of the Croat’s Iranian (and hence, 
non-Slav) origins was used to emphasise the ethnic difference between the Croats 
and the Serbs. The Ustasha Movement presented the Croats as an ‘Aryan race’. 
Half a century later, the HDZ portrayed the Croats as a nation which had nothing in 
common with the ‘barbarian’ Serbs. Nevertheless, the Croatian nationalist 
ideologies in general failed to offer a myth of origin which could clearly 
differentiate the Croats from the rest of the Slavs.
History. As is the case with many other nations, history has provided a rich source 
of material for defining the Croatian nation. A grandiose Croatian history was 
rediscovered by the Illyrian Movement and by the emerging Croatian intelligentsia 
driven by nationalist ideas. The intellectual life of nineteenth-century Croatia was 
characterised by the works of historians such as Smiciklas and Racki. However, 
since its beginnings the history of Croatia has been presented by these historians as 
a mixture of historical facts and myths. Stories of ancient Croatian kings and 
queens, treacherous foreign rulers and heroic Croatian noblemen and commoners 
have aroused the imagination and hopes of the nationalist ideologists. That history 
was a picture of the lost golden age. Each Croatian nationalist ideology appealed to
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their people to restore this golden age when Croats were ruled by their own kings 
and lived in their own state. The rule of the foreign kings - Hungarian, Austrian or 
Serb - was presented as the age of oppression, exploitation and suffering for the 
Croatian nation. The nationalist ideologies attempted to demonstrate that only a 
united nation prepared to undertake major sacrifices could restore that golden age. 
To achieve those ends, the creators of the nationalist ideologies celebrated and 
created myths around different national heroes. Hence, the myth of Zrinski and 
Frankopan was aimed to demonstrate the treacherous and corrupt nature of the 
Habsburgs, while the leaders of the Yugoslav Movement created a myth around 
Ban Jelacic in order to show the determination and ability of the Croats to fight 
against the threatening Magyar nationalism. The death of Stjepan Radic became a 
powerful symbol of Serbian oppression.
The nationalist ideologists considered history as the most significant and valuable 
marker of the Croatian nation, and not simply because it provided symbols and 
myths to arouse the imagination of their fellow compatriots. In Tudman’s 
nationalist ideology, history became an actor in itself and the source of national 
rights. At times when the Croatian nation exercised only limited power over its 
own internal affairs, and when the Croatian nation was perceived even by its 
leaders as being powerless and exploited, the ideologists claimed the historical 
right to self-determination. The nationalist ideologists were to select a proper 
historical moment in Croatian history which could serve as the basis for that right. 
One of the most ‘popular’ sources of the Croatian historical rights was the famous 
Pacta Conventa from 1102. Seven-and-a-half centuries later Croatian national 
leaders claimed rights that originated from that agreement. Hence, the nationalist 
ideologists claimed a historical right over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on the ground that it was, at some point, ruled by Croatian kings for several 
decades. Historical events that contradicted what the Croatian nationalist 
ideologists were attempting to argue were simply disregarded and ignored. The 
nationalist ideologists therefore manipulated and built myths around certain 
historical events to suit their political objectives.
State. Throughout its rule the HDZ has created a myth around the idea of the 
Croatian nation’s ‘nine-century-long dream’ - the creation of an independent
263
Croatian state. However, it could be argued that it was only in the second half of 
the twentieth century that the Croatian nationalist ideologies had actually clearly 
expressed a wish for the creation of a Croatian nation-state. Until 1918 Croatian 
nationalists had either worked for the restructuring of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, with a view to according Croats the same rights as the Magyars, or they 
strove for the creation of a common South-Slav state in which the Croats would 
enjoy equal rights with the rest of the South-Slav nations. The first articulated 
claim for an independent state came from the HSS and Stjepan Radic. However, 
when the HSS compromised with the Yugoslav government in the 1930s, the only 
remaining advocates of an independent Croatian state were the Ustashas. The 
Ustasha Movement was the first political entity to secure the establishment of a 
Croatian state in eight centuries. Regardless of their respective political 
programmes, all Croatian nationalist ideologies held that the state was the ultimate 
means for the preservation of the nation. The form of the state however differed 
according to the nature of the ideologies: some favoured the formation of a triune 
kingdom, others, the creation of a federal state with rest of the South-Slav nations, 
with the ‘pure’ ideologies viewing the creation of the Croatian nation-state as their 
ultimate aim.
National character. In the tradition of Romanticism many Croatian 
nationalist ideologies considered it important to highlight the distinct and unique 
character of the Croatian nation. One of the common features of almost all 
Croatian nationalist ideologies was to describe the Croatian nation as a peasant 
nation. This did not simply aim to emphasise the fact that until the late twentieth 
century, the majority of Croats worked on the land and that the basis of the 
Croatian economy was the agricultural sector. These nationalist ideologies went 
further by romanticising the peasant way of life as the only authentic Croatian 
way of life. One of the major corollaries of this ideological focus on the 
peasantry was the constant undermining of the role of the Croatian intelligentsia. 
One of the reasons for this glorification of the peasantry may be the fact that the 
majority of the Croatian nationalist ideologists and national leaders were of 
peasant origins - Starcevic, Radic, Pavelic, Tito, Tudman and many others. In 
contrast the Croatian intelligentsia was mainly concentrated in the cities. Many 
Croatian cities were actually built by non-Croats, and the majority of the non-
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Croat, non-indigenous population were living in the cities. The cities were 
perceived as the root of all evil. After all, according to Radic, it was the cities and 
city-dwellers who exploited the villages and peasants. The average Croat was 
portrayed by many of the nationalist ideologists as being a hard-working peasant, 
whose life was characterised by great hardship and who lived at a minimum 
subsistence level. The Croatian peasantry was also praised for having preserved 
their own traditions and customs untarnished by foreign influences. The Ustasha 
Movement radicalised this perspective and created a new marker for the national 
affiliation - whoever was not of peasant origin could not be a Croat. When a 
nationalist ideology lacks the means to clearly distinguish its own nation from 
others, an emphasis on its peasant origins is an effective mechanism for creating 
a distinction.
The various ways in which Croatian nationalist ideologies have defined the major 
constituent elements of the nation bring to light the wide range of possibilities to 
define a distinct nation.
One could note that it is not a mere enumeration of the constituent elements of 
the nation that gives a specific character to a nationalist ideology. Differences 
between these Croatian nationalist ideologies lie in their emphasis on a specific 
constituent element. Hence, even though almost every ideology stresses that the 
nation cannot exist without a long common history, only in the case of Tudman’s 
nationalist ideology does history become the primary actor and, moreover, the 
creator of the nation. While almost all nationalist ideologies stress the national 
language as an important constituent element of the nation, only in Gaj’s and 
Racki/Strossmayer’s ideologies is language the central marker of nationality and 
the crucial element of inclusion/exclusion of members of a nation.
When these various nationalist ideologies are placed in their temporal 
perspective, it could be observed that nationalist ideologies define the nation not 
in order to prove the existence of a nation in a specific historical period, but to set 
a political agenda for that nation. Hence, at the time when the Croats used 
different variants of the similar vernacular and several variants of the Latin script, 
Gaj defined the nation as a social group with the same language. One could argue
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that, following Gaj’s definition of the nation, there was no Croatian nation at that 
time. Similarly, when Radic defined a nation as a socio-cultural group that 
possessed its own independent and sovereign state, the Croats did not have one of 
their own. If one follows Radic’s argument, one could argue that the Croats 
become a nation in 1991, since the short-lived Ustasha state could not be 
described as independent and sovereign.
The nationalist ideologies not only evaluated and defined the constituent 
elements of the nation in a different way. It could also be said that at the same 
time the Croatian nation has been defined as a civic and as an ethnic nation, 
political and cultural, as an inclusive and an exclusive concept, as primordial (as 
in Starcevic’s ideology), perennial (as in Radic’s ideology) and modem (as in 
Kardelj’s ideology). One could try to explain the differences between these 
‘ideological definitions’ as products of their time, that is, by the fact that they 
were formed at different stages of history. If that is a relevant explanation, it is 
not clear whether it is the nation as a social phenomenon that changed, or 
whether it is social circumstances that dictate the employment of a different 
terminology. The former would lead to the conclusion that a set of constitutive 
elements of a nation is valid only for a certain historical period and is not valid 
for consecutive ‘developments’ of a nation. If the latter is the case, a change of 
circumstances would require a different sets of constitutive elements for defining 
a nation even in the same historical period, hence, the constitutive elements of a 
nation could not be seen as constitutive.
In a situation where consensus on the definition of the nation does not exist, the 
concept of the enemy can become one of the most efficient methods for defining 
it.145 Each Croatian nationalist ideology was able to clearly define its enemies. By 
defining the national enemy, the nationalist ideologies defined the Croatian 
nation as well. When the Magyars and Germans were perceived as being the 
major obstacle to achieving the political aims of nineteenth century nationalist 
ideologists, the national language became the most significant national marker.
145 At this point I do not wish to engage in discussion and to make any implications on the 
relevance of the concept of ‘others’ for the formation of national identity. Rather, this statement is 
concerned only with the problems of the formation of nationalist ideologies.
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That same marker (the national language) lost its political significance as soon as 
the Serbs were portrayed as the national enemies. Similarly, the selection of 
national myths, including the myth of origins, was also to a great extent 
determined by the nature of the national enemy. This does not imply that the 
definition of ‘others’ is a sufficient criterion on which to define one’s own nation. 
Rather, the example of the Croatian nationalist ideologies shows that in some 
circumstances the definition of a nation contains both positive and negative 
markers, that is, it defines ‘us’ in terms of our own specific characteristics and, at 
the same time, as ‘not-them’. ‘Others’ can therefore serve as a point of reference, 
as a black-and-white picture which helps to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’.
As already stressed, the nationalist ideologies did not provide elaborate 
descriptions of the ‘others’, i.e. of the national enemies. The enemies of the 
nation were those groups which were perceived as constituting major obstacles, 
not necessarily to the interests of the nation, but to the interests of the 
nationalists’ ideologies. National enemies were both internal and external, that is, 
groups of co-nationals with different political programmes, as well as* elements 
coming from other nations. The enemies were depicted according to current 
problems faced by the nation. The nationalist ideologies tried to portray national 
enemies as historical enemies, as enemies which had oppressed, betrayed and 
exploited the nation over the centuries. However, as soon as the ‘others’ ceased 
to be perceived as an obstacle to the current interests of the nationalist 
ideologists, the whole history of oppression was disregarded. Seven centuries of 
Hungarian oppression and exploitation meant little to twentieth century Croatian 
nationalist ideologists. Once again, history, myths and memories were used as 
symbols and were manipulated in order to serve the political agendas of 
nationalist ideologists and leaders. Historical realities counted for little in this 
process.
*  *  *
Up to this point, the analysis of the differences in the perceptions and definitions 
of the nation has been undertaken mainly at the level of the corporate agents. It 
has been shown how the nationalist elites, or more precisely, the national leaders,
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formulated and in some cases entirely created nationalist ideologies. A nationalist 
ideology was previously defined as a comprehensive set of statements which 
provides a definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in 
particular, which elaborates the origins, functions and goals of the nation. 
Through a variety of different means, the messages central to these nationalist 
ideologies were transmitted to the primary agents. The means of transmission 
differed according to political and social circumstances. Today’s dominant 
theories of the nation and of nationalism, such as Gellner’s, Anderson’s, 
Hobsbawm’s, etc., explain the creation of the nation as an uni-linear process 
‘from above’. The state, through the education system and media, promotes and 
transmits the dominant nationalist ideology, resulting in the homogenisation and 
mobilisation of the masses. A uni-linear interpretation of this kind could, 
however, be argued as being rather simplistic.
Through the example of Croatian nationalist ideologies it could be argued that in 
the process of the /re-/formation of the nation three distinct levels of analysis 
should be considered: (1) corporate agents such as the national elites, as the 
creators of an ideology; (2) state institutions, as potential transmitters or 
opponents of an ideology; and (3) the primary agents as potential acceptors of an 
ideology. A national elite can perceive the state and state institutions as the 
enemies of the nation either because they transmit a competing nationalist 
ideology or suppress transmission of any nationalist ideology. The nationalist 
ideologies which do have support from state institutions are not necessarily more 
‘successful’ than those who lack such support. After all, a nation can be created 
even when a nationalist ideology lacks the support of state institutions. However, 
the nature of the relationship between state institutions and a particular 
nationalist ideology to a great extent influences and shapes the strategies 
employed by nationalist ideologists in their attempt to reach and gain the support 
of primary agents.
On the other hand, primary agents in many of the dominant theories of nations 
and nationalism have been described as passive objects on which any ideology 
can be foisted, their identities depicted as a tabula rasa which can easily be 
shaped from above. Even if a theory of nations and nationalism, such as Smith’s,
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takes into account that the masses already have a particular ethnic identity, this 
identity could evolve into a national identity, which means that an ethnic identity 
really disappears with the formation of a nation. Such a view is based on the 
assumption that once a nationalist ideology gains the full support of the state 
institutions in due time the masses will be homogenised.
Hence, for the further analysis of the process of national-/re/formation it is 
necessary to investigate, first, some mechanisms of transmission of nationalist 
ideologies though the institutions of social structure, and, second, the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms through an analysis of primary agents’ 
attitudes. The first issue will be the subject of the next chapters in which a 
content analysis of Croatian secondary school history textbooks will be 
conveyed. Finally, Chapter Eight will present the results of a survey of a sample 
of Zagreb population and their attitudes towards the nation.
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Chapter Seven
NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES IN THE CROATIAN 
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
• • -[U]p bringing o f the future generations o f 
one nation is a national imperative; 
therefore the upbringing o f an individual 
is not an independent and individual matter, 
but (...) public, national and general.
(Blazekovic, 1944: 18)
In previous chapters it was shown how throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries different nationalist ideologies defined the Croatian nation and 
explained its origin, history and myths in various ways. All of these definitions 
and ideas became a part of Croatian culture. The ideas of Starcevic, Strossmayer 
and Radic remained on the political agenda long after their parties had 
disappeared. These ideas were reflected in history textbooks. Yet their place in 
Croatian history was not always the same. Dominant nationalist ideologies of the 
twentieth century interpreted these ideas and their authors in the ways they found 
most useful. m
This chapter will demonstrate how the dominant nationalist ideologies were 
propagated by the educational system. As can be seen from the quotation above, 
some nationalist ideologists regarded education as one of their primary tasks. The 
most obvious means by which to teach the younger generation how to understand 
their nation was the rewriting of history textbooks.
In this analysis I will first show that the dominant nationalist ideologies were 
clearly reflected in nineteenth-century Croatian history textbooks. For this 
purpose, I will refer to Charles Jelavich’s extensive analysis, published in 1990.1 
will then analyse three sets of secondary school history texts: a two-volume 
textbook published in 1943 during the Ustasha regime, four textbooks published
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in the 1950s, in the time of socialist Croatia within Yugoslavia,146 and three 
textbooks published in the 1990s in the independent Republic of Croatia.
This chapter is not conceived as yet another review of Croatian history. The aim 
is to analyse and compare the ways in which the dominant nationalist ideologies 
of their time influenced the re-writing of the history of the Croatian nation. In 
each case a different vocabulary was employed; different symbols were used; 
different events were highlighted and disregarded; and different individuals were 
described as national heroes and traitors. In other words, the discussion will show 
which aspects of history the nationalist ideologies wanted the younger generation 
to learn and which aspects they were hiding. Besides the fact that these 
ideologically different textbooks were describing the history of the same nation, 
they have one other thing in common - propagating their own nationalist ideas.
The dissolving of nationalist ideologies into the school curriculum indicates the 
direct relation between the cultural and structural systems of society. In this case 
the state institutions, such as secondary schools, were used with the aim of 
‘implanting’ a specific set of ideas into younger generations. The purpose of this 
chapter, therefore, is, first, to detect whether the history textbooks reflect the 
dominant nationalist ideology and, second, to investigate what kind of ideas and 
images the authors of the textbooks considered important for students’ education.
7.1. The Nineteenth-Century Textbooks
In his book South Slav Nationalism Charles Jelavich analyses various literary, 
geography and history textbooks published in the second half of the nineteenth 
century in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Jelavich offers an interesting and 
revealing account of the images and messages the authors of the textbooks 
presented to the younger generations about their own nations and other South 
Slavs. Jelavich’s (1990: 59) starting point is based on the assumption that the
146 It is important to emphasise that in the 1950s each federal republic of Yugoslavia had some 
autonomy in establishing the school curriculum. Hence, the analysed textbooks were published in 
Croatia, and were official textbooks in the Republic of Croatia only.
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educational system was of primary importance to the development of 
nationalism. Moreover, he holds that the teachers, lay or clerical, played the 
central role in the development of national movements, and that at the end of the 
nineteenth century ‘they almost unanimously favoured national unification’ 
{ibid.: 57) of the South Slavs.
The second reason for the analysis rests on Jelavich’s assumption that ‘most 
students, during their school years and afterward, believed that the books told the 
truth and that within their covers the reader could find a true expression of the 
nation’s wisdom’ {ibid.: 59). If we follow these premises, it could be concluded 
that the aim of Jelavich’s analysis is to ‘detect’ the attitudes, beliefs and opinions 
of the South Slav population at the time of their unification in 1918.
Even though it is difficult for me to agree with Jelavich’s assumptions, since we 
do not have any evidence of this direct correlation between education and the 
‘creation’ of national sentiments, his book offers an extensive set of data about 
Croatian secondary school history textbooks at the end of the nineteenth century.
Before commencing with an analysis of these textbooks, Jelavich offers some 
basic data about the Croatian educational system of that time. In 1885, for 
example, there were 1,263 elementary schools and only 64 per cent of children of 
school age attended classes {ibid.: 53). A year later, in 1886, 5,947 students 
enrolled in the secondary schools, and in 1910 that number rose to over 10,000. 
Jelavich also estimates that about 25 per cent of the population were considered 
literate in 1880, and 52 per cent in 1910. It should be mentioned, however, that 
Ruth Trouton (1952: 102) underlines that at this time ‘the school inspectors had 
reported that peasant children frequently lapsed into illiteracy after leaving 
school’.
Jelavich analyses the content of more then twenty Croatian secondary school 
history textbooks published in the period 1880-1920. At the beginning of his 
book Jelavich (1990: 208) stresses that the ‘Croatian textbooks forcefully 
presented their nation’s history’. The main aim of these textbooks was to ‘present 
Croatian national history, identify the heroes, and describe the nation’s relation
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with Vienna and Budapest within the Habsburg Empire’ {ibid.). In line with 
Jelavich’s analysis, in this part of the chapter I will try to summarise the main 
characteristics of the nationalist ideology that is offered in these history 
textbooks.
The texts deal with the history of Croatia since the sixth century, that is, since the 
migration of the South Slavs onto the Balkan Peninsula. According to Jelavich, 
‘the critical issue for every Croatian historian was to identify the Croatian lands’ 
{ibid.\ 210). The most frequent arguments these historians applied by were 
historical and ethnical. To be more precise, if the historians could not discover 
any relevant ‘historical rights’ (like, who came first) on a certain territory, they 
stressed the current ethnic composition of the population. As a result, the historic 
Croatian lands, according to these textbooks, were areas corresponding to 
present-day ‘eastern Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
and Montenegro’ {ibid.: 213). The importance of the issue of Croatian historic 
lands originates from the major concern of current Croatian nationalist 
ideologists - ‘unification of the Croatian lands of the Habsburg Empire into a 
single political entity’ {ibid.: 264).
With these territories, the story goes, lived a nation whose characteristics are 
determined by specific historical events. One of these characteristics is their 
religion. Not only does the Croat’s religion clearly separate them from most of 
the other South Slav nations, but it also firmly establishes Croatian nationhood in 
European history. The textbooks firstly stressed that the Croats ‘were the first of 
all the Slavic nations to become Christians, becoming thereby a recognised 
member of the European Christian community’ {ibid.: 214). Moreover, the 
Croats were the only nation ‘to gain and preserve the right to have the church 
service in their national language’ {ibid.: 215). As Jelavich concludes, in 
Croatian textbooks from the nineteenth century religion played a prominent role. 
Such a position is understandable since religion was a ‘compulsory subject in 
every grade of the elementary and secondary schools and was always listed as the 
first subject in the curriculum’ {ibid.: 269). Through these images the Croats 
were presented as a nation with a special position among the Christian 
community. This position, according to these history textbooks, was re-affirmed
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through centuries of defending Europe from Ottoman invasion; it earned them 
the right to the title ‘ Antemurale Cristhianiatatis *.
The turbulent relationships of the Croats with their neighbouring nations 
throughout history provided a fertile ground for the imaging of national heroes. 
Two of the most important heroes of the war against the Ottomans were Petar 
Berislavic and Krsto Frankopan. As the Ban of Croatia, Petar Berislavic erected 
strategic fortifications. He was assassinated in an ambush, and was ‘immortalised 
in national folk songs’ {ibid:. 225). Krsto Frankopan, after his victory against the 
Turks at Jajce in 1525, became ‘famous as the leading Croatian hero and father of 
his homeland’ {ibid.). Yet, the major figure in Croatian historical mythology, 
according to Jelavich, was Nikola Zrinski. The story tells us that faced by 
100,000 of Suleiman’s soldiers in 1566 Zrinski organised 2,500 Croats in 
defence of Siget. Knowing that ‘there was no more disgraceful sin then the 
betrayal of one’s homeland’ {ibid:. 228) Zrinski led a charge where he was killed. 
Jelavich stresses that Siget was for the Croats what Kosovo was for the Serbs. 
‘Each battle in its own way provided the historical inspiration of the nationalistic 
revival of the nineteenth century’ {ibid.).
According to Jelavich, throughout the textbooks the authors repeatedly assert that 
all harm done to the nation in all of its history was the result of dissension and 
lack of unity among the Croats themselves. Hence, unity was stressed as one of 
the most important values. Another national value frequently stressed by the 
authors of the textbooks is the loyalty of the Croatian nation to their rulers. 
Through various stories from Croatian history, the authors emphasised the 
unrewarded loyalty and self-sacrifice of the Croats. Examples like the fate of 
Krsto Frankopan and Nikola Subic, and the treatment of Croatia after the events 
of 1848, brought into question the relationship between Croats and other nations. 
The Croatian historians made an attempt to stress the need for Croats to 
reconsider their national interests and their loyalties.
Through his analysis of the history textbooks Jelavich discovers that at the end of 
the nineteenth century the Croatian historians contributed to the effort to make 
the stokavian dialect the standard literary language for the Croats. The issue of
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the national language was perceived as crucial for strengthening the unity of the 
Croatian nation. After emphasising that ‘Croatia’s contributions to the monarchy 
were not rewarded’ {ibid.: 237), the historians followed the main arguments of 
the Illyrian Movement, National Party and the Croatian-Serbian Coalition when 
stressing that the Croats could prosper as a nation only in close co-operation with 
fellow South Slavs, especially the Serbs. The unity of the two nations was firstly 
found in the common language. One of the writers of a textbook stressed that 
‘there was no difference [in the literary language] between them [the Croats] and 
the Serbs except for the alphabet’ {ibid.: 236). As Jelavich concludes ‘in their 
view, language was merely the link between the two separate but related nations’ 
{ibid.). The adoption of the ktokavian dialect was another step towards closer 
relations between the Serbs and the Croats.
The Croatian historians’ concern was not only maintenance of a good picture of 
the history of the Serbian Kingdom. They also had on the agenda the integration 
of the Serbs that lived in Croatia and who, at that time, numbered 25 per cent of 
the Croatian population. The writers of the textbooks aimed at creating a sense 
of loyalty to Croatia among these Serbs, and not to the neighbouring Serbian 
kingdom {ibid.: 264). The textbooks stressed, therefore, ‘the unity of the lands of 
the Triune Kingdom, but with the clear understanding that there were Croatian 
lands in which Serbs also lived’ {ibid.). ‘Their language was the same’, Jelavich 
continues, ‘but the only political nation in the Triune Kingdom was the Croatian’ 
(/bid.).141
At the end of his analysis, Jelavich concludes that these textbooks conveyed the 
type of information that promoted the ideas of brotherhood, co-operation and 
understanding, but not unity and assimilation, between the Croatian and Serbian 
nations. He concludes that ‘Yugoslavism appealed to idealists, but not to those 
who had to deal with realities of the South Slav world’ {ibid.: 272). It is worth 
mentioning that, as can be seen from the analysis in Chapter Four, not a single 
Croatian nationalist ideology propagated the idea of assimilation of these two 
nations. Cultural and political co-operation for these ideologies could not ‘erase’
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the individuality of such a historical social group as a nation. Such an attitude 
was also reflected in the history textbooks. After all, ‘in the national question, the 
overriding issue was to instil, through the schools and textbooks, a sense of pride, 
patriotism, and loyalty in the nation, its past, and its future’ {ibid.: 273).
As shown, the main method for securing the development of ‘patriotism’ among 
the younger generations is found in the specific use of vocabulary, symbols, 
myths and legends, the promotion of carefully selected historical figures into 
national heroes, and clearly labelled friends and enemies. I will use the same 
method for an analysis of three sets of Croatian secondary school history 
textbooks used in the twentieth century. The main aim of this analysis is to 
examine whether the textbooks published in 1943 reflected the main ideology of 
the Ustasha Movement, those published between 1954 and 1956 reflected the 
ideology of the Communist Party, and whether textbooks published in the first 
half of the 1990s propagated the ideas of Tudman’s nationalist ideology. Finally, 
a comparison of the content of these history textbooks should point to the 
methods the educational system employed in promoting the dominant ideas of 
the cultural level.
7.2. General Characteristics of the Textbooks
The three sets of textbooks cover history from the sixth century (the period of 
settlement of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula) to the twentieth century (that is, 
to the time of their publication). The 1943 textbook is published in two volumes. 
Together these two volumes have 313 pages, more then half (57.5 per cent) of 
which are dedicated to the history of the Croatian nation. The 1950s textbooks 
deal solely with the history of the Croatian nation in 31 per cent of their 702 
pages of text, while the 1990s textbooks dedicate 348 pages (or 48 per cent) to 
the same subject.
147 For more details on Serbo-Croatian relations and the idea of ‘political nation’ at the end of the 
nineteenth century, see Chapter Four.
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The 1943 textbook is not only characterised by the choice of topics and their 
interpretation, but also by topics that are deliberately avoided. Hence, for 
example, the Ustashas’ textbooks completely disregard and ignore the history of 
other Slav states and nations. Actually, the Slavs are mentioned on only three 
pages when the author discusses the migrations of the ‘Old Slavs’ and their 
customs and religion. In contrast, the 1950s textbooks dedicate 41 per cent of the 
text to the history of the other Slav nations. However, not all of the Slav nations 
are equally represented: 17 per cent of the text deals with the history of the Serb 
nation, 17 per cent with the histories of the other Yugoslav nations 
(Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenes), and only 7 per cent with the rest of 
the Slav nations (Czechs and Slovaks, Poles and Russians). The 1990s textbooks 
cover the whole pre-Yugoslavian history of the Serb nation in 11 pages, and 
spend 18 pages on the histories of the other Slav nations.
The preoccupation with the histories of the Slav nations in the 1950s textbooks 
leaves very little space for dealing with the history of the rest of the world. Only 
16 per cent of the text considers world history. The 1990s textbooks dedicate 
much more space to Europe and the rest of the world (39 per cent). The 1943 
textbooks deal with world history on 100 pages (31.9 per cent). Yet, it should be 
mentioned, 15 of these pages are dedicated solely to the history of Germany and 
the German people and 11 pages to the history of the Turks and the Ottoman 
Empire.
Two other interesting points of contrast between these history textbooks are their 
perspectives on the Catholic Church and, for the 1950s and 1990s textbooks, the 
Second World War. The 1950s textbooks cover the Second World War in 
Yugoslavia (that is, mainly the Popular Liberation War) in detail on 55 pages, 
while the 1990s textbooks cover the events of the same period in Croatia only 
and in 12 pages. With regard to the Church, the 1990s textbooks explain the 
history of the Roman Catholic Church in 45 pages. As could be expected, the 
socialist textbooks do not spend a single page on the history or doctrine of the 
Church, yet use an image of church institutions as the main villain in world 
history. The Ustashas’ textbook concentrates less on the history of the Catholic 
Church, than the 1990s text, though it stresses the importance of religion
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throughout. Yet, unlike the 1990s textbooks, the 1943 volumes also put some 
effort into explaining the basic ideas of Islam and the biography of Muhammad.
7.3. Confronting Ideologies
The main difference between these history textbooks lies not in what was said, 
but how it is expressed.
After reading the two-volume textbook published in 1943 it could be said that its 
main purpose was the education of young generations in a specific ‘national 
spirit’. Such a view on the purpose of education was not without an ideological 
basis. The ideology promoted in these textbooks could be easily labelled as 
‘national-socialist’. Such an ideology has two major points of reference: the cult 
of the nation-state and folk culture. These two cults are promoted from the very 
first pages of the textbook.
Discussing the origins of the Croatian nation, the author underlines that ‘a 
militant northern Slav tribe called the Croats’ lived on the territory between the 
Karpathian Mountains, and the Visla and Odra rivers. ‘Already there’, says the 
author, ‘they had their own state, and that was the oldest Slav state’ (Jakic, 
1943a: 16). The main task for the author thereafter is to ‘prove’ the undisturbed 
existence of a Croatian state until the twentieth century. Hence, for example, 
Croatia was an ‘independent state’ {ibid.: 31) in the ninth century in the period of 
the rule of Duke Branimir, and in the tenth century, under the rule of King 
Drzislav, it was a ‘big and powerful state’ {ibid.: 37). At the time when the 
Croats lived in a common kingdom with Magyars, Croatian statehood did not 
disappear. In 1382 when the Bosnian ruler Tvrtko became an independent ruler 
‘the Croatian state was resurrected’ {ibid.: 88) when ‘for a while Bosnia became 
a centre of Croatian statehood’ {ibid.: 91). Even when the Croats elected 
Ferdinand for their ruler in 1527, the author emphasises that the new king 
confirmed the ‘old rights of the Croatian Kingdom, that is, respect its state 
independence’ (Jakic, 1943b: 18). The following years Jakic describes as a 
‘struggle against Vienna and Magyars for the preservation of [Croatia] as an
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independent political totality’ {ibid.: 61). The cult of the state, that is perceived as 
nation-state, was finally clearly instituted with the interpretation of the basic 
ideas of the ‘new social order’ {ibid.: 118) established by Mussolini and Hitler. 
Jakic explains that this ‘new social order assumes that the state is the highest 
relic, where interests of individuals are subordinated to the interests of the 
community’ {ibid.). Once the cult of the state is instituted, the creation of the 
Independent State of Croatia in 1941 becomes the highest national achievement 
and its creators the true national heroes.
The importance of the state was explained to younger generations through its 
functions. While discussing the terrible social conditions of the common people 
during the Middle Ages, the author found a good opportunity to stress that only 
in the modem time ‘social care, that is, helping the poor and sick, became the 
first task of the state’ {ibid.: 55). This is the point when the nation-state ideology 
gains its ‘social’ character.
Besides telling the story of the Croatian state and nation, Jakic’s textbook offers a 
history of the suffering of the Croatian peasants, who are presented as symbols of 
anguish and endurance. While the life of the Old Slav peasants is described as 
poor and simple the author warns that ‘even today many of our peasants live in 
very poor conditions and know nothing of a better and nicer life’ (Jakic, 1943a: 
8). The importance of peasants for the Ustashas’ ideology originates from a view 
that these ‘peasants remained faithful to their national culture’ {Jakic, 1943a: 50; 
italics in original). ‘Since at that time’, Jakic {ibid.) explains, ‘villages had no 
schools, which could spread foreign influences, the peasant population could 
protect and develop their culture, that is, language, traditions, songs and customs 
through centuries’. Numerous and detailed explanations of the hard life of 
Croatian peasants throughout history create a picture of martyrs, the guardians of 
the national culture. At the same time, while depicting the dissipated life of the 
Croatian nobility, the author had to grant them the status of the guardians of the 
Croatian statehood rights {ibid.: 105), since they were the only political body in 
Croatia for centuries. The textbook clearly offers a critique of the class society. In 
return, however, the ideology does not offer equality for individuals, but 
anonymity of the masses within an all-inclusive national community.
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A critique of the class system reappeared in the Croatian textbooks ten years 
later. The 1950s textbooks have two related tasks of promoting both the Marxist 
and the official nationalist ideology of the Yugoslav Communist Party. All the 
history in these books is explained in terms of the class struggle. This history 
teaches us that there were always oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and 
exploited, rich and poor, smaller but better organised minorities and broad 
suffering masses. History is explained in terms of the struggle between slaves 
and slave-owners, nobles and surfs, capitalists and proletarians. In the Middle 
Ages ‘the entire dominant feudal class lived off the hard labour of serfs’ (Mali & 
Salzer, 1954: 24). The authors are asking their readers for compassion by directly 
inviting them to ‘[ijmagine in what kind of poverty the workers lived! The 
capitalists grabbed great fortunes and lived comfortably and luxuriously on the 
fortune earned by the workers’ blisters’ (Cubelic, 1957a: 4). The way of life, 
values and attitudes of the bourgeoisie are described in scathing terms: 
‘education, culture and wealth were for the ruling class only’ (Mali & Salzer, 
1954: 119); ‘the attitude of the bourgeoisie towards life and the world is not 
directed towards the fulfilment of their religious duties; they do not think that this 
world is merely “the valley of tears” and “a preparation for another world” as the 
Church preaches’ (Salzer, 1953: 3).
In the 1950s textbooks, the institution of the Church appears as the second 
favourite villain in history. In their attempt to promote Marxist ideology, the 
authors engage in a crusade against Christianity. From the first pages of the first 
volume they make their accusations: ‘Christianity had already became a 
supporter of the dominant classes in the fifth century’ (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 19); 
‘the Church participated in the violent expropriation of land’ {ibid.: 22); ‘the 
Church prevented the development of science and obstructed the development of 
society’ {ibid.: 88; and Salzer, 1953: 20). It is interesting that in making these 
accusations against the Church and Christianity the authors use a more personal 
manner of addressing their readers: ‘Christianity, as we already know, supported 
the development of feudal relations’ (Mali & Salzer: 27; italics mine); ‘ we know  
that at that time there could be no political independence without church 
independence’ {ibid.: 42, 72; italics mine). However, the authors do not accuse
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the Church simply of being a traitor to the nation throughout history: ‘With the 
support of Christianity and the priests, the Franks could easily keep the people in 
subjugation’ (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 30); ‘Christianity promoted Germanization of 
the Slav tribes’ {ibid.: 74). After these descriptions of the Church and priesthood 
as oppressors and traitors, the authors allow themselves some moderation in 
admitting that ‘there were those who thought that religion is necessary and that a 
human being must be religious’ (Salzer, 1953: 253). In the place of religion, the 
authors of the 1950s history textbooks offer to their masses a large portion of 
ideology. They divide all human beings and their communities into the 
progressive and the reactionary. Progressive, for example, was Jacobin rule in the 
French Revolution of 1789 (Salzer, 1953: 124), as were the Bolsheviks in the 
October Revolution (Cubelic, 1957b: 27), Gavrilo Princip and the organisation 
‘Young Bosnia’ (Cubelic, 1957a: 58), and the broad masses in general.
The authors of the 1990s textbooks have a different opinion. The Croatian 
nationalist ideology of the 1990s makes an effort to confront the remnants of 
Communist ideology once and for all. The Yugoslav Communist regime is 
described as a dictatorship: ‘The Communists were saying one thing, but were 
doing and thinking another. They were talking about democracy while they were 
suffocating every freedom and acting undemocratically. Demagogy and violence 
were the methods they employed’ (Peric, 1994: 155). The 1990s textbooks are 
not only waging an ideological war against the Yugoslav Communists, but 
against Marxist ideology in general. The authors of the textbooks unequivocally 
state that ‘Marx’s solutions to economic and social problems were theoretically 
wrong’ (Mirosevic & Macan, 1995: 150). At this point, in support of their 
statement, the authors quote Pope Leo XIII, who ‘correctly observes in his 
encyclical Rerum novarum that the socialists are imposing violence, injustice and 
confusion in all strata of society, and that the accomplishment of their ideas 
would open a door to jealousy, gossip and discord among different societies, 
while the proclaimed equality would actually mean general poverty’ {ibid.).
Marxist ideology is not the only point of dispute between the 1950s and 1990s 
textbooks. Two nationalist ideologies are in direct opposition as well. As was 
shown in previous chapters, the Yugoslav Communists created a particular
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nationalist ideology which was supposed to accommodate both the individual 
nations that composed Yugoslavia and an overarching supra-nationalism. The 
1950s history textbooks attempt the same task. Even though the books emphasise 
and glorify the national history of each Yugoslav nation148 - thus, for instance, the 
history of the Croats - the supra-national Yugoslavism is ever-present. The 
authors emphasise the common origins of all South Slavs, the similarities in their 
culture, traditions, and languages, and common history. Throughout the 
textbooks, they write of ‘our countries’, ‘our people’, ‘our coast’ and ‘our coastal 
cities’. Many historical figures are described as ‘our man’ (Omer-pasha Latas, for 
example, Mali & Salzer, 1954: 260) or as ‘the sons of our country’ (Cubelic, 
1957b: 41). Others glorify ‘our people’ as ‘skilled and courageous warriors’ 
(Mali & Salzer, 1954: 12) who ‘have never willingly submitted to any foreign 
power’ {ibid.: 64).
In sharp contrast, the 1990s history textbooks make sure that the national identity 
of every important historical figure is well known: ‘Petar Zrinski, Croatian ban’ 
(Mirosevic & Sanjek, 1995: 284) or ‘Fran Hrsto Frankopan, Croatian Duke’ 
{ibid.: 285) for example. Another characteristic of these textbooks is the 
‘Croatisation’ of history. This is particularly evident in the description of the 
early history of the Croatian nation. Hence the authors stress, for example, that 
even though Pope Gregory I (590-604) mentioned the ‘Slavs’ in his letters, ‘new 
archaeological findings prove that they were Croats’ {ibid.: 47). With no 
evidence to support them, the authors claim that ‘without any doubt King 
Tomislav’s sympathies were on the side of the Croatian bishop’ {ibid.: 61). King 
Peter is described as ‘the last king of Croatian blood’ {ibid.: 154). In places 
where the texts name Dalmatia and Slavonia, the authors add ‘Croatia’ in 
brackets {ibid.: 47, 49, 64, 145). The anti-regional stance of 1990s Croatian 
nationalist ideology is also present in the history texts, and is most evident in a 
general avoidance of the name of Dalmatia, instead of which the authors tend to 
use the term ‘South Croatia’ (Mirosevic & Macan, 1995: 23, 27, 93, 96-97). 
Moreover, in discussion of the work of Pavao Ritter Vitezovic, the authors state 
that he ‘rightly, denied the integrity of Dalmatia, which was just a slave of
148 Except the Muslims - in the 1950s they were not recognised as a separate nation.
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Venice’ {ibid:. 27; italics mine). The authors Croatise even the Church - they 
write of ‘the Croatian Church’ in the eleventh century (Mirosevic & Sanjek, 
1995: 83) and ‘the Bishop of the Croats’ {ibid:. 61). While the 1990s textbooks 
have Croatia as a main actor in history - ‘Croatia could not reconcile’ {ibid., 63); 
‘harmful for Croatia’ {ibid., 170) - the 1943 textbooks have the Croatian people - 
‘the Croatian people was relying on’ (Jakic, 1943: 101); ‘first ties between Pope 
and the Croatian people’ {ibid:. 22); and ‘the Croatian people stayed in touch 
with’ (ibid:31).
These are just a few examples of the differences in vocabulary between the three 
sets of history textbooks, which highlight their ideological differences and refute 
the image of history texts as simply collections of historical facts.
7.4. Myths and Legends
Early histories of peoples and nations - histories of times when written 
testimonies were rare or did not exist at all - provide plenty of space for 
historians’ imagination. Myths and legends easily fill gaps left by the lack of 
historical facts. In this respect the three sets of history textbooks analysed here 
are no different from any others. However, it is interesting to compare the 
selection of myths and legends that appears in each set. Differences are obvious. 
While the 1950s textbooks chose to print those legends which promote supra­
national Yugoslavism, the 1943 and the 1990s textbooks attempt the very 
opposite, that is, to emphasise individuality and particularity of the Croatian 
nation with respect to the other South Slavs.
Hence, from the first pages of the first volume of the 1950s textbooks, the 
authors recount the legends of the so-called ‘Old Slavs’ in their ancient homeland 
in the Karpathian Mountains: ‘The Slavs believed that at the end of December, 
the sun liberates itself from the power of the evil gods. At this time the Slavs 
celebrated the “young sun” which will liberate them from winter and bring nature 
back to life again. That natural phenomenon has been celebrated by other nations 
as well, and so, later, the Christian Church chose this celebration as the
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celebration of Christmas’149 (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 9). In contrast, the authors of 
the 1990s textbooks emphasise, rather indirectly, the distinct origins of the 
Croats. They present a map entitled The origins and migration o f the Croats 
which shows that the Croats - or the Harauvat and Harahvati150 as they were 
known - originate from Persia, from where they migrated in the sixth and fifth 
centuries BC. In this way the authors not only show the distinct origins of the 
Croats, but they also extend the history of this people for ten centuries. 
According to the myth, the migration of Croats in the sixth century AD was led 
by five brothers (Kluk, Lobel, Muhlo, Kosens and Hrvat) and two sisters (Tuga 
and Buga). This myth also highlights the crucial role these Croats had in rescuing 
the Byzantine Empire from the Avars: ‘The time of the Croats’ migration to 
Illyria coincided with the defeat of the Avars under the ramparts of 
Constantinople’ (Mirosevic & Sanjek, 1995: 47).
The Ustashas’ history textbook uses the same myth of the migration (Jakic, 
1943a: 15). However, the author of this text had a more difficult task. Not only 
does he have to prove the difference between the Croats and the other South 
Slavs, but he also has to ‘make’ the Croats an Aryan race. Jakic clearly, without 
any doubt, states that the Croats ‘were not of pure Slavic origins’ (Jakic, 1943a: 
16). Yet, Jakic is not so positive about what the Croats were. He offers two 
interpretations:
[Some] scholars claim that [the Croats] were a German tribe, probably Goths, 
which settled on the other side of the Karpathian Mountains among a more 
numerous Slav population, and, as a consequence, over a certain period, it 
became Slavicised. Other scholars hold that they [the Croats] are relatives of 
some Iranian-Caucasian tribes, which during the great migration of people left 
their Caucasian homeland and settled in the Karpathian area, where they 
became Slavs. In any case, the Croats were not of pure Slav race and that is 
the reason why they were more capable o f creating a state then other Slavs. 
(Jakic, 1943: 17, italics in original)
Both the 1943 and the 1990s textbooks make a legend of the Croat warriors, the 
1950s textbooks describe the legendary resistance of ‘the people’ to all 
oppression. Hence, the 1950s textbook uses the legend of the death of
149 In the original, Christmas is printed in lower case.
150 In the Croatian language Croats are called Hrvati.
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Zvonimir151 to illustrate the people’s determination to defend their freedom. The 
authors explain that ‘the people had had enough of waging wars in the name of 
the Pope far from their homeland’ and that ‘the people were dissatisfied with 
Zvonimir’s internal politics’ which led to Zvonimir’s death (Mali & Salzer, 
1954: 59). Thus, while the Communist textbooks describe how Zvonimir was 
killed at the hands of fellow Croats, ‘modem Croatian historiography’, write the 
authors of the 1990s textbook, ‘rejected the legend of Zvonimir’s death on a 
Kosovo field next to the five churches around Knin’. According to legend, 
unfaithful Croats killed Zvonimir because he intended to lead them on a Crusade 
to Palestine. The dying king put a curse on the Croats that ‘they will never have a 
ruler who speaks their own language, but will always be subjugated by a foreign 
language’ (Mirosevic & Sanjek, 1995: 69). ‘It seems’, the authors {ibid.) 
conclude, ‘that the legend was created with the aim of justifying the rule of the 
Arpads152 in Croatia, since they appear as those claiming revenge for the 
allegedly vicious killing of the ruler’. Obviously ‘modem Croatian 
historiography’ could not permit the notion that Croats could kill another Croat. 
The 1943 textbook is even more clear in denial: ‘if that really happened, the 
writers of that time would record that event’ (Jakic, 1943a: 43).
The three sets of history textbooks create legends around different historical 
figures. This issue deserves special attention.
7.5. National Heroes
Biographies of national heroes form a major part of every history textbook. One 
of the main indications of an ideologically coloured history textbook is its choice 
of figures that are described as such. As could be expected, the history textbooks 
analysed here depict rather different characters as heroes.
As already mentioned, the 1950s textbooks dedicate considerable space to an 
account of the history of all the South Slavs. Hence, unlike the 1940s and 1990s
151 The ruler of Dalmatia and Croatia in the eleventh century.
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textbooks, the 1950s textbooks deal with the non-Croats as well as Croat national 
heroes. Interestingly, the Serb national heroes are dealt with in an unusually 
crude manner. It appears that the authors of the textbooks want to de-throne the 
Serbian national heroes, especially those most represented in Serbian national 
songs and epics. Hence Prince Marko, a character featured in many popular folk 
epics, is described in terms directly opposite to those used in the epics. While the 
national poems celebrate Prince Marko as a great hero of the struggle against the 
Turks in the fourteenth century, the textbooks describe him as a national traitor: 
‘From history we know that he [Prince Marko] did not fight against the Turks, 
but that he was a Turkish vassal, and so he fought with the Turks against 
Christians’ (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 166). The authors explain that Prince Marko 
became a national hero through the popular songs in which, through Marko’s 
deeds, ‘the oppressed people expressed their longing for freedom’ {ibid.: 167).
A whole series of Serbian national heroes are accused of the greatest sin of all: 
collaboration with the Turks. These include Konstantin Dejanovic during the 
Turkish raid in 1394 {ibid.: 176), the son of Duke Lazar Stevan Lazarevic (1389- 
1427) {ibid.: I l l ), and even Milos Obrenovic, the legendary leader of the Second 
Serbian Uprising in 1815 (Salzer, 1953: 167) who apparently helped the Turks in 
crushing the Hadzi-Prodan’s Uprising in 1814. Interestingly, one historic figure 
who appeared as a traitor in the popular folk songs - Vuk Brankovic - is 
described in the 1950s textbook as the one ‘who did not want to help the Turks’ 
so that the Turkish ruler gave all Brankovic’s land to Stevan Lazarevic (Mali & 
Salzar, 1954: 177). These discrepancies between Serbian popular epics and the 
history textbooks may arise out of an attempt by the Communist national 
ideology to make a space for new national heroes by ‘de-throning’ the old ones. 
It should also be noted that those Serbian national heroes who where traditionally 
praised as fighters against the Turks are described in especially negative terms. In 
this way, the whole story of the four centuries of Serbian struggle against the 
Turks - which was, and still is, one of the cornerstones of Serbian nationalism - is 
downgraded. This could also be seen as an attempt to put all the histories of the
152 Hungarian ruling family.
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Yugoslav nations on an equal footing and as a direct attack on Serbian 
nationalism.
The 1950s textbooks prefer those historical figures who were active at a cultural 
level to the heroes of the battlefields. Two Serbian national figures of the 
nineteenth century were Dositej Obradovic and Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, who 
are said to have established the ‘foundations of the Serbian culture and the 
transformation of the vernacular into a literary language’ (Salzer, 1953: 110 and
273). However, the 1990s textbooks have a different view of these historical 
figures. The 1950s textbooks forget, and the 1990s textbooks cannot fail to 
mention, Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic’s ‘language policy’. This policy could be 
summarised in his creeds ‘Serbs, all and everywhere’ (Mirosevic & Macan, 1995: 
67) and ‘Serbs of three confessions’ {ibid.). Karadzic and his ideas, in this view, 
are the ‘root of the Great Serbian ideology and Serbocentrism, which then, just as 
today, endangered the independence and freedom of the non-Serb nations of the 
Balkans’ {ibid.). The 1943 textbooks, however, completely ignored characters 
from Serbian history.
The case of Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic provides only one of many examples of 
discrepancies in views on national heroes between these textbooks. Better 
examples can be found in relation to Croatian historical figures.
The 1950s textbooks celebrate some of the very same Croatian national heroes as 
the 1943 and 1990s textbooks. These include Nikola Zrinski, a hero of the battle 
of Siget against the Turks (Mali & Salzer: 1954: 52), Matija Gubec, a popular 
leader of the peasant uprising in 1573 {ibid.: 75-82), and Petar Zrinski and Krsto 
Frankopan, whose plot against the Austrian rulers tragically ended with their 
execution in Vienna. The authors of the textbooks describe them as ‘the Croatian 
nobles who even though they defended their own personal gains in the first place, 
defended the interests of Croatia as well’ {ibid.: 90). All three sets of textbooks 
praise Croatian national heroes of the Middle Ages. However, there is a large 
discrepancy in their descriptions of historical figures of the nineteenth century.
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One of the most celebrated figures of the nineteenth century who appears in the 
1990s history textbooks is Ban Josip Jelacic. The textbook dedicated an eight- 
page chapter to this hero. He is described as ‘a nationally conscious Ban and as a 
soldier loyal to the Emperor’ (Mirosevic & Macan, 1995: 106). During the events 
of 1848 the Ban not only became a ‘fighter for Croatia’ but also a ‘fighter against 
the Magyar revolution and Viennese uprising’ {ibid.: 109) and as such he ‘saved 
Croatia from aggressive Magyar chauvinism’ {ibid.). According to the 1990s 
textbook, Jelacic also ‘defended the Croatian flag: he emphasised the importance 
of the flag to the masses during the events of 1848, and rejected regional flags as 
negations of the spirit of national unification’ {ibid.: 111). The 1943 textbooks 
mainly draw the same picture of Jelacic, though the emphasis is a little different. 
Jakic highlights Jelacic’s military ‘achievements’ by claiming that ‘the Croatian 
Ban’ crushed the revolt in Vienna (Jakic, 1943b: 93) even though he actually 
never reached Vienna.153
The 1950s textbooks have another view of the Ban’s role in these events. He is 
described as a man ‘in the service of the Viennese court’ who was ‘defending its 
reactionary policy’ (Salzer, 1953: 216). The author of this textbook finds it 
important to emphasise that Jelacic ‘had the support of the broad masses but at 
the same time was inclined towards feudal anti-popular aspirations’ {ibid.: 222); 
that he ‘established drumhead trials’ {ibid.: 224); that he served the reactionary 
court {ibid.: 226); and that he had an anti-revolutionary attitude {ibid.: 227). The 
most damning evidence against Jelacic was that he waged wars under the 
Emperor’s flag and for the Emperor’s benefit’ {ibid.). Nevertheless, the author of 
the textbook is careful not to accuse the whole nation of the same sins as those of 
which Jelacic is accused: ‘and while Jelacic continues to fight for the Habsburgs’ 
interests, the Croats maintain their resistance’ {ibid.: 228).154
And so, looking at these history textbooks we find that yet another historical 
figure appears as a national hero in the one and a traitor in the other. The 
textbooks do not deny or pass over in silence any important event of that era.
153 For more about Jelacic’s military expedition in 1848, see Goldstein (1999: 71).
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Yet, the perspectives on Jelacic’s deeds are contradictory. The Socialist regime 
could not forgive Jelacic for his anti-revolutionary attitude, and the 1940s and the 
1990s Croatian nationalist ideologies refuse to overlook a hero who fought 
Magyar chauvinism.
The greatest national hero for the 1943 textbook is Ante Pavelic, the Poglavnik 
(leader) of the Ustasha Movement. In the manner that German or Italian official 
publications of that time described the Fuhrer and Duce, Jakic describes ‘the 
greatness’ of Pavelic. Not only that Pavelic organised the Ustashas, established 
the Independent State of Croatia, gained international recognition of the state 
(sic!), and secured the state borders by himself, but he was also endowed with a 
visionary mind when he foresaw the ‘great war’ (Jakic, 1943b: 122). While the 
textbook readily glorifies Pavelic for including Bosnia within the Croatian 
borders {ibid.: 123), it somehow omits to mention that the whole of Dalmatia and 
Istria was handed to fascist Italy.
As could be expected, for the 1950s history textbooks Josip Broz Tito was the 
real hero, the ‘greatest son of our nations’. Tito’s leading role in the events of the 
1940s and 1950s is frequently highlighted. Over the course of 50 pages the 
authors use the phrase ‘the Communist Party with Tito at its head’ 14 times, and 
‘Military committee with Tito at its head’ twice. Tito is described as a great 
leader with a great love for his people: ‘Comrade Tito showed warm-heartedness 
and deep love, and great concern for his wounded combatants' (Cubelic, 1957b: 
76). Just a few pages later we read: ‘it was again Comrade Tito who thought of 
the wounded and ill combatants’ {ibid.: 80). All the military operations of the 
National Liberation Army during the Second World War are presented as having 
been under the direct command of Tito, who ‘demonstrated great military 
knowledge’ {ibid.: 78). The 1990s textbooks, in contrast, do not display such an 
enthusiasm for Tito and his deeds. The greatest sin Tito committed was his 
crushing of the Croatian Spring in 1971, and for the authors of the 1990s texts
154 It is worth mentioning that as soon as the Communists seized power in Yugoslavia in 1945, the 
statue of the Ban Jelacic disappeared from the main square in Zagreb which had borne his name, 
and the square was renamed the Square of the Republic.
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that deed is unforgivable and must be classified as an act of open hostility 
towards the Croatian nation.
However, the 1990s textbooks reserve a special place for another leader: Franjo 
Tudman. It is worth translating a part of the passage dedicated to the ‘great 
leader’:
Dr. Franjo Tudman, the president of the Republic, greatly contributed to 
the strength and international reputation of the Republic of Croatia. As a 
man whose preoccupation in life was a free and independent Croatia, who 
worked hard and suffered much for such a Croatia, as a man of great 
knowledge and experience, and as a powerful personality, Dr. Franjo 
Tudman was at the political helm, and did not allow any deviation or 
digression. His authority is respected in Croatia just as in the wider world. 
In his speeches, press conferences and interviews he always gave 
directions on and answers to all the most important questions at the right 
time and in the right way, (...) important for Croatia and its interests. 
Working for the good of Croatia, he was also active abroad. (Peric, 1994: 
213)
To conclude this analysis of how the three sets of history textbooks create and 
de-throne national heroes, it can be said that those individuals are not judged on 
their deeds, but rather in terms of their usefulness to national ideologies that were 
created long after their times. In addition, as could be expected, for each national 
ideology its own leader is the most important historical figure.
7.6. Nation, National Values, National Interests
The opposing ideologies that shaped the 1940s, 1950s and 1990s history 
textbooks could not but promote highly contrasting symbols and values. While 
the Communist ideology is preoccupied with emphasising class-based values and 
symbols, the followers of the Ustasha Movement and the nationalist ideology of 
Franjo Tudman exclusively promote values and symbols of the Croatian nation, 
but in rather different ways.
The 1943 history textbooks do not offer a clear definition of the nation. For such 
a definition one has to ‘read between lines’. The first impression when reading 
the textbook is that the nation in general, and definitely the Croatian nation, is a
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primordial phenomenon. The existence of the nation is ‘proven’ by pointing to 
the existence of the name of the nation. In other words, the fact that a social 
group named Hrvati existed since time immemorial and that it has been recorded 
throughout history, in these texts testifies to the continuity of the existence of the 
Croatian nation. Yet even these textbooks recognise that something significantly 
different happened in the course of the nineteenth century. Everything starts with 
the Napoleonic Wars. Jakic (1943b: 78) admits that ‘following the example of 
the French, the national consciousness of other peoples started to awaken, so that 
they became proud of their name, language and history’. The terminology used in 
this sentence could have several meanings. Awakening of the national 
consciousness literally could mean that at some point in history that 
consciousness existed, but was lost. It could also mean that national 
consciousness in the nineteenth century was a new phenomenon for previously 
‘un-awakened’ social groups. While discussing European events in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, Jakic points to the emergence of a new idea which 
claims that one nation cannot be subjugated by another. ‘Every nation has to 
decide its own destiny!’ (Jakic, 1943b: 83). The author explains that this idea is 
the basis of the ‘popular (national) idea’ {ibid., italics mine). ‘Patriotism’, Jakic 
continues, ‘became a new power in the world’ {ibid.).
The 1943 textbooks repeatedly emphasise that name, language and history are the 
main (only?) constituent elements of the nation. Even though the role and 
importance of religion is underlined throughout the textbook, the author omits it 
as a significant marker of nationality. From the content of the textbook it is clear 
that emphasis on religion at this time would be counter to national interests. After 
all, the textbook is also written for Bosnian Muslims, who were considered by 
the Ustasha regime as Croats. For this reason the textbook incorporates the 
history of Bosnia as Croatian history and Islam as one of the Croatian religions. 
From the first pages the textbooks educate the younger generation about 
Muhammad and the basic teachings of Islam. Muhammad is described as ‘a 
righteous and holy man’ (Jakic, 1943a: 17) and his work marked the ‘start of a 
new era for the Arab people, filled by great and famous deeds’ {ibid.). Just two 
pages later, the textbook stresses that ‘when the Turks came to the Balkan 
Peninsula, considerable numbers of the Croatian nation [in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina] embraced Islam’ {ibid.: 19). From now on, Jakic is very anxious to 
find an equilibrium between the history of Christianity and history of Islam. The 
first challenge came with the Crusades. Jakic {ibid.: 61) writes: ‘Since the 
Christians met the Muslims for the first time, the view that the Muslims were 
industrious and good people, just as the Christians, gradually prevailed. That is 
the reason why the hatred between the two religions considerably lessened’.
An attempt to integrate the Bosnian Muslims within the Croatian core demanded 
a peculiar interpretation of the events that marked the Ottoman expansion on the 
Balkan Peninsula. As shown earlier, the 1943 textbooks celebrate those who 
distinguish themselves in the wars against the Ottomans as Croatian national 
heroes. At the same time it was necessary to celebrate heroes of the Bosnian 
Muslims who distinguished themselves in the same war, but on the other side. 
Jakic mentions many Muslim ‘heroes and knights’ (1943b: 14), like Mustajbeg 
of Lika, Smail-aga Cengic,155 Gazi Huser-beg and Omer-pasha Latas.
Nevertheless, in spite of their different religions, the 1943 textbook presented 
Croatian Catholics and Muslims as sharing the same values. A frequently 
repeated characteristic of the Croats is their loyalty and readiness to lay down 
their lives for their rulers. In that vein we read that the Croats fought and died for 
Maria Teresa just as for Napoleon {ibid.: 65 and 82), and that ‘with their blood 
they defended not only themselves, but the other nations as well’ {ibid.: 26). By 
fighting against the Ottomans for centuries, the Croats ‘defended Vienna and 
Middle Europe’ {ibid.: 21 and 24). At the same time, the textbook emphasises, 
‘many Croats achieved the highest positions in Turkey and committed great 
deeds for the Turkish state’ {ibid.: 14).
These heroic stories aimed to instil national pride and glorify Croatian military 
traditions. The young generation had to be reconciled with the idea that they
155 In 1831 Smail-aga crushed a peasant revolt in Herzegovina that was supported by the 
Montenegrins. In revenge Montenegrin Vladika Peter II Petrovic NjegoS sent a small gang to 
assassinate Smail-aga. This event was described by a Croatian poet Ivan Mazuranic in his famous 
epic ‘Death of Smail-aga Cengic’. Jakic (1943b: 106) writes: ‘the content of the epic does not 
completely correspond with the truth. Cengic was not so bad a man, as rumour says, and he was a 
hero greater than many others’.
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might be asked to give their own lives for the national cause, just as their 
ancestors did. Hence, at every opportunity, the 1943 textbook underlines how 
history teaches us that ‘the nations could never gain their freedom and 
independence without great struggle and sacrifices’ {ibid.: 98, 103 and 123). The 
atrocities committed by the Ustashas from 1941 until 1945 gained its justification 
- it is all in the name of the nation.
Ten years later the authors of the 1950s textbooks aim at reconciling the separate 
histories of the Yugoslav nations. Hence, the histories of all the nations must be 
presented as equally glorious and heroic. Past clashes between them, if 
mentioned at all, are mostly explained as having been initiated by foreign 
oppressors and aggressors or the domestic bourgeoisie. The authors demonstrate 
how the emphasis on the ‘narrow’ national values, symbols and cultures of the 
Yugoslav nations produced the extreme nationalisms of the period of the Second 
World War. According to Marxist ideology, nationalism is an ideology of the 
bourgeoisie that has as its aim the promotion of their class interests; it must 
therefore be overcome in the new socialist order. The interests of the broad 
masses are proclaimed to be the main concern of the authors of these textbooks. 
As could be expected, the glorious revolution of 1941-1945 provides the focus of 
the main symbols and values associated with the ‘progressive forces’ of 
Yugoslavia, that is, the working class, peasants and the ‘honourable 
intelligentsia’.
The authors constantly emphasise the revolutionary spirit of the masses 
throughout history. They write of the ‘slave revolutions’ in the third and fourth 
centuries AD (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 3, 5), of the ‘revolutionary people’ in the 
sixteenth century Reformation (Salzer, 1953: 23), and the ‘serfs’ revolution’ of 
the 1573 peasant uprising in Croatia {ibid.: 75) They celebrate the Hussite 
revolution, the French Revolution, which is described as ‘the first attempt to 
introduce communism’ {ibid.: 124), and, of course, the October Revolution. But 
for these authors, the Yugoslav revolution of 1941-1945 sets the precedent for 
future Yugoslav generations. This was the revolution during which the Yugoslav 
peoples showed that they ‘loved their country’, that ‘they knew how to fight and 
were willing to lay down their lives for their country’ (Cubelic, 1957b: 59).
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Through this revolution the Yugoslav people ‘won the right to determine their 
own destiny’ {ibid.: 85). Moreover, the author claims that the ‘liberation struggle 
of the Yugoslav nations became a model for the rest of the enslaved nations of 
Europe’ {ibid.: 67). Thus the histories and glorious battles which have been 
celebrated by the individual Yugoslav nations could not compete with the 
‘greatest struggle in the history of our nations’ {ibid.: 100). The revolution of 
1941-1945 became a symbol of the common struggle of the Yugoslav nations for 
their freedom. It became a symbol of ‘the brotherhood and unity of all the 
Yugoslav nations’ {ibid.: 94, 101, 106). The author stresses that ‘there is no force 
which could cause the Yugoslav people to stray from the path on which they 
have been set by the Party and Comrade Tito’ {ibid.: 87). For the author, this 
history textbook is his own small contribution to the people’s task.
The 1990s history textbooks have another goal: to destroy the symbols and 
values created by the Communist regime and to promote and propagate new, this 
time ‘pure’ national values and symbols of Croatia. The ideology of the 
Communist regime is used as a symbol for anything imposed on and foreign to 
the Croatian nation and the Croatian culture. The history of Croatia must prove 
that this nation is, if not the oldest, then at least as old as the oldest Western 
European nations. It must prove that the Croatian nation has always been a part 
of Western history and west European Catholic ‘civilisation’. It must prove that 
Croatia is not a Balkan, but a central European country.
In pursuing this goal the authors of the 1990s history books use the terms 
‘civilisation’ and ‘cultural zones’ not only to emphasise that the Croatian nation 
has always belonged to Western Europe, but also to sever all relations between 
Croatia and the other South Slav nations, particularly the Serbs. The term 
‘civilisation’ in this context underlines the differences in culture, history, 
interests and values between the nations, and emphasises incompatibilities 
between the populations. The border between the two civilisations in the Balkan 
peninsula was, according to the authors, established in 395 AD with the division 
of the Roman Empire: ‘the dividing line, which on the Balkan peninsula runs 
from the River Drina straight to the Adriatic Sea, is the civilisational, cultural and 
religious border between West and East, between Rome and Constantinople,
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between universalistic (Catholic) and nationalistic (Orthodox) Christianity’ 
(Mirosevic & Sanjek, 1995: 12). The River Drina hence becomes a border 
between two civilisations, between two cultural zones, and Croatia is firmly 
established within an ‘area of Western culture and civilisation’ (Mirosevic & 
Macan, 1995: 12).
The Croatian nation is described as a nation with a ‘millennial history’ {ibid.:
274), or, to be more precise, the authors are dealing with ‘13 centuries of written
Croatian history’ {ibid.: 297). The Croats comprise ‘the only nation within
western Christianity with a millennial liturgical tradition in their national
language’ {ibid.: 49). The authors emphasise ‘the unity of Croatian culture, which
will later become one of the cornerstones of national consciousness’ {ibid.: 41).
All of this is supposed to be proof that Croatia is one of the oldest nations in
Europe. In addition to its long existence, according to the authors, the Croatian
nation meets the necessary criteria of nationhood, since ‘the main features which
distinguish one nation from another are a common economy and common social
interests, language, culture, history and political consciousness’ {ibid.: 63). Later
in the textbook, when outlining the errors made by Ljudevit Gaj, who defined the
nation solely on the basis of a common language, the authors claim that:
he did not realise that a nation requires other features like the feeling of 
belonging and knowledge of its origins, common history and state 
tradition, a developed ideology of national consciousness (which serves to 
integrate the different social strata and territories, and to propagate a 
common religion and general outlook on the world), the democratisation 
of politics, a longing for a shared future, and highly developed political, 
economic, cultural and institutional inter-connections and goals, {ibid.:
99)
A nation which meets all these criteria is entitled to its own nation-state in which 
‘there should be the rule of the majority’ {ibid.: 63).
It was not only the case that the ‘Croatian nation was following the route taken 
by other nations as an integral part of Europe’ {ibid.: 4), but, furthermore, the 
Croats have also been the defenders of Europe. Using many examples, the 
authors teach their readers about the historical injustice done to the Croatian 
nation. They underline how ‘throughout their long history the Croats unselfishly 
and actively participated in the building of the European Christian civilisation’
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{ibid.\ 200), and yet, on many occasions they were abandoned by the European 
powers. For example, ‘in the war with the Turks, the Croats were not only 
defending their own freedom, but that of Europe as well, especially its central 
part. Waging a war for others as well, with minimal help from Europe (...) the 
Croatian people were strengthening their self-consciousness about their survival 
on these territories’ {ibid.: 168). ‘For two centuries’ the authors accuse, ‘Croatia 
was bleeding, suffering and pleading for help’ {ibid.: 268). The struggle of the 
Croats ‘amazed Europe’ {ibid.: 181); ‘Zrinski’s victories strongly resounded 
throughout Europe’ {ibid.: 285); ‘the heroic defence of the two Croatian heroes 
(...) saved Vienna from the Turks’ {ibid.: 186). Who else, then, is more deserving 
of the title ‘rampart of Christianity’ then the Croats {ibid.: 187)?
The authors focus on Catholicism as one of the most important features of the 
Croatian nation. On the basis of religion, the authors explain, the Croats built 
their specific national values. They created an image of themselves as the people 
chosen to be Antemurale Cristhianiatatis. Their national interests were closely 
tied to their religious mission. Religion, then, became the source of all the 
national values and interests they proclaimed. The destiny of Catholicism in the 
Balkans became dependent on the strength of the religious beliefs of the Croats. 
To emphasise this link between the nation and religion, the authors present a 
short history of the Catholic Church in parallel with the history of the Croatian 
nation. The Church is presented as the key political, cultural and social force in 
Europe throughout its history. Hence, the Crusades are described as a ‘kind of 
opening drama for the Europe o f nations, and they also brought this Europe’s 
first success: they liberated (albeit only temporarily) Jesus’ grave’ (Mirosevic & 
Sanjek, 1995: 11; italics in original). Sixty pages later the authors find that a 
motive of the Crusades lay in ‘Western solidarity with the oppressed Christians 
of the East’ {ibid.: 74). Furthermore, the authors try to mitigate the negative 
image of the Inquisition, in claiming that ‘liberal historians over-emphasised the 
inhumanity of the Inquisition and exaggerated the number of victims’ {ibid.: 
142), and that the ‘clash between the Inquisition and Galileo Gallilei arose from 
misunderstanding’ {ibid.: 143). The Church is described as a major force against 
slavery {ibid.: 89), as a force against the rich and on the side of the poor {ibid.:
100). ‘The Church was seen in feudal society’, the author claims, ‘as an
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institution which gave ethical inspiration and provided basic social functions, like 
education, administration, the dissemination of information (novelties are more 
easily propagated in churches)’ {ibid.: 136). The Church even ‘confronted the 
military-inclined nobles and proclaimed “God’s peace’” {ibid.: 143).
Even though the authors are constantly emphasising the universalism of the 
Catholic Church, in contrast to the nationalism of Orthodoxy, they write of the 
importance of the ‘Church among Croats’ {ibid.: 263) to the development of 
national culture. Hence, fraternities, like the orders of St. Francis and St. 
Benedict can be praised for ‘developing new artistic expression within the 
Croatian territory’, ‘preserving the oldest documents of Croatian national history’ 
and ‘improvement of the Croatian economy’ {ibid.: 133). The Franciscans 
‘contributed enormously to the development of science, expansion of education, 
and the struggle for better human relations; and with their personal talents and 
sense of beauty they created immortal works of art and, hence, enriched the 
cultural heritage of their nation’ {ibid.: 134). The Jesuit monasteries, meanwhile, 
became the ‘focus of intellectual, cultural and religious life’ {ibid.: 135). The 
authors of the textbooks thus teach their readers that religion in general and the 
Catholic Church in particular became an integral part of Croatian national history 
and culture.
One of the most important achievements of the Catholic Church, according to the 
authors, was ‘the establishment of a firm social and moral order within the 
decadent Western Christianity’ {ibid.: 43). The authors describe the introduction 
of Christianity to the Croats as an ‘historical turning-point’ {ibid.: 47) and their 
conversion to Christianity as a ‘painstaking process of centennial preaching 
through which a Christian mentality evolved’ {ibid.: 48). The authors regard the 
Papal Encyclicals as the source of the values the Croats cherish. They quote the 
Encyclical Rerum novarum of Leo XIII which states that ‘in this world inequality 
must exist (since not all people have the same intellectual capabilities, they are 
not equally diligent, nor do they have the same strength and health)’ (Mirosevic 
& Macan, 1995: 147). The Pope hereby rejects the socialist solution which is 
‘unacceptable because it is unjust’ and appeals to ‘human solidarity’ {ibid.: 147). 
In place of socialism and socialist values, the textbook offers another set of
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values: ‘in the free market societies (capitalism), by the end of the nineteenth 
century the workers had already achieved social security, better education, better 
working and leaving conditions, and salaries which were sufficient for decent 
living (enough to support themselves, their wives and children, to save, and to 
own property)’ {ibid.). This is a picture of the ideal life for every Croat at the end 
of the twentieth century.
7.7. National Enemies
The 1940s, 1950s and 1990s history textbooks published in Croatia portray the 
histories of other nations, states and communities in ways most appropriate for 
the nationalist ideologies which influenced these books. During the 1950s, the 
real enemies of the South Slavs, and hence of Croatia, were perceived to be the 
entire Western and Eastern blocs. On the other hand, the most significant 
enemies of the Croatian nation in both the 1940s and 1990s were the Serbs. In the 
1990s textbooks they are portrayed as having been the enemies of the nation 
throughout its history. The 1943 textbook has a longer list of national enemies. 
Thus it appears that, once again, contemporary politics wrote the history.
In the 1950s, Yugoslavia found itself between two hostile blocs. As a socialist 
country, it was isolated from the Western ‘capitalist’ countries which labelled it 
an ideological enemy. In 1949, on the grounds of its Titoism, Yugoslavia was 
isolated from the Eastern socialist bloc as well. The authors of the 1950s history 
textbooks faced the task of explaining to their readers both the corruption of the 
West and the dangers of Stalinism.
According to the 1950s textbooks the South Slav nations had, throughout their 
history, suffered at the hands of stronger nations. Venetian, Norman, Frank, 
German, Hungarian, Austrian, Russian, French, Turkish and many other armies 
all passed through the territories of the South Slavs at some time in history. They 
exploited ‘the internal conditions of the South Slav nations in grabbing parts of 
the (their) territory for themselves’ (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 57). They used every 
means to conquer the Slavs. They ‘tortured them and massacred the adult
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population, and took the children away with them’ {ibid.: 74). They ‘used every 
opportunity to weaken the power of the Croatian nobles’ {ibid.: 70). However, 
they were cowards who ‘would run away even before the battle started’ {ibid.: 
202). No wonder, then, that these conquerors ‘provoked hatred and repulsion 
among the Slavs’ {ibid.: 74).
The authors of the textbooks do not concern themselves only with the 
conquerors. Russia, throughout history, bore the label of protector of the Slavs 
under the Turkish yoke, and among the Serbian and Montenegrin populations 
enjoyed great popularity. The authors try to diminish the role Russia played in 
these territories in the past, in order to alter popular attitudes towards Russia in 
their own day. Hence the authors stress several times that Russia ‘deserted the 
Serbs’ (Salzer, 1954: 157); that ‘Russia did nothing to help the position of the 
Montenegrin tribes’ {ibid.: 176). They explain that ‘Russia exploited unrest 
among the Balkan nations under Turkish rule, and encouraged the Slavs to rise 
up against the Turks’ (Cubelic, 1957a: 85); however ‘this was done not in the 
interests of the Balkan nations but in its own interests’ {ibid.). Just like Western 
countries, Russia was only following ‘its own imperialist aspirations’ {ibid.: 49). 
Nothing had changed in twentieth-century Soviet Union: the events of 1949 are 
described as yet another ‘attempt by the government of the Soviet Union to 
subjugate our country to its own interests’ (Cubelic, 1957b: 106). The lonely and 
righteous South Slavs, as they are depicted, have only one option. History finally 
taught us that ‘the only way to suppress the national hatreds among the Balkan 
nations and prevent further interference of the great powers in the events of the 
Balkan’ was to create the Balkan federation - Yugoslavia (Cubelic, 1957a: 92). 
The 1990s history textbooks describe that creation - Yugoslavia - as the most 
vicious enemy of the Croatian nation.
In the 1950s textbooks the Serbs are portrayed as those who ‘were the first in the 
Balkans who rose up to fight for their freedom’ (Salzer, 1953: 144); who fought 
for their freedom with ‘great determination and courage’ (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 
168); who, in time, created an ‘internally strong state, which became an 
important political power on the Balkan peninsula’ {ibid.: 117); who, in the First 
World War, ‘fought the aggressor heroically’ (Cubelic, 1957b: 7); who were
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celebrated by the other South Slavs for their ‘heroic struggle and (who) 
demonstrated how people should fight their aggressors’ {ibid.) - but the authors 
of the 1943 and 1990s textbooks have a different opinion.
Throughout the 1990s textbooks, the authors portray the Serbs as the eternal 
enemies of the Croats. The events from the 1990s are explained as the 
consequence of the Serbs’ centuries-long hatred of ‘everything Croatian’. From 
the first mention of the Serbs, the authors emphasise the depths of that hatred. 
Evidence of this is found by the authors in the events of 1444, when a ‘Christian 
Army’, supported by Pope Pius n, was waging a war against the Turks in which 
it was defeated. ‘That defeat’ the authors claim, ‘was the outcome of the deceitful 
Byzantine politics of the Serbian despot (Durad Brankovic) and many others 
among the Orthodox, who “preferred to see in Constantinople a Turkish turban to 
a Roman hat”. Hatred of everything Latin (Catholic) had already overwhelmed 
Orthodoxy in the fifteenth century, even when [the Catholics] were defending 
them from the Turks’ (Mirosevic & Sanjek, 1995: 124). It appears that the 
Serbian hatred of the Croats originated in their hatred of Catholicism.
The authors dedicate significant space to an account of the origins of the Serbs on 
Croatian territory. All sets of textbooks - those published in the 1940s, 1950s and 
1990s - agree that the Serbs from Krajina are Serbianised Orthodox Vlachs. 
These Vlachs migrated to the area of Krajina in the sixteenth century. At first, the 
Vlachs were in the service of the Turks. Their ‘sudden and vicious attacks on the 
territories which had belonged to the Croats for centuries left these areas as 
wasteland’ {ibid.: 185). They ‘burned Croatian villages, purged, pillaged and 
killed’ {ibid.). According to the authors of the 1990s textbooks, after the Turkish 
defeat under the city of Sisak in 1593, the Vlachs ‘wanted to change their 
masters’ {ibid.). They took the side of the Austrians and migrated to Croatian 
territory. However, the area of Military Krajina where the Vlachs settled was 
under the direct control of Vienna, so ‘from the beginning the Vlachs in Croatia 
had a special political role: in the service of the Austrian generals they were 
supposed to destroy Croatian rule on Croatian territory’ {ibid.). Hence, the events 
of the sixteenth century and earlier are used as justification for the events that
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would occur a few centuries later. The Vlachs, described as ‘unwanted guests’ 
and ‘newcomers’ {ibid.: 273), soon became known as the Serbs of Croatia.
In the 1860s, the issue of recognition of the Serbs in Croatia as a separate nation 
produced the first open hostilities on the political scene between that group and 
the Croats. In the 1990s texts, the rejection of the Serb demand is justified in 
terms of the events of the 1990s: ‘recognition of the Serbian people in Croatia [in 
the 1860s] would have meant recognition of another sovereign people on the 
territory of Croatia, and that would have supported the Great Serbia ideology 
which regarded certain Croatian territories as Serbian, and it would also have 
meant a weakening of the Croatian state-right in the constitutional struggle of the 
time’ (Mirocevic & Macan, 1995: 173). Once again, the blame for the period of 
hostility between the Croats and the Croatian Serbs is placed on the Orthodox 
priesthood: ‘Their priesthood cherished the memory of the Medieval Serbian 
state and hence religion was used to enhance national consciousness. When they 
did not accept Illyrianism, the Serbs in South Croatia established a base for their 
own separate national development, for their own national awareness and for 
connections with their homeland outside Croatia’ {ibid.: 182). Thus the priests 
were responsible for transforming the Vlachs into nationally conscious Serbs. 
The Orthodox priesthood of Bosnia and Herzegovina is accused of the same sin 
{ibid.: 151).
The foreign policy of the Serbian state is equally to blame. This policy is 
described as expansionistic, aggressive, and Serbocentric; as an expression of 
Greater Serbian politics: ‘Serbia wanted to expand into other people’s territories’ 
{ibid.: 151); the state was preoccupied with ‘the Serbocentric plan of gathering 
all Serbs within a single Greater Serbian state’ {ibid.). This policy was clearly 
manifest, the authors claim, in Serbian interference in the internal affairs of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resulted in the 1875 uprising, in the 1885 war 
against Bulgaria, in the Balkan wars, and, above all, in Yugoslavia. The Serbs are 
accused of ‘dishonestly glorifying and mythologising their history, especially in 
relation to the period of Dusan’s empire. They claimed that Dusan’s Serbia 
extended to Bosnia and Croatia, and even to the Czech Republic, when it is well 
known that it did not cross the River Drina. They described Bosnia and
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Macedonia as the Serbian lands’ (.ibid.'. 153). The kind of conquerors the Serbs 
were is illustrated by the authors with the example of the Albanians: ‘On the 
territories conquered in 1877/78 they started to persecute the Albanians and 
carried out genocide against them. They burned Albanian houses till the people 
abandoned the territories in which they were living’ {ibid.). And history has 
taught us that Serbian expansionist politics in the Balkans ‘has continued to be a 
most deadly danger until recent days’ {ibid.).
Thus the authors present the Serbs and the Serbian state in such a way that the 
events at the end of the twentieth century, and, more specifically, in Yugoslavia, 
become explicable. With the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the Croats would 
experience this aggressive Serbian nationalist ideology first-hand. From the 
beginning, the Serbs displayed their ‘political primitivism’ (Peric, 1994: 57). 
They brought ‘terror to the Slovenian and Croatian populations’, ‘they burnt 
Slovenian and Croatian institutions’ {ibid.: 59). Gendarmes beat Croatian 
peasants {ibid.: 58); ‘humiliated peasants’ were told that the ‘Serb is their only 
“master and God”, and were made to kneel in front of sajkaca,156 {ibid.: 58). The 
atrocities committed by the Serbs in the first years of Yugoslavia were numerous. 
It all culminated in the 1928 murder of Stjepan Radic.
The Second World War provides the late twentieth-century authors with more 
material to support their claim of an eternal Serbian hatred ‘of everything 
Croatian’. The collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941 after seven days’ resistance 
allows the authors to ridicule the myth of Serbian military superiority: ‘the 
Serbian people, who were always boasting about their military skills and their 
patriotism, showed neither their military courage nor “loyalty to the fatherland”; 
they avoided direct confrontations and deserted their military units; they did not 
refrain from cowardliness or treachery’ {ibid.: 132). The authors spare a few 
pages to describe the Chetniks’ crimes against the Croats: ‘They showed 
themselves to be robbers, arsonists and butchers of an innocent population’ 
{ibid.: 160); ‘they expressed their commitment to crime through the song they 
enjoyed singing: “We Chetniks can do it, what is not good we’ll kill it!” {ibid.)\
156 Serbian national hat.
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they also ‘bum schools and Catholic churches’ (.ibid.\ 161). The author gives 
similar space to a description of the ‘partisan-Serbs’ {ibid.: 164) killing ‘several 
tens of thousand of people’ in Blaiburg and Spanovica {ibid.). On the other hand, 
it is interesting to note, the authors describe the Ustashas’ atrocities in two 
paragraphs, that is, in four sentences {ibid.: 136).
The Ustasha textbook, on the other hand, does not bother to mention Serbian 
history. The first mention of Serbia is only in the second half of the first volume 
and even then only as a route of the Tatars’ retreat (Jakic, 1943a: 69). The 1943 
textbooks are more preoccupied with the history of the Croatian Serbs. These 
textbooks, just as the 1990s textbooks, offer a similar story of the Vlachs’ 
migrations in Croatia and adoption of the Serbian name. The Serbs gain some 
importance only with the discussion of the events in Croatia in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. While the textbooks could not fail to mention the relevance 
of the Illyrian Movement for the ‘national awakening’ of the Croats, the author 
emphasises the mistakes and misconceptions of Ljudevit Gaj and Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer - for example, their assertion that the South Slavs are one nation 
(Jakic, 1943b: 88). Jakic stresses the naivete of the two national leaders who 
wanted to create a common state with the Serbs, while Serbia was simultaneously 
developing its own concept of the ‘Great Serbia’ {ibid.: 100). The author explains 
how Croatian Serbs were always taking the side of the Hungarian and Austrian 
rulers, against Croatian interests {ibid.: 109), that history proved that every co­
operation with the Serbs was harmful for the Croatian interests, such as the 
formation of Croatian-Serbian coalition at the end of the nineteenth century 
{ibid.: 112). Everything culminated with the formation of the Yugoslav Kingdom 
when ‘the Croats were exposed to Serbian mercy’ {ibid.: 119). In that state the 
Serbs ‘had all power in their hands’ {ibid.) and the Orthodox Church had ‘more 
rights than the Catholic and Muslim had’ {ibid.: 120). The period between the 
world wars are described as ‘years of terrible persecutions’ when ‘the Croatian 
patriots were imprisoned, tortured and brought in front of the firing squad’ {ibid.: 
121). Jakic describes the establishment of Alexander’s dictatorship in 1929 as the 
beginning of a ‘Croatian Golgota’ {ibid.). ‘The dictatorship’, the author 
concludes, ‘marks the final break between the Croats and the Serbs’ {ibid.). After
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these explanations, what was perpetrated during Ustasha rule could only be 
understood as revenge.
While the Serbs were portrayed in the 1943 textbooks as national enemies, the 
Jews were a kind of class enemy. The author frequently repeats that the majority 
of the world capitalists were Jews {ibid:. 91). He claims that the same happened 
in Croatia and Bosnia where the main profiteers of the economic development in 
the nineteenth century were ‘foreigners, mainly Jews’ {ibid.: 109). The ‘Jewish 
crime’ was illustrated through a description of the world economy in the inter- 
war period. Jakic {ibid.: 118) writes: ‘Capitalism in the “winning” states had 
developed as never before by dragging the broad masses, especially workers and 
peasants, into worse poverty. Almost all capital, that is, money, was gathered in 
Jewish hands’. Even though the textbook does not express any racist view 
towards the Jews, it should be mentioned that only 12 per cent of the pre-1941 
Jewish population in the territories controlled by the Ustashas - Croatia and 
Bosnia - survived the war.
7.8. Conclusion
At first glance, one might imagine that a history textbook is a collection of facts 
about events and battles, maps, and the dates of birth and death of important 
historical figures. It may be a book that one has had to learn by heart in 
childhood, and not considered interesting bed-time reading. Another 
characteristic of this kind of book is that the facts it contains are taken for granted 
and rarely, if ever, questioned by its readers. I have to admit that I found reading 
Croatian history textbooks much more interesting than I had expected. In these 
three sets of textbooks, the history of the nation is an ideologically coloured, 
interesting mix of historical facts, myths and legends. History written in this 
manner turns into an account of national values, interests and aspirations. These 
textbooks tell us more about the ideologies underlying them and the political 
circumstances of the time in which they were written, than about the history of 
Croatia and other nations.
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To conclude this analysis of the 1940s, 1950s and 1990s Croatian history texts, 
their major characteristics can be briefly summarised. The major feature of the 
1990s books is their strong emphasis upon the victimisation of the Croatian 
nation. They show how the Croats were victims of numerous, aggressive, morally 
suspect nations, religions and states. Readers of such a story must sympathise 
with the Croatian side. It proves that the Croats, who had suffered throughout 
history, can find salvation only in their own independent national state. The 
authors of the 1950s textbooks apply the same methods to another subject. It is 
not only the Croatian nation, but all South Slav nations which have suffered and 
sacrificed themselves for higher causes throughout their history. However, while 
the 1990s textbooks give primacy to the nation, the 1950s books emphasise the 
sufferings of the masses oppressed both by other imperialist nations and the 
privileged classes of their own nations. These oppressed masses can finally be 
free and happy only within a socialist state, in which class oppression is bound to 
have been eliminated. This reasoning has another consequence. While the authors 
of the 1940s and 1990s textbooks blame entire nations for the atrocities 
committed against the Croats, the 1950s books take the line of Communist 
ideology. The aggressors, oppressors and murderers are never nations or peoples, 
but the leaders, governments, ideologists and other ‘reactionary elements’ of 
nations and states.
It would be impossible to demonstrate that the textbooks written in 1943 
influenced the authors of the 1990s textbooks. However, many similarities can be 
observed. The suffering and heroic Croatian nation is the main actor of history in 
both sets of books. They emphasise similar myths and legends of the Croatian 
origins. The nation is defined in similar ways, but the 1990s textbooks are even 
more exclusive in defining the Croatian nation mainly because the idea of 
Croatisation of the Bosnian Muslims was ‘unacceptable’ after the 1993-95 
Croatian-Bosnian war. Surprisingly, the 1943 textbooks do not reflect entirely 
the Ustashas’ nationalist ideology. Even though the author’s attempt to present 
the Croats as an Aryan race is almost comical, the textbooks do not show any 
wish to elaborate the racist part of the Ustasha ideology. Nevertheless, it could 
be said that the major characteristics of the history textbooks are, at the same 
time, major characteristics of the respective nationalist ideologies.
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The analysed texts were written just a few years after the creation of new states - 
the Independent State of Croatia in 1941, socialist Yugoslavia in 1945 and the 
independent Republic of Croatia in 1992. It could be said that such ‘young’ states 
require ideological support to provide stability and to legitimise their existence. 
However, it is clear that the ideologically-driven school curricula, which lasted 
for almost fifty years, could not prevent the collapse of Yugoslavia and of the 
concept of Yugoslavism that had such a strong presence in the 1950s history 
textbooks. One might argue that any concept of supra-nationalism has little 
chance when contested by the nationalism of a particular nation. The events 
surrounding the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s offer some support for that 
viewpoint. However, the Croatian nationalism of the early 1990s was not 
bolstered by the social structure. The schools’ curricula, legislation, and the 
media were still firmly in the hands of the Communist Party. Hence, if a school 
curriculum is seen to shape the national identity of the pupils by propagating a 
particular nationalist ideology, one would have cause to question the stability of 
that national identity. It is difficult to imagine that the national identity of the 
Croats will change with a new history textbook. I am inclined to believe that the 
ideologically coloured textbooks can tell us something about the political 
circumstances in which they were written, rather then about the political attitudes 
of their readers.
All three sets of history textbooks were approved by their Ministries of 
Education, something that is clearly stated on their cover pages. From that fact 
we can only guess the extent to which the official state structures influenced the 
content of the textbooks. The above analysis, however, showed that the dominant 
Croatian nationalist ideologies have been clearly reflected in the school 
curriculum since the nineteenth century. Besides their educational function, these 
textbooks could also be seen as attempts to institutionalise these nationalist 
ideologies. As such they present an historical and ‘scientific’ justification of the 
ideology itself, an explanation of the origins of such an ideology and the political 
programmes of the creators of these ideologies.
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The ideologisation of the school curriculum signifies that the proponents of a 
nationalist ideology succeeded in transforming both the structural level of the 
society (exemplified by establishing full control over the education system), and 
the cultural level (exemplified by the formation of ‘official’ history). The 
achievement of a situation of ‘necessary complementarity’ between the levels of 
structure and culture, according to Archer’s framework, marks the last stage of 
social morphogenesis - the elaboration of structure and culture. Hence, the 
institutionalisation of a nationalist ideology by means of the creation of ‘official’ 
national history offered in school textbooks is one of the marks of the end, rather 
than the beginning, of a morphogenetic cycle of nation-formation. The new 
nationalist corporate agents formed a stable political structure that supported their 
ideas and ideology - like, for example, the Ustashas in the period 1941-43, or the 
Communists in 1945-50. The political structure of a society is transformed in 
such a way that it is able to strongly influence the form and the content of the 
educational system. Such an educational system aims at legitimising the existing 
social structure and dominant culture. The newly-established forms of social 
structure and culture condition further social interaction within society, and 
hence open a space for the beginning of a new morphogenetic cycle. Once firmly 
established at all levels of the social reality, the new corporate agency, in order to 
maintain its position, would have to either prevent the formation of a conflicting 
corporate agency or incorporate in its system new tendencies. While the Ustasha 
regime collapsed after only four years, unable to compete with the oppositional 
Partisan Movement, the Communist regime lasted for almost fifty years by either 
eliminating the opposition, or restructuring its structural and cultural systems to 
accommodate new social groups and ideas.
The last remaining questions that this thesis has to tackle is ‘how can an 
educational system gain support from the primary agents?’, that is, to paraphrase 
Eugene Weber, ‘how can it transform the peasants into good nationalists?’. In the 
next chapter I will deal with this question and examine to what extent these 
institutionalised nationalist ideologies are actually accepted by the primary 
agents.
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Chapter Eight
PRIMARY AGENTS: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE 
NATION
After examining the ways the nation has been perceived at the structural and 
cultural levels by the corporate agents in Croatia throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and how these perceptions were reflected by cultural and 
structural elaboration in Croatian society, this chapter will focus on primary 
agents.157 Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to investigate to what extent and 
in what form primary agents actually respond to corporate agents’ attempts to 
mobilise them around proclaimed nationalist ideologies.
An analysis of the perceptions of the nation should include an analysis of the 
ways in which the nation is defined in general, and the Croatian nation in 
particular, and a description of significant ‘others’. While a content analysis of 
the corporate agents’ writings could signify the ways they perceive the nation at 
the cultural level, and while a content analysis of history textbooks could reveal 
the ways the nation has been perceived at the structural level throughout the 
given period of analysis, there is no data which could allow such a longitudinal 
analysis of the primary agents. From the available data, like censuses or elections 
results, it is not possible to reconstruct primary agents’ attitudes throughout the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, that is, the ways they were understanding 
the concept of the nation, the nationalist ideology they were supporting, or their 
attitudes towards other nations. For these reasons, this research will concentrate 
on events in the 1990s, and the question of how primary agents reacted to the 
structural circumstances of that period and to attempts of their mobilisation on 
the part of the dominant corporate agents - the proponents of Tudman’s 
nationalist ideology.
157 Archer (2000: 265) defines Primary Agents as social collectivities that lack both organisation 
and articulation of their interests. As such, Primary Agents are unable to exercise their power in 
structural and cultural modelling. For more about the characteristics of primary agents, see 
Chapter Two.
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As already outlined in the theoretical framework, primary agents play a crucial 
role in the process of nation-/re/formation. Only when corporate agents 
successfully mobilise primary agents around their nationalist ideology does a 
process of social interaction end and a process of structural, cultural and agential 
elaboration of the nation begin.
In the theoretical framework, I emphasised the fact that success in mobilising 
primary agents depends on several factors:
• the proclaimed nationalist ideology has to define ‘national boundaries’, that 
is, the ideology has to offer a clear set of ideas which define ‘what is the 
nation’, and ‘who are the members of that nation’, and where the primary 
agents could recognise themselves as the members of such a community;
• the nationalist ideology has to offer a vision of the ‘future of the nation’, that 
is, to clearly define ‘nationalist interests’, which primary agents are able to 
identify as their own personal interests; and, finally,
• the nationalist ideology has to offer a clear direction of action as a set of 
solutions, also perceived by the primary agents as solutions to their own 
problems, which would lead towards that proclaimed ‘national future’; this is 
usually presented in relation to other nations, defined in a positive or negative 
manner.
At the most general level, the success of political and social mobilisation of 
primary agents around a nationalist ideology, by specific corporate agents, could 
be simply hypothesized through an ex post facto analysis, where the success of 
this mobilisation would be judged only by its ultimate consequences. Yet, such 
an analysis cannot offer any insights into the same process of mobilisation at the 
level of primary agents. Such an analysis is not able to answer to what extent the 
primary agents support the nationalist ideology, or which segment of nationalist 
ideology was decisive for their support. Only an analysis of primary agents’ 
attitudes can offer some picture of the ‘mechanisms’ of social interaction 
between corporate and primary agents.
309
However, it should be kept in mind that the primary agents are not just recipients 
of ideology, a kind of tabula rasa ready to be moulded by a greater force. These 
primary agents are not only conditioned by a dominant political structure, but 
they are also a group of individuals conditioned by the long history of their own 
local culture. As such, they present a ‘force’ by itself which, in the end, 
conditions the formation and actions of the corporate agents, and, ultimately, the 
outcome of the social elaboration. Hence, in order to investigate primary agents’ 
perceptions of the nation, it is not enough to analyse the level of their acceptance 
of the dominant nationalist ideology of their time. A thorough analysis has to 
identify all of the possible ways the primary agents could perceive the concept of 
the nation in general, and the Croatian nation in particular, and their attitudes 
towards all ‘significant others’.
With this aim in mind, in the period of November 1999 to March 2000,1 carried 
out a survey of primary agents’ attitudes towards the nation on a sample of the 
Zagreb population. Before discussing the structure of this sample and analysing 
the data, a more detailed account of the construction of the survey’s instruments 
and constructed sample will be given.
8.1. Methodology
In accordance with the aims of this part of the research, stated above, the survey 
was divided into four major parts.
The first part of the survey tries to establish the ways in which primary agents 
perceive the general concept of the nation, which ultimately offers a set of 
criteria for determining who are the members of that nation. With this aim in 
mind the concept of the nation is divided into two separate instruments: first, 
constituent elements o f the nation, and, second, origins o f the nation. Hence, by 
surveying the existing theories of nations and nationalism, a general schema of 
an operational definition of the nation has been created (see Figure 8). Each 
element was transformed into a statement which was offered to the respondents 
for their evaluation. The Constituent elements instrument consists of 22
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statements that define the nation at the level of structure, culture, agency and its 
emergent properties. In addition, it has been assumed that the respondents could 
express different attitudes towards the origins of the nation. The Origins o f the 
nation instrument, hence, offers four statements which define the nation as a 
modem, primordial, perennial and socially constructed phenomena.
The second part of the survey is constructed with the aim of investigating the 
extent of acceptance of the main Croatian nationalist ideologies, examined in 
previous chapters. Such an analysis has to investigate whether the primary 
agents support the specific political and social agenda of a nationalist ideology, 
as well as the level of acceptance of the national symbols. For that aim, two 
instruments have been constructed. The first, the National interests instrument, 
offers respondents a set of 25 statements for their evaluation. Each statement is a 
direct quotation taken from writings or speeches of those nationalist ideologists 
analysed in Chapters 4-6. The second instrument deals with the acceptance of 
certain national symbols and myths. Taking into account the methodological 
limitations of a survey and the complexity of the issue, the instrument focuses on 
the respondents’ perceptions of National heroes. Hence, a list of twenty 
individuals, who have played an important role at some stage of Croatian history, 
has been selected. The respondents were asked to evaluate whether these 
individuals played a negative or positive role in the formation of the Croatian 
nation.158
158 To each statement offered in these two parts of the survey a Lickert scale of measurement has 
been attached (l=absolutely disagree; 2=disagee; 3=do not know, not sure; 4=agree; 5=absolutely 
agree).
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The third part of the survey is concerned with the respondents’ perceptions of 
other nations. With this purpose an instrument for ‘measuring’ ethnic distance 
has been created. The distance is measured using a modified Bogardus social 
distance scale.159 The scale represented a continuum: from ethnic distance (1-5), 
ethnic ostracism (6-7) to ethnic aggressiveness (8-9), that is, from ‘close 
relationship including marriage’ to ‘I would personally exterminate them all’. 
The respondents are asked to express the degree of their closeness/distance 
towards thirteen nationalities.
The fourth and final part of the questionnaire covers respondents’ basic socio­
demographic data.
Since the Lickert and Bogardus scale allows us to treat each statement in the 
survey as an interval variable, the data will be analysed using both univariate and 
multivariate methods. First, the descriptive statistics will be offered of each 
variable (frequencies, percentages and means). Second, each set of statements 
(Perception of the nation, Croatian nationalist ideologies, National heroes, and 
Ethnic distance) will be factorized separately.160 Third, for each set of extracted 
factors, analyses of variance with demographic variables will be conveyed in 
order to distinguish whether certain categories of the sample significantly differ 
in their preferences of given concepts.
Finally, since the main aim of this survey is to investigate to what extent and in 
what form primary agents accept or reject the dominant nationalist ideology, 
regression analyses will be applied in order to establish possible relations 
between different segments of the research.
159 For more about the modified Borgardus scale, see Malesevic and Uzelac (1997: 292).
160 Each factor analysis will be carried out with the same method: the factors will be extracted 
with the Principle Component method, and rotated with the Promax method with Kaiser 
normalization. All relevant statistics will be given in tables and footnotes.
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8.2. Sample
The choice of sample for this research has been mainly restricted by available 
data and material resources. The first restriction came from the fact that the last 
census in Croatia was conducted in 1991, that is, before the war, which 
accounted for a significant fluctuation of the Croatian population. Bearing in 
mind the ‘nature’ of that war in Croatia, it could justifiably be assumed that data 
about the structure of the Croatian population gathered by the 1991 census does 
not correspond to the structure of the Croatian population in late 1999-early 
2000. That is especially true for the national and religious composition of the 
population. Hence, it could be said that the sample chosen in this survey is 
random and representative according to age and gender. The second restriction 
dictated a smaller and geographically narrower sample. Hence, the survey was 
conducted on 307 respondents, who resided in the Zagreb area. A more detailed 
structural composition of the sample is shown in the tables below.
Table 2: Age
20-34 26.3 %
35-49 29.7 %
50-65 27.1 %
65 and more 16.9 %
Table 1: Gender
Males 44.3 %
Females 55.7 %
Table 4: Religion
Catholic 83.4 %
Orthodox 4.9%
Other 11.7%
Table 3. - Nationality
Croats 91.2 %
Serbs 8.1 %
Others 0.7%
Table 5: Level of Education
Primary school 3.3%
Craft school 3.3%
High school 51.8 %
University 41.6 %
Table 6: Support of political Party
HDZ 2.3 %
SDP 16.6 %
HSLS 3.9%
HSS 0%
HNS 0%
HSP 0.3%
DS 0.7%
NONE 76.2 %
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Table 7: Level of religious convictions (mean=3.90)
Against religion 0.7%
Not religious 7.2%
Indifferent towards religion 15.9 %
No different than other religious people 55.7 %
Very religious 20.5 %
Table 8: Material status (mean=2.92)
Worse than majority of others 5.9%
A little worse than others 13.4 %
Not better nor worste that majority of others 63.8 %
A little better than others 16.6 %
Significantly better than majority of others 0.3%
Table 9: Period of living in Zagreb
Not more than 5 years 0.3%
5-10 years 2.0%
10-20 years 14.3 %
More than 20 years 83.4 %
Table 10: Size of the place where grown up
1 Village 4.6%
2 Small town 5.5%
3 Small city 9.1 %
4 City 15.6 %
5 Bigger city 7.2%
6 Zagreb 58.0%
It is necessary to stress that the stated restrictions in sampling prevent me from 
drawing any conclusions about the possible attitudes of the whole Croatian 
population. Nevertheless, this example of the sample of the Zagreb population 
will allow me to examine the mechanisms of social interaction between corporate 
and primary agents. Such conclusions could serve as a basis for theorising about 
the success of nationalist ideologies in the mobilisation of primary agents in 
general.
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8. 3. Interpretation of the results
In this section, the results of the applied analyses will be given, as well as their 
interpretation and explanation. For stylistic reasons all relevant methodological 
data will be explained in footnotes, except those necessary for understanding the 
results.
Firstly, each instrument will be analysed separately and the results from an 
application of different univariate and multivariate methods will be provided. 
After that, the relations between those instruments will be examined. Finally, at 
the end of this section, the expected and actual results will be compared and 
discussed with reference to the theoretical framework.
8.3.1. Origins o f the Nation
Taking into account the purpose and the principle of the creation of this 
instrument, at this stage only some univariate methods were applied for its 
analysis. In this instrument four statements which were supposed to present four 
different concepts of the origins of the nation (modernist, perennialist, 
primordialist and constructionist161) were offered to respondents for their 
evaluation. None of these statements were direct quotations or stated in any 
theory of nations and nationalism. Rather, each statement was an attempt to 
summarize the major idea of each concept in such a way that the essence of a 
particular approach was conveyed in simple, clear terms that could be easily 
comprehended by the respondents.
According to the stated means and percentages of agreement or disagreement 
with the statements (see Table 11), it can be said that the respondents mostly 
agreed with the ‘perennial’ approach, represented by the first statement. Of all 
respondents, 42.6 per cent expressed their agreement with the idea that the nation 
originates in ethnic groups characterized by a distinctive name, tradition, history,
161 For more details about each concept, see Smith (1999).
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culture and homeland. It should be emphasised that a slight dominance of this 
concept of the origins of the nation does not signify anything about the theories 
which represent such an attitude, neither is it within the scope of this research. 
Rather, it expresses the respondents’ conviction that their nation is a stable entity 
rooted in the distant past by a distinctive myth-symbol complex. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the second most represented concept supports a primordial 
attitude. The idea that the nation has existed since the birth of human society is 
supported by almost half of the respondents.
Table 11: Origins of the Nation
Statement 1* 2 3 4 5 mean
In modem times, the nation has developed from 
ethnic groups which have their own name, tradition, 
common history, culture and ancient homeland
12.7 19.2 25.4 33.2 9.4 3.07
The nation has existed since human society existed 15.6 22.8 15.0 36.2 10.4 3.03
The nation has been created by influential people 
who have standardized its language and wrote its 
history
9.4 33.2 22.1 26.1 9.1 2.92
The nation as a phenomenon emerged in the 
nineteenth century with the development of 
industrialised society
22.8 27.4 25.7 17.6 6.5 2.58
* 1 - absolutely disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 - do not know; 4 - agree; 5 - absolutely agree
The last two statements show that even though the respondents do not entirely 
reject the importance of individual efforts in the process of nation-formation, 
more than 50 per cent of them do not support the idea that the nation emerged 
‘only’ in modem times with the development of industrialised society. It appears 
that these two ideas of the origin of the nation (constructionist and modernist) 
stand out from the standard opinion about the ancient origins of the nation, which 
are in many cases supported by nationalistic doctrines (see Chapters 4-6).
Further application of an analysis of variance aimed to investigate whether 
certain categories of the sample are more inclined to support stated concepts of 
the origins of the nation. Interestingly, while none of the sample’s categories 
significantly differ in perceiving so-called perennial and modernist perspectives, 
the other two statements tend to ‘polarize’ the respondents. Hence, an analysis of
317
variance162 showed that while males are more inclined to reject, women were 
more inclined to accept163 the ‘primordial’ statement according to which the 
nation has existed since the dawn of human society. The same statement tends to 
be accepted more by those of lower material status then those of middle material 
status;164 and rejected more by those who considered themselves as ‘indifferent 
towards religion’.165 The same method revealed that Serbs, more then Croats, are 
inclined to accept the idea that the nation has been created by influential people 
who have standardized its language and written its history.166
8.3.2. Constituent Elements o f the Nation
The results of the first instrument give us an insight into how the respondents 
perceive the origins of the nation. However, it is still unknown what the 
respondents think the nation is as a specific phenomenon. With the aim of 
examining the manner in which the respondents define the nation, and 
consequently, how they define the criteria for membership of the nation, the 
respondents were asked to evaluate which constituent elements of the nation are 
crucial for its existence. In order to examine whether the respondents express a 
consistent set of attitudes regarding the issue, a factor analysis of the 22 offered 
statements167 was conducted. The analysis extracted five significant concepts.168 
The structure of each concept will be given in a table below, and its content will 
be explained.
The first extracted factor (Table 12) consists of five highly saturated statements.
162 Each statement has been analysed by the Oneway ANOVA method where a set of independent 
variables consisted of all demographic variables (see Tables 1- 10). The mean difference was 
significant at the 0.05 level. Where applicable, a Post Hoc method was applied.
163 The mean difference was significant at the 0.002 level, F=10.17.
164 The difference between those of lower material status and those of middle material status was 
significant at the 0.004 level, F=4.61.
165 ANOVA was significant at the .001 level. The difference between means of 'not religious' 
(mean=3.36) and 'indifferent' (mean=2.37) was significant at the .002 level, and between 
'indifferent' and 'not different that other religious people' (mean=3.16) at the .000 level.
166 The difference between the means was significant at the .006 level, F=5.27 (mean of the Serbs' 
= 3.56 and mean of the Croats = 2.86).
167 For the list of statements and their level of acceptance, see Appendix, Table 42.
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Table 12: Nation 1 - Concept of Nation-State
Statement r 169 mean
Every nation has to have its own state .733 3.28
The nation has to have specifically defined borders .677 3.03
The nation has to have its own specific territory .636 3.18
The nation must be sovereign .501 3.69
The nation has to have one common economic system .487 3.26
R2 = 20.6 per cent Lambda = 3.71
The respondents who are more attached to this factor hold that the nation cannot 
be formed without establishing its own sovereign state. It has to have strictly 
defined borders, and its own territory and economic system. In this case the 
concept of the nation is equated with the concept of nation-state. Since the nation 
is defined in pure political terms, these respondents do not attach themselves to 
any specific national cultural markers or sense of distinctiveness. It is not 
surprising that this concept appeared as significant, especially among a 
predominantly Croatian sample. However, while this concept corresponds with a 
myth of a ‘900 years long dream of a Croatian state’, a concept intensively 
supported by many Croatian nationalist ideologies, it raises the question of 
whether a nation exists before the establishment of a sovereign national state.
The analysis of variance showed that while this concept is significantly170 more 
supported by those who consider themselves Catholics, those of ‘other’ religions 
tend to reject it. Moreover, the proponents of this concept are those who consider 
themselves as ‘very religious’, while those who consider themselves as ‘no 
different than other religious people’, those ‘indifferent towards religion’, ‘not 
religious’ or ‘against religion’ tend to reject it.171 The same method revealed that 
those of lowest material status and bom in small towns tend to accept this 
concept significantly more than other groups.172 Taking into account these results 
and the lack of cultural ‘markers’ as significant for this concept of the nation, it 
could suggest that those respondents more attached to this concept would
168 These five concepts explained 51.63 per cent of total variance.
169 The main criterion in the interpretation of each factor was the existence of at least three 
variables with a saturation (r = correlation between a factor and a variable) of more than .30. In 
the tables presented, the saturation of each variable will be presented as well as their mean on the 
scale from 1-5. The table presents only five of the most correlated variables.
170 ANOVA was significant at the .027 level, F=3.655.
171 Oneway ANOVA between Factor 2 and Level of Religiousness was significant at the .009 
level, F=3.44.
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probably be more inclined to equate citizenship with national affiliation. In short, 
the boundaries of the state are the boundaries of the nation.
The second extracted concept (Table 13) could be provisionally named an 
egalitarian concept of the nation. According to the content of the five most 
highly correlated statements, it is a complex concept which combines structural 
and cultural levels with the nation’s emergent powers.
Table 13: Nation 2 - Egalitarian Concept of the Nation
Statement r mean
The members of the same nation must share a sense of equality .782 3.81
The members of the same nation must have the same rights and duties .733 3.94
The nation must be sovereign .644 3.69
The nation has to have one common economic system .487 3.26
The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness .411 2.76
R2 = 9.76 per cent Lambda = 1.72
This concept is built around the idea that the nation ‘makes’ its members equal 
individuals who have the same rights and duties. It implies a notion of the nation 
as a community sovereign in its own state. Even though these respondents admit 
that the nation has to have a sense of distinctiveness, it is not related to any 
particular cultural markers. Taking all of these characteristics into account, it 
could be said that this concept resembles liberal civic concepts of the nation. Yet, 
against the Western European liberal tradition, the respondents of different levels 
of religiousness significantly differ in their attitudes towards such a concept. 
Since the concept emphasises the notion of community it could be anticipated 
that those ‘very religious’ respondents of lowest material status tend to accept it, 
and those ‘indifferent towards religion’ of average material status tend to reject 
this concept of the nation173
The five most saturated statements on the third factor (Table 14) all deal with the 
properties of the members of the nation. They compose a ‘subjective’ definition
172 These analyses of variance were significant at the levels of .000 (F=8.769) and .002 (F=4.016) 
respectively.
173 Both Oneway analyses of variance were significant at the .000 level (‘Level of Religiousness’ 
F=5.662, and ‘Material Status’ F=14.91).
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of the nation which could be provisionally named the concept of the nation as a 
belief system.
Table 14: Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System
Statement r mean
The members of the same nation have to be of the same religion .595 2.36
The members of the same nation have to have the same ancestors .573 2.71
The members of the same nation have to be characterized by the same national 
character
.570 2.65
The members of the same nation have to share the same value system .525 2.68
The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness .484 2.76
R2 = 8.13 per cent Lambda = 1.46
What composes this concept is a belief that the members of the same nation are 
descendants of the same ancestors, that they share the same national character 
and value system, and that they possess a clear sense of distinctiveness. The only 
‘objective’ constitutive element significant for this concept is shared religion, 
which, after all, is a belief system of its own. According to the results of analyses 
of variance, this concept tends to be rejected by those of lower material status174 
and those with higher education.175
Table 15 shows the structure of the fourth extracted factor. This concept sees the 
nation as a community not created by some historical chance or momentary set of 
circumstances. Throughout the nation’s long history, which ultimately justifies 
its existence, the members of the nation have shared a sense of distinctiveness 
and a value system, which formed them into a community with a common will. 
Directed by good leadership, the nation becomes a social force with the sole 
purpose to guard and promote that will. Such a concept could be named a 
concept of the nation-by-design. Analyses of variance reveal that this concept is 
mainly accepted by Catholics bom in city centres, and of the lowest material 
status.176
174 ANOVA was significant at the .027 level, F=3.105.
175 ANOVA was significant at the .037 level, F=3.182.
176 These three analyses of variance were significant at the .000 (F=9.838), .006 (F=3.355) and 
.000 (F=7.617) levels respectively.
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Table 15: Nation 4 - Concept of the Nation-By-Design
Statement r mean
The nation has to have a long history .734 2.69
The nation has to have a common will .636 2.87
The nation has to have good leadership .540 4.06
The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness .531 2.76
The members of the same nation have to share the same value system .373 2.68
R2 = 7.16 per cent Lambda = 1.29
The respondents attached to the last extracted factor (Table 16) do not think that 
an ‘external’ representation of the nation plays any crucial role in national 
formation. It is not important whether the nation is represented by a distinctive 
set of myths and symbols. The nation in this concept is homogenous community 
whose members live in the same territory, attend the same education system, and 
are of the same national character, and linked by the same destiny. Such a 
concept sees the nation as a unifying and harmonious community where any 
divergence is perceived as jeopardizing the essence of the nation. It is therefore 
no wonder that an analysis of variance177 shows that Croatian Serbs tend to reject 
this concept.
Table 16: Nation 5 - Concept of the Nation as a Homogenous Community
Statement r mean
The members of the same nation are linked by a common destiny .722 2.18
The members of the same nation have to attend the same education system .717 2.32
The nation has to have its own specific myths and symbols -.517 3.35
The members of the same nation have to be characterized by the same 
national character
.426 2.65
The nation has to have its own specific territory .441 3.26
R2 = 6.19 per cent Lambda = 1.12
As explained earlier, the basic solutions of extracted factors were transformed by 
applying the Promax oblique rotation. This method allows us to examine possible 
relations between the extracted factors. From the data given in the Factor 
Correlation Matrix (Table 17) it should be noticed that all factors are positively 
correlated, that is, the proponents of one factor do not entirely reject the 
importance of the other factors. Taking into account the idea behind the 
construction of the instrument, this result is not unexpected. While the
177 ANOVA was significant at the .007 level, F=4.231.
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respondents held that any constitutive elements can play a role in the process of 
the formation of the nation, they perceive differently the crucial segments of the 
nation.
Table 17: Nation - Factor Correlation Matrix
Nation 1 Nation 2 Nation 3 Nation 4 Nation 5
Nation 1 1.00 .384 .130 .295 .262
Nation 2 1.00 .237 .294 .276
Nation 3 1.00 .197 .309
Nation 4 1.00 .193
Nation 5 1.00
it is interesting to note that the egalitarian concept of the nation (Nation 2) has a 
higher correlation with the concept of the nation-state (Nation 1, r=.384), which could 
signify respondents’ equation between the sate and the nation. The concept of the 
nation as a belief system (Nation 3) is highly correlated with the concept of the nation 
as a homogenous community (Nation 5, r=.309). Obviously the respondents more 
attached to these concepts emphasise a subjective definition of the nation by 
considering certain properties of membership to be a base for the existence of the 
nation. To paraphrase Benedict Anderson, the nation in these cases is an imagined 
community.
The factor analysis as a multivariate method is not designed to show to what 
extent these factors are represented by the respondents. Therefore, an artificial 
prediction can be made based on the average means of significant variables, and 
then only in comparison with other factors.
Chart 1:
Representativeness of the Concepts of the Nation
From Chart 1, it could be seen that the second factor, an egalitarian concept o f 
the nation, is the most represented concept, mainly due to the high means of the
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two most significantly correlated statements, according to which the members of 
the same nation must share a sense of equality and have the same rights and 
duties. The least represented concept is Nation 3, the concept of the nation as a 
belief system.
8.3.3. Croatian Nationalist ideologies
Having examined the perception of the concept of the nation in general, this 
chapter will now examine how respondents perceive the Croatian nation, its 
constitutional elements, national values, and national interests. Moreover, by 
offering the respondents specific ideas expressed by relevant Croatian nationalist 
ideologists for their evaluation, this chapter will simultaneously investigate to 
what extent historical Croatian nationalist ideologies are acceptable to the current 
Croatian population.
The instrument consists of 25 statements.178 These statements are factorized in 
order to detect consistent sets of attitudes towards the Croatian nation. The factor 
analysis extracted six significant factors which together explained 53.87 per cent 
of variance.
Table 18: Ideology 1 - Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology
Statement r mean
Croatian historical territory is that on which Croatian blood has been spilt .734 1.92
Without any pretensions, Croats could say that they have four times more 
brains than members of other nations
.731 1.80
Croats are a chosen people, a holy community, which deserves to be respected 
and worshipped
.589 1.92
Those who are not descendants of a peasant family, in 90 cases out of 100, are 
not of Croatian descent or blood, but immigrants
.517 2.33
The Croatian nation has preserved the racial and blood characteristics of its 
forefathers, and embraced the religion of its ancestors
.482 2.77
R2 = 13.42 Lambda = 2.23
The first extracted factor (Table 18) consists of five positively saturated 
variables. In this concept the Croatian nation is defined in a strictly biological, 
racial manner. The national affiliation, according to this concept, can only be
178 The percentages and means of responses are given in Table 43, in the Appendix.
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inherited. This is to say, not only is national affiliation determined by blood, but 
also by national ‘historical’ (sic!) territory.
The Croatian nation is perceived as a sacred community, a community of a 
biologically and religiously homogenous population of chosen people. This 
concept, which can be provisionally entitled the Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist 
Ideology, is significantly more accepted by those bom in a village than those 
bom in a bigger city,179 and rejected by those of somewhat lower economic 
status180 and of university education.181
The second factor (Table 19) is provisionally entitled the Integrational 
Nationalist Ideology. Even though the respondents more attached to this concept 
perceive the Croatian nation as a small unit within an international order, its 
‘historical’ borders are identical with the borders of Greater Croatia. This map, 
offered by the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic, is acceptable as a historical Croatian 
territory to these respondents potentially because it includes the whole of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and a good part of Montenegro, regardless of the fact that it 
does not include Istria. Still, Croatian national interests are seen to be linked with 
those of bigger, more powerful and Slav nations. This concept does not propose 
any kind of state unity with these nations. National sovereignty is still perceived 
as one of the greatest national characteristics.
Table 19: Ideology 2 - Integrational Nationalist Ideology
Statement r mean
Croats are a small nation and hence they have to look for friends among big 
and powerful nations
.754 3.37
Sovereignty over the Croatian territories belongs to the Croatian nation and it 
cannot be shared with anyone else
.624 3.60
One who loves Croatdom will look for friends among Slav nations .471 2.41
From the West along the Adriatic Sea from Rijeka until Kotor, then between 
the rivers Drava and Danube from North and the river Drina from the East lies 
the ancient historical Croatian state
.441 3.17
Once when circumstances allow for it, the Croatian nation, just as all other 
nations, will disappear as an important source of an individual’s identity
-.437 2.94
R2 = 10.95 Lambda =1.96
179 Oneway ANOVA was significant at the .001 level, F=4.496.
180 Oneway ANOVA was significant at the .028 level, F=3.069.
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Interestingly this concept is significantly more acceptable for women and those 
with a high school education. At the same time, it is rejected by those bom in a 
village and of better economic status. Bearing in mind the perceived historical 
borders of the Croatian nation, it is not surprising that those of Serbian 
nationality tend to reject such a concept.182
The third factor (Table 20) presents a classical idea of a Communist Nationalist 
Ideology. The Croatian nation is seen as a modem phenomenon developed in the 
conditions of the nineteenth century. It is accepted as a current necessity that will 
eventually wither away as a phenomenon with a change of circumstances 
(achievement of communism?). This concept perceives the state borders as the 
greatest obstacle for peaceful co-existence between nations and the greatest 
source of nationalism. Such a concept of the Croatian nationalist ideology is 
significantly more rejected by women that men, and significantly more accepted 
by those who have lived in Zagreb for more than 20 years.183
Table 20: Ideology 3 - Communist Nationalist Ideology
Statement r mean
The only way to solve the problem of Croatian national minorities in other 
states is abolishing the borders between these states
.643 2.31
The Croatian nation was formed in the nineteenth century, thanks to the 
efforts of important individuals of that time
.642 2.49
Once when circumstances allow for it, the Croatian nation, just as all other 
nations, will disappear as an important source of individual’s identity
.485 2.94
Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a 
bigger area are considered more patriotic
.474 2.43
One who loves Croatdom will look for friends among Slav nations .449 2.41
R2 = 9.38 Lambda =1.95
Four out of five statements chosen from Franjo Tudman’s speeches and writings 
appeared as the most saturated on the fourth factor. This clear concept of 
Tudman’s nationalist ideology is strongly grounded in references to national 
history. It is history that teaches us how disunity and weak leaders were to be 
blamed for all Croatian suffering. These leaders could not even prevent the
181 Oneway ANOVA was significant at the .002 level, F=4.909.
182 An analysis of variance shows that acceptance of this concept by women and by those with a 
high school diploma is significant at the same level of .003 (F=4.584 and F=4.824 respectively); 
while the rejection by Serbs is significant at the .003 level (F=5.857), by those bom in a village at 
the level of .01 (F=3.06) and by those of better economic status at the .034 level (F=2.92).
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exaggerations of the Myth of Jasenovac which created a black legend of 
historical guilt for the whole Croatian nation. Yet this concept emphasises the 
greatness of ‘one of the oldest nations in Europe’ which had the spiritual 
openness to recognise the Muslim religion. The consequences of this concept of 
the Croatian nationalist ideology are given elsewhere184 and, therefore, will not be 
elaborated any further at this point. Nevertheless, some data important for this 
empirical research is given by an analysis of variance: there is no significant 
difference between different socio-demographic categories of the sample in level 
of the acceptance/rejection of this concept.
Table 21: Ideology 4 - Tudman’s Nationalist Ideology
Statement r mean
Systemic exaggeration of the Myth of Jasenovac in Socialist Yugoslavia 
aimed to create a black legend of historical guilt for the whole Croatian 
nation
.672 3.41
The worst enemy of the Croatian nation is their disunity .631 3.50
Throughout history, indecisive and weak leaders can be blamed for many 
sufferings of the Croatian nation
.619 3.36
Croatdom, though Catholic, had a spiritual openness and need to recognise 
Muslim religion, which had emerged due to historical circumstances within 
the Croat national entity
.470 3.03
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe .328 3.30
R2 = 7.58 Lambda =1.98
Table 22: Ideology 5 - Ustasha Nationalist Ideology
Statement r mean
The Croatian name is of Iranian origins .662 2.77
The Croatian nation has preserved the racial and blood characteristics of its 
forefathers and embraced the religion of its ancestors
.509 2.77
From the West along the Adriatic Sea from Rijeka until Kotor, then between 
the rivers Drava and Danube from North and the river Drina from the East 
lies the ancient historical Croatian state
.463 3.17
Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a 
bigger area are considered as more patriotic
.418 2.43
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe .416 3.30
R2 = 6.58 Lambda =1.67
The next concept, the concept of the Ustasha Nationalist Ideology (Table 22), 
however, is significantly more accepted by women,185 yet rejected by those of the 
lowest economic status.186 It is a racist ideology that claims its right to a ‘Greater
183 Oneway ANOVA shows that women’s rejection of this concept is significant at the .003 level 
(F=8.944), and the acceptance of those who have lived in Zagreb for more than 20 years at the 
.001 level (F=7.673).
184 See Chapter Six.
185 ANOVA significant at the .024 level (F=5.160).
186 ANOVA significant at the .021 level (F=3.285).
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Croatia’ on the basis of history. This concept proclaims the Croatian nation as 
one of the oldest in Europe and attempts to ‘purify’ it from any connection with 
other South Slav nations by ‘tracing’ its national origins to Iran. It is a concept 
which tightly binds soil and blood.
Table 23: Ideology 6 - Ethnically ‘Inclusive’ Nationalist Ideology
Statement r mean
In spite of all attempts, Croatdom has survived mainly due to the survival of 
its own language
.720 3.22
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe .551 3.30
Croatdom, though Catholic, had a spiritual openness and need to recognise 
the Muslim religion, which had emerged due to historical circumstances 
within the Croat national entity
.529 3.03
Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a 
bigger area are considered as more patriotic
-.326 2.43
R2 = 5.96 Lambda =1.54
The last concept (Table 23) of the Croatian nationalist ideology consists of four 
highly saturated variables. It has been provisionally entitled the concept of the 
Ethnically ‘Inclusive’ Nationalist Ideology. It clearly defines the Croatian nation 
in cultural terms (language, history, religion), yet it expresses ‘flexibility’ in 
those criteria for defining who are the Croats. The Croats are Catholics, but they 
can also be Muslims. As far as the national interest demands, the Croats will 
open their ‘national boundaries’ even to those who claim a different nationality.
The factor correlation matrix given in Table 24 shows that the highest correlation 
between factors exist between Ideology 4 and Ideologies 1 (r=.238) and 5 
(r=242). It could be interpreted that those respondents who are more attached to 
Tudman’s Nationalist Ideology (Ideology 4) are also more inclined towards the 
Ethnically Exclusive (Ideology 1) and Ustasha (Ideology 5) nationalist 
ideologies. It is also interesting that Ideology 3, the Communist Nationalist 
Ideology, is negatively correlated with all other concepts, except with the 
Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology.
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Table 24: Ideology - Factor Correlation Matrix
Ideol_l Ideol_2 Ideol_3 Ideol_4 Ideol_5 Ideol_6
Ideol_l 1.00 .148 .120 .238 .084 .020
Ideol_2 1.00 -.53 .001 .003 .039
Ideol_3 1.00 -.111 -.026 -.089
Ideol_4 1.00 .242 .147
Ideol_5 1.00 .042
Ideol_6 1.00
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
R e p re sen ta tiv en e ss  of 
th e  C ro a tia n  N a tio n a lis t  Ideo log ies
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By applying the same method of approximation as in the case of the Constitutive 
Elements Factors, Chart 2 offers some clues about the relative acceptance of the 
extracted factors. With a mean of 3.32 and 3.1 respectively, the most accepted 
concepts are nationalist ideologies of Tudman and the Communists. Hence, even 
though some ideas deriving from the nationalist ideologies of the Croatian past 
are still present within the current Croatian population, the long dominance of the 
Communists’ and Tudman’s nationalist ideologies in the media and the 
educational system has secured their weak and relative supremacy.
8.3.4. National Heroes
The task of ‘measuring’ respondents’ perceptions of national symbols is a rather 
complicated one, since it has to deal with diversity and the mixture of symbols’
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forms and content, on the one hand, and the respondents’ emotional and 
cognitive perceptions of these symbols, on the other. In the process of the 
construction of the instruments used to analyse this data, the purpose and method 
of analysis has to be clear and simple. With this objective, this section deals with 
just one form of national symbols - the perception of national heroes. Secondly, 
since a questionnaire cannot offer an answer to the question ‘why the respondents 
perceive some historical personalities as heroes’, by applying specific 
methodological tools, at least, it should be possible to reconstruct a logic behind 
the respondents’ choices. These were the premises in seeking to construct this 
analytical instrument. A list of twenty names of personalities who played a 
crucial part in Croatian history187 was offered to the respondents, and they were 
asked to evaluate whether these historical personalities played a positive or 
negative role for the formation of the Croatian nation. A factor analysis has also 
been applied with the aim of investigating whether the respondents express 
consistency in choosing their national heroes.
The factor analysis extracted five significant factors which together explained 
52.17 per cent of cumulative variance. Just as in previous cases, each factor will 
be analysed separately, and the results will be compared. The complete data of 
responses is given in Table 44 in the Appendix.
The first extracted factor (Table 25) consists of five positively saturated names. 
This list is a mixture of three leaders and founders of some Croatian political 
parties (Ante Starcevic, a leader of the Croatian Party of Right; Ljudevit Gaj, a 
leader of the National Party; and Stjepan Radic,188 a leader of the Croatian 
Peasant Party), and two personalities more associated with their military than 
political activities (King Tomislav, reigned c. 910-c. 928, who apparently threw 
the Hungarian army out of Croatia in the tenth century, and Ban Jelacic, who, 
nine centuries later, marched against the Hungarian revolutionary army). All of 
these historical personalities could be perceived as Croatian National Awakeners
187 Most of the names offered in this instrument were already mentioned and discussed in the 
historical overviews in previous chapters.
188 For more about StarCevic, Gaj and Radic, see Chapters 4-6.
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except for King Tomislav who has been perceived in many ideologies as the first 
monarch to unite the Croatian territories under one rule.
Table 25: Heroes 1 - Croatian National Awakeners
Statement r mean
Ante Starve vie .699 3.90
King Tomislav .692 4.04
Ljudevit Gaj .690 4.25
Stjepan Radic .661 4.22
Ban Jelacic .488 3.82
R2 = 18.53 Lambda = 3.15
At first glance, it seems surprising that these historical personalities are perceived 
as playing a positive role for the Croatian nation more by those of Serb 
nationality and the Orthodox religion.189 Yet, as shown in previous chapters, none 
of these historical individuals were proponents of negative attitudes towards the 
Serbs in general. At the same time these individuals are accepted as national 
heroes by those who are very religious190 and rejected by those with a university 
education.191
The first three individuals who were the most saturated on the second factor 
(Table 26) were all more active in the cultured sphere than in the political sphere 
of Croatian social life. Franjo Racki,192 though highly affiliated with 
Strossmayer’s National Party, was a distinguished historian and the first 
president of the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Art, established in 1867 in 
Zagreb. Vladimir Nazor (1876-1949), though the first president of ZAVNOH,193 
was one of Croatia’s greatest poets and novelists; and Janko Draskovic (1770- 
1856), though one of the leaders of the Illyrian Movement, was a distinguished 
Croatian writer. Since the respondents more attached to this factor perceive these 
individuals as Croatian national heroes, this factor could be provisionally entitled 
Croatian Cultural Awakeners. By expressing a negative attitude towards the role 
of Franz Joseph I, these respondents also reject any quasi-nostalgic feelings
189 The difference of variance between the Serbs, Croats and Others was significant at the .006 
level (F=5.177), and between Catholics, Orthodox and Others at the level of .000 (F=l 1.159).
190 ANOVA was significant at the level of .014 (F=3.169).
191 ANOVA was significant at the level of .022 (F=3.251).
192 For more about Ra£ki, see Chapter 5.
193 ZAVNOH (Zemaljsko Antifasisti£ko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodenja Hrvatske - Regional 
Antifascist Council of the Popular Liberation of Croatia) was established in 1943 as the supreme 
body of Partisan civil government in Croatia.
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towards the era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By perceiving Mika Tripalo, 
one of the 1971 leaders of the Croatian Spring, as a national hero the respondents 
also express their sympathies towards the idea of a democratic Croatia.
Table 26: Heroes 2 - Croatian Cultural Awakeners
Statement r mean
Franjo Racki .716 3.68
Vladimir Nazor .690 4.08
Janko Draskovic .641 3.66
Franz Joseph I -.395 3.07
Mika Tripalo .373 3.58
R2 = 10.9 Lambda = 1.86
Predictably, an analysis of variance showed that this concept of the Croatian 
Cultural Awakeners as national heroes is significantly more supported by those 
bom in Zagreb194 then those in other regions of Croatia and rejected by those with 
only a primary school level of education.195
Table 27: Heroes 3 - Right Extremists
Statement r mean
Josip Frank .689 3.20
Mile Budak .602 2.95
Mika Tripalo .522 3.58
Ante Pavelic .314 1.88
Baron Trenk .314 3.02
R2 = 9.23 Lambda =1.57
The respondents more strongly attached to the third extracted factor (Table 27) 
perceive the Croatian Right Extremists as national heroes. Two of the most 
notorious leaders of the Ustashas (Ante Pavelic and Mile Budak) found their 
place on this factor together with Josip Frank, the leader of the Croatian Party of 
Right in the first decades of the twentieth century, and Baron Trenk, the 
‘legendary’ leader of his ‘Panduri’, a paramilitary group of Maria Teresa, who 
spread terror wherever they appeared.
As expected, this concept of the Croatian nationalist heroes is significantly more 
rejected by those of Serb nationality and Orthodox religion196 then those of other 
nationalities and religions represented in this sample. It is also rejected by those
194 ANOVA was significant at the level of .001 (F=4.149).
195 ANOVA was significant at the level of .001 (F=5.608).
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who declare themselves as agnostics.197 Yet, those with a high school diploma,198 
and those who are not supporters of any current Croatian political parties,199 are 
more inclined to accept these personalities as national heroes.
The fourth extracted factor (Table 28) consists of two positively and two 
negatively correlated variables. It could be said that the respondents most 
attached to this factor perceive South Slav Unity Proponents as Croatian national 
heroes. The founder and ruler of the so-called Second Yugoslavia, Josip Broz 
Tito (1892-1980), is perceived positively just as Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815- 
1905),200 the leader of the National Party and main ideological proponent of 
Yugoslavism. It is not a surprise that the two leaders of the Ustashas Movement, 
perhaps the greatest enemies of the idea of Yugoslavism, Ante Pavelic and Mile 
Budak, are perceived as playing a negative role for the Croatian nation.
Table 28: Heroes 4 - South Slav Unity Proponents
Statement r mean
Josip Broz Tito .806 3.38
Ante Pavelic -.699 1.88
Mile Budak -.373 2.95
Josip Juraj Strossmayer .331 3.96
R2 = 6.93 Lambda =1.18
Analyses of variance show that those of Serb nationality,201 those with a 
university education,202 supporters of the SDP,203 and those bom in a village are 
more inclined to support this concept, while those who declare themselves as 
Catholics204 and very religious reject it.
196 Both analyses of variance were significant at the .000 level (F=9.916 and F=12.345 
respectively).
197 ANOVA was significant at the level of .003 (F=4.009).
198 ANOVA was significant at the level of .003 (F=4.762).
199 ANOVA was significant at the level of .003 (F=4.777).
200 For more about Strossmayer, see Chapter 4.
201 ANOVA was significant at the level of .002 (F=6.188).
202 ANOVA was significant at the level of .000 (F=7.828).
203 The SDP (Social Democratic Party), formed in 1990 through reformation of the Croatian 
Communist Party, was one of the winners of the 3 January 2000 elections. ANOVA was 
significant at the level of .002 (F=4.989).
204 The religious affiliation variable was significant at the .000 level (F=9.468) and the level of 
religiousness was significant on .020 level (F=3.088).
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Table 29: Heroes 5 - Habsburg Empire Proponents
Statement r mean
Maria Teresa .631 3.03
Ban Jelacic .508 3.82
Franc Joseph I .504 3.07
Ante Pavelic .351 1.88
Baron Trenk -.329 3.02
R2 = 6.56 Lambda =1.11
The last extracted factor (Table 29) could be perceived as an expression of 
nostalgia for the era of the Habsburg Empire, the time of Emperors (Franc Joseph 
I) and Empresses (Maria Teresa), the time of the brave (Josip Jelacic) and the 
not-so-brave (Baron Trenk) warriors. It appears that those respondents who are 
more attached to this factor express a similar kind of nostalgia towards the era of 
the Independent State of Croatia, by perceiving its Poglavnik as a national hero 
as well. Still, this concept of national heroes could be provisionally entitled 
Habsburg Empire Proponents. Interestingly, analyses of variance show that no 
significant category of the Croatian population more significantly accepts or 
rejects this concept.
It could be said that the analyses of variance applied on this instrument show a 
kind of polarization of the respondents around three concepts: Croatian National 
Awakeners, Right Extremists and South Slav Unity Proponents. According to the 
Factor Correlation Matrix (Table 30), the first factor (Croatian National 
Awakeners) is positively correlated with all other factors, which could be 
interpreted in terms of a recognition by most of the respondents that these 
Awakeners played a positive role for the Croatian nation to some degree.
Table 30: Heroes - Factor Correlation Matrix
Heroes 1 Heroes 2 Heroes 3 Heroes 4 Heroes 5
Heroes 1 1.00 .157 .168 .047 .121
Heroes 2 1.00 -.084 .188 -.254
Heroes 3 1.00 -.130 .164
Heroes 4 1.00 -.039
Heroes 5 1.00
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Those parties that were historically in conflict are also perceived by the current 
Croatian population as antagonistic: those who perceive Right Extremists 
(Heroes 3) as Croatian national heroes cannot equally perceive the South Slav 
Unity Proponents (Heroes 4, r= -.130) or Cultural Awakeners (Heroes 2, r= - 
.084) as heroes, amongst whom the prime position is given to Vladimir Nazor, a 
strong symbol of the Partisan Movement. Similarly, the respondents who 
perceive the South Slav Unity Proponents (Heroes 4) as national heroes, could 
not support the proponents of the Habsburg Empire (Heroes 5) with a touch of 
the Ustashas’ fascism (Heroes 3, r= -.039).
Chart 3: Representativeness of the Concepts of National 
Heroes
4.5
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8.3.5. Attitudes Towards the Others
Following the operational definition of the perceptions of the nation, after 
examining the ways the respondents perceived the nation in general and the 
Croatian nation in particular, the last part of the survey has been constructed to 
investigate the respondents’ attitudes towards other nations. With that aim, a 
modified Bogardus’ scale of social distance was offered for the respondents’ 
evaluation. The modification, that is, the extension of the scale, was guided by 
the extreme circumstances of war and the post-war climate that existed in
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Croatia, assuming that ethnic war had an impact on the radicalization of social 
attitudes. Hence, the original Bogardus’ scale of seven degrees was expanded to 
nine. It presented a continuum of three parts: ethnic distance (from 1-close 
relationship including marriage, to 5-citizen in my country), ethnic ostracism (6- 
to avoid any contact with them, and 7-to forbid them entry in my country) and 
ethnic aggressiveness (8-would like someone to kill them, and 9-would 
personally exterminate them all). This scale was attached to a list of thirteen 
different nationalities which could be considered as ‘significant others’ at some 
stage in the history of the Croatian nation.
Table 31: Social Distance
No Nationalities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mean
1 Albanians 0.0 3.9 4.2 22.8 56.0 10.1 2.6 0.0 0.3 4.74
2 Montenegrins 0.0 7.5 5.5 18.6 55.0 10.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 4.64
3 Undeclared 0.0 3.6 7.2 14.7 71.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.64
4 Jews 0.0 4.6 5.5 20.2 68.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.57
5 Russians 1.0 5.2 10.7 11.7 66.1 2.9 2.3 0.0 0.0 4.55
6 Italians 1.0 2.6 12.1 16.3 65.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.3 4.55
7 Hungarians 2.6 2.3 6.8 16.9 71.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.52
8 Muslims 0.0 5.9 16.9 12.1 56.0 4.6 4.6 0.0 0.0 4.50
9 Macedonians 2.0 8.8 7.8 14.7 63.5 2.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 4.40
10 Slovenes 3.6 9.1 10.1 10.7 62.9 2.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 4.32
11 Germans 2.6 8.8 9.4 17.3 61.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.27
12 Serbs 13.4 11.7 8.5 21.2 34.9 7.8 2.3 0.0 0.3 3.87
13 Croats 72.3 14.0 3.3 3.6 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.59
1 = close relationship including marriage; 2 = close Mend; 3 r colleague at work; 4 = citizen in my town; 5 = citizen
in my country; 6 = to avoid any contact with them; 7 
kill them; 9 = would personally exterminate them all
= to forbid them entry in my country; 8 = would like someone to
In Table 31 the percentages of the respondents’ evaluation are given. The list of 
thirteen nationalities is rank-ordered depending on the average (mean) distance 
expressed by the respondents.
As can be seen from the mean values of each variable, the respondents expressed 
a high level of social distance towards all nationalities, except the Croats 
themselves. Even though, on average, the respondents showed a low level of 
ethnic ostracism and almost no ethnic aggressiveness, the distances varied 
between ‘4-citizen in my town’ to ‘5-citizen in my country’. Perceiving other 
nationalities as just citizens in a town or country actually expresses a wish for 
weak personal contact with them. The highest social distance was shown towards 
the Albanians, Montenegrins and those who declare themselves as Undeclared. 
The highest distance expressed towards Albanians reveals that stereotypes about 
this group were not undermined, even by recent political events in Kosovo. The
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distance towards Montenegrins, regardless of a significant improvement in 
political relations between the two countries, could be interpreted as 
unwillingness on the part of the Croats to forget the involvement of 
Montenegrins in the destruction of Dubrovnik and the still unsolved status of 
Prevlaka, the area on the Montenegrin and Croatian border, over which both 
sides claim sovereignty. A high social distance towards those who declare 
themselves as Undeclared could also be seen as a reaction on the part of 
respondents to those who are usually offspring of nationally mixed marriages. In 
times of socialism, most of these individuals declared themselves Yugoslavs.
The second group consists of those nationalities with whom the Croats have little 
personal contact, yet are still present as national minorities in Croatia: Jews, 
Russians, Italians, and Hungarians. While the distance towards the Jews could 
just be interpreted as an expression of the respondents’ stereotypes, the Russians 
are mainly perceived as traditional allies of the Serbs, and, hence, as not so 
friendly towards Croats. Still a relatively high distance towards Italians and 
Hungarians cannot be explained by any recent political controversies with these 
national minorities in Croatia or their domicile countries. This is especially 
surprising when one takes into account the fact that the respondents showed a 
relative higher degree of social distance towards these nationalities than towards 
Muslims, Macedonians and Slovenes, fellow South Slavs and former Croatian 
compatriots within the former Yugoslavia. Perceived as traditional friends and 
Croatian allies, the Germans are the lowest rejected nationality among this group, 
where more than 22 per cent of the respondents expressed their willingness for 
closer personal relationships with the Germans either through marriage, 
friendship or as colleagues at work.
Yet the biggest surprise of this part of the research came from the respondents’ 
attitudes towards the Serbs. According to the results, the Serbs are the most 
accepted nationality: almost 34 per cent of the respondents expressed their 
willingness to have close personal contact with those of Serbian nationality. 
Bearing in mind that similar research conducted just only a few years earlier,205
205 See Malesevic and Uzelac (1997).
337
demonstrated that the Croatians expressed the highest social distance towards the 
Serbs, these results were at first taken with a good deal of reservation. Another 
reason for skepticism was the fact that 8.1 per cent of the respondents declared 
themselves as Serbs, which could significantly alter the picture of the social 
distance towards the Serbs as a category. Thus, in order to clarify this result, 
some further analyses of the data were undertaken.
In the first instance, a factor analysis was conducted to examine whether the 
respondents consistently expressed a higher distance to specific groups of listed 
nationalities. The factor analysis extracted two relatively non-correlated factors 
(r=.055) which together explained 57.98 per cent of cumulative variance.
The first extracted factor (Table 32) consists of a list of nine nationalities. The 
high positive correlation of these variables with the factor could indicate that the 
respondents more attached to this concept express higher social distance towards 
these nationalities. At the same time, none of these nationalities could be 
perceived as directly threatening the existence of the Croatian nation or the 
Croatian state. It could be said that it just clearly expresses a xenophobic attitude
towards all non-Croatian nationalities.
Table 32: Distance 1 - Xenophobia towards non-Croats
Statement r mean
Hungarians .883 4.52
Slovenes .850 4.32
Russians .810 4.55
Undeclared .790 4.64
Jews .760 4.57
Germans .743 4.27
Italians .691 4.55
Montenegrins .690 4.64
Macedonians .658 4.40
R2 = 47.10 Lambda = 6.12
This conclusion was further justified after the application of analyses of variance. 
This concept is mainly accepted by those of Croatian nationality, and those with 
a high school education,206 and rejected by those who declare themselves as 
atheists207 and those of ‘other’, that is non-Catholic and non-Orthodox, religion.208
206 Both ANOVA were significant at the level of .000, (F=l 1.133 and F=13.247 respectively).
207 ANOVA was significant at the level of .007, (F=3.556).
208 ANOVA was significant at the level of .001, (F=6.861).
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The second factor (Table 33) indicates those nationalities towards which the 
respondents, at the same time, expressed a high level of social distance and a 
level of closeness. According to the three positively saturated variables, these 
respondents expressed high levels of social distance towards Albanians, Croats 
and Muslims, and, at the same time, preferred Serbs and Montenegrins. It came 
as no surprise that this concept was significantly more accepted by the Serbs, 
those of Orthodox religion and atheists, supporters of the SDP, and those with a 
craft school education.209 Such a factor could be provisionally entitled a Pro- 
Serbian concept.
Table 33: Distance 2 - Pro-Serbian Concept
Statement r mean
Albanians .639 4.74
Croats .599 1.59
Serbs -.552 3.87
Muslims .379 4.50
Montenegrins -.338 4.64
R2 = 10.89 Lambda =1.42
The results of this factor analysis demanded a different approach to the 
distribution of frequencies interpreted in the first instance. A new analysis was 
carried out which looked at the level of social distance expressed by those 
respondents of Croatian and those of Serbian nationality separately.
Table 34 reveals that the results, where only those respondents of Croatian 
nationality are included, did not significantly change from the original one, 
except that the Croatian respondents expressed higher distance towards the 
Montenegrins them the Albanians. It showed once again that, though still a high 
average (mean=4.12), the respondents of the Croatian nationality expressed the 
lowest social distance towards the Serbs.
209 All analyses of variance were significant at the level of .000 (F=47.512; 51.00; 16.739, 22.505; 
and 12.374 respectively).
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Table 34: Distribution of Frequencies for the respondents of Croatian nationality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
1 Montenegrins 17 45 165 32 9 4.68
2 Albanians 11 13 67 160 26 3 4.66
3 Undeclared 7 22 45 195 11 4.65
4 Russians 1 11 33 30 189 9 7 4.61
5 Jews 11 17 54 193 5 4.59
6 Italians 3 6 35 47 181 2 2 4 4.55
7 Hungarians 8 6 18 43 204 1 4.54
8 Muslims 17 46 37 160 9 11 4.47
9 Slovenes 9 20 26 33 181 8 3 4.40
10 Macedonians 5 26 16 45 184 3 1 4.39
11 Germans 8 24 29 43 175 1 4.27
12 Serbs 18 35 23 65 107 24 7 1 4.12
13 Croats 215 23 10 11 21 1.57
1 = close relationship including marriage; 2 = close Mend; 3 = colleague at work; 4 = citizen in my town; 3 = citizen 
in my country; 6 = to avoid any contact with them; 7 = to forbid them entry in my country; 8 = would like someone 
to kill them; 9 = would personally exterminate them all
On the other hand, the results of social distance expressed by those of Serbian 
nationality (Table 35) revealed an extremely high social distance towards 
Albanians (mean=5.60) which is a clear expression of ethnic ostracism, followed 
by a high distance towards the Muslims (mean=5.00).
Table 35: Distribution of Frequencies for the respondents of Serb nationality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
1 Albanians 1 1 12 5 5 1 5.60
2 Muslims 1 4 12 5 3 5.00
3 Undeclared 2 23 4.76
4 Italians 2 3 20 4.64
5 Macedonians 1 1 6 11 4 2 4.56
6 Jews 1 8 16 4.56
7 Germans 1 10 14 4.48
8 Hungarians 1 1 9 14 4.44
9 Russians 5 6 14 4.16
10 Slovenes 8 5 12 3.64
11 Montenegrins 9 12 4 3.44
12 Croats 5 20 1.80
13 Serbs 21 1 3 1.28
1 = close relationship including marriage; 2 = close Mend; 3 = colleague at work; 4 = citizen in my town; 5 = citizen 
in my country; 6 = to avoid any contact with them; 7 = to forbid them entry in my country; 8 = would like someone 
to kill them; 9 = would personally exterminate them all
Comparing the results given in these two tables, it is apparent that the Serb and 
the Croat respondents still mostly prefer each other. Yet, the distance of the 
Croats towards the Serbs cannot be called small. On average, the Croats accept
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the Serbs just as citizens in their own town (mean=4.12), while the Serb 
respondents express a high degree of closeness to the Croats (mean=1.80).
On the other hand, both Croat and Serb respondents expressed a high, and almost 
equal, level of social distance towards all other nationalities (the average distance 
towards all other nationalities are 4.53 for the Croat and 4.48 for the Serb 
respondents). It is also noticeable that both groups expressed an extremely small 
willingness to marry anyone except a member of their own nationality.
For these reasons, it could be concluded that ten years of isolation from all 
relevant international relations, the war, and internal ethnic conflicts have turned 
Croatian citizens into a nearly xenophobic population striving for a life within an 
ethnically homogenous community.
8.3.6. Attitudes Towards the Nation
After examining the ways the respondents perceive the nation as a social 
phenomenon (through an examination of their views on constituent elements and 
origins of the nation in general), after the analyses of the respondents’ attitudes 
towards the Croatian nationalist ideologies and national symbols, and after 
examining the respondents’ attitudes towards other nations, we still know little 
about the relations between these sets of attitudes. In other words, at the end of 
this part of the research, it has yet to be examined whether a specifically 
expressed type of nationalist ideology assumes a specific set of views on the 
origins of the nation and its constituent elements, national symbols and national 
enemies.
For that reason a regression analysis was applied to those different concepts of 
Croatian nationalist ideology, where the five factors of the constituent elements 
of the nation, four views of the origins of the nation, five concepts of national 
heroes, and two distinctive concepts of social distance towards other nations 
served as a predictor set.
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Four concepts appeared as significant predictors for the concept of the Ethnically 
Exclusive Nationalist Ideology (Table 36). Together they explained 38.1 per cent 
of the dependent variable’s variance. The respondents most attached to the 
concept of an Ethnically Exclusive nationalist ideology are inclined to define the 
Croatian nation in terms of a blood-related and sanctified community. It could be 
expected that the same respondents perceive the nation in general as a 
homogenous community of those who share the same belief-systems, that is, the 
same religion, value system and national character.210 Even though the concept of 
the nation as a homogenous community implies that the nation has to have its 
own specific set of myths and symbols, the respondents who are most attached to 
this concept of nationalist ideology show a stronger bond or rejection of a 
specific set of symbols. They express a high negative attitude towards the 
proponents of South Slav unity and everything related to that era of Croatian 
history. Yet, they share one attitude with at least one group of South Slav unity 
proponents - the proponents of the Communist nationalist ideology. Surprisingly, 
though not incompatible with the above attitudes, some of these respondents 
perceive the nation as a modem phenomenon, emerging in the nineteenth century 
with the development of industrial society. Such a concept shows that the nation 
does not have to be perceived as either primordial or perennial to be, at the same 
time, perceived as sacred. The concept of common ancestors does not have to 
reach into an ancient past, as long as it is held that the members of the nation 
managed to preserve their national characteristics and purity of their blood.
Table 36: Regression Analysis on the First Nationalist Ideology Factor
IDEOLOGY 1- Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology Corr. beta sig.
1 Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System .447 .260 .000
2 Nation 5 - Concept of the Nation as a Homogenous Community .382 .245 .000
3 Heroes 4 - South Slav Union Proponents -.365 -.257 .000
4 Origins 1 - The Nation as a Modem Concept .233 .173 .000
R = .617 R2 = .381 Sig. = .000
The regression analysis applied to the second concept of nationalist ideology 
(Table 37) extracted five predictors as statistically significant, which together
210 The differences between the values of direct correlation and beta-coefficients of Nation 3 and 
Nation 5 are the result of higher correlation between these predictors (r=.309) which can serve as 
suppressors of each other.
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explained 24.4 per cent of the dependent variable’s variance. This second 
concept, which has been provisionally entitled Integrationist Nationalist 
Ideology, held the view that the Croatian nation, in order to survive as a small 
nation, has had to establish good relations among its neighbouring and powerful 
nations. However, good relations with other nations does not imply in any sense 
that the Croatian nation has to deny any aspect of its own sovereignty. The nation 
is seen as a homogenous community (Nation 5, r=2.75) of equal citizens (Nation 
2, r=.244), which has existed since the beginning of human society (Origin 2, 
r=.261), and as such exercises full sovereignty over its territory. A clear rejection 
of the proponents of South Slav Unity as national heroes (Heroes 4, r=-.201), 
does not mean that the respondents who support this attitude also support the 
formation of any new common state with other South Slavs, in spite of an 
attitude which supports establishing good relations with these nations, as 
expressed by the concept of Integrational Nationalist Ideology. In short, the 
respondents most attached to this concept believe that national sovereignty goes 
hand-in-hand with wider international co-operation, and hence, directly oppose a 
dominant policy of Tudjman’s regime which in the 1990s brought Croatia into a 
state of international isolation.
Table 37: Regression Analysis on the Second Nationalist Ideology "actor
IDEOLOGY 2- Integrational Nationalist Ideology Coir. beta sig.
1 Nation 5 - Concept of the Nation as a Homogenous 
Community
.275 .170 .005
2 Nation 2 - Egalitarian Concept of the Nation .244 .146 .018
3 Origins 2 - The Nation as a Primordial Concept .261 .208 .000
4 Origins 4 - The Nation as a Social Constructed Concept -.195 -.127 .021
5 Heroes 4 - South Slav Union Proponents -.201 -.149 .021
R = .494 R2= .244 Sig. = .000
In Table 38 the results of the regression analysis, where the dependant variable 
was the concept of Communist nationalist ideology, are given. Five predictors 
were extracted as significant, while the whole predictors’ set explained 28.9 per 
cent of total variance. The composition of the Communist Nationalist Ideology, 
as shown before, indicates the presence of Kardelj’s ideas of the nation and 
nationalism. This conclusion is supported by the appearance of the Concept of 
the Nation as a Belief System (Nation 3, r=1.77) as a significant predictor of this 
nationalist ideology. The nation is not perceived just as a bourgeois concept
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created in the age of industrialization, but also as a new ‘opium’ of the people 
who share the same religion, national character, value system, sense of 
distinctiveness and belief in common ancestors. This non-territorially-delimited 
concept of the nation is more understandable in combination with the Pro- 
Serbian Concept of social distance. A positive correlation of this concept 
(Distance 2, r=.161) shows that the majority of the respondents most attached to 
this concept of nationalist ideology are of Serbian nationality. Hence, it could be 
said that their status as a national minority in Croatia ‘forces’ them to define their 
national bonds in terms of a belief system, which could preserve their sense of 
national identity. The existence of state borders and national boundaries directly 
influences their everyday life, and a nationalist ideology which propagates the 
imminence of the withering away of these obstacles, also promises a solution to 
their problems emerging from their status as a national minority.
Table 38: Regression Analysis on the Third Nationalist Ideology!;actor
IDEOLOGY 3- Communist Nationalist Ideology corr. beta sig.
1 Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System .177 .160 .006
2 Heroes 1 - Croatian National Awakeners -.293 -.231 .000
3 Distance 2 - Pro-Serbian Concept .161 .217 .000
4 Origins 1 - The Nation as a Modem Concept .242 .222 .000
5 Origins 2 - The Nation as a Primordial Concept -.239 -.174 .001
R = .537 R2 = .289 Sig. = .000
The regression analysis (Table 39), where the dependent variable was Tudman’s 
Nationalist Ideology, extracted four predictors as significant. The predictor set 
explained 39.1 per cent of total variance.
Table 39: Regression Analysis on the Fourth Nationalist Ideology Factor
IDEOLOGY 4- Tudman’s Nationalist Ideology corr. beta sig.
1 Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System .304 .186 .001
2 Heroes 1 - Croatian National Awakeners .373 .281 .000
3 Heroes 4 - South Slav Unity Proponents -.205 -.197 .001
4 Origins 4 - The Nation as a Social Constructed Concept .196 .198 .000
R = .625 R2 = .391 Sig. = .000
The respondents who are most attached to the concept of Tudman’s Nationalist 
Ideology share with those proponents of the Communist Nationalist Ideology the 
same concept of the nation as a belief system. Sarcastically, one could say that 
this bond between the two concepts is no surprise when we take into account
344
Tudman’s Communist past. Yet, the respondents who are most attached to 
Tudman’s ideology at the same time strongly reject any positive attitude towards 
Tudman’s once supreme commander, Josip Broz Tito, as one of the strongest 
proponents of South Slav unity (r=-.205). Instead these respondents are more 
inclined to perceive Stjepan Radic and Ante Starcevic as true fighters for the 
Croatian cause. This clear expression of both positive and negative attitudes 
towards the individuals who played important roles in Croatian history, are not 
an expression of support or rejection of national symbols. Rather, they are an 
expression of a specific definition of the nation as a phenomenon. These 
respondents hold that the nation has been created by influential people who have 
standardized its language and written its history (Origins 4, r=.196). Hence, it 
could be concluded that not only did Tudman perceive himself in these terms, but 
he was similarly perceived by the members of his nation. According to this 
concept, the nation should not only share the same ancestors, religion, values and 
character, but also a belief in one national leader who symbolizes a re-creation of 
the nation itself.
The results of the regression analysis of the same predictors set211 on the Ustasha 
Nationalist Ideology (Table 40) reveals that the supporters of this concept went 
just one step further than in previous case. Even though this nationalist ideology 
also assumes the nation as a belief system, it clearly emphasises the importance 
of the will of the nation, embodied in a great leader (Nation 4, r=.188).
Table 40: Regression Analysis on the Fifth Nationalist Ideology Factor
IDEOLOGY 5 - Ustasha Nationalist Ideology Corr. beta sig.
1 Nation 3 - The Concept of the Nation as a Belief System .223 .202 .001
2 Nation 4 - Concept of the Nation-by-Design .188 .183 .002
3 Heroes 1- Croatian National Awakeners .199 .250 .000
4 Heroes 5 - Habsburg Empire Proponents -.126 -.088 .012
5 Origins 3 - The Nation as a Perennial Concept .159 .158 .006
R = .456 R2 = .208 Sig. = .000
Unlike the previous case, the respondents most attached to this concept perceive 
national heroes and anti-heroes merely as a set of symbols. The nation is a 
perennial social phenomenon and the role of the individual cannot disrupt the 
nation from its given destiny.
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The last regression analysis was applied to the concept of an Ethnically 
‘Inclusive’ Nationalist Ideology (Table 41).212 This concept does not denote a 
tolerance of other nationalities, but rather the exclusion of a specific set of 
criteria as crucial for national membership. By emphasizing the importance of 
common ancestors and disregarding religious affiliation, the Croats could 
become a much greater nation. This notion is upheld by the concept of the 
Nation-by-Design, which does not define the nation in terms of cultural markers, 
but in terms of the accomplishments of some ‘greater forces’ like national will 
and destiny. The respondents most attached to this concept perceive proponents 
of the Habsburg Empire as playing a positive role in the Croatian nation. It is the 
Habsburg Empire which incorporated all Croatian ‘historical territories’, and 
forced the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina to declare themselves 
as Croats.
Table 41: Regression Analysis on the Sixth Nationalist Ideology Factor
IDEOLOGY 6- Ethnically Inclusive Nationalist 
Ideology
Corr. beta sig.
1 Nation 4 - Concept of the Nation-by-Design .173 .181 .003
2 Heroes 5 - Habsburg Empire Proponents .165 .197 .001
3 Origins 3 - The Nation as a Perennial Concept .239 .250 .000
R = .422 R2 = .178 Sig. = .000
The oldest nation in Europe, as formulated in this nationalist ideology, traces its 
roots to ancient history, probably with the formation of the first Croatian 
kingdoms. That ancient history offers a ‘myth of a golden age’, an age where all 
subjects of the kingdom were Croats, which ultimately accounts for their destiny 
even to today.
8.3.7. Conclusion
In this research, attention was focused on primary agents as both recipients of 
corporate agents’ attempts at mobilisation around a specific nationalist ideology, 
and as proponents of different local and national cultures. The specific position
211 The predictors’ set explained 20.8 per cent of the total variance of the dependent variable.
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of primary agents in society posed a methodological problem for any attempt to 
reveal the ‘mechanisms’ of this type of social interaction. The research aimed to 
investigate, on the one hand, the level of acceptance of the existing dominant 
nationalist ideology, and, on the other, to discover the limitations and forms of 
that acceptance. The final question remains whether the analysed data support the 
main assumptions stated in the theoretical framework.
Before addressing the above issues, I should stress certain limitations of this type 
of analysis. While the survey enables us to deal with a large group of individuals 
and to ‘measure’ their attitudes, at the same time it gives us no answers to 
questions such as ‘Why did the respondents express these attitudes in the first 
place?’. If a research project sought answers to this question, the application of 
alternative qualitative methods would probably be more desirable. The research 
presented here, however, has a much narrower aim.
The choice of sample of the Zagreb population in the period of late 1999-early 
2000 set the social and cultural parameters of the analysis. It was a period when 
the social structure clearly reflected the main ideas of Tudman’s nationalist 
ideology, mainly through political institutions and policies, the media and the 
educational system. It was a post-war period when the country faced serious 
economic and social problems, like poverty, bankruptcies of most large 
companies, and a high rate of unemployment. At the cultural level, it was a 
period of strong censorship and of revision of ideas, symbols and values, when 
long suppressed and unsolved issues found a new forum for debate. To what 
extent were such circumstances reflected by primary agents?
One of the most obvious conclusions of this empirical research is that the 
respondents showed a certain variety in their perceptions of the nation. 
Respondents expressed even diametrically opposite views of the possibilities of 
defining the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular. They 
expressed different views on the origins of the nation and its constituent 
elements; they perceived some national symbols as directly confronting each
212 The predictors’ set explained 17.8 per cent of the total variance of the dependent variable.
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other. These results showed that regardless of the dominance of a specific 
ideology, the primary agents in question could uphold these different attitudes, 
which - though not dominant in the media and education - were nevertheless still 
very much alive at the cultural level, a level of ideas. They showed that 
complementarity of the structural elements does not entail a homogeneity of 
attitudes among the primary agents. Ten years after the death of the system, the 
concepts proposed during fifty years of socialism were still present in the 
perceptions of primary agents. Even more, sixty years after the tragic Croatian 
fascist episode, the concepts of the Ustashas still live on.
Nevertheless, the presence of concepts different from the dominant ones does not 
mean that the attempts at mobilisation around a specific nationalist ideology have 
been unsuccessful. On the contrary, the data showed that Tudman’s nationalist 
ideology is the most represented among the respondents. But that is not all. The 
analysis of variance showed that all socio-demographic categories of the sample 
equally accept (and reject) Tudman’s ideology. The dominant nationalist 
ideology of the 1990s, supported and distributed by all available means, reached 
all social strata equally. Yet, a consensus was achieved in just a few spheres. 
While these respondents expressed some agreement in defining the position and 
interests of the Croatian nation, they were polarized around the definitions of the 
nation in general, its origins, and national symbols.
Thus, the analysis of national symbols revealed that the Croatian population is 
more likely to reach some kind of consensus around those individuals who 
symbolize Croatian ‘earlier’ history. Differences between the concepts and 
agendas of the national and cultural awakeners from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries disappeared in the wake of a romantic view of fighters for the 
Croatian cause. In contrast, it seems that antagonisms which marked recent 
Croatian history still tend to polarize the Croatian population, especially when 
the evaluation of the historical role of the Partisans and the Ustashas is in 
question.
The ‘measurement’ of social distances towards other nationalities signified 
another strong polarization among the Croatian population - that between Croats
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and Serbs. Within their national groups, each nationality was unanimous in 
expressing a high social distance towards almost all other nationalities. Yet, the 
internal relation between these two groups remains peculiar. The Serbs from 
Zagreb obviously expressed closeness with the Croats, which is not surprising 
taking into account the groups’ centuries of experience of common life, a high 
rate of intermarriage, and, more recently, a mainly supportive attitude of the 
urbanized Serbs towards the independence of the Republic of Croatia. A pleasant 
surprise is that the Croats, out of all nationalities represented, expressed the 
lowest social distance towards the Serbs. It is methodologically useless to 
speculate about the reasons for such an attitude, though it still points to one 
important result of this research - the structure of the sample itself.
However significant for this research it would be to make assertions about the 
entire Croatian population, the data warns us that the socio-demographic 
variables are the determinants of the modes of acceptance of nationalist 
ideologies and perceptions of the nation. The research shows that certain 
concepts are more or less acceptable to specific categories of the sample, 
depending on their gender, nationality, religious affiliation and level of religious 
convictions, on their level of education and their economic status. This also 
implies that a nationalist ideology which tends to mobilise a majority of primary 
agents has to offer a programme acceptable to the majority of social strata.
At this point, after an empirical analysis of primary agents’ attitudes, it becomes 
possible to hypothesize about their role in the process of national /re/formation.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK RECONSIDERED
With the conclusion of the discussion of the case study of the /re/formation of the 
Croatian nation from the early nineteenth until the end of the twentieth century, it 
is time to return to some arguments stated in the theoretical framework. This 
framework, developed in Chapter Two, dealt with two major issues: how to 
define such a phenomenon as the nation, and how to analyse the processes of 
nation-/re/formation. The application of social realist theory to the case of the 
emergence of the nation hypothesised that the nation can be defined only through 
identification of the processes of social change that occurred in a specific period 
of time. This led to the conclusion that the process of the emergence of the nation 
can be disentangled only through an analysis of the interrelations between 
changes of the social structure, developments at the level of culture, and 
/re/formations of agency.
The hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework were tested on the case of 
Croatia. The empirical analyses followed the structure of the theoretical 
framework. While the social changes that occurred on separate levels of social 
reality were analysed separately, at this point it is necessary to synthesise these 
findings. First, I will discuss the relevance of the empirical analyses for 
theorising the definition of the nation. After that, I will address the question to 
what extent the morphogenetic approach was useful in identifying the crucial 
processes of nation-/re/formation.
Defining the nation
Throughout this thesis the issue of defining the nation as a specific social form 
imposed itself as the starting point for all ensuing analyses. In Chapter Two it 
was demonstrated that at the theoretical level it is impossible to tackle the issue 
of nation-/re/formation without defining the concept of the nation. A review of
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various definitions of the nation offered by the dominant theories of nations and 
nationalism showed that the nation as a social phenomenon was defined at two 
levels: conditionally and temporally. A ‘conditional definition’ of the nation is 
most often constructed in the form of an enumeration of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of the nation that are understood as ‘constituent 
elements’ of the nation. Even though the definitions constructed in this way 
assume that elements like various forms of common culture, language, state and 
common political institutions, a common economy, some level of self-awareness, 
or a specific territory constitute a nation, they actually argue that the nation 
cannot exist without the existence of these elements. This type of definition also 
has a practical consequence. Since the dominant definitions of the nation are 
starting points for the analyses of historical social formations, these definitions 
are used as a means for determining whether a specific social group in a certain 
historical period fulfills all the necessary conditions in order to be labelled as a 
nation. A ‘temporal definition’ of the nation delineates a specific stage in history 
when the nation as a social phenomenon emerged. Conditional definitions of the 
nation necessarily determine the nation’s temporal definition. Hence, if the nation 
is defined as a social entity related to the equality of rights and duties of its 
members, for example, it would be impossible to define the nation as a 
primordial phenomenon.
The discussion, offered in Chapter Two, about this method of defining the nation 
concluded that a set of constitutive elements, however defined, could not serve as 
a conditional definition of the nation for several reasons:
• the nation cannot be defined by a single constituent element;
• there is no final set of constituent elements that could define the nation;
• there is no one constituent element that is generally more important for the 
formation of the nation than others, since this varies from case to case;
• a set of constituent elements cannot clearly distinguish the nation from other 
forms of social community.
The problem of defining the nation reappeared with the analyses of Croatian 
nationalist ideologies. These ideologies postulate two interconnected definitions: 
they offered a definition of the nation in general, and a definition of the Croatian
351
nation. As demonstrated throughout Chapters Four, Five and Six, definitions of 
the nation and a specific nation, offered by a nationalist ideology, serve rather 
different functions than those definitions offered by general theories of nations 
and nationalism. In the case of nationalist ideology, a definition of the nation, at 
the same time, provides criteria for group membership and claims for the group’s 
rights. The Croatian case study demonstrated that the same nation, in different 
circumstances and within different structural, cultural and agential conditions, 
could be defined in opposite ways by emphasising disparate constituent elements 
of a/the nation. Hence, the analysis of seven Croatian nationalist ideologies 
revealed that by defining the nation the ideologues set their own political agendas 
rather than formulating conditions for the existence of the nation.
Finally, the question ‘what is the nation?’ provided the basis for examining the 
ways primary agents perceive the nation as a general concept. The data of the 
survey (conducted on a sample of the Croatian population) revealed that a group 
of co-nationals did not reach a consensus about the relevance of constituent 
elements for defining the nation. This result indicates that the same nation, in the 
same historical period, could be perceived by its own members as having 
different temporal and conditional definitions. An obvious fact was also 
demonstrated: the perceived relevance of certain constituent elements of the 
nation does not determine national identification, since the respondents clearly 
identified themselves as members of the same nation.
From the analysis of Croatian nationalist ideologies and the results of the survey 
it may be concluded that a set of constituent elements could not serve as a 
conditional definition of a/the nation for several reasons:
• the relevance of a single constituent element for the /re/formation of a nation 
can change with a variation in social conditions;
• in a given historical period a nation could lack a constituent element that is
described by an ideology as the most significant for its emergence;
• in a given historical period a nation could be defined by various constituent
elements;
• conditional (and temporal) definitions of a specific nation do not determine 
attitudes (national identification?) of the population to a nation;
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• the emergence of a nation is a process, and any set of constituent elements of 
the nation will fail to distinguish different stages of its emergence.
Every social group consists of ‘people’ who possess a certain ‘culture’; and the 
group operates in a specific ‘structure’. The above analyses demonstrated that 
enumeration of any set of properties of the ‘people’, elements of culture or of 
structure, and any combination of them, cannot determine when a/the nation 
emerges. If the nation is defined as a specific social group, a community, 
composed of both corporate and primary agents, then it is not the quality of 
agents that determine the nation, but their actions. For example, even a group of 
people that are queuing for a bus could be understood as a social group. They are 
conditioned by the structure (buses, bus stations), and culture (not jumping in 
front of the queue), but they are not defined by this structure and culture. What 
defines them as a social group is the act of queuing within certain structural and 
cultural conditions. In parallel, what determines the conditional definition of 
a/the nation are the relationships and processes in which a social group is 
engaged. Hence, in Chapter Two the nation was defined as a social agency 
politically organised as a community which claims its rights on the basis o f a 
culture defined as its own.
In the same chapter I postulate an assumption that the application of the social 
realist theory to the case of the nation can offer a methodological framework for 
the analysis of the process of the formation of the nation. In Part Two of the 
thesis this methodological framework was applied to the case of Croatia. At this 
point it is necessary to make a re-evaluation of the developed framework and to 
summarise the results of its application.
Processes of Nation-/re/formation
The starting point of the theoretical formulation of the process of nation- 
/re/formation was the assumption that the process of the formation of a specific 
social form can be analysed only in the context of the emergence of social 
changes. It was stated that every social change necessarily involves changes at
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the level of social structure, the level of culture, and of the formation and 
transformation of agencies. From a methodological point of view it was 
important to emphasise that social changes can be identified only ex post facto, 
that is, once morphogenesis of social reality occurs.
The application of these theoretical premises to the empirical analysis of the 
/re/formation of the Croatian nation determined both the period of analysis and 
the major morphogenetic cycles. I identified six such cycles that have emerged 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century:
• from 1830s until 1868 - the period of Enlightened Absolutism;
• from 1868 until 1918 - the period of Dual Monarchy;
• from 1918 until 1941 - the period of the First Yugoslavia;
• from 1941 until 1945 - the period of the Independent State of Croatia;
• from 1941 until 1990 - the period of the Second Yugoslavia;
• from 1990 onwards - the period of the Croatian nation-state.
The identification of the main structural changes in Croatian society was not only 
the marker of morphogenetic cycles, but also the starting point of my analysis. 
On the one hand, the assumption that the existing structure of society and 
developed cultural forms condition the emergence of relevant agencies pointed to 
the importance of a historical examination of the main characteristics of political, 
social and economic systems and the emergence of certain ideas and cultural 
forms. It was also argued that only agencies can initiate the process of 
transforming structural and cultural systems.
These theoretical assumptions, operationalised in Chapter Three, pointed to the 
main relations between the three levels of social reality within and between 
different morphogenetic cycles of nation-/re/formation. I identified three such 
interrelationships between:
1) social structure, culture and agency within a specific morphogenetic cycle 
that includes:
a) structural and cultural conditioning of agency,
b) interrelation between structural and cultural conditions,
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c) elaboration of structural and cultural systems and agency;
2) internal segments of agency, that is, between corporate and primary agents;
3) consequent morphogenetic cycles.
All of these interrelations were applied to the case of Croatia, and at this point it 
is necessary to summarise the main findings.
Structural and Cultural Conditioning o f Agency
Historical analysis of the structural and cultural circumstances of Croatian 
society revealed several levels of conditioning of the formation and 
transformation of a nationalist agency. It is clear that the existing political, 
cultural and social systems strongly conditioned the formation of the first 
Croatian nationalist agency. The internal structure of the Habsburg Empire at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century brought the existing corporate agencies into 
direct conflict. The main issues of dispute included problems within the political 
system and the form of political institutions, administrative reform, the 
introduction of the official language, and the division of power, that is, the 
problem of defining the boundaries of jurisdiction of the corporate agencies 
within the Empire. Later, economic and educational developments facilitated the 
creation of a relatively small Croatian intelligentsia independent of and excluded 
from the dominant local corporate agency. At the cultural level the Napoleonic 
Wars left ideological legacies from both the French Revolution and German 
Romanticism. These developments, as shown in Chapter Four, created the 
circumstances for the development of the Illyrian Movement.
The following analyses demonstrated that structural and cultural systems not 
only condition the formation of nationalist agencies, but also their form. The 
territorial composition of the Habsburg Empire impeded the formation of 
‘nation’-wide groups and organisations, while the federal composition of 
Socialist Yugoslavia promoted it. The regime of so-called Enlightened 
Absolutism facilitated the formation of cultural rather than political agencies, 
while the political system of the Dual Monarchy opened a space for the
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formation of both. Both the Ustasha and Communist regimes, on the other hand, 
forbade the formation of any competing political or cultural agencies.
Another impact of structural and cultural conditioning could be seen in the 
formation of agents’ patterns of organisation. Pressed by the perceived problems 
set by the existing structural and cultural systems, some nationalist agencies 
opted for the formation of broad political movements rather then political parties. 
Hence, for example, in search of the broadest possible support the Illyrian 
Movement was formed from rather disparate groups and individuals who 
incorporated diverse political and economic orientations. The Ustasha Movement 
united its membership around strictly defined political aims and ‘nationalist 
interests’. The oppressive political system of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia forced 
both Ustashas and Communists to opt for tight ‘underground’ organisation.
The same political and cultural conditioning had a direct impact on the 
formulation of various agents’ aims and programmes. The historical analysis 
offered in Chapters Four, Five and Six showed that the dominant ideas and 
ideologies, promoted by relevant nationalist agencies, were not created in 
reference to their grand visions of the past or future of the nation, but as a direct 
response to the pressing current constraints and perceived injustice. The 
insistence on the codification and systematisation of the Croatian language in the 
nineteenth century was not initiated by the idea that every nation should have its 
own language. Rather, it was a response to threatened attempts of Magyarisation 
and Germanisation on the one hand, and a move towards closer Serbian-Croatian 
relations, on the other. The strongly advocated creation of the Croatian national 
state by Radic’s party lost its importance with the incorporation of that party into 
the system of power by the establishment of the Croatian Banovina. A national 
history, so much cherished by Starcevic and Tudman, did not serve as a value in 
itself, but as a source of national rights in the present.
Therefore it can be concluded that the formations and transformations, forms, 
organisations and programmes of national agencies cannot be explained without 
elaboration of the structural and cultural conditions in which they were created 
and in which they operated.
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Interrelation between Structural and Cultural Conditions
The analysis of history textbooks, presented in Chapter Seven, re-emphasised the 
importance of the cultural system in the process of nation-formation. Once 
dominant ideas and ideologies, after being replaced by another set of ideas, are 
not forgotten or lost. They always remain within the cultural system ready for 
further exploitation once the ‘proper’ time comes. The idea of Yugoslavism 
dominated Croatian history textbooks at the end of the nineteenth century. After 
fifty years it re-emerged as the dominant doctrine of the Communist ideology and 
textbooks. The ideas of Ante Starcevic which stressed state independence as the 
most important national interest of the Croats found its new expression within 
Ustasha ideology, just as within the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudjman. 
Radic’s search for an authentic nation ‘discovered’ the Croatian peasant culture. 
This idea gained its radical form in Ustasha ideology, and was again revived in 
Tudman’s writings and textbooks.
In addition, the historical analysis of Croatian nationalist ideologies 
demonstrated that in the same period of time several ideologies could offer 
diametrically opposite views on the definition of a/the nation and its interests, 
characteristics and significant ‘others’. These ideas and ideologies stand in a 
relation of logical inconsistency with each other and with other ‘non-nationalist’ 
ideas. The ideas of Starcevic, for example, were in direct competition with the 
nationalist ideology of Yugoslavism, just as with the unitary ideas propounded 
from Vienna or nationalist ideologies of the Hungarian nationalist corporate 
agents. This clearly illustrates that an analysis of the formation of nationalist 
ideas has to take into account the existence of a ‘conflict’ of ideas, or, in 
Margaret Archer’s words, of a logical inconsistency within the cultural system 
and a lack of socio-cultural integration. Since these contradictory ideas supply 
directional guidance for agencies, as Archer claims, whether the society will go 
through the process of morphostasis or morphogenesis would clearly depend on 
the outcome of the interaction of the social groups that advocate these ideas.
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One of the hypotheses of social realist theory states that developments in the 
cultural system necessarily relate to the structural system. High systemic 
integration (structural and/or cultural), such as existed during Socialist 
Yugoslavia, resembles Archer’s ‘myth of cultural integration’ where a highly 
integrated structural system is supported by a highly integrated cultural system. 
In return, society was structured in order to protect that culture. The analysis of 
secondary school history textbooks in Chapter Seven points to these situations. 
The analysis revealed how a social institution (in this case a school system) can 
be used to promote the dominant nationalist ideology. The adoption of a single 
nationalist ideology by the structural elements marks the end of a morphogenetic 
cycle of nation-/re/formation and, at the same time, creates an opportunity for the 
formation of a new competition between social groups. The creation of structural 
and cultural integration will be sustained as long as the corporate agency that 
maintains it is successful in accommodating new structural and cultural 
tendencies, preventing the formation of competing corporate agencies, and/or 
enjoying the support of primary agents.
Corporate and Primary Agents
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two emphasised that the nation 
is formed through the efforts of social groups and individuals. This does not 
imply that the nation is a form of ‘invention’ in Hobsbawm’s sense. ‘Invention’ 
of the nation can only be understood as an intervention of the agents in the 
formation of a social form as a driving force of social changes. Social realist 
theory reminds us that no single agency, and no single individual, operates 
outside given structural and cultural systems, unconstrained by the pressures of 
primary agents. Rather, the nation emerges as an outcome of social, socio­
cultural, and group interactions. In other words, the nation is a ‘product’ of 
interaction between different social groups that promote conflicting structural 
and cultural institutions and nationalist ideologies. These groups are termed 
corporate agencies.
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The example of Croatia demonstrates that the formation of a corporate agency 
that arises in opposition to the ruling corporate agency is conditioned by the 
existence of:
• structural incompatibilities within society, when the structural system is 
unable to accommodate these differences - for instance, in late nineteenth- 
century Croatia when the existence of the relatively independent Saborvt&s in 
contradiction with the introduction of Bach’s absolutism;
• cultural incompatibilities, when the dominant cultural system cannot 
accommodate new ideas without endangering its consistency - as in the 1920s 
when a centrally promoted unitarism was in direct contradiction with the 
developed Croatian nationalist ideology;
• incompatibilities between social groups, when the current social system is 
unable to integrate new groups and individuals without endangering the 
system itself - as in the late 1930s in the Banovina Croatia when the ruling 
HSS could not incorporate either Ustashas or Communists.
Nevertheless, the existence of these incompatibilities within a society is not a 
sufficient condition for the creation of an opposing corporate agency. The ruling 
corporate agency maintains its position by controlling material resources, the 
means of force, and/or enjoying some support from the primary agents. The new 
social group that promotes a distinctive nationalist ideology will become an 
opposing corporate agency only at the point when it gains a favourable 
bargaining position. The case of Croatia shows that this has been achieved by:
• creating national cultural institutions - as in the case of the Illyrian 
Movement;
• obtaining support from external powers - as in the case of the Ustasha 
movement;
• the collapse of the ruling corporate agency through internal political and 
economic circumstances - as was the case in the 1990s, and the rise of HDZ 
to power;
• mobilising primary agents in support of the agency’s programme - as 
happened with the Croatian Peasant Party in the 1930s.
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The example of Croatia also demonstrated that the mobilisation of primary 
agents proved to be the most efficient way for both obtaining and maintaining a 
corporate agency’s bargaining power. Yet, it should be also noted that, in the 
case of Croatia, the importance of the primary agents’ support for a corporate 
agency is a relatively new phenomenon. Only with the spread of nationalist 
ideologies and with the introduction of general suffrage at the beginning of the 
twentieth century did primary agents ‘became introduced into history’.
While nineteenth-century nationalist corporate agencies concentrated their efforts 
on mobilising a small circle of nationally ‘awakened’ intelligentsia, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century agencies operated in changed circumstances 
of competing political parties. The votes of primary agents became crucial for 
defining the bargaining power of corporate agents. Since then corporate agencies 
have invested much effort into mobilising the population around a specific 
nationalist ideology.
The case of Croatia revealed that mobilisation of primary agents occurs in two 
stages: by formulating a nationalist ideology, and by disseminating it to the 
primary agents. The method of dissemination directly depends on the status of 
the corporate agency. While the corporate agency in opposition has to rely on 
either personal contacts with primary agents or on the restrictive availability of 
the mass media, the ruling corporate agency also mobilises the whole social 
structure for the same purpose. Hence, we saw how, besides controlling the mass 
media, the Ustasha, Communist and Tudman’s regimes used the educational 
system, various cultural institutions, and the military, police, and youth 
organisations to mobilise primary agents. This is a point on which many 
dominant theories of nations and nationalism, like Ernest Gellner’s, and some 
empirical researchers, like Eugene Weber, base their explanations of the process 
of nation-formation - ‘creation from above’.
The results of the survey discussed in Chapter Eight shed some further light on 
the mechanisms of mobilising primary agents and the importance of a nationalist 
ideology in that process. These results demonstrated that a group of primary 
agents that claim to be members of the same nation do not necessarily share the
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same perception of that nation. They might ascribe different significance to the 
same constitutive elements; they might have different ideas about the origin of 
their nation; they might define national interests differently; they might also 
recognise different symbols as national. The survey showed that the only 
homogenising element for these co-nationals is the perception of the ‘significant 
other’. By no means do I want to claim that national identity is formed only 
through a negative point of reference, through identification of ‘not-us’ groups. 
However, the results of the survey allow me to claim that national identification 
does not require a single agreed definition of a/the nation, identification with the 
same symbols, or recognition of the same national interests. Regardless of the 
fact that the members of the same nation may identify with different political and 
cultural elements defined as national, the case of 1990s Croatia indicates that the 
power of a nationalist ideology to mobilise primary agents lies in pointing out the 
‘problems’ or threats to the nation and offering solutions to those problems. The 
ideological and cultural homogeneity of the population of co-nationals is an 
ideological formulation, not a description of reality.
Elaboration o f Structural and Cultural Systems and Elaboration o f Agency
If a nation is understood as a social form, then the process of nation-/re/formation 
means the process of /re/formation and elaboration of its structural and cultural 
systems and the corporate and primary agencies. This means that the existence of 
a nationalist ideology alone cannot be a mark of the formation of a nation; that 
the formation of a national institution does not mean that a nation is created; that 
the existence of a group of ‘nationally awakened’ individuals cannot be 
considered as the sufficient condition for the existence of a nation.
Social realist theory assumes that the end of a morphogenetic cycle requires the 
formation of some form of structural and cultural /re/integration. The analysis of 
six morphogenetic cycles of the Croatian nation at the level of social structure, 
culture and agency from the early nineteenth until the late twentieth century 
allows me to conclude that an integrated social form can be called a nation when 
social, socio-cultural, and group interaction generate:
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• the formation of a political community, through the definition of its 
‘membership’;
• the institutionalisation of national doctrines, through the ‘nationalisation’ of 
social, political and cultural institutions;
• the politicisation of culture, by offering a defined national culture;
• the mobilisation of the population around specific nationalist ideologies;
• a change in the population’s perceptions of their own social group; 
and all o f these occurring in the same period o f time.
After developing a theoretical framework and applying that framework to the 
case of Croatia, it is impossible for me to determine the date of the creation of the 
Croatian nation. Nevertheless, it could be claimed that it was formed at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. This was the period when the Croats formed 
themselves as a political community; the Croatian national - political, cultural 
and social - institutions were created; when Croatian national culture was 
defined; when the Croats were mobilised around two distinctive nationalist 
ideologies; when these ideologies defined the main criteria for ‘being a Croat’; 
when the Croatian population for the first time, literally on the streets, 
demonstrated their support for these ideologies. At this point it is important to 
emphasise that the label of ‘being a nation’ is not a form of evaluation of a social 
group, but a theoretical and methodological point of reference. The nation 
defined through these processes, not constituent elements, allows us to analyse 
the process of its creation and, at the same time, to clearly distinguish this social 
form from others, like the ethnic group whose creation in not the result of these 
particular precesses.
Morphogenetic Cycles of the Nation
The question that remains to be answered is whether the social realist approach 
proved valuable for examining the process of nation-/re/formation. This question 
can only be assessed through a review of the main findings of this research and a 
brief comparison with the dominant theoretical concepts of nations and 
nationalism.
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1. The developed theoretical framework insists on defining nation-/re/formation 
as a process. This premise has several consequences: it points to the 
dynamics of social change and the importance of time as a variable. It is 
based upon the historicity o f emergence. This implies that no social form, and 
that means no single nation, emerges without being conditioned by the 
existence of previous social forms. The social form that goes through a 
morphogenetic cycle, or a series of morphogenetic cycles, could gain such 
distinctive characteristics that we can assign to it a new label - the nation, for 
example. Yet these characteristics could not be understood without the 
analysis of processes that preceded their emergence. The social form that 
preceded the emergence of the nation in the literature of nations and 
nationalism is usually labelled the ‘ethnic group’.
2. Analytical dualism is an approach to the study of the emergence of the nation 
that enables us to analyse separately the processes of structural, cultural and 
agential transformations. It assumes that structure, culture and agency are in 
constant interaction with one another, but only active agents can transform 
and maintain their structural and cultural systems. Hence, unlike many 
dominant theories of nations and nationalism, this approach does not consider 
the formation of the nation as an ‘evolutionary’ process, as an historical 
necessity, or series of historical stages; neither does it treat human beings as 
puppets of their institutions. At the same time, this approach strongly 
emphasises the importance of structural and cultural conditioning of an 
agency’s actions. Therefore, this leads us to the conclusion that the process of 
nation-/re/formation can be examined only through the analysis of the 
outcomes of socio-cultural interactions.
3. The premises of analytical separability and temporal distinction underlying 
the theoretical framework and its application to the case of Croatia 
demonstrated that the nation is not created in a single process of social 
change. There is no single event that marked the emergence of the Croatian 
nation. It emerged as the consequence of a series of morphogenetic cycles. 
Elaborations of each of these cycles condition, but do not determine, the 
cycle that follows.
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4. The findings of this research also demonstrate that the nation itself can pass 
through several morphogenetic cycles. This indicates that the nation is not a 
static social form that preserves its assumed characteristics once and for all. 
The case of Croatia shows that these reformations of the nation can be 
dramatic. Throughout its existence the Croatian nation frequently changed its 
definition, its rights of membership, its national symbols, its national culture, 
and defined various groups as ‘significant others’. Hence I would conclude 
that a nation cannot be described as cultural or political, as ethnic or civic, as 
‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’ (unless it is just a mark of its geographical position). 
We can only claim that a certain nationalism in a specific period o f time 
could be seen as predominantly cultural or political, ethnic or civic, Western 
or Eastern.
5. Finally, the dynamics of the process of nation-/re/formation developed in this 
research point to the dominance of, to paraphrase Archer, ‘the myth of 
national integration’ within theories of nations and nationalism. The 
theoretical and empirical analyses offered in this thesis indicate diversities 
and varieties of perceptions of the nation even within the same nation and the 
same period of time.
There are probably many other positive and negative implications of this research 
and its theoretical framework. I believe that only their further application to a 
range of examples could reveal them all.
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APENDIX
Table 42: Constituent Elements of the Nation
No. Statement 1* 2 3 4 5 mean
1 The nation has to have good leadership 2.3 10.1 10.4 33.9 43.3 4.06
2 The members of the same nation must have the 
same rights and duties
5.2 12.1 10.7 27.7 44.3 3.94
3 The members of the same nation must share a 
sense of equality
4.6 13.4 12.1 36.2 33.9 3.81
4 The nation must be sovereign 7.8 9.1 18.9 34.2 30.0 3.69
5 The members of the same nation must share a 
sense of solidarity
9.1 17.3 11.1 38.4 24.1 3.51
6 The nation has to have its own specific 
language
13.4 22.5 4.2 29.6 30.3 3.41
7 The nation has to have its own specific myths 
and symbols
5.9 24.4 14.0 40.4 15.3 3.35
8 The nation has to have one common culture 7.1 22.8 14.0 44.0 12.1 3.31
9 Every nation has to have its own state 15.3 18.2 9.1 37.5 19.9 3.28
10 The nation has to have one common economic 
system
12.1 23.1 15.3 25.4 24.1 3.26
11 The nation has to have its own specific territory 19.9 19.5 9.1 25.7 25.7 3.18
12 The nation has to have specifically defined 
borders
21.2 17.3 14.7 31.3 15.6 3.03
13 The nation has to share a common will 26.1 20.5 7.2 32.9 13.4 2.87
14 The members of the same nation have to have a 
sense of distinctiveness
28.0 17.9 21.2 16.3 16.6 2.76
15 The members of the same nation have to have 
the same ancestors
20.5 30.6 16.9 20.8 11.1 2.71
16 The nation has to have a long history 26.4 22.1 17.6 24.1 9.8 2.69
17 The members of the same nation have to share 
the same value system
24.1 29.3 9.8 28.3 8.5 2.68
18 The members of the same nation have to be 
characterized by the same national character
27.0 23.1 13.4 30.6 5.9 2.65
19 The members of the same nation have to be of 
the same religion
30.9 34.9 10.1 15.6 8.5 2.36
20 The members of the same nation have to attend 
the same education system
34.9 28.3 13.7 16.0 7.2 2.32
21 The members of the same nation are linked by a 
common destiny
36.8 31.3 13.4 14.3 4.2 2.18
22 The members of the same nation have to share 
the same blood
42.3 29.0 13.0 11.7 3.9 2.06
*1 - absolutely disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 - do not know; 4 - agree; 5 - absolutely agree
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Table 43: Croatian Nationalist Ideologies
No. Statement 1* 2 3 4 5 mean
1 The Croatian nation can prosper only when other nations 
prosper as well
3.3 7.2 16.0 46.9 26.7 3.87
2 Sovereignty over the Croatian territories belongs to the 
Croatian nation and it cannot be shared with anyone else
4.9 14.7 14.3 47.9 18.2 3.60
3 The worst enemy of the Croatian nation is its own disunity 7.8 14.7 16.3 42.3 18.9 3.50
4 Systemic exaggeration of the Myth of Jasenovac in 
Socialist Yugoslavia aimed to create a black legend of 
historical guilt of the whole Croatian nation
11.1 17.9 8.5 44.3 18.2 3.41
5 A Croat is not one who is a descendent of ancient Croats, 
but one who is imbued in the Croatian spirit
6.2 19.9 17.3 43.3 13.4 3.38
6 Croats are a small nation and hence they have to look for 
friends among big and powerful nations
12.7 12.4 13.0 48.9 13.0 3.37
7 Throughout history, current indecisive and week 
leaderships can be blamed for the many sufferings of the 
Croatian nation
5.5 21.8 16.0 45.0 11.7 3.36
8 The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe 6.8 20.2 20.8 40.7 11.4 3.30
9 In spite of all attempts, Croatdom has survived mainly due 
to the survival of its own language
7.2 28.7 12.1 39.1 13.0 3.22
10 Croats, just as other South Slavs, originate form common 
Karpathian homeland
12.7 11.4 29.6 35.5 10.7 3.20
11 From the West along the Adriatic Sea from Rijeka until 
Kotor, then between the rivers Drava and Danube from 
North and the river Drina from the East lies the ancient 
historical Croatian state
9.8 17.3 28.0 36.2 8.8 3.17
12 Croatdom, though Catholic, had a spiritual openness and 
need to recognise the Muslim religion, which had emerged 
due to historical circumstances within the Croat national 
entity
9.8 26.4 23.5 31.9 8.5 3.03
13 Throughout its history Croats were ramparts of Christianity 7.5 32.6 20.5 33.9 5.5 2.97
14 Once, when circumstances allow it, the Croatian nation, just 
as all other nations, will disappear as an important source of 
individual’s identity
6.5 33.6 24.8 29.3 5.9 2.94
15 The Croatian name is of Iranian origins 13.7 23.8 43.6 9.8 9.1 2.77
16 The Croatian nation has preserved the racial and blood 
characteristics of its forefathers and embraced the religion 
of its ancestors
15.0 32.2 22.8 20.8 9.1 2.77
17 The original Croatian culture is one which is based on old 
traditions of the Croatian peasantry
24.4 25.4 19.5 20.8 9.8 2.66
18 The Croatian nation was formed in the nineteenth century, 
thanks to strivings and efforts of important individuals of 
that time
17.9 43.0 20.2 10.1 8.8 2.49
19 Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those 
who think about a bigger area are considered as more 
patriotic
26.7 34.5 16.6 13.0 9.1 2.43
20 One who loves Croatdom will look for friends among Slav 
nations
23.1 41.7 13.4 14.3 7.5 2.41
21 Those who are not descendants of a peasant family, in 90 
cases out of 100, are not of Croatian descent or blood, but 
immigrated foreigners
23.1 41.4 19.2 11.7 4.6 2.33
22 The only way to solve the problem of Croatian national 
minorities in other states is by abolishing the borders 
between these states
19.5 49.2 18.6 6.2 6.5 2.31
23 Croats are a chosen people, a holy community which 
deserves to be respected and worshipped
45.9 29.3 15.0 6.5 3.3 1.92
24 Croatian historical territory is territory on which Croatian 
blood has been spelt
49.5 26.4 10.7 9.1 4.2 1.92
25 Without any pretensions, Croats could say that they have 
four times more brains than members of other nations
56.4 25.1 7.8 3.3 7.5 1.80
* 1 - absolutely disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 - do not know; 4 - agree; 5 - absolutely agree
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Table 44: Croatian National Heroes
No. Statement 1* 2 3 4 5 mean
1 Ljudevit Gaj 1.3 3.3 3.9 52.1 39.4 4.25
2 Stjepan Radic 1.0 2.3 8.8 49.8 38.1 4.22
3 Vladimir Nazor 2.0 3.9 11.4 49.5 33.2 4.08
4 King Tomislav 1.6 2.3 7.5 67.8 20.8 4.04
5 Josip Juraj Strossmayer 2.3 2.3 18.6 50.8 26.1 3.96
6 Ante Starcevic 2.3 11.1 11.7 44.6 30.3 3.90
7 Ban Jelacic 4.2 7.2 13.0 53.7 21.8 3.82
8 Franjo Racki 1.6 7.8 24.4 53.1 13.0 3.68
9 Janko Draskovic 2.6 4.6 25.7 58.3 8.8 3.66
10 Mika Tripalo 5.5 11.4 26.4 33.2 23.5 3.58
11 Matija Gubec 0.3 2.6 11.1 75.6 10.4 3.39
12 Josip Broz Tito 8.5 17.6 18.6 37.8 17.6 3.38
13 Josip Franck 8.5 14.0 38.8 27.0 11.7 3.20
14 Vlatko Macek 8.5 22.1 25.7 34.9 8.8 3.13
15 Franc Joseph I 2.3 23.1 46.9 20.8 6.8 3.07
16 Maria Teresa 9.1 21.8 34.5 26.4 8.1 3.03
17 Baron Trenk 4.2 20.8 50.8 16.6 7.5 3.02
18 King Coloman 4.2 19.9 55.7 14.7 5.5 2.97
19 Mile Budak 15.6 14.0 36.8 26.4 7.2 2.95
20 Ante Pavelic 49.5 26.1 15.3 5.5 3.6 1.88
* 1 - explicitly negative role; 2 - negative role; 3 - do not know; 4 - positive role; 5 - explicitly positive role
Table 45: Correlation Matrix: Constituent Elements of the Nation
E9
N1 1.000 .181 .006 .185 -.044 -.025 .090 .008 -.065 .182 .113 .075 -.025 -.061 -.117 .234 .011 .069
N4 .181 1.000 .038 .033 .123 .123 .103 .138 .037 .205 .037 .211 .106 .027 .008 .135 .078 .222
N5 .006 .038 1.000 .067 .119 .055 -.148 .111 .064 .018 .084 -.035 .073 .183 .106 .014 .059 -.047
N6 .185 .033 .067 1.000 .006 .109 .054 .140 .162 .290 .258 .178 -.011 -.053 .036 .142 .148 .151
N7 -.044 .123 .119 .006 1.000 .297 .142 .291 .217 .104 .032 .055 .266 -.026 .109 .055 .198 .166
N8 -.025 .123 .055 .109 .297 1.000 .228 .358 .122 .176 .117 .271 .250 .088 .171 .161 .303 .272
N9 .090 .103 -.148 .054 .142 .228 1.000 .222 .069 .130 .094 .154 .159 .012 .025 .125 .214 .438
N10 .008 .138 .111 .140 .291 .358 .222 1.000 .153 .162 .185 .234 .342 .055 .106 .215 .307 .235
N il -.065 .037 .064 .162 .217 .122 .069 .153 1.000 .115 .171 -.069 .082 .030 .219 .064 .159 .081
N13 .182 .205 .018 .290 .104 .176 .130 .162 .115 1.000 .259 .249 .303 .157 .202 .316 .264 .339
N15 .113 .037 .084 .258 .032 .117 .094 .185 .171 .259 1.000 .252 .212 .136 .130 .227 .192 .197
N16 .075 .211 -.035 .178 .055 .271 .154 .234 -.069 .249 .252 1.000 .166 .159 .027 .215 .160 .318
N19 -.025 .106 .073 -.011 .266 .250 .159 .342 .082 .303 .212 .166 1.000 .280 .366 .218 .327 .261
N20 -.061 .027 .183 -.053 -.026 .088 .012 .055 .030 .157 .136 .159 .280 1.000 .463 .150 .224 .229
N21 -.117 .008 .106 .036 .109 .171 .025 .106 .219 .202 .130 .027 .366 .463 1.000 .146 .222 .030
N2 .234 .135 .014 .142 .055 .161 .125 .215 .064 .316 .227 .215 .218 .150 .146 1.000 .152 .172
N12 .011 .078 .059 .148 .198 .303 .214 .307 .159 .264 .192 .160 .327 .224 .222 .152 1.000 .401
N17 .069 .222 -.047 .151 .166 .272 .438 .235 .081 .339 .197 .318 .261 .229 .030 .172 .401 1.000
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Table 46: Correlation Matrix - Factors
N a tio n l Nation2 N ation3 N ation4 N ation5 Ideol. 1 Ideol. 2 Ideol. 3 Ideol. 4 Ideol. 5 Ideol. 6 O rigin 1 O rigin 2 O rigin 3 O rigin 4 H eroesl H eroes2 H eroes 3 H eroes 4 H eroes 5 Distan. 1 Distan. 2
N ation 1 1.000 .384 .130 .295 .262 .220 .206 - .0 6 4 .259 -.048 .078 -.039 .005 .042 -.080 .131 .086 .270 - .129 -.093 .114 -.191
N ation  2 .384 1.000 .237 .294 .276 .190 .244 .014 .304 .056 .095 -.062 .059 .057 - .0 8 4 .164 .039 .064 .012 -.0 5 0 -.050 -.149
N ation 3 .130 .237 1.000 .197 .309 .447 .151 .177 .1 1 9 .223 .030 .125 .066 .101 -.0 3 4 -.051 -.080 .293 - .3 1 9 - .015 -.0 5 7 -.170
N ation  4 .295 .294 .197 1.000 .193 .257 .269 .040 .291 .188 .173 .080 .110 .016 -.008 .116 -.063 .330 -.133 - .026 .093 -.072
N ation 5 .262 .276 .309 .193 1.000 .382 .275 .110 .130 .096 .109 .084 .000 .083 -.0 4 2 -.136 -.051 .351 - .1 0 4 - .015 .114 -.139
Id eo logy  1 .220 .190 .447 .257 .382 1.000 .148 .120 .238 .084 .020 .233 .040 -.017 -.032 .032 -.098 .259 -.365 .034 .048 -.1 5 4
Id eo logy  2 .206 .244 .151 .269 .275 .148 1.000 - .0 5 4 .002 .003 .040 .052 .261 -.040 -.195 -.003 -.038 .198 -.201 - .0 5 4 .126 -.0 9 7
Id eology 3 -.0 6 4 .014 .1 7 7 .040 .110 .120 -.0 5 4 1.000 -.111 -.026 -.090 .242 -.2 3 9 .002 .1 4 7 -.293 - .1 1 4 -.072 .051 - .043 - .176 .161
Id eology 4 .259 .304 .119 .291 .130 .238 .002 -.111 1.000 .242 .147 -.026 .176 .139 .196 .373 .127 .243 -.205 - .1 1 7 -.0 4 9 -.235
Id eology 5 -.048 .056 .223 .188 .096 .084 .003 - .026 .242 1.000 .042 -.053 .128 .159 .060 .199 .055 .064 -.079 -.126 -.0 2 6 .048
Id eo logy  6 .078 .095 .030 .173 .109 .020 .040 - .090 .147 .042 1.000 -.052 -.052 .239 .069 .132 .041 .102 -.0 7 4 .165 -.099 -.085
O rigins 1 - .039 -.062 .125 .080 .084 .233 .052 .242 -.026 -.053 -.052 1.000 - .073 .095 -.080 -.125 -.0 4 0 .068 -.156 -.116 -.0 3 0 -.162
O rigins 2 .005 .059 .066 .110 .000 .040 .261 - .2 3 9 .176 .128 -.052 -.073 1.000 - .042 -.083 .179 .049 .126 -.1 2 7 -.1 1 0 .063 -.023
O rigins 3 .042 .057 .101 .016 .083 -.0 1 7 -.040 .002 .139 .159 .239 .095 -.042 1.000 .097 -.030 -.015 .099 -.041 -.1 0 7 -.0 7 4 -.090
O rigins 4 - .0 8 0 - .0 8 4 - .0 3 4 -.008 -.042 -.032 -.195 .147 .196 .060 .069 -.080 -.083 .097 1.000 .117 -.023 -.0 3 9 .095 .006 -.2 1 4 .110
H eroes 1 .131 .164 -.051 .116 - .136 .032 -.003 -.293 .373 .199 .132 -.125 .179 -.030 .117 1.000 .157 .168 .047 .121 .059 .019
H eroes 2 .086 .039 -.0 8 0 - .063 -.051 -.098 -.038 - .1 1 4 .127 .055 .041 -.040 .049 -.015 -.023 .157 1.000 - .0 8 4 .188 - .2 5 4 -.0 4 7 -.003
H eroes 3 .270 .064 .293 .330 .351 .259 .198 -.072 .243 .064 .102 .068 .126 .0 9 9 -.0 3 9 .168 -.0 8 4 1.000 - .1 3 0 .164 .226 -.172
H eroes 4 - .129 .012 -.3 1 9 - .133 - .1 0 4 -.365 -.201 .051 -.205 -.079 -.074 -.156 -.1 2 7 -.041 .095 .047 .188 -.1 3 0 1.000 - .0 3 9 - .0 8 7 .468
H eroes 5 -.093 - .050 -.015 -.026 - .015 .034 -.0 5 4 -.043 -.1 1 7 -.126 .165 -.116 -.110 -.107 .006 .121 - .2 5 4 .164 -.039 1.000 .033 .057
D istan ce 1 .114 -.0 5 0 -.0 5 7 .093 .114 .048 .126 - .176 -.049 -.026 -.099 -.030 .063 - .0 7 4 -.2 1 4 .059 -.0 4 7 .226 -.0 8 7 .033 1.000 .055
D istan ce 2 -.191 -.149 -.1 7 0 -.072 -.139 -.1 5 4 -.097 .161 -.235 .048 -.085 -.162 -.023 -.090 .110 .019 -.003 -.172 .468 .057 .055 1.000
